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EDITOR'S NOTE
Time and again, we hear the old saying attributed to Mark
Twain _ "whiskey's for drinking, water's for ~ghting abou_t." Wit~ climate change and the ever-growing populauon, Mr. Twam was nght.
But ifwe must fight over every drop of water, we must go to the courts.
Thus, this issue of the Water Law Review focuses on common problems
and themes found in water courts today.
Every state has some mechanism "".hich ~ey use to determin~ who
has a right to what water. Colorado 1s no d~er~nt. H~re, a _se~es of
water courts, placed strategically in each maJor nver basm, adjudicates
water rights and grants decrees confirming the amount of water a user
may appropriate. Colorado water courts also review changes of water
rights, exchanges, and augmentation plans.
These Colorado water courts, as well as others across the western
United States, rely on expert testimony to explain hydrological science
and engineering. In Hydrology and the Courts: The &le ofExpert Witnesses
- A Study on Potential Reforms, Dr. Mariam Masid analyzes the effects of
this testimony. Dr. Masid provides a historical backdrop of expert testimony - why courts allow it, what problems surface because of it, and
possible reforms. She then turns to a basic overview of the hydrologic
model. Dr. Masid illustrates the potential for manipulation of the data
these experts produce to the court. Finally, Dr. Masid shares the results of an empirical study highlighting these troubling issues and offers insights for change.
In Fifth Amendment Takings & Transitions in Water Law: Compensation
(just) for the Environment, Ling-Yee Huang delves into the history of the
5th Amendment Takings Doctrine and the various systems of allocating
rights to water. Ms. Huang then applies the Takings Doctrine to the
evolving water systems of both riparian and prior appropriation states.
Finally, Ms. Huang highlights the problems attendant in both systems
for users stripped of water rights and the high burden these users have
to prove a taking occurred.
Jamie Janisch offers a detailed look into a recent Supreme Court
case in Scope ofFederal Jurisdiction Under Section 404 of the C/,ean Water Act:
Rethinking 'Navigab/,e Waters' After Rapanos v. United States. First, Mr. Janisch begins with a history of what "navigable waters" means. Next, Mr.
J~nisch sheds light on the apparent inconsistencies in the interpretatJon of the Clean Water Act. Finally, he offers a compromise for courts
to use when interpreting "navigable waters" as it applies to wetlands.
In addition to our coverage of conferences, books and the latest
court opinions relating to water law, we offer a new feature. In September 2007, the Federalist Society For Law and Public Policy hosted a
panel discussion on the enforcement of the Clean Water Act. We are
pleased to reproduce a transcript of that panel.

We hope you enjoy the works in this issue of the Water Law Review.
The Review values your continued support, and we hope you will share
your thoughts and opinions regarding our publication.
Amy Petri Beard
Editor-in-Chief

WILLIAM DAVEN FARR

WILLIAM DAVEN FARR:
STUDENT OF WATER AND LIFE*
DEDICATION BYJIM WITWER

Ry.fisherman, water visionary, banker, lamh and catt/,e feeder, farmer, rancher, dad,
grandfather, great grandfather, friend and mentor to many, W Farr, 97, died
Aug. 14 in his native Greeley.
After failing to deflect this request to remember W.D. Farr by nominating more qualified candidates, I opened the file in my office
bearing his name. It is embarrassingly thin. Nearly two generations
separated us during his life.
Perhaps, then, the best perspective I can provide begins as a common, ignorant one. How easy it is to take for granted all but his reputation as a leader in water, banking, and agriculture. I played in Greeley's
Farr Park as a boy, but did not then know that the park had been part of
his farm near the end of the Greeley and Loveland Irrigation Company
ditch (or even that there was such a ditch). I worked briefly one summer at Farr Feedlots, but did not learn of the work he did nationally to
improve the quality of U.S. beef until much later.
Only during a working relationship with him late in his life did I
begin to see the contours of what he was still busy building: A life filled
with optimism and effort to improve the communities in which he
lived.
My first letter from Mr. Farr contained the following passages:
I believe that Greeley is in a unique position to plan a perfect city that will
continue to be very attractive to new people and new industry.... I have
seen Greeley grow from a population of 5,000 to the present 75,000. If
we had ever dreamed that we would grow this much and this fast we
could have prevented many costly problems.

Who else writes, or thinks, like this? Few in modern times. An exhortation to strive for the perfect city, a blunt acknowledgment of current imperfection, and a second implied demand-to dream big
dreams and then put on your overalls, as the saying goes.
In an 1887 speech to Fort Collins farmers that Mr. Farr's son, Bill,
sent me later, Professor Elwood Mead noted:
On your shoulders rests a greater responsibility than devolves on your
brothers in regions of more abundant rainfall. You must not only attend
* The following tribute to W.D. Farr is reprinted with permission from the Colorado Foundation for Water Education's Fall 2007 edition of Headwaters Magazine.
Information on the Foundation can be found at www.cfwe.org.

to your individual affairs but assist in the control and management of
their common interest, on the wise management of which the prosperity
of the State so largely depends.

This may as well have been Mr. Farr's credo. He acted so often
out of a sense of duty to improve the community-and so often focused on projects to benefit future generations of that community.
We still play in the parks that Mr. Farr worked to build. The Colorado-Big Thompson and Windy Gap projects and Greeley's water system may be best known to Coloradans. Service in the nascent Environmental Protection Agency, and long involvement with the National
Cattlemen's Beef Association, count among his accomplishments. He
also played a pivotal role in negotiations that led to federal designation
of parts of the Cache la Poudre River as wild and scenic. In a 2000
newspaper clipping, he wondered aloud if he was an environmentalist,
but then added, ''You have to take care of the environment. We hope
the world will be here in hundreds of years."
What Mr. Farr accomplished, and why he did it, make up only part
of his story. How he worked-his thirst to find information and trends
in that information, his uncanny ability to adapt and surmount failure,
and his compassion for others engaged in the same effortdistinguishes him as much or more.
His interest in one topic-the weather-illustrates the first of these
traits. Most of us are used to discussing the weather for five or ten
seconds. With Mr. Farr, those conversations easily could exceed five
minutes. He ravenously reviewed the work of local, regional, and international climatologists, and constantly checked predictions against outcomes.
A copy of the program from the 1999 National Western Stock
Show dinner, which named Mr. Farr a "Citizen of the West," reminds me that, while he was a compendium of historical information, he preferred to recount the past with an eye to the future. He
did not view the past as the good old days.
"The next 50 years," he told those assembled at the dinner, "will be
the best we have ever experienced. I'm only sorry that I won't be there
with you to enjoy them."
He knew, as Twain noted, that history does not repeat itself-at
best it sometimes rhymes. What he tried to teach us was less specific
knowledge than how to think, to plan and execute based upon the best
information we have, and to learn from the experience and move further ahead. He did not hold grudges or nurse old injuries. There was
no use, or time, for that. His view of water policy, and life, combined
enthusiasm and the scientific method. He was a great teacher precisely
because he was a great student.
His approach required enough humility to acknowledge and learn
from failure. In the 1980s, when his proposal to sell some of Greeley's
reservoirs and use the proceeds to acquire other water supplies met

opposition from the Greeley City Council, he instead ensured that the
city spent adequate funds to rehabilitate those reservoirs. When the
Windy Gap Project water rights were thrown out of court for failure to
provide Western Slope water interests with additional compensatory
storage beyond that of the original C-BT Project, he was instrumental
in directing additional payments (part of the money for Wolford
Mountain Reservoir).
The final ingredient to Mr. Farr's work style was his care for those
working with him. Even as his voice grew faint late in life, he never
sought to end your conversation without asking after you and your
family. Though a man of boundless passion and drive, he always remembered that people matter.
It is tempting to conclude this remembrance with a lament that we
may have seen the last of people with such a remarkable communitarian spirit. Then we in the water community could more comfortably
complain that the world is so much more complex now, and the water
supply challenges we face nearly insurmountable-the low-hanging
fruit are gone.
Such responses would, of course, miss the point of Mr. Farr's life.
"If you get busy planning and working hard," he would tell us, "things
will work out well."
Can't you hear him still?
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INTRODUCTION**
The rules of evidence in civil cases govern the admissibility of expert testimony in water matters. Problems with expert testimony continue to plague the courts even after the change in the Federal Rules
of Evidence and guidance from the U.S. Supreme Court in the Daubert
Trilogy1 of cases. There are unique issues that surround expert testimony concerning hydrological evidence. Such issues include the
complexity of the testimony, the difficulty in assessing the admissibility
of evidence using a hydrologic model, and the potential for manipulation of the model for the benefit of the party that hired the expert.
There is a movement abroad in civil cases to change the way expert
witnesses interact in the courtroom, to make experts accountable to
the court, and to provide expert evidence that is more useful to the
judge. An empirical study ("DTW Survey") assessed the need for
reform concerning expert witness testimony in western United States
water cases and the receptiveness of judicial and quasi:judicial officers
to various reforms that have been proposed or adopted in England,
Australia, and other jurisdictions. The survey participants were the
members of Dividing the Waters ("DTW"), a water education project
for judges and quasi:judicial officers.
The survey revealed that western water judges and administrative
officers experience the same problems with expert witness testimony
that other common law adversarial systems abroad experience. The
DTW survey also revealed substantial support for many of the reforms
adopted in England, Wales, and Australia, which involve a change in
the culture of the adversarial use of expert witness evidence.
In the last decade, drought, water shortages, and increased pressure on urbanization have made water issues headline material. There
is increasing pressure on water courts and administrative bodies to resolve disputes resulting from increasing competition for water resources. Added to the water scarcity and population increases are advances in technology in hydrology and engineering. The combination
of these factors has emphasized the need for useful and reliable scientific and engineering expertise in the courtroom and administrative
hearings to assist the decision makers.
The changing standards for admissibility of expert witness testimony under the state and Federal Rules of Evidence, and the need to as-

** Portions of this article are from a dissertation submitted to the Academic Faculty of Colorado State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy, by Mariam J. Masid entitled "Reforming the Culture of Partiality: Diffusing the Battle of the Experts in Western Water Wars," dated October 30,
2007.
1. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); Gen. Elec. Co. v.
Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
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similate judicial interpretation of those standards place greater pressure on the judge to act as a gatekeeper. This gatekeeping function
has translated into recommendations for judges to become more
learned in the scientific method so that they can assess whether a particular expert's methodology is scientifically valid, and whether the
expert has properly applied that methodology to the facts at issue in
the case. 2
The complexity of hydrological science and engineering in water
matters makes this challenge even more pronounced. The judge must
not only understand the concepts of calibration and validation, he or
she must determine whether the expert operated the model in such a
fashion that the results are reliable and useful to the court.' As shown
by the case studies described in this article, experts and courts can misuse hydrologic modeling, making the judge's gatekeeping role much
more difficult. The quality and reliability of a hydrologic model may
be suspect because of its complexity, the paucity of data used in calibration and validation, and the lack of transparency.
This article contains three parts. The first part provides a historical
background against which the reader might better understand the role
of the expert in the courtroom or administrative hearing. The adversarial system for resolution of disputes in the United States draws its
origin from English common law. This article briefly discusses the reasons for allowing expert witnesses to give opinions, the problems that
have ensued, and the attempts at reform in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in England and in the United States.
The second part of this article describes the use of expert witness
testimony in water cases and very generally describes the development
of a hydrologic model. Through case studies, this article describes the
potential for manipulation of a model in favor of the party that retained the expert and examples of cooperative model development.
The third part of this article describes the results of an empirical
study with the participants of DTW. The survey results point toward
possible adoption of some of the recent reforms that many other international jurisdictions have adopted.

I. IDSTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The use of expert witnesses in court cases dates as far back as 1345.4
Howlin quotes the words of a judge from the 1554 case of Buckley v.
Rice Thomas. "If matters arise in our law which concern other sciences
2. Kenneth R. Foster et al., Science and the Toxic Tort, 261 SCI. 1509, 1509, 1614
(1993).
3. E. Scott Bair, Models in the Courtroom, MODEL VALIDATION: PERSPECTIVES IN
HYDROLOGICAL SCIENCE 59, 62-63 (Malcolm G. Anderson & Paul D. Bates eds., 2001).
4. Niamh Howlin, Special juries: A Solution to the Expert Witne5s?, 12 IRISH STUDENT L.
REV. 19, 20 (2004).
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or faculties, we commonly apply for the aid of that science or faculty
which it concerns."5 According to Howlin, by the end of the seventeenth century, judges were beginning to recognize the need for expert testimony on some points, and by the late eighteenth century,
observers could recognize expert witnesses' testimony in their modern
guise operating along side the emerging rules of evidence. 6
However, some have said that conflicts concerning the use of scientific evidence arose and came to a head in I 782. 7 In Fo/,kes v. Chadd,
"also known as the Wells Harbor case, litigants summoned to court
several sorts of 'men of science,' to testify before the jury as to what
had caused the decay of a certain harbor on the Norfolk coast of England."8 According to historian Tal Golan, the Wells Harbor litigation
constituted an "important historical moment in the deployment of
expert knowledge in the courtroom," because "[i]t was a junction
where the expanding late eighteenth-century cultures of law and
science finally crossed paths." 9 Golan describes how experts initially
appeared at the behest of and under the control of the judge to assist
the trier of fact with concepts that were beyond the common knowledge of the judge or jury. 10 However, such testimony became critical
as lawyers and parties called experts to bolster their case. 11 According
to Golan, control of the expert's testimony moved from the bench to
the bar; attorneys took control of the presentation of evidence and
experts in the courtroom, with the judge merely acting as referee. 12
Golan suggests that the reason courts allowed partisan scientific
experts to testify as to their opinions was that judges counted on men
of science to give unbiased opinions by ties of honor and that an expert's opinion would not be swayed by the party for whom he or she
would be testifying. 1'
Men of science had long adopted the gentlemanly code of honor as a
necessary condition for the reliability of the scientific discourse. Gentlemen were bound to credit the word of their fellows. The status of
the gentleman - his economic independence, his freedom of action,
the moral discipline he imposed upon himself - all guaranteed the

5.
6.

Id. (quoting Buckley v. Rice Thomas, (1554) 75 Eng. Rep. 182, 192).
Id. at 21.

7.

TAL GoLAN, LAWS OF MEN AND LAWS OF NATURE: THE HISTORY OF SCIENTIFIC

EXPERT TESTIMONY IN ENGLAt'\/D AND AMERICA 6

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id.
Id. at 44.
Id. at 18, 22, 49.
See id. at 22.
See id. at 50.
See id. at 51.

(2004).
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credibility of his word. . . . Nothing ruined gentlemanly status quicker
14
than dishonesty.

In the early nineteenth century, there was a "tremendous expansion of science and technology into industry and other public sectors ..
15
• •"
Golan notes that this "quickly established the scientific expert
witness as a pivotal figure in the courtroom" and partisan expert testimony became acrimonious. 16 Some experts found themselves manipulated in the hands of lawyers whose job it was to win a case. 17 According
to Golan, the result was "a continuous parade of leading men of
science zealously contradicting each other from the witness stand, a
parade that cast serious doubts on their integrity and on their science
in the eyes of the legal profession and the public." 18
Golan describes how judges lost respect for the expert witness, as
many scientists allowed the purchase of their testimony and were willing to testify in one manner or the other, depending on the party that
retained them. 19 Scientific expert testimony became the subject of
public scandal. 20 By 1859, a campaign to reform the legal procedures
of expert testimony was underway and considered by the National Association for the Promotion of Social Science ("NAPSS"). 21 Golan describes an address by Robert Angus Smith to the Royal Society of Arts
in 1860, which exemplified the frustration of scientists and called for
reform. 22 Golan paraphrased Smith's statements that "the root of all
evils ... lies in the partisan position men of science have come to occupy in the adversarial courtroom."23 Smith declared that if the courts
allow or encourage the scientist to become an advocate, giving the
scientist duties that he never was intended to perform, it "destroy[s]
the very ideal of his character .... "24 Scientists learn "to study impartially and then [courts] tell them to practice with partiality."25 "Such a
division of the moral nature of man is extremely hurtful, both to the
individual and to society."26 Smith believed that "no class of men will so
fully agree with each other as the scientific, if not kept separate by the
present corrupting system, and no class will spread a more beneficial
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
136-37
25.
26.

Id. at 50.
Id. at 51.
Id.
See id. at 54.

Id.
See id. at 89.
See id. at 110.

Id.
Id. at 110-11.
Id. at 111.
Robert Angus Smith, Science in Our Courts of Law, 7 J. OF THE Soc'Y OF ARTS, 135,
(1860), as quoted in, GoLAN, supra note 7, at 111.
Id.
Id.
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influence over society if not contemptuously treated by counsel, as they
often are, in a witness box." 21
Smith's proposed reforms included eliminating the jury in civil
cases of a technical nature, instead presenting the trial to the judge
and up to three skilled assessors, or experts. 28 The lawyers voiced the
other side of the discourse, stating that the legal system was no place
for the scientific community to make such reforms. 29 Eliminating the
jury ran against the fundamental right of trial by a jury of one's peers. 30
Furthermore, lawyers argued that allowing the court to call in expert
witnesses was contrary to the right of the parties (and their lawyers) to
present evidence to a neutral court. 31 Lawyers considered such remedies "worse than the disease." 32
The proposals for reform in the nineteenth century were similar to
many of the reforms that the legal and scientific communities had
proposed in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Golan's historical
references combined with "subsequent scientific evidence literature
reveals that these ideas have been regularly recycled and unsuccessfully
attempted over the last 150 years." 33
A. THE IKARIAN REEFER

A turning point for expert witness testimony occurred in 1993 English case, "The Ikarian Reefer," which set out the duties and responsibilities of expert witnesses. 34 In Ikarian, "the Court had to decide whether
[a] ship had been deliberately set on fire by its crew on the instruction
of its owners, and whether the defendant insurance company should
therefore pay the amount insured."35 The case involved numerous and
complex technical issues and according to one commentator, " [ t] he
pre-trial and trial judges went to great lengths to control the use of
experts .... "36 "Throughout the trial, ... Justice Cresswell held regular
reviews with counsel concerning the use of expert evidence," and unsuccessfully attempted to narrow the issues with a pretrial meeting be-

27. Id. at 136, 139-41, as quoted in, GoLAN, supra note 7, at 113.
28. See GoLAN, supra note 7, at 112-13, 117.
29. See id. at 114-15.
30. See id. at 115.
31. See id. at 116-17.
32. Id. at 122.
33. Edward K. Cheng, Book Note, Same Old, Same Old: Scientific Evidence Past and
Present, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1387, 1393 (2006) (reviewing GoLAN, supra note 7).
34. Nat'! Justice Compania Naviera S.A. v. Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. (The
lkarian Reefer), 2 Lloyd's Rep. 68 (Q.B.D. 1993), rev'd on appeal, l Lloyd's Rep. 455
(EWCA (Civ) 1995).
35. Deirdre Dwyer, Changing Approaches to Expert Evidence in England and Italy, l
INT'L COMMENTARY ON EVIDENCE 1, 3-4 (2003).
36. Id. at 4.
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tween experts. 37 Dwyer describes that "the use of expert evidence at
the trial was often unnecessary" and "the trial judge believed that the
expert opinion was at time biased, shaped towards their client's case,
and intended to conceal information from the other side."38
The court's frustration is evident in Justice Cresswell's opinion, in
which he set out the duties and responsibilities of expert witnesses in
civil cases:
1. Expert evidence presented to the Court should be, and should
be seen to be, the independent product of the expert uninfluenced as
to form or content by the exigencies of litigation.
2. An expert witness should provide independent assistance to the
Court by way of objective unbiased opinion in relation to matters within his expertise. An expert witness in the High Court should never
assume the role of an advocate.
3. An expert witness should state the facts or assumption upon
which his opinion is based. He should not omit to consider material
facts which could detract from his concluded opinion.
4. An expert witness should make it clear when a particular question or issue falls outside his expertise.
5. If an expert's opinion is not properly researched because he
considers that insufficient data is available, then this must be stated
with an indication that the opinion is no more than a provisional one.
In cases where an expert witness who has prepared a report could not
assert that the report contained the truth, the whole truth and nothing
but the truth without some qualification, that qualification should be
stated in the report.
6. If, after exchange of reports, an expert witness changes his view
on a material matter having read the other side's expert's report or for
any other reason, such change of view should be communicated
(through legal representatives) to the other side without delay and
when appropriate to the Court.
7. Where expert evidence refers to photographs, plans, calculations, analyses, measurements, survey reports or other similar documents, these must be provided to the opposite party at the same time
39
as the exchange of reports.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals commented, " [w] e do not think
that it is an exaggeration to say that the parties seem to have become
more intent on winning the battle of the experts than on establishing
the facts upon which their respective cases were based." 40 Although the
appellate court reversed the judgment on a different interpretation of
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. The Ikarian Reefer, 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 81-82 (internal citations omitted).
40. Nat'! Justice Compania Naviera S.A v. Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. (The
lkarian Reefer), 1 Lloyd's Rep. 455,468 (EWCA (Civ) 1995).
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the facts, it expressed sympathy for Justice Cresswell. "He was overwhelmed by a plethora of expert evidence. Much of it was of little or
no assistance; the immense amount of detail and technical complexity
can only have deflected him from the essential facts of the case."42
Lord Woolf cited the Ikarian Reefer case favorably, and proposed
incorporating some of Justice Cresswell's points into an expert witness
code of conduct for England and Wales." The New South Wales Law
Reform Commission also cited The Ikarian Reefer while discussing the
common law foundation for its recommendations to reform the expert
witness code of conduct, 44 and a number of Canadian decisions have
cited them favorably as well.4 5 Lord Woolfs research resulted in an
Interim Report published in 199546 and a Final Report published in
1996. 47 The Interim Report quoted an editorial from the journal Counsel for November/December 1994:
Expert witnesses used to be genuinely independent experts. Men of
outstanding eminence in their field. Today they are in practice hired
guns: there is a new breed of litigation hangers on, whose main expertise is to craft reports which will conceal anything that might be to
8
the disadvantage of their clients.4

Lord Woolf stated that England and Wales were not the only countries that the situation described above affects.49 "The change in the
role of experts into additional advocates of the parties is a phenomenon well known in the United States of America and one which is caus-

41. Id. at 508.
42. Id.
43. See THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE LORD WOOLF, DEP'T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
AFFAIRS,
ACCESS
TO JUSTICE
Ch.
23,
,r 5 (1995), availahk at
http://www.dca.gov.uk/civil/interim/chap23.htm (hereinafter INTERIM REPORT]; see
also
id.
at
Recommendations
,r,r
101,
106,
availabk
at
http:/ /www.dca.gov.uk/civil/interim/recoms.htm (recommending to make expert
witnesses independent by having the court appoint them and that an expert's report
"end with a declaration that it includes everything which the expert regards as being
relevant to the opinion which he has expressed in his report and that he has drawn to
the attention of the court any matter which would affect the validity of that opinion.").
44. See NEWS. WALES LAW REFORM COMM'N, REPORT 109-EXPERT WITNESSES x-xii, 4143 (2005), available at http:/ /www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/lrc/ll_Irc.nsf/vwFiles/
rl09.pdf/$file/rl09.pdf [hereinafter REPORT 109].
45. RICHARD M. BOGOROCH, & LEANNE GOLDSTEIN, FORENSIC AND DEMONSTRATIVE
EVIDENCE FOR INSURANCE CLAIMS: REFLECTIONS ON THE ROLE OF THE EXPERT WITNESS
(2003), available at http:/ /www.bogoroch.com/articles/expert-witness.pdf.
46. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 43.
47. THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE LORD WOOLF, MAsn:R OF THE ROLLS, ACCESS TO
JUSTICE: FINAL REPORT TO THE LORD CHANCELLOR ON THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN
ENGlAND AND WALES {1996).
48. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 43, at ch. 23, 110 (internal citation omitted).
49. Idatch. 23,111.
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ing real concern in Australia." 50 The report stated that unless countries
took remedial measures, the position was "likely to deteriorate further
rather than improve."51 The escalating cost of expert witnesses, the
delay caused by the need to engage experts, and that experts had become partisan advocates rather than neutral givers of opinions
troubled Lord Woolf. 52 Following the Final Report's recommendations
for reform, England and Wales implemented and adopted the Civil
Procedure Rules 1998 ("CPR") on April 26, 1999.53 Some describe
these rules as "the most far-reaching reforms to court procedure for
125 years in England and Wales." 54 England and Wales adopted most
of the many recommendations for reform, resulting in new Civil Procedure Rules for England and Wales. 55
Part 35 of the Civil Procedure Rules ("CPR 35") established new
requirements for expert reports in the civil courts in England and
Wales. 56 The new rules' basic premise as they relate to expert witness
testimony is that the expert's function is to help the court, not to advance the case of the party that retained him. 57 In no uncertain terms,
the new rules state that "the duty of an expert [is] to help the court on
the matters within his expertise" and that "[t]his duty overrides any
obligation to the person from whom he has received instructions or by
whom he is paid."58 The Civil Justice Council offers guidance to experts and to those instructing them in the interpretation of and compliance with CPR 35 and its associated Practice Direction ("PD 35") .59
A report published in 2005 describes the change of culture in the
English courts when experts are involved. 60 The use of the single joint
expert is more frequent and there is the requirement that the expert
sign a statement of truth of the report and the instructions include a
reminder of the mandate that experts' duty is to the court. 61 According
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at ch. 23, '111 5, 12, 13, 17.
53. Hunton & Williams, The Civil Procedure Rules in England and Wales: The Woolf
Refrmns - Success or Failure? Focus ON INT'L LmG. & ARBITRATION 1 (Spring 2003), available at http:/ /www.hunton.com/files/tbl_s47Details/FileUpload265/l48/Intl_LitArbi tration_Spring2003. pelf.
54. Id.
55. See REPORT 109, supra note 44, at 41.
56. Civil
Procedure
Rules,
Part
35,
2005,
(Eng.),
available
at
http://wwwJustice.gov.uk/civil/procrules_fin/pdf/parts/part35.pdf.
57. Id. at Rule 35.3.
58. Id.
59. CML JUSTICE COUNCIL, PROTOCOL FOR THE INSTRUCTION OF EXPERTS TO GIVE
EVIDENCE IN CML CLAIMS 3 (2005), available at http://www.civiljusticecouncil.gov.uk/
files/Protocol_for_the_Instruction_ of_Experts. pdf.
60. See JOHN PEVSNER & MARY SENEVIRATNE, DEP'T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, THE
MANAGEMENT OF CML CASES: THE COURTS AND POST-WOOLF LANDSCAPE i (2005), available
at http:/ /www.dca.gov. uk/ research/2005 /9_2005_full. pelf.
61. See id. at 23.
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to Peysner and Seneviratne, "(t]he overall effect of these changes is
that the days of the 'hired gun', the expert generally instructed by one
side only and perceived to be 'pro-claimant' or 'pro-defendant', are
largely over and neither practitioners nor judges expressed any nostalgia. "62
The Woolf Reforms and Judge Cresswell's expert witness code from
The Ikarian R.eefer have caught the attention of the international community; one can find proposals for and adoption of similar reforms in
Hong Kong, Canada, Australia, and New South Wales. In 2004, the
Hong Kong Civil Justice Reform published a Final Report with recommendations to follow some of the Woolf Reforms and some of the reforms adopted by the Supreme Court of New South Wales. 6' The Hong
Kong Final Report made recommendations aimed at countering a perceived lack of impartiality or independence among expert witnesses. 64
The report recommended adopting: (i) a rule expressly emphasizing
"the supremacy of the expert's duty to assist the court over his duty to
the client or the person paying his fees"; (ii) a rule requiring the expert to acknowledge in the expert's report the overriding duty to the
court; and (iii) a rule requiring the expert to agree to be bound by an
approved code of conduct for experts. 65
A number of subsequent Canadian decisions have applied The Ikarian Reefer and the duties of the expert witness enumerated by Judge
Cresswell. 66 In addition, the Woolf Reforms very much influenced developments in Australia. 67 The Australian Federal Court Chief Justice
imposed Practice Notes, which include the duty of the expert to the
court and not to the party that hired the expert. 68 The rules also require the expert to disclose all sources of information used to form
their opinion and all sources they would have liked to have but were
not available. 69 The expert's reasoning process has become very transparent, as they must disclose their procedures, methods, and data used
in forming the opinion. 70

62. Id. at 23-24.
63. CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM JUDICIARY H.K. SPECIAL ADMIN. REGION, FINAL REPORT:
CHIEF JUSTICE'S WORKING PARTY ON CIVILJUSTICE REFORM 323, 332-33 (2004), available at
http:/ /www.civiljustice.gov.hk/ cjr/ downloadJsp?FN=fr/ documents/ cjr_final_report.p
elf [hereinafter CMLJUSTICE REFORM].
64. Id. at 321.
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., Merck & Co., Inc. v. Apotex Inc., [2004] F.C. 567, 'l[l6; Graham Constr.
& Eng'g (1985) Ltd. v. LaCaille Devs. Inc., [2006] A.B.Q.B. 898, 36;Jacobson v. Sveen,
[2000] A.B.Q.B. 215, 6-7; Dansereau v. Vallee, [1999] A.B.Q.B. 557, 25.
67. REPORT 109, supra note 44, at 40.
68. Id. at 55.
69. Id. at 30.
70. Telephone Interview with Hugh M. Selby, Austl. Nat'! Univ. Coll. of Law Quly
31, 2007).
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Australian jurisdictions that have reformed the rules relating to expert witnesses include New South Wales, Queensland, the Federal
Court, the Family Court, and the Australian Capital Territory. 11 "The
newer approaches feature the formulation of standards, either in rules
of court or ... as a code of conduct forming a schedule to the rules." 72
Australian jurisdictions have intended the newer approaches to formulate "standards in a coherent and authoritative form, and require expert witnesses to acknowledge and adhere to them." 73 Although Australia adopted many reforms in the late 1990's, it continues to modify
and update those reforms. 74 The Uniform Civil Rules that various Australian jurisdictions are now implementing impose requirements that
the Australian Federal Court started in 1998. 75 The New South Wales
Supreme Court introduced a "code of conduct for expert witnesses" in
January 2000. 76 As of August 2005, the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules
embodied the equivalent provisions and code of conduct. 77
The provisions of the expert witness code of conduct in the rules of
court have been strongly influenced by the common law, including
the principle that expert evidence presented to the court should be,
and should be seen to be, the independent product of the expert un78
influenced by the exigencies oflitigation.

This follows the direction of The Ikarian Reefer and Report 109 of
the New South Wales Law Commission, which cites the case. 79 Courts
should not treat the provisions of the expert witness code of conduct as
rules of admissibility of expert opinion evidence, but as "a code of
conduct designed to improve the quality of expert opinion evidence."80

B. SCIENTIFIC EXPERT TESTIMONY IN THE UNITED STATES
The issues surrounding expert testimony in England in the nineteenth century were also concerns in the United States. A study conducted on expert testimony took first prize in 1870 at Harvard Law
School. 81 The study reported that eminent judges and jurists were attaching less and less importance to expert testimony because of "the
71. REPORT 109, supra note 44, at 50.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 55, 89.
75. Id. at 55.
76. Id. at 25.
77. See id. at 24.
78. Id. at 27.
79. Id. at 27, n.16 (citing Nat'! Justice Compania Naviera S.A. v. Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. (The lkarian Reefer), 2 Lloyd's Rep. 68 (Q.B.D. 1993)).
80. Aust!. Sec. & Inv. Comm'n v. Rich (2005) 149 N.S.W.S. Ct. R. 242, 321 (Aust!.).
81. GolAN, supra note 7, at 136 (citing Note, Expert Testirrwny, 5 AM. L. REv. 227
(1871)).
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surprising facility with which scientific gentlemen will swear to the most
opposite opinions upon matters falling within their domain." 82 In
1874, U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice Morrison Remick Waite commented on how "experts are seen arrayed against each other, prostituting at times the science which they professed to represent .... "83
"The American courts observed the same adversarial procedures of
Common Law" and "the American scientific community advertised the
same high expectations from the scientific method, as did their English
counterparts."84 In 1866, similar to the lobbying efforts of Dr. Smith to
the Royal Society of Arts, Judge Emory Washburn "brought the same
subject before the members of the American Society of Arts and
Sciences."85 However, according to Golan, "[t]he nineteenth-century
American scientific community lacked the organization, status, and
political resources needed to challenge the legal system and its procedures."86 "The reform of expert testimony became one of the hottest
topics in the meetings of the various bar associations that mushroomed
in late-nineteenth-century America, and many bills were drafted to remedy the evils of expert testimony." 87 Most of the American legislative
bodies were reluctant to make such reforms and courts promptly held
those that did unconstitutional. 88
The United States courts have instead focused their attempts at reforms of scientific expert testimony within the laws of evidence. 89 This
focus is not on controlling bias or changing the way that experts testify,
instead the focus is on the type of evidence that judges allow into the
courtroom. 90 The struggle to control creative scientific theories introduced in the courts came to a head in the early 1900's in Frye v. United
States. 91 This historic decision, commonly known as the Frye test or the
"general acceptance test," set the standard for the exclusion of scientific evidence in the courtroom-it was the sole guidance for federal
courts for the admissibility of expert testimony until 1975, when Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence. 92
However, it was not until 1993 that the U.S. Supreme Court in Daubert found the enactment of Federal Rules of Evidence had superseded
the traditional Frye general acceptance test for the admission of scien82. Id. (quoting Note, Expert Testirrwny, 5 AM .L. REv. 227, 228 (1871)).
83. Hon. Morrison R. Waite, Testirrwny of Experts, 8 W.JURIST, 129, 134 (1874), quoted
in COLAN, supra note 7, at 136-37.
84. GoIAN, supra note 7, at 136.
85. Id. at 135.
86. Id. at 140.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
92. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 585-87 (1993).
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tific testimony. 93 Later in 2000, Congress amended the Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 to specify additional requirements concerning the admissibility of expert testimony. 94 The additional factors in Rule 702 require that: "(l) the testimony is sufficiently based upon reliable facts
or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. "95
The impact of Daubert is not limited to federal courts. Most states
followed Frye at least with respect to new scientific theories and
processes.96 Over the years, a number of states have formally adopted
the Daubert standard; some have expressly rejected the Daubert standard
and chosen to retain Frye, and yet others have a combination or hybrid
standard for admissibility. 97 Although expert testimony has received
increased judicial attention in the years since Daubert, problems with
testifying experts have not changed. According to one study, judges
and attorneys still report "frequent problems with partisan experts and
the excessive expense of experts" - the same issues identified in pre98
Daubert times.
The issue of partisanship by an expert witness is of particular concern in water disputes because of the way that experts develop hydrologic testimony. The heavy reliance upon hydrologic models as the
basis of the expert's testimony creates a unique challenge for the potential expert witness. As described below, the first step in developing
a model is determining the model's purpose. If the purpose of the
model is to provide testimony to support one side of a case, then that
purpose will determine the development of the model with results that
will reflect that bias. On the other hand, if the purpose of the model is
to provide an independent assessment of the issues, as the code set
forth in The Ikarian R.eefer requires, then the results will be less likely to
be biased and, and the expert witness testimony based on the model
will arguably be more useful to the trier of fact.
II. HYDROLOGIC MODELS GENERALLY

"[H]ydrologic models are used to evaluate historic hydrologic
events or conditions, and are used to predict future hydrologic events
or conditions."99 One may trace the first use of hydrologic models
93.
94.

Id. at 587.

CYNTHIA H. CWIK & JOHN L. NORTH, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE REVIEW: ADMISSIBILITY
AND USE OF EXPERT EVIDENCE IN THE COURTROOM, MONOGRAPH No. 6, at 4 (2003).
95. Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702).

96.
97.
98.
Expert
99.

Id. at 2.
See id. at 3.
Carol Krafka et al.,Judge and Attorney Experiences, Practices, and Concerns Regarding
Testimony in Federal Civil Trials. 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. PoL'Y & L. 309, 330 (2002).
Bair, supra note 3, at 57.
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founded on solving partial differential equations using numerical methods to England in 1941. 100 Scientists used a finite-difference model to
address a groundwater seepage problem. 101
According to Bair,
"[a]dvances in numerical methods, and in [the] theoretical and applied knowledge" of hydrologists, added to "the ease, cost and power of
computers," have allowed "hydrologists to address problems previously
considered intractable." 102
"In the context of hydrology, a model is an approximate or simplified representation of a real system and its behavior[;]" there is inherent uncertainty in models of systems that exchange energy and
materials with their surroundings. 103 Although models, as used in the
courtroom, are extremely useful, they "are often suspect because of
their complexity, the paucity of data used in calibration and validation,
and their lack of transparency." 104
The discourse on models in the context of hydrology reveals differences of opinion as to whether, and if, a model may in fact represent a
real world system. For example, some have described ground water
systems as inherently uncertain, that model verification is unobtainable, and that modelers and model users need to accept this uncertainty. 105 "Acceptability of a modeling effort is founded on the number and
strength of confirming observations; ... [a] subjective judgment will
always be required to determine if a model appropriately represents
the ground water system." 106
Within the context of hydrologic modeling, the need for testing
takes on different challenges. Models use the terms "verification" and
"validation" in ways that some have called contradictory and misleading.101 Oreskes et al. described how in hydrology, "numerical models
always represent complex open systems in which the operative
processes are incompletely understood and the required empirical
input data are incompletely known." 108 Therefore, according to
Oreskes et al., such models can never be verified and what "passes for

100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Daniel F. Luecke, Hydrologic Models in the Courtroom 2 Qune 2007) (unpublished working paper for Dividing the Waters Model Assessment Committee, on file
with author).
104. Id. at 1.
105. William W. Woessner & Mary P. Anderson, Good Model-Bad Model, Understanding
the Flow Modeling Process, in SUBSURFACE FLUID-FLOW (GROUND-WATER AND VADOSE ZONE)
MODEI.ING 14, 15 Qoseph D. Ritchey &James 0. Rumbaugh eds., 1996).
106. Id.
107. Naomi Oreskes et al., Verification, Validation, and Confirmation of Numerical
Models in the Earth Sciences, 263 Sa. 641, 641-42 (1994).
108. Id. at 643.
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verification and validation is at best confirmation" and as such, confirmation is a matter of degree and is inherently partial. 109
Furthermore, Oreskes et al. describe how philosopher Nancy
Cartwright has even compared a hydrologic model to a novel. 110 A novel "may resonate with nature, but it is not a 'real' thing." 111 One might
ask "how much [of] the characters in a novel are drawn from real life
and how much is artifice[?]" 112 Similarly, with regard to a model, one
might ask "[h]ow much is based on observation and measurement of
accessible phenomena, how much is based on informed judgment, and
how much is convenience?" 113 The fundamental reason to model is due
to a "lack of full access, either in time or space, to the phenomena of
interest." 114 "Any scientist who is asked to use a model to verify or validate a predetermined result should be suspicious" 115
As described by Anderson and Bates in their book titled Model Validation, the term validation may be inappropriate and hydrologists
should use it as a stimulus to discuss the underlying fundamental issues
and the widely recognized agreement that model validation, in an absolute sense, is not possible. 116 The book contains numerous articles by
experts in the field summarizing the discourse on hydrologic models
•
•
117
from vanous perspectives.
The complexity of hydrologic testimony and models when proffered as evidence in civil litigation gives rise to particular difficulty for
the judge. As described by Bair, use of such models may also give rise
to a quandary for the hydrologic expert in a courtroom. 118 The attorney might ask him or her to use analysis techniques that produce results that are more favorable to that attorney's client's case. 119 Furthermore, parties might not be able to afford a more accurate complex
analysis and instead opt for a less expensive, albeit less accurate, simplistic, one-dimensional analytical model. The overly simplistic approach is difficult to defend on cross-examination. 120 However, the
lawyer or judge may not understand the more complex analysis. 121
109.

Id.

110. Id. at 644.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Malcolm G. Anderson & Paul D. Bates, Hydrologi,cal Science: Model Credibility and
Scientific Integrity, in MODEL VALIDATION: PERSPECTIVES IN HYDROLOGICAL SCIENCE 1, 2
(Malcolm G. Anderson & Paul D. Bates eds., 2001).
117. MODEL VALIDATION: PERSPECTIVES IN HYDROLOGICAL SCIENCE (Malcolm G. Anderson & Paul D. Bates eds., 2001).
118. Bair, supra note 3, at 62.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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HYDROLOGIC MODEL AsSESSMENT

Three different terms often appear in the literature concerning
models: conceptual model, computer model program, and model: 22
In their article, Reilly and Harbaugh propose useful definitions. 123
A "conceptual model" is the hydrologist's concept of a ground-water
system. A "computer model program" is a computer program that
solves ground-water equations. Computer model programs are general purpose in that they can be used to simulate a variety of specific
systems by varying input data. A "model" is the application of a computer model program to simulate a specific system. Thus, a model incorporates the model program and all of the input data required to
represent a ground-water system. The modeler attempts to incorporate what he or she believes to be the most important aspects of the
conceptual model into a model so that the model will provide useful
124
information about the system.

Scientists create models with inherent uncertainty and sparse and
noisy data. 125 "In most cases involving site-specific application of hydrologic models, many factors are simply unknown and hence uncertain."126 A number of authors and professional associations have suggested modeling protocols. 121 Assuming that a model cannot be constructed that is 100% accurate, "[g]iven a probability range from Oto
1.0 that a hydrologic model accurately represents the flow system ...
then a range of 0.75 to 0.90, or 75 to 90%, ... would demonstrate a
relatively high degree of correspondence between model results and
measured values." 128 Professor Bair provided a simplified description of
the process commonly followed by modelers as depicted in Figure l. 129

122. THOMAS E. REILLY & ARLEN W. HARBAUGH, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, U.S.
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, GUIDELINES FOR EVALUATING GROUND-WATER FLOW MODELS,
SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 2004-5038, at 1 (2004).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Bair, supra note 3, at 60.
126. Id. at 61.
127. See American Society of Testing Materials International, Standard Guide for Afr
plication of a Ground-Water Flow Model to a Site-Specific Problem, in ANNUAL BOOK OF ASTM
STANDARDS 1261 (2004) [hereinafter, STANDARD GUIDE]; see also Mary P. Anderson &
William W. Woessner, The role of the postaudit in model validation, 15 ADVANCES IN WATER
REs.167, 167 (1992).
128. Bair, supra note 3, at 61.
129. Id. at 59 fig.5.1.
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Figure 1: Bair Steps of Hydrologic Model

Woessner and Anderson suggest that one may evaluate a model's
acceptability by confirming observations, comparing field data and
considering alternative hypotheses with simulated results. 1w The acceptability of the model is ultimately a subjective assessment made in the
context of the model's stated purpose. 131 The model's defined purpose
is the first step in applying the model and will influence not only the
results but also the remaining steps in the model's application.m "The
purpose of the model forms the context for judgement [sic]." 133
Woessner and Anderson state that it is within the context of that purpose, that "a rational subjective judgement [sic] can be made as to the
appropriateness of the modeling effort." 134
A report from the United States Geological Survey ("USGS") provides "some guidelines and discussion on how to evaluate complex
ground-water flow models used in the investigation of ground-water
systems." 135 Consistent with the comments of Bair, Woessner, and Anderson, that the first step in model development is to define the purpose, Reilly and Harbaugh state that in an effective evaluation of the
adequacy of a model, "the objectives of the study must be specified. "136
Reilly and Harbaugh describe how one may use a computer model
with different approaches to solve a problem. 137 "Approaches ... that
are commonly used are: calibrated model, hypothetical system model,
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Woessner & Anderson, supra note 105, at 17.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 16 fig.I, 21.
Id. at 21.
Id.
REILLY & HARBAUGH, supra note 122, at 1.
Id.
Id. at 2.
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sensitivity analysis, superposition, and particle tracking. Frequently,
several approaches are combined to address a problem." 158 The following description borrows heavily from their article, and this article paraphrases their discussion below.
One may simply define model calibration as the "modification of
model input data for the purpose of making the model more closely
match observed heads and flows."m One may use "nonlinear regression statistical techniques" or adjust the parameters manually. 140 In a
broader definition of model calibration, "parameter adjustment is only
one aspect of calibration"; other key aspects of the model "that influence the capability of the model to meet the problem objectives also
are evaluated and adjusted as needed during calibration." 141 The
amount of effort needed to calibrate a ground water flow model is dependent upon the objective of the investigation. 142
Most models of specific ground-water systems that are used to estimate aquifer properties, understand the past, understand the present,
or to forecast the future are calibrated by matching obsenred heads
and flows. Determining if the calibration is sufficient for the intended use of the model is very important in evaluating whether the
14
model has been constructed appropriately. '

A hypothetical model is an idealized or representative system, not a
model of a specific system. 144 "Hypothetical models are not calibrated,
but input data are frequently adjusted during model development to
make the model fit the idealized system or to test how the model responds. "145 "Hypothetical models have been used to examine various
processes that affect or are affected by ground-water flow, for example:
boundary conditions, contributing areas to wells, and model calibration."146
"Sensitivity analysis is the evaluation of model input parameters to
see how much they affect model outputs .... "147 The relative effect of
the parameters provides a "fundamental understanding of the simulated system. "148 "Sensitivity analysis also is inherently part of model
calibration. The most sensitive parameters will be the most important

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Id.
Id.
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parameters for causing the model to match observed values." 149 Reilly
and Harbaugh give the example that when a model does not respond
to hydraulic conductivity, it usually indicates an area where there is
relatively little water flowing. 150 "If the model is being calibrated, then
changing the value of hydraulic conductivity in this area will not help
much in causing the model to match observations." 151 They note that
this model would most likely not be suitable for evaluating recharge or
withdrawal in this area as the level of uncertainty from the calibration
would be unacceptable. 152
The American Society for Testing and Materials ("ASTM") defines
sensitivity analysis as the process of determining how deliberate and
systematic variation in selected parameter values, input data, and other
features of the model affect model results. 153 It is important to note the
ASTM definition places emphasis on "deliberate and systematic variation" as well as parameters and other model features that are not included in the Reilly and Harbaugh description. 154
According to Reilly and Harbaugh, "[s]uperposition is a modeling
approach that is useful in saving time and effort and eliminating uncertainty in some model evaluations. Models that are designed to use
superposition evaluate only changes in stress and changes in responses. "155 They note that in "[m]ost aquifer tests that analyze drawdown use superposition ... [o]nly the change in [the drawdown] and
change in flows are analyzed .... "156 This assumes that the system's
response "is only due to the stress imposed and is not due to other
processes in the system." 157 Particle tracking determines "the path a
particle will take through a three-dimensional ground water flow system. "158 This "aids in conceptualizing and quantifying the sources of
water in a modeled system. "159
"[M] any model programs can be used in one, two, or three dimensions, and they can be applied as transient or steady state." 160 "The
simplification of the model domain to one or two dimensions . . . is
used to minimize the cost of constructing a model." 161 Reilly and Harbaugh caution that simplification of the system to one or two dimensions "must be consistent with the flow field under investigation and
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2-3.
Id. at 3.
supra note 127, at 1262.
E-mail from D. Luecke (Oct. 22, 2007) (on file with author).
REILLY & HARBAUGH, supra note 122, at 4 (internal citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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consistent with the objectives of the study." 162 This "means that there is
no or negligible flow orthogonal to the line or plane of the one- or
two-dimensional system being simulated. "163
Although true steady-state conditions do not exist in natural systems, steady-state models are frequently used. 164 Climactic variations
will cause natural systems to fluctuate and may be seasonal, annual,
decadal, or longer. 165
In steady-state models, an assumption is made that a system can be
represented by a state of dynamic equilibrium or an approximate
equilibrium condition. If the objectives of the investigation do not
require information on the time it takes for a system to respond to
new stresses or the response of the system between periods of relative
equilibrium, then simulation of the system as a steady-state system
may be a reasonable approach. However, if the system is not at a period of equilibrium or approximate equilibrium during the periods of
166
interest, then a transient analysis is required.

To determine the appropriate modeling approach, Reilly and Harbaugh suggest asking the following questions:
1. Is the overall approach (calibrated model, hypothetical system
model, sensitivity analysis, superposition, and particle tracking) for
using simulation in addressing the objectives clearly stated and appropriate?
2. If the analysis is not three dimensional, is the representation of
the system using one or two dimensions appropriate to meet the objectives of the study and justified in the report?
3. If the model is steady state, is adequate information provided to
167
justify that the system is reasonably close to a steady-state condition?
Reilly and Harbaugh discuss the need for complete documentation
of the model development so that the reviewer may: (a) understand
the hypotheses; (b) understand the methods used to represent the
actual system with a mathematical counterpart; and (c) determine if
the model is sufficiently accurate for the objectives of the investigation.168 The study objectives and the complexity of the simulations will
determine the appropriate level of documentation necessary. 100
Construction of a simulation report is similar to that for any investigative study, and should include: "(1) the objectives of the study, (2)
a description of the work that was done, (3) logical arguments to con162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 26.
Id.
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vince the reader that the methods and analyses used in the study are
valid, and ( 4) results and conclusions." 11° For specific reporting requirements, the authors refer to a U.S. Geological Survey Office of
Ground Water Technical Memorandum, which identifies ten topics to
address in reports concerning studies that use simulation:
1. Describe the purpose of the study and the role that simulation
plays in addressing that purpose.
2. Describe the hydrologic system under investigation.
3. Describe the mathematical methods used and their appropriateness to the problem being solved.
4. Describe the hydrogeologic character of the boundary conditions used in the simulation of the system.
5. If the method of simulation involves discretizing the system (finite-difference and finite-element methods for example), describe and
justify the discretized network used.
6. Describe the aquifer system properties that are modeled.
7. Describe all the stresses modeled such as pumpage, evapotranspiration from ground water, recharge from infiltration, river stage
changes, leakage from other aquifers, and source concentrations in
transport models.
8. For transient models, describe the initial conditions that are
used in the simulations.
9. If a model is calibrated, present the calibration criteria, procedure, and results.
10. Discuss the limitations of the model's representation of the actual system and the impact those limitations have on the results and
.
cone1us1ons
presente d.m t h e report. 111
The Technical Memorandum states that the report should address
the ten topics above, but no specific format is required. 112 However,
"[t]he report should describe the purpose of the simulation and convince the reader that the use of simulation is credible." 173 In addition,
the report should "describe the system being simulated, the methods
of simulation, and the data that are used." 11•
B. THE MANIPULATION OF MODELS

Although water rights cases are not tried to juries, Bair puts forth
an example of how hydrologic modeling might impact the decision
170. Id.
171. Id. (citing WILLIAM M. ALLEY, CHIEF, OmCE OF GROUND WATER, U.S. GEOLOGIC
SERVICE, TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM No. 96.04, POLICY ON DOCUMENTING TI-IE USE OF
GROUND-WATER SIMULATION IN PROJECT REPORTS (1996) [hereinafter TECHNICAL
MEMORANDUM], available at http:/ /water.usgs.gov/admin/memo/GW/gw96.04.html).
172. TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM, supra note 171.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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maker with analysis of the well-publicized 1986 Woburn Toxic Trial. 175
The book entitled "A Civil Action" 176 and the motion picture with the
same name sensationalized the case. 177
The plaintiffs sued the defendant manufacturing facilities, alleging
improper disposal of five industrial chemicals that flowed into the
groundwater and into the two municipal wells. 178 The plaintiffs claimed
that "prolonged ingestion and exposure to toxic chemicals caused leukaemias, central nervous system disorders, and other health problems. "179
The case involved three hydrologist experts, one for the plaintiffs
and one for each of the defendants. 180 The jurors were faced with attempting to comprehend a list of hydrologic topics Bair described as
"equivalent to the content of courses a graduate student is required to
take for a master's degree in hydrology." 181 Bair read over 1800 pages
of the three hydrologic experts' testimony, and helped construct threedimensional numerical flow and transport models of the wells. 182 He
described the three approaches in modeling by each expert. 183
"The plaintiffs' expert analysed well logs ... and portrayed the geology as a heterogeneous assemblage of glacial materials." 184 "He used
this geologic framework to construct an uncalibrated threedimensional numerical flow and transport model for illustrative purposes. "185 According to Bair,
The one-dimensional analytical equation he used to compute contaminant travel times inadequately incorporated the heterogeneous nature of the glacial materials, converging three-dimensional flow to the
pumping wells, induced infiltration from the river and wetland, leakage from bedrock, hydrodynamic dispersion, spatial and temporal
186
variations in recharge, and temporal variations in pumping rates.

175. Bair, supra note 3, at 63 (discussing Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp.
1219 (D. Mass. 1986)); see also Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 96 F.R.D. 431 (D. Mass. 1983)
(decided prior to the Supreme Court's Dauhert decision, which established the gatekeeping standard for trial judges).
176. JONATHAN HARR, A CML ACTION (Random House 1995).
177. A CMLACTION (Touchstone Pictures 1998).
178. Bair, supra note 3, at 63.
179. Id.
180. See id. at 66.
181. Id. at 72.
182. Id. at 73.
183. Id. at 64-70.
184. Id. at 73.
185. Id.
186. Id.
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Based on these limitations, Bair believed the probability that the
analysis used by the plaintiffs expert realistically represented the flow
system when the wells were in use was no more than 0.4 or 40%. 187
Defendant Beatrice's expert "plotted and analysed the water level
and streamflow data from [a] 30-day pumping test." 188 This expert
"constructed no models and made no travel time calculations." 189 The
analysis ignored the "interaction between the surface-water and the
groundwater flow systems" and ignored "the three-dimensional nature
of the groundwater flow system created by the partial penetration of
the wells and the river." 190 Bair ranks the probability that this analysis
realistically represents the flow system between 1964 and 1979 to be
less than 0.25 or 25%. 191
The defendant W.R. Grace's expert "used the available geologic,
hydrologic and pumping data to construct a transient threedimensional numerical flow and transport model .... "192 According to
Bair, it was the most comprehensive and sophisticated of the three
models. 193 "The flow model was calibrated using two sets of measured
water level and streamflow gain/loss data." 194 "The transport model was
not calibrated," although the expert did perform a sensitivity analysis
related to contaminant arrival times. 195 "The model ... included more
parameters and processes and fewer unrealistic assumptions than the
other [two] approaches." 195 Bair ranked the probability at 0.75 or 75%
that this analysis represents the actual behavior of the flow system during the relevant period. 197
The jury, after ten days of deliberation, found Beatrice not liable
and W.R. Grace liable for the contamination and injuries to the plaintiffs. 198 This result is the inverse of the ranking of the sophistication
and purported accuracy of the hydrologic models. Bair observes that
the "nagging questions for lawyers and hydrologists studying the Woburn Toxic Trial is whether the science itself was too complicated for
the judge and jury, and/ or whether the presentation of the science was
too confusing." 199
Another example of differing results from hydrologic modeling was
not within the context of trial, but was instead within the context of an
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 73-74.
Id. at 74.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

24

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 11

administrative process. D.B. McLaughlin completed a report for the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in 1984 to compare the considerably
different results of three studies of a proposed pumping plan using the
same data and the same model. 200
The case study concerns a public utility, which sought permission
to pump groundwater from the San Andres-Glorieta aquifer in northwestern New Mexico. 201 As part of its application, Plains Electric introduced models which "suggested that the impacts of its proposed pumpage plan would be acceptable." 202 Several local users responded with
their own independent modeling studies. 20 ' "These studies all used the
same groundwater model (developed by the U.S. Geological Survey)
but the inputs and general approaches to model application differed
considerably."204 "Some of the modeling studies predicted rapid dewatering in the vicinity of the Plains well field while others predicted only
minor effects on the local water levels." 205 McLaughlin reports that
overall the computer modeling caused "more confusion than it dispelled. "206
One commentator, upon review of the McLaughlin report stated
that the modelers' assumptions (aquifer parameters, types of boundary
conditions) made it clear that:
Models 1 and 3 were optimistic (they wanted to limit drawdowns and
to create water) and Model 2 was pessimistic (they wanted to predict
scary drawdowns and they were not about to concede that there was an
available groundwater supply) .... I have no doubt the hydrologists
were competent. In fact they knew very well what parameters to
choose and what assumptions to make in order to obtain results that
would meet their clients' desire. Obviously Models 1 and 3 were developed for a client that wanted the developments to proceed and
Model 2 was carried out for a client that did not favour the development. What is needed is an independent study, from a party that has no
. d .... 201
axe to gnn

200. DENNIS B. McLAUGHLIN, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, HYDRO LOGIC ENG'G CENTER,
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF GROUNDWATER MODEL FORMULATION: THE SAN ANDRESGLORIETA CAsE STUDY 1 (1984), available at http://www.hec.usace.anny.mil/
publications/ResearchDocuments/RD-22.pdf.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Hubert J. Morel-Seytoux, Groundwater, in MODEL VALIDATION: PERSPECTIVES IN
HYDROLOGICALSOENCE 293, 319-20 (Malcolm G. Anderson & Paul D. Bates eds., 2001).
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C. JOINT DEVELOPMENT OF MODELS
Barbara Cosens of the University ofldaho describes an approach to
avoiding the type of partisan expert opinions and model construction
and use as seen in the McLaughlin Report and the Woburn Toxic Trial.208 Cosens participated in the development of a database for the Milk
River in north-central Montana. 209 The Milk River basin is home to
four Indian reservations and numerous Indian allotments and was the
site of the dispute that led to the Winters Doctrine and the U.S. Supreme Court's recognition oflndian reserved water rights. 210 The basin
is also the site of a national park, several national wildlife refuges, bull
trout (a listed species under the Endangered Species Act), and the
Milk River Project, an early federal reclamation project. 211
The State of Montana launched a new program for resolution of
reserved water rights through negotiation as part of the statewide general stream adjudication. 212 The State identified the Milk River basin as
its highest priority. 213 "[T]he parties in the Milk River settlement talks
developed a hydrologic model to test the impacts and water supply
available from different solutions proposed to settle tribal water rights
for the Fort Belknap Reservation." 214 Considering the steps of construction of a hydrologic model (that Anderson and Woessner described),
the first step was to determine the overall purpose of the model. 215 The
parties agreed that they needed a model to evaluate the proposed settlement solutions. 216
Cosens describes two keys to the success of the negotiation. 217
"First, the model was developed by joint technical teams representing
the parties to the negotiation." 218 "This avoided the need to resolve
differences between competing models" and avoided "character assassination of the opposing technical expert[,]" something Cosens referred to as the means "commonly found at the interface between
science and the law." 219 The parties also left the "technical modeling
choices to the modelers, avoiding the second guessing of decisions by
negotiators concerned with the outcome for their party."220 The mod208.

Barbara Cosens, The Rol,e of Hydrowgy in the Resolution of Water Disputes, 133 J.
&Eouc.17, 17 (2006).
Id. at 19.
Id. at 20; Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908).
Cosens, supra note 208, at 20.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 22.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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elers were "charged with the task of agreeing on a single model" and
avoiding the "coloring [of] their positions with the desires of their
client."221 According to Cosens, the "[r]esults in the Milk River suggest
that [the modelers] accomplished both of these requirements." 222
The second key to success was that the parties "agreed not only to
relinquish the technical work to the modelers, but to use the results of
their efforts even when unfavorable to their position."22' Cosens commented that this approach was essential to the success of the water negotiation "to the extent an understanding of the hydrologic impacts of
a proposed solution seem relevant to the decision, the analysis of those
impacts by the joint technical team should be followed." 224
The case Kansas v. Nebraska illustrates another example of cooperative model building. 225 In Kansas v. Nebraska, the State of Kansas filed a
complaint with the United States Supreme Court alleging that the
State of Nebraska had violated the Republican River Compact ("Compact") "by allowing the unimpeded development of thousands of wells
in hydraulic connection with the Republican River and its tributaries. "226 The complaint further alleged that Nebraska was depriving
Kansas of its full water entitlement because Nebraska was using more
water than the Compact allocated. 227 "The State of Colorado was joined
in the lawsuit because the headwaters of the Republican River rise within that state and it is a party to the Republican River Compact." 228
The State of Nebraska filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming that the
"Republican River Compact did not specifically mention ground water,
therefore ground water cannot be restricted or included in the allocation or consumptive use computations."229 In response, "[t]he State of
Kansas argued the opposite and asserted all forms of ground water
should be included within the computation of virgin water supply and
consumptive use." 230 "The State of Colorado offered an intermediate
position and claimed the compact and historic practice of the [Compact] justifie[d] the inclusion of alluvial ground water, but [did] not
include wells located on the tablelands that pump from the Ogallala
aquifer." 231

221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Kansas v. Nebraska, 538 U.S. 720, 720 (2003).
226. Colo. Div. of Water Res., Colo. Dep't of Natural Res., The Republican River
Compact, http:/ /water.state.co.us/wateradmin/republicanriver/rr_overview.asp (discussing Kansas v. Nebraska, 538 U.S. 720 (2003)).
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
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Special Master McKusick denied Nebraska's Motion to Dismiss and
"concluded ground water is to be included within the allocation and
consumptive use computations in the Republican River Compact."232
He found that although the Compact never uses the words "ground
water," a comprehensive definition of virgin water supply, which the
Compact fully allocates, includes streamflow that comes from both surface runoff and ground water discharge and interception of either of
those sources can cause a State to receive more than its Compact allocation and violate the Compact. 233
The denial of Nebraska's Motion to Dismiss was pivotal and
prompted the three states to request a stay in the trial schedule to undergo mediation. 234 The three states reached a settlement and stipulation that contained a waiver of new claims, a moratorium on new wells,
compact administration mechanisms, a dispute resolution system, and
other features. 235 The U.S. Supreme Court approved the Final Settlement Stipulation. 236
In accordance with the Final Settlement Stipulation, "the Republican River Ground Water Modeling Committee developed a comprehensive ground water model to represent the ground water flow system
in the Republican River Basin. "237 The primary purpose of the Republican River Compact Administration Ground Water Model ("RRCA
Model") "is to determine the amount, location, and timing of streamflow depletions to the Republican River caused by well pumping and to
determine streamflow accretions from recharge of water imported
from the Platte River Basin into the Republican River Basin .... "238
"Representatives from the State of Colorado, State of Kansas, and
State of Nebraska developed the RRCA Model, with participation from
the United States Bureau of Reclamation and United States Geological
Survey."239 According to the executive summary, all three States and
the United States provided and shared the data and information used
in construction and calibration of the RRCA Model in a collegial manner.240 Similarly, in a collaborative exercise, technical experts from all
three States constructed and calibrated the RRCA Model. 241

232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Kansas v. Nebraska, 538 U.S. 720, 720 (2003).
237. Republican River Compact Administration Ground Water Model 1 (2003),
available at http:/ /water.state.co. us/wateradmin/ republicanriver/ rrca_model. pdf.
238. Id. at 2.
239. Republican River Water Conservation Dist., Republican River Mode~
http:/ /www.republicanriver.com/model.asp.
240. Id.
241. Id.
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Kenneth W. Knox made a comprehensive review of Republican
River Compact Administration in his doctoral dissertation in 2004. 242
The Knox dissertation provides a unique insight into the decisionmaking processes and shows the effectiveness of the RRCA Model.
ID. THE NEED FOR REFORM

The Dividing the Waters Assessment Committee is considering ways
of improving the process for assessing hydrologic models as discussed
in a Hydrologic Models in the Courtroom Working Paper. 243 The DTW
Working Paper contains a discussion as to the problem of assessing
models when parties to a dispute do not consider it to be in their interests to cooperate. 244 The most common approach to assessing conflicting evidence is through cross-examination; however, this "does not
fix problems, it merely finds flaws." 245 Luecke suggests considering alternatives to cross-examination for dealing with conflicting models in
an adversarial setting such as deference to court appointed experts,
peer review, third-party experts chosen by the parties for review, or a
third expert chosen by the parties for arbitration. 246 The options, other
than arbitration with a third party expert, "can ... be combined with
cross-examination - the parties are allowed to cross-examine the appointed experts or peer reviewers .... "247 However, none of the options "change the underlying dynamics of the process, i.e., there remain very limited incentives to pool resources, experience and expertise. "2•s
According to Luecke and the Committee, the objective of using a
third party expert in an arbitration would be to "create an environment that gives the parties their full say, but at the same time encourages combining expertise rather than placing opposing experts at
loggerheads." 249 There is a need for alternatives to cross-examination
that are effective, efficient, and fair. 250
A. REFORMING THE CULTURE OF PARTIALl1Y-THE DTW SURVEY

As described in this article, problems with experts continue to plague the courts, with complaints of partisanship and bias by experts, the
242. Kenneth W. Knox, The Allocation of Interstate Ground Water: Evaluation of
the Republican River Compact as a Case Study (2004) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Colorado State University) (on file with Morgan Library, Colorado State University).
243. Luecke, supra note 103, at 1.
244. Id. at 20.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 21.
250. Id.
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number of experts employed, and the ensuing cost to the courts and
the parties. The literature on hydrologic modeling reveals that the
first step in constructing a model is defining the purpose of the model.
Case studies show that experts may be constructing models with the
primary purpose of providing results that will support the case or position of the party or attorney that hired them.
Literature concerning potential expert witness reforms in the
United States suggests that there is a need for reform; however, the
adversarial system is very much entrenched and if reform is to occur it
requires localized, context-specific solutions, which respect the need
for diversity in problem solving approaches. 251 Considering that hydrologic models are the basis for most expert witness testimony in water
disputes, and that the first step in constructing a model is defining its
purpose, the potential for more useful and reliable evidence is greater
if assisting the court rather than advocating for one side defines the
purpose of the model.
In order for one to (1) to assess the need for reform concerning
expert witness testimony in Western water cases; and (2) to assess the
receptiveness of judicial and quasi-:judicial officers to various reforms,
proposed or adopted in England, Australia and other jurisdictions, this
author created a survey for the members of Dividing the Waters. 252
The co-conveners of DTW agreed to participate in this study and
provided mailing labels for the members. The survey package included a letter encouraging participation from Colorado Supreme
Court Justice Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr. 253 All persons on the DTW mailing
list received the DTW survey, totaling 184 individuals in eighteen
states. The list included state and federal appellate judges, trial judges,
magistrates, referees, special masters, administrative hearing officers,
permitting agency board members, and a few in other categories.
All individuals on the DTW mailing list received the DTW survey in
June 2007. Of the 184 surveys mailed, twelve were undeliverable or the
recipient responded that they did not answer because he or she was
not a judicial or quasi-:judicial officer. Recipients completed 74 surveys
and returned them by mail or online. The response rate was 43.02%.
One hundred and thirty nine survey recipients worked in a state
system and 33 worked in the federal system. Of the 74 surveys re251. See SHEIIA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY IN
AMERICA 222 (Harvard Univ. Press 1995).
252. Following is a detailed discussion summarizing the results of this survey. See
Mariam J. Masid, Reforming the Culture of Partiality: Diffusing the Battle of the Experts in Western Water Wars (Oct. 30, 2007) (published Ph.D dissertation, Colorado
State
University),
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdlink?did=l46788883l&Fmt=
7&client1%20d=79356&RQT=309&VName=PQD&cfc=l (providing relevant survey
data on pp. 132-47 and in Appendix F).
253. The letter from Colorado Supreme Court Justice Gregory J. Hobbs,Jr. is on file
with the author.
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turned, 59 were from persons working in a state system and fourteen
were from persons working in the federal system. The response rate
for the two groups was consistent with the overall response rate:
42.44% for state responses and 42.42% for federal responses. A summary of the survey responses follows.
1. The type and frequency of expert evidence
Nearly 39% of the respondents encounter expert testimony in at
least 75% of their cases. Another 22% encounter expert testimony in
at least 50% of their cases. Therefore, 61 % of all participants experience expert witness testimony more in more than half of their cases.
Over 16% encounter experts in at least 25% of their cases. Another
22% encounter experts in less than 10% of their cases. The types and
frequency of expert testimony varied; however, geology and hydrology
were the most frequent. Over 76% of respondents reported that they
encountered the same expert witness at least once a year. Of those
responding, 15% saw the same expert more than seven times in a year.
2. Problems associated with expert evidence
A series of questions asked whether and how frequently the respondents encountered certain problems:
• Have you encountered adversarial bias on the part of the expert
[predisposition, inclination, or favoritism towards the party who called
or hired the expert]?

The response was that over 59% encountered adversarial bias often
or always. Over 34% encountered adversarial bias occasionally and
only 6% never encounter adversarial bias.
• Have you encountered use of oral or written language by the expert
that was difficult to understand?

Twenty six percent (26%) of the respondents encountered this
problem often and 60% encountered this problem occasionally. Only
14% said they never encountered oral or written language that was
difficult to understand.
• Have you encountered failure by the expert to stay within the parameters of his or her expertise?

Over 20% of the respondents often or always encountered experts
that did not stay within the parameters of their expertise. Over 59%
encountered this problem at least occasionally. Approximately 20%
never encountered this problem.
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Have you encountered non-responsiveness b-y the expert to questions?

Over 20% of the respondents often encounter non-responsiveness
by the expert to the questions. Over 53% encountered this problem at
least occasionally. Over 26% never had this problem.
• Have you encountered failure to prove the basis of the expert's opinions?

Over 19% of the respondents often encounter experts who fail to
prove the basis of their opinions. Nearly 56% of the respondents encounter this problem occasionally. Over 25% never encounter this
problem.
• Have you encountered failure b-y the lawyer to pose direct examination questions appropriately ?

Nearly 31 % of respondents often encounter the failure by the lawyer to pose direct examination questions appropriately. Nearly 58%
occasionally have this problem. Only 11 % stated this never occurs.
• Have you encountered failure b-y the lawyer to cross-examine so as to
make the expert accountabl,e?

Over 31 % of respondents often encounter failure by the lawyer to
cross-examine the expert to make the expert accountable. Approximately 58% have this problem occasionally. Only 11 % stated this never occurs.
• Have you encountered failure of the expert to arliculate his or her
opinion understandably?

Over 23% of the respondents often find that the expert has failed
to articulate his or her opinion understandably. Over 63% have this
problem occasionally. Only 14% never encounter this problem.
• Have you encountered failure of the expert to adequately support the
opinions gi,ven ?

Nineteen percent (19%) of the respondents often encounter experts who fail to adequately support the opinions given. Nearly 67% of
the respondents encounter this problem occasionally. Only 14% never
have this problem.
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• Of the prob/,ems listed above, what is the single most serious problem
you have encountered with expert evidence?

The single most serious problem encountered is adversarial bias
on the part of the expert, according to nearly 41 % of the respondents.
Over 23% reported the most serious problem was the use of oral or
written language that was difficult to understand. Over I 0% stated the
most serious problem was the expert's failure to adequately support
the opinions given.
• Of the prob/,ems listed above, what problem you have encountered
most frequently?

According to over 56% of the respondents, the most frequent
problem encountered was adversarial bias. Over 20% reported that
the most frequent problem was the expert's use of oral or written language that was difficult to understand.
3. Evaluation of evidence
• Have you encountered evidence from experts that you were not able
to evaluate adequately because of its complexity?

Over 63% of respondents occasionally had problems evaluating
evidence adequately because of its complexity. Over 32% never had
this problem.

• If

you answered occasionally, often, or always to the previous
question, did the evidence come from a witness or witnesses from the
disciplines of biology/life sciences, engi,neering, economics/finance,
geology, hydrology, soil sciences, statistics/mathematics, or other?

Respondents could select all of the disciplines that apply. Fifty
percent (50%) listed hydrology, 38% listed engineering, 25% listed
economics/finance, and 21 % listed statistics/mathematics.
• Have you had any difficulty in ensuring that the expertise you consider necessary to assist you in making your decisions is available to
you?

Twelve percent (12%) of the respondents reported often having
difficulty ensuring the availability of expertise necessary to make the
decisions. Nearly 57% reported that this was a problem they encountered occasionally. Over 31 % never had this problem.
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• When expert witnesses are used, do you find the expert evidence useful for the fact-finding process?

When experts are used, nearly 18% always find the expert evidence
useful and over 63% often find the evidence useful. Nearly 18% reported that the evidence was occasionally useful.
• Have you had any difficulty evaluating the opinions of one expert
against those expressed by another?

Over 20% of the respondents often had difficulty evaluating the
opinions of one expert against those expressed by another. Over 65%
occasionally had this difficulty.

• If you

have had difficulty evaluating the opinions of one expert
against those expressed by another, which of the following factors was
responsible?

The survey asked respondents to select all of the answer options
that applied. The following Table 1 describes the responses. The majority of the respondents, over 69%, cited the fundamental irreconcilability of the views as the factor in their difficulty evaluating expert opinions against those that another expert expressed. The next highest
factor was the inadequate cross-examination of expert testimony at
over 45%. It is interesting to note that in the previous question concerning identification of problems, the respondents indicated that
31 % of the time the lawyer often fails to pose direct examination questions appropriately, and 31 % of the time the lawyer often fails to crossexamine so as to make the expert accountable. From the response to
this question, it appears that the failure to cross-examine to make the
expert accountable causes much more difficulty than improper direct
examination for the judge or administrative hearing officer in evaluating the opinions of one expert against another.
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Table 1: Factors Responsible for Difficulty Evaluating Expert Opinions

Answer Options
Inadequate introduction of expert testimony
bv the lawver
Inadequate cross-examination of expert
testimonv
Inadequate communication by the expert of
his or her oninion to the trier of fact
The experts lacked credibility
Complexity of the expert evidence
Fundamental irreconcilability of views
exnressed bv oooosin!! exoerts
Testimony by the experts failed to directly ad
dress issues
Other (please specify)

Response
Percent
14.52%
45.16%
35.48%
25.81%
43.55%
69.35%
32.26%
4.84%

• What is your view about expert witnesses being present in the court
or administrative hearing to hear and comment on the evidence of other
expert witnesses ?

Over 70% of all respondents were of the view that it was helpful to
have the expert witnesses present in the courtroom or administrative
hearing to hear and comment on the evidence of the other expert witnesses. Nearly 20% were of the view that it made no significant difference and 10% said it was not helpful.
4. Reliability of expert witness testimony
• Is the courtroom a forum in which the reliability of expert theories
and techniques is adequately evaluated?

Most of the respondents, over 72%, responded that the courtroom
is a forum in which the reliability of the theories and techniques is
adequately evaluated. Over 19% answered "no" to this question and
8% had no opinion.
• Is the administrative hearing a forum in which the reliability of expert theories and techniques is adequately evaluated?

Over 42% of respondents had no opinion as to whether an administrative hearing was a forum that allowed for the adequate evaluation
of the reliability of expert theories and techniques. Nearly 41 % said it
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was, and 17% answered no. The fact that 57% of the respondents were
either trial or appellate judges explains the high "no opinion" response.

• Are most experts who give evidence before you representative of the
views of their discipline?
Seventy-three percent (73%) of all respondents agree that most
experts who give evidence are representative of their discipline. Over
24% had no opinion.

• If you answered No or No Opinion to the previous question, do you
think that this is a significant probkm for the quality offact-finding?
Of the total respondents, 26% answered the prior question with a
"No" or "No Opinion." Of those answering this question, 65% report
that this is a significant problem for the quality of fact-finding.

• Do the same expert witnesses appear regularly before you for the same
side?
Over 66% of the respondents have experts regularly appear before
them on the same side. Nearly 18% of the respondents do not, and
16% had no opinion.

• Have you had expert witnesses appear before you and give testimony
that is inconsistent with evidence that was presented uy them in a different case?
Of total respondents, 60% reported that expert witnesses did not
appear and give testimony that was inconsistent with evidence that they
presented in a different case. However, 27% of the respondents did
have this occur.

• If the answer to question above was 'Yes' did this affect:
o
0

o

Your decision to admit the evidence?
The weight you gave the evidence?
The ultimate decision in the case?

Nearly 71 % of the respondents who answered that they have had
evidence inconsistent with evidence the expert had presented in a different case, said that it did not affect their decision to admit the evidence. However, 74% said it did affect the weight given the evidence,
and 55% said it affected the ultimate decision in the case.
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• Have you encountered partisanship in expert witnesses caUed to gi,ve
evidence before you ?
Over 78% of the respondents have encountered partisanship in
expert witnesses called to give evidence.

• If you answered 'Yes' to the previous question, is this a significant
problem for the quality offact-finding?
Nearly equal responses were received as to whether this was a significant problem for the quality of fact finding, with 41.4% saying it was
a significant problem and 46.6% saying it was not a significant problem.
5. Participation by lawyers in preparation of expert witness reports
The following questions and tables show that approximately onethird of respondents are uncertain as to the extent of participation that
the lawyers have in the preparation of the expert witness reports. The
questions assess the lawyer's type of participation and the usual effect
upon the respondent's assessment of the evidence.
A substantial number, over 30% of the time, the respondent was
uncertain as to whether, and to what extent, the lawyer participated in
the preparation of the expert witness report. 254 Table 6 below, shows
the effect of the editing. The majority indicated that editing of the
report for spelling or grammar, or style and presentation, made no
difference to them. However, there was an even split at 42.9% each of
those who believe that editing for content either harmed or made no
difference. A slightly higher percent of respondents believed that editing for opinion or conclusion harmed ( 48.2%) compared to those that
believe it makes no difference ( 44.6%).

• In the expert reports that are tendered to you, does it appear that
lawyers have played a part in finalizing the report?
0

Report edited for spelling and grammar?

T able 2: Report Ed'1ted fior S,peIrm~an dGrammar
Answer Options

Never
Occasionally
Often
Always
Uncertain
254.

See infra Table , Table , Table 4, and Table .

Percentage
15.2%
18.2%
21.2%
7.6%
37.9%
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Report edited for sty/,e and presentation?

Table 3: Report Ed"1ted £or Sity1e an dP resentation
Answer Options
Never
Occasionally
Often
Always
Uncertain
o

Percen~e
12.1%
27.3%
16.7%
7.6%
36.4%

Report edited for content?

T abl e 4 : Report Ed"1ted £or Content
Answer Options
Never
Occasionally
Often
Always
Uncertain
o

37

Percen~e
13.4%
19.4%
22.4%
13.4%
31.3%

Report edited for opinion or conclusion?

.
..
or Cone1us10n
T abl e 5 : Report Ed"1ted£or 0 1p1n1on

Answer Options
Never
Occasionally
Often
Always
Uncertain
0

Percentaee
14.9%
22.4%
17.9%
11.9%
32.8%

What is the usual effect that this participation by the lawyers
has upon your assessment of the expert's evidence?

T able 6 U sua1 Efliecton Assessment ofE xpert Evi"d ence

Report edited for
spelling and grammar
Report edited for style
and presentation
Report edited for
content
Report edited for
opinion or conclusion

It helps

It harms

It makes no difference

44.6%

3.6%

51.8%

40.4%

7.0%

52.6%

14.3%

42.9%

42.9%

7.1%

48.2%

44.6%
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6. Usefulness of expert witness testimony
• Overall, how do you assess the usefulness of the WRJITEN expert
reports that are tendered to you?

Over 17% of the respondents consider the written reports to be
very good and nearly 41 % consider the reports to be good. Thirty-nine
percent of respondents consider the reports reasonable and 3% consider them poor.
• Overall, how do you assess the usefulness of the ORAL expert reports
that are presented to you ?

Thirteen percent of respondents considered the usefulness of oral
reports to be very good, 35% considered them good. The highest percentage of respondents considers the reports to be reasonable at 43%,
and nearly 10% consider the oral reports to be poor.
7. Authority to appoint experts
The next set of questions assessed whether or not the respondents
had the authority to appoint an expert, and if so, if they had exercised
the authority. If they had not exercised the authority, the questions
asked why not, and if they had exercised the authority, the questions
assess the usefulness of doing so.
• Do you have the authority to call an expert witness to assist you in
relation to the evaluation of expert evidence?

Over 82% of the respondents had the authority to call an expert
witness.

• If you

have such authority to call an expert witness, have you exercised it in the last five years?

Of those respondents with the authority to appoint an expert witness, 68% had never exercised the authority in the prior five years.
Seven percent (7%) had done so one time and 16% had appointed an
expert between two and five times. Only 9% had appointed an expert
more than five times in the prior five years.
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• If you have authority to call an expert witness,

but have not done so,
is this because: it is incompatibl,e with the adversary process; no party
has ever requested that I exercise the power; the parties have argued
against the procedure; it has not been necessary; other (pkase specify).

The smvey asked respondents to mark all of the answer options
that apply. The majority of 55% stated that it has not been necessary;
20% stated that no party has ever requested them to exercise the power; and 16% state that it was incompatible with the adversary process.
A large percentage 34% cited other reasons. Of those citing other reasons, the majority commented that it related to the cost of the witness,
and either not knowing who to charge, or expressing concern about
assessing the cost against a party that may not have the financial resources to pay for the expert.

• If you have appointed an expert, from the point of view of the quality of the fact-finding process was this not helpful, not very helpful, helpful, or very helpful?
All of the respondents (100%) who had appointed an expert stated
that it was helpful, of which 64% stated it was very helpful.

• If you have appointed an expert, how did you sekct the expert?
The survey asked respondents to select all applicable answers from
the answer choices. Fifty-five percent (55%) selected the expert in
consultation with the lawyers; 23% selected an expert in their complete
discretion; 18% selected an expert from an approved list; and 36%
responded 'other'. The 'other' category included staff experts or statutorily appointed experts. One respondent used an RFP (request for
proposals) process.

• If you have appointed an expert,

who paid the costs of the expert?

In 56.5% of the cases, the respondents allocated the costs between
the parties. In 39% of the cases, the court or administrative agency
paid the costs. In 8. 7% of the cases, the parties stipulated to the allocations of costs.

• Are you of the view that more use of court appointed experts woul,d
be helpful to the fact-finding process?
The majority of respondents (65.6%) believe that more court appointed experts would be helpful. Only 9.4% said it would not, and
25% had no opinion.
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8. Receptiveness to reforms
The next sixteen questions assessed the respondents' receptiveness
to various reforms that various international jurisdictions, including
England and Wales, and a number of Australian jurisdictions have
adopted or recommended.

• Are you in Javor of reforms that would create a paramount duty of
expert witnesses to the court or tribunal?
T a ble 7 : P aramount D uty to Court

All

Definitely Yes
Probably Yes
Probably No
Definitely No
Undecided

32.80%
34.30%
16.40%
3%
13.40%
99.90%

Fed
30.80%
30.80%
7.70%
0%
30.80%
100.10%

State

34%
36%
17%
3.80%
9.40%
100%

• Are you in favor of reforms that would require the expert witnesses to
discuss the issues among themselves in a pre-trial or pre-hearing conference or meeting without the attorneys or parties present?
T a ble 8 : P re h eanng D'lSCUSSIOil or Meetmg
All
Fed

Definitely Yes
Probably Yes
Probably No
Definitely No
Undecided

21.70%
40.60%
27.50%
1.50%
8.70%
100.00%

15.40%
46.20%
38.50%
0%
0%
100.10%

State
23.60%
38.20%
25.50%
1.80%
10.90%
100.00%

• Are you in Javor of reforms that would require the parties to present
a joint report of experts indicating areas of agreement and disagreement?
Table 9:Joint Report of Experts

All

Definitely Yes
Probably Yes
Probably No
Definitely No
Undecided

30.40%
53.60%
8.70%
2.90%
4.40%
100.00%

Fed
38.50%
46.20%
7.70%
7.70%
0%
100.10%

State
29.10%
54.60%
9.10%
1.80%
5.50%
100.10%
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• Are you in favor of reforms that would require the parties to consider
whether a single expert should be appointed, and if this is not appropriate, indicate why not?
T a bl e 10 C ons1"der s·mg.e
l E xpert

All

Definitely Yes
Probably Yes
Probably No
Definitely No
Undecided

26.10%
36.20%
21.70%
7.30%
8.70%
100.00%

Fed
38.50%
7.70%
30.80%
15.40%
7.70%
100.10%

State
23.60%
43.60%
20%
3.60%
9.10%
99.90%

• Are you in Javor of reforms that would require all written instructions and notes of oral instructions to be annexed to the expert's report?
T a ble 11 W.
ntten I nstructlons An nexe d to Report

All

Definitely Yes
Probably Yes
Probably No
Definitely No
Undecided

20.90%
29.90%
28.40%
3%
17.90%
100.10%

Fed
23.10%
38.50%
30.80%
0%
7.70%
100.10%

State
20.80%
26.40%
28.30%
3.80%
20.80%
100.10%

• Are you in Javor of reforms that would require expert witnesses to
specify the bases of their expert opinion in writing?
Table 12: Specify Bases of Opinion in Writing

All

Definitely Yes
Probably Yes
Probably No
Definitely No
Undecided

47.80%
40.60%
11.60%
0%
0%
100.00%

Fed
53.90%
46.20%
0%
0%
0%
100.10%

State
47.30%
38.20%
14.60%
0%
0%
100.10%
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• Are you in Javor of reforms that would require the expert witness to
specify all assumptions that they made in forming their opinions?

Table 13: Specify All Assumptions Made
All
Definitely Yes
50.70%
Probably Yes
40.60%
Probably No
8.70%
Definitely No
0%
Undecided
0%
100.00%

Fed
61.50%
30.80%
7.70%
0%
0%
100.00%

State
49.10%
41.80%
9.10%
Q.%.
0%
100.00%

• Are you in Javor of reforms that would require the expert witness to
disclose whether and to what extent their written reports have been
edited by the parties or attorneys that retained them?

Ta ble 14 ff1sclose Extent
Definitely Yes
Probably Yes
Probably No
Definitely No
Undecided

ntten Reports Ed"1ted
All
Fed

40.60%
29%
24.60%
1.50%
4.40%
100.10%

38.50%
30.80%
23.10%
0%
7.70%
100.10%

State
41.80%
27.30%
25.50%
1.80%
3.60%
100.00%

• Are you in Javor of reforms that would require the expert witness to
sign a declaration acknow'-edging their ro'-e as advisors to the court rather than advocates of the parties?

visors to Court
T abl e 15 Experts s·urn Dec larauon ofRo le as Ad.
Fed
All
State
Definitely Yes
31.90%
23.10%
34.60%
Probably Yes
23.20%
30.80%
21.80%
18.80%
23.10%
18.20%
Probably No
Definitely No
11.60%
7.70%
10.90%
Undecided
14.50%
15.40%
14.60%
100.10%
100.00%
100.10%
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• Are you in favor of reforms that would require the expert witness to
disclose whether their reports are inconsistent with any other report that
the expert has proffered in any other adjudicative or administrative
hearing?
Table 16: Experts Disclose if Report is Inconsistent with Prior Report
.
Oh
many
t er M atter
All
Fed
State
Definitely Yes
7.70%
22.10%
25.90%
Probably Yes
41.20%
53.90%
37%
Probably No
23.50%
30.80%
22.20%
Definitely No
4.40%
0%
5.60%
Undecided
8.80%
7.70%
9.30%

100.00%

100.10%

100.00%

• Are you in favor of reforms that would require all of the experts to
give their testimony together, in a form of discussion presided over by the
judicial officer, rather than in a traditional examination and crossexamination form (sometimes referred to as "hot-tubbing")?
Tbl
a e 17G"IVe E"d
VI ence Concurren tl1y - H ot T u bAapproac h
All
Fed
State
Definitely Yes
8.80%
8.30%
9.10%
Probably Yes
19.10%
8.30%
21.80%
Probably No
33.30%
32.40%
30.90%
Definitely No
14.60%
16.20%
25%
Undecided
23.50%
23.60%
25%

100.00%

99.90%

100.00%

• Are you in Javor of reforms that would promote more frequent use of
court-appointed expert witnesses?
T abl e 18 P romote More Frequent U se o fC ourt A,oomntedExperts

Definitely Yes
Probably Yes
Probably No
Definitely No
Undecided

All

Fed

23.50%
39.70%
16.20%
5.90%
14.70%
100.00%

7.70%
53.90%
30.80%
0%
7.70%
100.10%

State

27.80%
37%
11.10%
7.40%
16.70%
100.00%
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• Are you in Javor of reforms that would require the parties to disdose
whether a "shadow expert" has been used in preparation for the adjudicative or administrative hearing (an expert that has not been otherwise
disclosed) ?
T able 19 D"1sc ose 'Shad ow Expert

All

Definitely Yes
Probably Yes
Probably No
Definitely No
Undecided

26.50%
27.90%
30.90%
4.40%
10.30%
100.00%

Fed
38.50%
23.10%
30.80%
0%
7.70%
100.10%

State
24.10%
27.80%
31.50%
5.60%
11.10%
100.10%

• Are you in Javor of reforms that would limit the depositions of expert
witnesses?
Ta ble 20 : L"lffilt
. Depos1uons ofE xperts
All
Definitely Yes
11.60%
Probably Yes
17.40%
Probably No
40.60%
Definitely No
15.90%
Undecided
14.50%
100.00%

Fed
7.70%
23.10%
53.90%
15.40%
0%
100.10%

State
12.70%
16.40%
38.20%
14.60%
18.20%
100.10%

• Are you in Javor of reforms that would limit the interrogatories of
expert witnesses?
Table 21 Limit Interrogatones of Experts
All
Fed
Definitely Yes
11.60%
7.70%
Probably Yes
15.90%
23.10%
Probably No
44.90%
61.50%
Definitely No
13%
7.70%
Undecided
14.50%
0%
99.90%
100.00%

State
12.70%
14.60%
41.80%
12.70%
18.20%
100.00%
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• Are you in favor of reforms that would prorrwte "cost shifting" to include expert witness fees to compensate the winning party?
T able 22 P romote costshif.
Ung to I nc Iud e Expert
All
Fed

Definitely Yes
Probably Yes
Probably No
Definitely No
Undecided

7.30%
31.90%
33.30%
10.10%
17.40%
100.00%

0%
15.40%
53.90%
15.40%
15.40%
100%

1tness Fees
State

9.10%
34.60%
29.10%
9.10%
18.20%
100.10%

B. SURVEY RESULTS SUMMARY

The DTW survey results revealed that western water judges and
administrative officers experience the same problems with expert witness testimony that those in other international jurisdictions experience.255 According to the survey results, water judges and administrative hearing officers, described "adversarial bias" as the most serious
problem they have encountered with expert witness testimony. The
next most serious problem is use by the expert of oral or written language that is difficult to understand. The DTW survey also revealed
that judges who have difficulty evaluating the opinions of one expert
against another, blame first the fundamental irreconcilability of the
expert's views, and second the inadequate cross-examination of expert
testimony.
The DTW survey also revealed substantial support for many of the
expert witness reforms adopted in England, Wales, and Australia. Figure 2 shows the level of support for such proposed reforms. 256

255. See Masid, supra note 252. This author's dissertation, dated October 31, 2007,
contains a comparison to similar questions in surveys of judges and magistrates in Australia conducted by the Australian Institute ofJudicial Administration.
256. Figure 2 combines the affirmative responses "Definitely Yes" and "Probably Yes"
for the percentage showing level of support.
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Promote More Frequent Use of Cowt Appointed Experts

Experts Disclose if Report Inconsistent with Prior ~ in Other Mauer

Experts Sign Declaration of Role As AdviSOf'S to Court
Disclose C~ent Written Reports Cdited
51,)ecify All Assumptions Made

Specify Basa of Opinon In Writing

Writtl?n Instructions Annexed to Report

51% [
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I

62%:
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Joint Report of Expcru.
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I·1

Paramount Duty to Cou11

~.:,7%

:O_______: -----· :______ :_______: -- -- :_______ :_______: ------: _______ :------ :
Figure 2: DTW Proposed Reforms - Level of Support

The supported reforms involve a change in the culture of the adversarial use of expert witness evidence. The majority of the D1W
judges and administrative officers want greater transparency in expert
witness reports and support reforms that will make experts acknowledge that their role is to be an advisor to the court, and not an advocate of the parties.
The survey revealed that the majority of D1W judges and administrative officers are in favor of reforms that will:
• Create a paramount duty to the court or tribunal;
• Require experts to discuss issues prior to trial or hearing
without attorneys or parties;
• Require a joint report of experts that narrows the issues indicating areas of agreement and areas of disagreement;
• Require the parties to consider appointment of a single joint
expert;
• Require annexation of all written instructions and notes of
oral instructions to the expert's report;
• Require the expert to specify the bases of their opinion in
writing;
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• Require the expert to specify all assumptions that they made
in forming their opinions;
• Require the expert to disclose whether, and to what extent
the parties or their attorneys edited the written reports;
• Require experts to sign a declaration acknowledging their
role as advisors to the court rather than advocates of the parties;
• Require the expert to disclose whether their reports are inconsistent with any other report that they have proffered in any
other adjudicative or administrative hearing;
• Promote more frequent use of court appointed expert witnesses; and
• Require parties to disclose whether the party used a shadow
expert.
C.SUMMARY

The majority of water cases or administrative hearings include expert witness testimony. Most of those experts are testifying in the fields
of hydrology and geology. These experts rely heavily on complex hydrologic models. Case studies show that experts may manipulate hydrologic modeling to provide evidence supporting the party that retained the expert. The first stage in constructing a model is defining
its purpose. A biased model will more likely result where the expert's
purpose is to support the case of the party that retained such expert. If
that purpose instead is to provide the independent product of the expert uninfluenced as to form or content by the exigencies of litigation,
then adversarial bias and partisanship in model results will be less likely.
The DTW survey reveals that judges and administrative officers
support reforms that will make experts acknowledge that their role and
paramount duty is to be an advisor to the court, and not to be an advocate of the parties. The survey also reveals support for transparency in
expert witness reports. The judges and administrative officers want to
know: what instructions the expert received; what the expert relied
upon to base his or her opinion; what assumptions the expert made;
whether and to what extent the parties or their attorneys edited the
written reports; whether the reports are inconsistent with the expert's
other reports in other tribunals; and whether the parties have or will
use a "shadow expert." There is also support to require the experts to
meet prior to trial to narrow the issues and to provide a joint report of
matters upon which they agree and those upon which they disagree.
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The judges and administrative officers want the parties to consider
whether they should appoint a single expert, and they want to encourage more frequent use of court appointed experts. In short, the DTW
survey informs us that there is support on the part of the bench for
reforms that involve a change in the culture of the adversarial use of
expert witness evidence.
The DTW survey also reveals that there is support for more frequent use of court appointed experts. Although the majority of the
DTW judges and administrative officers currently have the authority to
appoint an expert, very few use that authority. Based on the comments
in the responses, there is a need to provide guidance to the judges and
administrative officers concerning how to compensate the expert, and
under what circumstances a court appointed expert is appropriate.

CONCLUSION

It is hopeful that if courts implement some or all of the proposed
reforms in water cases, that it will be less crucial for the judge or hearing officer to become more educated in the sciences, statistics, and
hydrology. The original purpose of having experts in the courtroom
was to assist judges in areas of expertise in which they lacked training.
A change in the culture of partiality will allow the expert to fulfill his or
her duty to inform the court, rather than act as advocate for one side.
Courts will require an expert relying on a hydrologic model to consider the first stage of designing the model with this purpose in mind.
The expert will provide unbiased useful information to the court,
without requiring the judge to become a scientist or engineer.
These changes will come closer to fulfilling the original purpose of
making exceptions to the rules of evidence to allow for expert opinions. Furthermore, men and women of science who appear in a court
or tribunal to assist the decision maker will be less likely to face having
their characters impugned or their credibility attacked.
These changes will make the adversarial setting less of a battleground, and should help to diffuse the battle of the experts in western
water wars. Reform in water matters is necessary not simply due to the
complexity of the issues. Reform in water matters is necessary because
water is a public resource, and finding better and fairer ways to share it
is critical as we move into a future of increasing populations, urbanization, and water scarcity.
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INTRODUCTION
The fundamental, life-sustaining properties of water rest at the intersection of two highly demanding and often competitive spheres: the
human society, defying gravity and geography in its quest for water,
and the natural environment, evolved and adapted to the rhythms of
the hydrologic cycle. A reflection of the historical patterns of rainfall
and water abundance across the United States, the development of

* A previous draft of this Article was selected as the winning essay for the 2007
Roscoe Hogan Environmental Law Essay Contest, sponsored by the Pound Civil Justice
Institute.
** B.A. Rice University; L.L.M. University of Kent at Brussels, Belgium; J.D. University of Florida Levin College of Law, expected May 2008. For my parents, Ching-tzu
and Carol Huang, and my sister, Lynn Huang. I am most grateful to Professor Christine Klein for her generous and insightful guidance and for challenging me to think
creatively about water law.
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water law split along the one-hundredth meridian. 1 States east of the
meridian have generally adopted common law riparianism while their
western counterparts have generally adopted prior appropriation. 2
Current and emerging conflicts over water resources - already numerous in western states and noticeably spreading to eastern states - illustrate the inability of traditional water law systems to balance the increased human demand for water consumption with the need to sustain water resources for the natural environment.
Vast expanses of parched land and intractable battles over rivers
and other water resources are common to the western United States,
where providing water for human consumption is a costly endeavor.
However, the relevance and applicability of these same descriptions has
shifted eastward. The current drought across the normally humid and
precipitation-rich southeastern states has left fields dry in Alabama and
Georgia and has exposed the bed of Florida's Lake Okeechobee for
the first time since record keeping began in 1931.' Meanwhile, protracted litigation over water rights in the west and northwest continues
as a result of over-appropriated rivers that further jeopardize species
and ecosystems.' As the population of the United States increases, the
demand for water will increase, compelling state governments and
Congress to reevaluate and modernize water and environmental protection laws.
A significant obstacle to the federal and state governments' ability
to modify these traditional water laws and to meet the demands of
competing user-groups is the looming specter of Fifth Amendment
takings claims by individual holders of water rights. Although approximately one-third of states have transitioned from traditional common
law riparianism to a statutory, permit-based system of regulated riparianism, the full impact of these transitions on riparian rights will become clear only as demand increases and individuals venture to the
outer bounds of their water rights. 5 In prior appropriation states, the
transition to compliance with federal environmental statutes has all. See Thomas Sarver, Salr,wn, Suckers and Sarrow: Rural Cleansing Under the Shadow
of the Endangered Species Act, 8 DRAKE]. AGRIC. L. 455,457 (2003).
2. Id.
3. Erika Bolstad, Lake Okeechobee: Businesses Suffer as Lake Okeechobee Dries Up, MIAMI
HERALD, June 1, 2007, at Al; Adam Nossiter, Drought Is Sap-ping the Southeast, and Its
Farmers, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2007, at Al. The low lake levels have also revealed high
levels of arsenic contamination in the lakebed, as well as artifacts dating back 2,000
years. See Audra D.S. Burch & Kathleen McCrory, Shallow Okeechobee Reveals Pool of
Relics, MIAMI HERALD,June 28, 2007, at Al; Andy Reid, Arsenic High in Muck Taken from
Lake Bed, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL,July 8, 2007, at Al.
4. See TROUT UNLIMITED, A DRY LEGACY: THE CHALLENGE FOR COLORADO'S RivERS 1,
7 (2002), http://www.cotrout.org/Portals/0/pdf/reports/legacy.pdf (discussing the
effect of increased water demand and litigation on the environment).
5. See generally Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Law of Water Allocation in the Southeastern
States at the Opening of the Twenty-First Century, 25 U. ARK. LITILE ROCK L. REv. 9 (2002).
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ready generated a number of takings claims. 6 Motivated by contradictory objectives for consumption and conservation of water, the inevitable strengthening and probing of water law systems will undoubtedly
cause takings litigation over water rights to mushroom across the future legal landscape.
This Article examines the application of the Fifth Amendment Takings Doctrine to transitions in state water law systems. These transitions include the movement of riparian states from traditional common law riparianism to pre-determined allocation systems and the
progress of prior appropriation states in complying federal environmental laws and other conservation measures. Under the Takings
Doctrine, state governments have generous latitude to enact and enforce state and federal conservation measures by curtailing individuals'
current and future water rights.' Courts tend not to view these measures as physical occupations or as depriving the water right of all economic value. 8 The effect of enforcing these measures is comparable to
the effect of zoning and land-use laws on real property, which courts
have consistently upheld as a constitutional exercise of the state police
power, not resulting in a taking that requires just compensation under
the Fifth Amendment. 9 Reasoning similar to those permitting local
governments to enact zoning and land-use laws without paying just
compensation will often defeat an individual's taking assertion with
regard to their water rights.
Part I examines the contours of water as a property right and the
current Fifth Amendment Takings Doctrine. Unlike real property or
other natural resources, water occupies time and space in a way that is
incongruous with traditional concepts of property. Thus, applying the
ever-evolving Takings Doctrine to water as property presents many
challenges. Parts II and III explore some of these challenges with respect to transitions in state water law systems and analogize these transitions to zoning and amortization in land-use law. In this context, takings issues arise in different temporal frames for common law riparian
rights and prior appropriation rights. In riparian systems, these transi6. See generally Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution, Property Rights, and the Future of Water
Law, 61. U. COLO. L. REv. 257, 258 (1990) ("At its crudest the claim would be that
whatever uses an appropriator has been making, and that have been recognized as
lawful in the past, must as a matter of property right be permitted to continue or be
compensated as a taking.").
7. Id. at 260 (stating that "[w]ater rights have no greater protection against state
regulation than any other property rights").
8. Id. at 261-62 (noting that courts view regulation of water rights as an acceptable
legislative exercise of the police power).
9. See generally Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (holding that
regulation prohibiting the erection of permanent habitable structures on property did
not constitute taking); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)
(holding that use restriction on property did not constitute a taking because it served a
substantial public purpose).
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tions affect the riparian's ability to expand or initiate new uses of water
in the future, whereas in prior appropriation systems, the transitions
affect the exercise of the current right.
Unifying these transitions, however, is the extent to which the law
treats water rights as vested property rights, an inquiry crucial to takings litigation. Parts II and III assert that both future riparian and
present prior appropriation water rights generally lack the concrete
parameters of real property rights. Courts are either unlikely to recognize such water rights as compensable property rights, or courts may
reframe the claim under other areas oflaw, such as contract law. Thus,
individuals who seek to recover just compensation under the Fifth
Amendment face many significant obstacles to prevailing, including
establishing a water right as a compensable property right.
Despite the dissimilarity between water and real property, the reasoning that sustains zoning and land-use laws without payment of just
compensation often applies to transitions in water law systems. While
the language of zoning readily applies to the takings claims that result
from transitions in riparian systems, proponents of conservation measures should borrow from the language of amortization to facilitate
transitions in prior appropriation systems. This Article concludes by
discussing the implications of these takings issues and their potential
application to other areas of environmental protection and future
transitions in water law.
I. BACKGROUND
This Part begins by discussing the contours of water rights as property rights and then examines the current and relevant aspects of the
Fifth Amendment Takings Doctrine. The degree to which the law
views water rights as property is crucial for a takings claim under the
Fifth Amendment. A water right holder must demonstrate that she has
a constitutionally protected property interest and that the government
has "taken" that property by enacting a regulation that "goes too far." 10
Thus, regulating water rights fdr t:!nvironmental and conservation purposes turns in part on the degree to which the law views a water right as
a constitutionally protected atm compensable property right. The
combination of the legal limitations on a water right and the physical
properties of water complicates the complainant's burden of establishing a compensable property right. 11 Not only do the federal and state
governments have broad regulatory powers over water, but individual
water right holders have limited rights to appropriate or receive water

Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922).
See Brian E. Gray, The Property Right in Water, 9 HAsnNGS W.-Nw. J. ENVfL. L. &
POL'Yl, 26 (2002).
10.
11.
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in conflict with federal and state mandates to protect endangered species, water quality, and other natural resources. 12
The necessary, but often incoherent, legal framework that courts
impose on water resources creates tension between private water rights
and state ownership of water. 13 Omnipresent considerations such as
the public trust doctrine, the federal navigational servitude, and permit
or contract limitations influence the private property nature of water
rights, whether riparian or appropriative. 14 For example, California
applies an extremely expansive public trust doctrine that requires protection of navigable waters from harm caused by the diversion of nonnavigable tributaries for irrigation and human consumption. 15 In Mono
Lake, the Supreme Court of California sought to reconcile the uncontested need to supply water to Los Angeles with the need to protect the
environmental and recreational values of Mono Lake, "a scenic and
ecological treasure of national significance." 16 The court declared that
the state has a duty to "protect the people's common heritage of
streams, lakes, marshlands and tidelands, surrendering that right of
protection only in rare cases when the abandonment of that right is
consistent with the purposes of the [public] trust." 11 The court thus
imposed an affirmative duty on the state to protect public trust uses
and to consider the public trust doctrine when planning and allocating
water resources. 18 The holding in Mono Lake demonstrates the overwhelming public interest in and the communal nature of water, aspects
reflected in the inherent legal limitations on water rights.
A. CONTOURS OF THE PROPER1Y RIGHT IN WATER RIGHTS

The traditional analogy of property as a bundle of sticks provides a
relevant point of departure for examining the property right in both
12. Id.
13. Id. at 2.
14. Id. at 26. See also Myrl L. Duncan, &conceiving the Bundle of Sticks: Land as a
Community-Based Resource, 32 ENVTL. L. 773, 792-93 (2002); U.S. v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121,
123 (1967) (holding that the government's exercise of a dominant navigational servitude was a "lawful exercise of a power to which the interests of riparian owners have
always been subject").
15. Nat'I Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court (Mono Lake), 658 P.2d 709, 721 (Cal.
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983). California's broad interpretation of the public
trust doctrine contrasts with more narrow interpretations of the public trust doctrine.
See People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1030 (Colo. 1979) (rejecting the public trust
doctrine to allow the public to recreate in waters above a privately-owned stream bed);
Rettkowski v. Dep't of Ecology, 858 P.2d 232, 236-37 (Wash. 1993) (declining to extend
the public trust doctrine to non-navigable waters and finding that the Department's
enabling statute does not permit it to assume the state's public trust duties in regulating water resources).
16. Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 712.
17. Id. at 724.
18. Id. at 728.
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riparian and prior appropriation water right regimes. 19 In this analogy,
the rights, or sticks, include the right to exclude others, the right to
possess, the right to use, and the right to alienate. 20 While these concrete rights readily apply to real property, water law originates from the
concept of res communei 1 in which individual ownership of resources,
such as air, does not exist. 22 The individual-centered "bundle of sticks"
analogy is difficult to apply to water rights because the property right
in water is unique, stemming from water's singular ability to sustain life
and nature as a common resource. 2'
The chemical, biological, and physical characteristics of water
render it an anomaly among property rights. When examining the
right to water use as property, courts should reconsider traditional
concepts of property law as applied to water, perhaps to limit the
property right itself as well as to reduce individuals' expectations. Water supports entire ecosystems of natural flora and fauna, channels
through the earth and the atmosphere via the hydrologic cycle, and
provides the foundation for society and development from the most
basic to the most complex level. 24 Unlike stationary natural resources,
and other fugitive natural resources, water occupies time and space in
such a way as to render attempts to measure or quantify it rife with un19. Many scholars have argued for a re-working of this "bundle of sticks" analogy
for the natural environment as property. See Craig Anthony Arnold, The Reconstitution
of Property: Property as a Web of Interests, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 281 (2002). As applied
to natural resources, the "bundle of sticks" concept violates fundamental environmental ethics by failing to recognize the interconnectedness of people and their physical
environments, and the unique characteristic of each object. Arnold argues, in his
article, for a new analogy of property as a web of interests, which remedies the gaps in
the bundle of sticks analogy. This web analogy affects the takings analysis by focusing
on whether the government has "radically altered" the relationship between the object
and the primary interest holder by shifting that primary interest to another interest
holder in the web. Additionally, this web concept, presented visually as the totality of
all interests in the object, tends to further the argument of this Article that restrictions
on water rights for environmental protection purposes are unlikely to constitute a
compensable taking, particularly when the primary interest holder is aware of the various interests in addition to her own. See also Duncan, supra note 14 (arguing that the
bundle of sticks metaphor fails to adequately consider public rights in a community
resource).
20. Arnold, supra note 19, at 285.
21. "Things common to all; things that cannot be owned or appropriated, such as
light, air, and the sea." BIACK'SLAWDICTIONARY 1333 (8th ed. 2004).
22. Duncan, supra note 14, at 791-92.
23. Id. at 775-76. In his article, Professor Duncan comments that the traditional
metaphor over-emphasizes individual parts, or sticks, while disregarding the entirety of
the bundle and the interconnectedness among parcels of contiguous property. Thus,
this microscopic and limited perspective fails to reflect the reality that ecosystem functions are not confined to real property boundaries, and defining water rights as this
individualistic and isolated "bundle of sticks" is even less reflective of the properties of
water.
24. See U .s. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, NAT'L WATER SUMMARY 1983 - HYDROLOGIC EVENTS
AND ISSUES 8 (1983)).
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certainty. 25 Natural uncertainties arise from meteorological conditions
and the inability to measure accurately quantities of available surface
or groundwater. 26 Human-induced uncertainties arise from factors
such as the diverse prioritization of values and numerous techniques to
measure available water. 27
1. The Nature of Riparian Water Rights

Riparians acquire water rights through the purchase of land that
abuts a natural water course. 28 Such rights are generally incorporeal
rights because they pertain to the use, rather than the ownership, of
the water. 29 In an early exploration of this property right, the court in
Tyler v. Wilkinson stated that "strictly speaking, [a riparian landowner]
has no property in the water itself; but a simple use of it, while it passes
along." 30 Courts traditionally preferred that riparians use the water on
their tracts of riparian land or, at a minimum, in the same watershed. 31
This on-tract preference represents sound watershed management and
environmental protection practices by retaining water in the same
drainage basin, permitting the return of run-off flows. However, with
an increasing geographic mismatch between demand and location of
water resources, the preference for on-tract use has diminished accordingly, 32
The elastic doctrine of reasonable use limits and quantifies riparian
water rights. 33 It accounts for factors such as the size of the stream; the
physical, chemical, and biological character of the stream; the purpose,
extent, duration, and method of use; and the customary use and needs
of other riparian landowners. 34 Thus, a determination of reasonableness must account for all relevant facts and circumstances, including
changes in social or economic values over time. 35 This elastic doctrine
provides the flexibility to incorporate environmental values into the
definition of reasonableness. The use of out-dated irrigation tech-

25. Gray, supra note 11, at 4.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. A. DANTARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES§ 3:9 (2007).
29. Id.
30. Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas. 472, 474 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827) (No. 14,312).
31. Christine A. Klein, On Integrity: Some Considerations for Water Law, 56 ALA. L. REv.
1009, 1041 (2005).
32. Id. at 1043.
33. TARLOCK, supra note 28, § 3.60.
34. Id. (quotingRedRiverRollerMillsv. Wright, 15N.W.167, 169 (1883)). Seealso
REsl'ATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 850A (1979) (noting similar factors for determining reasonable use: the purpose of the use, the suitability of the use to the watercourse,
the economic and social value of the use, the nature and degree of the harm to other
riparians, and equity and priority of use).
35. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 850A (1979).
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niques such as flooding fields or even watering during peak daylight
hours warrants increased skepticism when readily available and efficient techniques exist. 36 For example, prioritizing modem irrigation
techniques represents a method that will fold environmental protection objectives into the evaluation of reasonableness. At the same time,
this elasticity may also accommodate values favoring the consumptive
use of water, and the piecemeal litigation required to determine the
scope of riparian rights may result in a fragmented and inconsistent
approach to environmental protection.
The property right in presently exercised riparian water rights reflects the malleable parameters, which define riparian rights. The contingent ability to ertjoy the water right and the inability to quantify or
measure volumes of water use limits the property right. 37 State supreme courts have recognized that allocation of water among riparian
users and thus the water rights depend on future riparian users as well
as current users; therefore, the contours of the riparian right are
bound to change with the additional users or the definition of reasonableness.38 Courts have found vested, constitutionally protected property rights in the existing use of water, as decreed by state legislatures
or under state constitutions. 39 For example, a South Dakota statute
defines vested rights as domestic uses, actual application of a riparian
right to a beneficial use prior to the effective date of the prior appropriation system, certain rights granted by court decree, and water rights
neither abandoned nor forfeited prior to the 1907 water law. 40 Pursuant to this statute, the South Dakota Supreme Court upheld a riparian landowner's existing water rights but noted that the statute limited
the accrual of unexercised riparian rights.4 1
The property right in future, unexercised riparian rights is even
more tenuous than the property right in a current riparian water right.
In situations where the state is implementing a transition from ripa36. See Charles F. Wilkinson, We5tem Water Law in Transition, 56 U. COLO. L. REv.
317, 330 (1985); see also LYNN JENSEN & c.c. SHOCK, OR. STATE UNN. EXTENSION SERV.,
STRATEGIES
FOR
REDUCING
IRRIGATION
WATER
USE
1
(2001),
http://extension.oregonstate.edu/catalog/pdf/em/em8783.pdf (listing general irrigation strategies designed to reduce water use).
37. SeeTARLOCK, supra note 28, § 3:10.
38. Hoover v. Crane, 106 N.W.2d 563, 566 (Mich. 1960) (keeping a riparian's water-use decree open for "future petitions based on changed conditions"); Little Walla
Irrigation Union v. Finis Irrigation Co., 124 P. 666, 670 (Or. 1912) ("The extent of a
riparian owner's right to the use of water ... is necessarily indefinite, uncertain, and
subject to fluctuations, as it must always be dependent on the future like needs of other
riparian owners .... ").
39. Baeth v. Hoisveen, 157 N.W.2d 728, 733 (N.D. 1968) (holding that in a transition from riparianism to prior appropriation, the actual application of water to a beneficial use determines whether water rights have vested).
40. S.D. CoomED LAws § 46-1-9 (2004).
41. Belle Fourche Irrigation Dist. v. Smiley, 204 N.W.2d 105, 107 (S.D. 1973).
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rianism to prior appropriation, the unpredictable initiation of a future
riparian right complicates the determination of water rights along a
stream system and precludes appropriation of the remaining waters. 42
2. The Nature of Prior Appropriation Water Rights
The second pillar of water law is the prior appropriation system,
developed from customary mining practices in the western United
States." The essence of prior appropriation rights reduces to the expression "first in time, first in right." 44 Unlike the riparian system that
attaches water rights to the ownership of riparian land, priority determines acquisition of water rights in a prior appropriation regime, independent of land ownership. 45 The three elements of acquiring a
prior appropriation right are (1) an intent to appropriate the unappropriated waters of a natural water course, (2) the diversion of those
waters, and (3) the application of those waters to beneficial use without
waste. 46 The latter elements, diversion and the doctrine of beneficial
use without waste, inject a greater sense of certainty and stability to the
property right in prior appropriation water rights.
The element of diversion helped to stabilize property rights by giving notice to other potential users in the stream system and enabling
quantification of water use. 47 However, western states have begun to
expand the traditional concept of diversion, a move that in-stream recreational industries and environmental groups have heralded.48 As
early as 1958, Oregon established an in-stream flow right, followed by
Montana in 1970 and Colorado in 1973.49 In Colorado, the authority
to appropriate water for in-stream flows lies with the Colorado Water
Conservation Board, which must first determine the minimum flow
levels or water volume required "to preserve the natural environment
to a reasonable degree."5() Although Colorado limits these in-stream
flow rights to the Board, the Colorado Supreme Court recognized ap42. See In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Sys., 599 P.2d 656, 661 (Cal. 1979). See also
infra Part II.
43. TARLOCK, supra note 28, § 5:3.
44. Id.§ 5.4.
45. Id.
46. Id. §§ 5:60, 5:65-66.
47. Id. § 5:65. See also DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 92 (3d ed.
1997).
48. See
e.g.,
Sierra
Club,
Sierra
Club
Conservation
Policies,
http:/ /www.sierraclub.org/policy/conservation/water.asp (last visited Nov. 26, 2007)
("Comprehensive programs to ensure protection of instream flows should be enacted
in states and provinces where they do not now exist, and should be implemented in all
states and provinces.").
49. SASHA CHARNEY, DECADES DOWN THE ROAD: AN ANALYSIS OF INSTREAM FLOW
PROGRAMS IN COLORADO AND THE WESfERN UNITED STATES 20 (2005), availahle at
http://cwcb.state.co.us/Streamandlake/Documents/ISFCompStudyFinalRpt.pdf.
50. COLO. REV. STAT.§ 37-92-102(3) (2007).
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propriation of in-stream water for recreational purposes in 1992.51 The
court interpreted "diversion" to mean not only the actual removal of
water from the natural water course but also the control of water in the
natural water course. 52
Following the decision to expand the definition of diversion, the
Colorado legislature amended the Water Right Determination and
Administration Act of 1969 to permit local government entities and
water districts to apply for recreational in-stream diversions from the
Colorado Water Conservation Board. 53 The Board subsequently promulgated Recreational In-Channel Diversion Rules,54 and cities including
Golden, Vail, and Breckenridge filed suit for in-stream water allocations to support whitewater rafting and kayaking courses in the Colorado River. 55 Although these recreational diversions are primarily for
human benefit, that the recreational in-stream diversion results in ancillary benefits for the protection of fish and wildlife does not render
the appropriation invalid. 56 Thus, the benefit of in-stream water diversion for the environment and the aquatic ecosystems is incontrovertible, demonstrating the profitability of water-dependent businesses that
enhance, rather than impair, the natural environment.
The doctrine of beneficial use without waste also sculpts the property right in prior appropriation systems by enabling courts to determine a party's continuous application of water to a productive use. 57
The doctrine also serves to protect the aquatic environment by expanding the list of the beneficial uses to which a user may apply water. 58
Traditional uses include domestic, agriculture, and mining and power.59 Expansion of these uses has led to the inclusion of newer uses,
such as fish, wildlife, and in-stream protection, groundwater recharge,
wetland restoration and stream-flow augmentation, and other public

51. See City of Thornton v. City of Fort Collins, 830 P.2d 915,931 (Colo. 1992).
52. Id. at 930.
53. Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969, 1969 Colo. Sess.
Laws 1200, amended uy 2001 Colo. Sess. Laws 1187 (codified as amended at COLO. REV.
STAT.§ 37-92-102(5) (2007)).
54. 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 408-3 (2006).
55. Ten communities have obtained decrees for water rights, and four communities are currently awaiting final determination of their applications. See Colo. Water
Conservation
Bd.,
Recreational
In-Channel
Diversion
Program,
http:/ /cwcb.state.co.us/WaterSupply/RICD.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2007) ("There
are six communities that have obtained decrees for water rights prior to the passage of
Senate Bill 216: Fort Collins, Littleton, Golden, Breckenridge, Vail, and Aspen. [T]he
following communities have RICD water rights decreed under Senate Bill 216: Longmont, Gunnison, Steamboat Springs and Chaffee County. RICD water rights applications are pending for: Silverthorne, Pueblo, Avon, and Durango.").
56. City of Thornton, 830 P.2d at 931.
57. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S., 424 U.S. 800,805 (1976).
58. City of Thornton, 830 P.2d at 931.
59. City and County of Denver v. Sheriff, 96 P.2d 836,844 (Colo. 1939).
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interest uses. 60 One state legislature has even declared that the public
interest requires protection and maintenance of in-stream flows to
"preserve the minimum stream flows required for the protection of fish
and wildlife habitat, aquatic life, recreation, aesthetic beauty, transportation and navigation values, and water quality." 61
The combination of diversion and the doctrine of beneficial use
render water rights under the prior appropriation system more concrete than water rights under the riparian system. 62 The property contours of appropriative rights are more definite because the system operates by permits or judicial decrees that specify the place and quantity
of diversion and other discrete factors. 63 Because prior appropriation
quantifies the amount allocated to a water user, it is easier for one to
determine when a user diverts a reduced volume as opposed to a riparian right, where the doctrine of reasonable use quantifies the amount
of water used. In theory, the appropriation of water by priority also
avoids piecemeal and hindsight litigation of rights along a water course
because water users have a pre-determined, allocated amount. Thus,
individuals who claim a Fifth Amendment taking of an appropriative
water right tend to have a stronger property claim than those individuals claiming a taking of a riparian water right.
B. THE CURRENT FIITH AMENDMENT TAKINGS DOCTRINE

The current Fifth Amendment Takings Doctrine is a product of
continual judicial refinement. 64 The twelve words composing the doctrine - "nor shall private property be taken for public use without just
compensation" - have generated copious litigation that covers the
spectrum of property rights. 65 The doctrine prevents the government
"from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." 66 Federal and state environmental protection regulations, such as coastal

60. TARLOCK, supra note 28, § 5:66.
61. IDAHOCODEANN. § 42-1501 (2003).
62. See Dellapenna, supra note 5, at 19 ("Appropriative rights are basically a private
property approach to water allocation in which the water right is defined as to quantity, time, place, manner of use, and most importantly, according to its priority relative
to other users.»). The importance of water in the West most likely contributes to the
staunch protection of water rights as private property rights.
63. Seee.g., OR. REV. STAT.§ 537.140 (2005).
64. See John D. Echeverria, Lingle, Etc.: The U.S. Supreme Court's 2005 Takings Trilogy,
35 ENVIL. L. REP. 10577 (2005) (arguing that a trilogy of takings cases reflects the
Court's fairly conservative interpretation that the Takings Clause poses a slight imposition on public officials attempting to design programs in furtherance of the public
welfare).
65. U.S. CoNsr. amend. V.
66. E. Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 522 (1998) (quoting Armstrong v. United
States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
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management and protection of endangered species, increasingly affect
individual property rights for the benefit of the public. Thus, the success or failure of individual takings claims may ultimately dictate the
outcome of many conservation efforts.
As the Supreme Court stated in 1992, the two discrete groups of
"categorical" compensable takings claims are physical invasions of
property and regulations that deny all economically beneficial or productive use of property. 67 Courts evaluate takings claims that do not
fall into either of these categories under the factors established in Penn
Central. 68 The inquiry regarding which regulations most closely approximate the exercise of the government's eminent domain power unites
these branches of the takings inquiry. 69 Where an environmental protection regulation affects individual water rights, those individuals will
attempt to frame the regulation as a categorical taking, which is a clear
path to just compensation, rather than arguing the Penn Central factors.
Individuals seldom argue, and rarely succeed on the argument, that
the government has physically occupied their water right through a
given regulation. 70 On the other hand, the government or environmental groups that support the regulation will tend to frame the regulation under the Penn Central balancing factors, which require a factspecific inquiry. 11 Case law suggests that regulatory restrictions fare
better when parties characterize them as takings using the Penn Central
factors. 12
Physical takings are regulations that cause a permanent physical invasion of property, regardless of the physical size of the intrusion or
the public purpose behind the regulation. 73 The Fifth Amendment
explicitly requires just compensation for permanent physical occupations. 74 However, the Supreme Court has described these per se physical takings as "relatively rare, easily identified, and usually represent a

67. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
68. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). See also
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'I Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 321-24
(2002) ("For the same reason we do not ask whether a physical appropration advances
a substantial government interest or whether it deprives the owner of all economically
valuable use, we do not apply our precedent from the physical takings context to regulatory claims.").
69. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005).
70. See infra Part II.
71. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124).
72. See James H. Davenport & Craig Bell, Governmental Int,er[erence with the Use of
Water: "When Do Unconstitutional "Takings" Occur?, 9 U. DENV. WATERL. REV. 1, 69 (2005).
73. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435-40 (1982) (holding that just compensation is required for
permanent physical occupation resulting from the installation of television cables) and
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 265, n.10 (1946) (holding that physical invasion
of airspace functions as an effective ouster of a property owner from property)).
74. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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greater affront to individual property rights." 15 Individuals claiming a
Fifth Amendment taking of water rights have generally not succeeded
in characterizing the effect of a governmental regulation as either a
physical occupation or effective ouster. 76 The migratory characteristics
and even molecular composition of water make occupying water nearly
impossible in a traditional or constructive sense of the word. 77
The second category of per se takings occurs "when the owner of
real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle .... "78 The defense to this charge, however, provides that the government is not required to pay just compensation
where the regulation "inhere[s] in the title itself, in the restrictions
that background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance"
place on existing property ownership. 79 Despite the initial sense of victory among private property proponents, the ruling in Lucas has not
had quite the expected impact, much to the relief of the environmental community.80 In 2005, the Supreme Court significantly constricted
per se takings, concluding that categorical takings under Lucas are a
narrow exception for the extraordinary circumstance of a permanent
deprivation of all beneficial use. 81 Applied to situations where the
property at issue is environmental property, such as a piece of undeveloped land or unused water, it is difficult to imagine that the property
is completely valueless in its natural state. 82 As the Washington Supreme Court recognized, "land may have some economic value where
the [remaining] uses allowed are recreational." 83
75. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., 535 U.S. at 324.
76. However, in Franco-Am. Charolaise Ltd. v. Okla. Water Res. Bd., the Oklahoma
Supreme Court found a physical taking. 855 P.2d 568, 576-77 (Okla. 1990). See also
infra notes 153-160 and accompanying text.
77. But see infra notes 153-160 and accompanying text.
78. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019.
79. Id. at 1029.
80. See Michael C. Blumm & Lucas Ritchie, Lucas's Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVrL. L. REv. 321, 341 (2005)
(arguing that, to the likely chagrin ofJustice Scalia, government defendants after Lucas
increasingly relied on background principles to defend against paying compensation
because of the clear formula and ease of application of the Lucas exceptions).
81. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., 535 U.S. at 332.
82. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1044 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
83. Buechel v. State Dept. of Ecology, 884 P.2d 910, 918 (Wash. 1994). See also
Turner v. Del Norte, 101 Cal. Rptr. 93, 96 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972) (concluding that a
flood plain zoning ordinance that limited use of appellants' property to parks,
recreation, and agriculture did not effect an unlawful taking because appellants still
had numerous ways to benefit economically from their property); Hall v. Bd. of Envtl.
Prot., 528 A2d 453, 456 (Me. 1987) (holding that denial of a sand dune permit required to build residential structures on coastal property did not render the coastal
property valueless and thus did not effect a compensable taking where the landowner
still had seasonal recreational use of property and where adjacent property had sold
for substantial sums); Turnpike Realty Co. v. Dedham, 284 N.E.2d 891, 900 (Mass.
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Courts evaluate the remainder, and majority, of takings claims under the oft-quoted Penn Central balancing factors, which include: (1)
the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant; (2) the extent
to which the regulation has interfered with reasonable investmentbacked expectations; and (3) the character of the governmental action.84 The first factor requires examining the change in the fair market value of the property, accounting for realistic and probable uses. 85
The second factor consists of two elements: the extent of the individual's reliance on the existing regulatory scheme at the time she acquired
the property, and the "extent to which the further regulation of its
property was foreseeable." 86 Finally, the third factor considers the retroactive effect of the regulation and whether the regulation targets an
individual. 87 The impact of governmental regulations may range from
those approximating physical invasions to public programs "adjusting
the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common
good." 88 The balance of these factors relies more heavily on the economic impact and the interference with expectations than on the character of the governmental action. 89
For certain types of property with particular environmental value
or for natural resources such as water, the Penn Central balancing factors could include additional elements. For example, courts could
evaluate the physical, chemical, and biological functions, and characteristics of natural property as a background against which to assess the
reasonableness of the owner's expectations.90 Courts should be particularly wary of consumptive uses of land and natural resources, due to
an incomplete understanding of the effects and interconnectedness of
. 1 systems. 91
eco1ogica
Under this framework of property rights and the Fifth Amendment, Parts II and III of this Article focus on the application of the
property aspects of riparian and appropriative rights to transitions in

1972) (finding that the flood plain zoning that restricted development did not deprive
landowner of all beneficial uses where zoning ordinance specifically permitted a variety
of ecological, agricultural, and recreational uses).
84. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
85. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987). See
also Brace v. United States, 72 Fed. Cl. 337, 350 (Fed. Cl. 2006).
86. Brace, 72 Fed. Cl. at 354. But see Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 628
(2001) (rejecting a blanket rule that "purchasers with notice have no compensation
right when a claim becomes ripe").
87. Brace, 72 Fed. Cl. at 356.
88. Penn Centra~ 438 U.S. at 124.
89. See Lingle v. Chevron, U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540 (2005). See also Pataz.zow,
533 U.S. at 635-36 (O'Connor,]., concurring) (emphasizing a balanced approach and
cautioning against adopting "per se rules" in either direction).
90. Arnold, supra note 19, at 347.
91. Id. at 320.
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water law systems, analogizing these transitions to zoning and to amortization of non-conforming uses.

II. RIPARIAN RIGHTS IN TRANSIDON
Riparian water law systems tend to undergo two main transitions
that ultimately result in a pre-<letermined allocation of water: regulated
riparianism or prior appropriation. 92 These water law transitions are
often a part of states' efforts to improve and realize the need for protection of the environment and water resources. 9' Because these transitions generally protect existing riparian uses, they tend to generate
takings claims based on future expansion of the riparian right. Both
systems prevent the holder of a riparian right from expanding her water use on the basis of the reasonable use doctrine, the cornerstone of
the riparian right. The effect on the riparian is to curtail or effectively
eliminate her ability to initiate a previously unexercised right as a riparian landowner. Thus, the riparian owner argues that the regulation
that authorizes the transition has effected a taking of her future, unexercised right to water use.
Despite this potential for takings claims, the riparian owner faces
two significant obstacles. First, she must successfully argue that riparian water rights are a type of property protected under the Fifth
Amendment. In addition to the general limitations of framing water
rights as property rights, the property right in riparian water rights further escapes concrete definition because of the contingencies related
to the specific nature and definition of the riparian water right. 94
Where a state legislature has defined the scope of the vested property
right in water as part of the final transition, that statutory definition
may constrain the riparian landowner. Moreover, a future riparian
right is somewhat equivalent to a future expectation, the validity and
establishment of which is questionable. Second, a riparian must succeed on the argument that the transition to regulated riparianism or
prior appropriation effects a taking. The impact of these transitions is
analogous to the impact of zoning laws on real property, an impact
that courts generally do not recognize as a compensable taking. Applied to these water law transitions and relying mostly on the Penn Cen-

92. Although this Article addresses transitions from riparianism to regulated riparianism and prior appropriation simultaneously, the two systems remain distinct. Both
systems operate by allocating water to users before they actually use the water. However, regulated riparianism still functions with the elements of traditional riparianism,
such as sharing during times of water shortage. In prior appropriation systems, water
rights are based on temporal priority and users do not share water during a shortage.
See generally Joseph Dellapenna, Adapting Riparian Rights to the Twenty-First Century, 106
W. VA. L. REV. 539 (2004).
93. Id. at 590.
94. See supra Part I.
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tral balancing factors, courts seem to give state legislatures the necessary room to modernize common law riparianism, producing incidental benefits for environmental protection.
The weaknesses of riparianism, which are as plentiful as historical
water supplies in the eastern United States where riparianism prevails,
motivate state legislatures to transition into pre-determined allocation
systems. 95 Uncertainty and unpredictability resulting from the doctrine
of reasonableness plague riparianism. 96 In upholding California's transition from riparianism to prior appropriation, the California Supreme
Court described the uncertainty in riparian water rights as "pernicious
effects."97 Because the definition of reasonableness is dynamic, evolving as users increase their uses or as values on certain uses change, individual riparian landowners may be discouraged from making longterm investments using the local water resource. 98 The overall instability that the doctrine of reasonableness generates inhibits effective water
resource management. 99
Although riparianism's doctrine of reasonable use theoretically encourages sharing during times of shortage,1 00 parties' legal rights are
only adjudicated in a retrospective, piecemeal fashion. The environmental damage has often already occurred; thus, legal remedies under
riparianism are curative rather than preventative, undermining the
basic notions of protection and precaution. During litigation, courts
hesitate to adjudicate beyond the individual parties' rights, even
though the damage may extend to parties outside the lawsuit. 101 Further, the balance of interests in the reasonableness inquiry inevitably
favors large, wealthy users over small, domestic users. 102 By virtue of
sheer size, large volume users tend to have more economic investment
in the water use and, if ruled against, have a larger radius of social and

95. See Dellapenna, supra note 5, at 9.
96. Id. at 16.
97. In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Sys., 599 P.2d 656, 666 (Cal. 1979). See also
infra notes 131-144 and accompanying text.
98. In re Long Val/,ey Creek, 599 P.2d at 666.
99. Id.
100. See RESTATEMENf (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 35 (defining how the reasonableness of a water use "depends upon a consideration of the interests of the riparian
proprietor making the use, of any riparian proprietor harmed by it and of society as a
whole."). But see Dellapenna, supra note 5, at 9-10 (identifying the logical disincentive
for individual riparians to share a limited water source).
101. See In re Long Val/,ey Creek, 599 P.2d at 666.
102. See e.g., Amoco Prod. Co. v. Viii. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 545 (1987) (refusing
to grant an injunction where companies invested $70 million in oil and gas leases
compared to the village's concern for potential, but not probable, environmental
damage); Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870,873 (N.Y. 1970) (refusing to
enjoin the operations of a cement plant where the respondents had invested $45 million in the plant, which employed 300 workers, whereas the depreciation of the plaintiffs homes as a result of the pollution from the plant amounted to $185,000).
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economic effects than the latter. 103 Thus, the interests of the larger,
more affluent user will tend to outweigh the interests of smaller users.
Recognizing these weaknesses, states with traditional riparianism
transitioned toward systems of water law that required allocating water
in advance. Intentional or not, the move toward regulated riparianism
and even prior appropriation has produced benefits for preserving the
environment, by stabilizing water rights and expanding consideration
of environmental objectives. For example, Florida transitioned from
common law riparianism to regulated riparianism with the passage of
the Water Resources Act of 1972. 104 The Act embraces paradoxical
goals: simultaneously seeking to preserve natural resources and wildlife
and to protect the environmental and aesthetic value of public land
while enabling and managing the consumptive use and development
of surface and ground water. 105
This transition to regulated riparianism remedies common law riparianism, for example, by allowing the state permitting authority to
declare uniform restrictions on all water rights during or in anticipation of times of shortage, lessening the complications posed by posthoc litigation. Moreover, water conservation benefits arise from the
legislature permitting courts to consider the beneficial application of
water, along with the traditional reasonableness analysis. 106 This additional consideration imports the waste and economic efficiency analysis
from the prior appropriation system. 101 Florida defines reasonablebeneficial use as "the use of water in such quantity as is necessary for
economic and efficient utilization for a purpose and in a manner
which is both reasonable and consistent with the public interest." 108
Thus, water management districts theoretically may not grant permits
for environmentally unsound and wasteful applications of water.
A. THE TRANSITION TO PRIOR APPROPRIATION

In general, courts have not found that the transition from riparianism to prior appropriation or regulated riparianism constitutes a taking
103. Amoco, 480 U.S. at 545; Boomer, 257 N.E.2d at 873.
104. FlA. STAT. ANN. § 373.016 (2006) ("such waters have not heretofore been conserved ... the department ... shall ... manage those resources in a manner to ensure
their sustainability."). Florida's statute is a model statute for regulated riparianism.
Dellapenna, supra note 5, at 59.
105. FlA. STAT. ANN.§ 373.016(3) (2006).
106. Id.
107. Id.§ 373.016(3)(6). See also Dellapenna, supra note 5, at 61 (discussing meaning
of "beneficial" in Florida's regulated riparian statute). See generally Concerned Citizens
of Putnam County for Responsive Gov't, Inc. v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 622
So. 2d 520, 521 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (recognizing that the dual purpose of the
Florida Water Resources Act of 1972 is to conserve water resources while maximizing
beneficial use).
108. FlA. STAT. ANN.§ 373.019(16) (2006).
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of the riparian's right to initiate a new or expanded water use in the
future.")9 When addressing the nature of the property right, courts
tend to find that this future right is not a vested right which requires
compensation. 11 ° Courts also recognize existing state and federal regulations that limit water rights as compensable property rights and
states' broad police power to modify or implement water laws in order
to achieve greater certainty and goals related to the protection of water
resources.'" This latter prong further undermines the ability of individuals to claim a vested property right because the water right is perpetually subject to overriding federal and state interests.
Moreover, courts tend to find that the transition to a state's ultimate system of water law does not effect a taking because the curtailment of future expansion does not result from a compensable government action under the Penn Central analysis. 112 Rather, curtailment
occurs because of the riparian's inaction or failure to comply with the
statutory transition mechanism. This inaction may lead a court to find
that the riparian has abandoned her water rights. Courts also find that
the statutory reversion of water rights does not amount to an active
government taking. Similar to zoning, an impairment of the water
right or a mere diminution of its value does not constitute a taking.
For example, in addressing both the property aspect of water rights
and the nature of an alleged taking, the Texas Supreme Court held
that after notice and upon reasonable terms, the termination of the
riparians' continuous non-use of water did not amount to a taking of
their property and thus did not require just compensation. 113 Relying
on the scope of the property right in the riparians' water right, the
court found that the riparians held vested rights to a usufructuary use
of the waters that the state owns. 114 However, the riparians did not and
could not acquire vested rights to the non-use of water that they proposed to initiate at an indeterminate future date. 115 The court deter109. See e.g., In re Water Rights of the Upper Guadalupe Segment of the Guadalupe
River Basin, 642 S.W.2d 438, 444 (Tex. 1982) ("[A]fter notice and upon reasonable
terms, the termination of the riparians' continuous non-use of water is not a taking of
their property.").
llO. SeeTARLOCK, supra note 28, § 3:92.
111. See In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Sys., 599 P.2d 656, 665-66 (Cal. 1979)
(stating that the California Legislature's "comprehensive administrative scheme for the
final determination of all rights in a stream system" falls within their authority).
112. See supra notes 92-108 and accompanying text.
ll3. The Supreme Court of Texas upheld an adjudication of water rights along the
Upper Guadalupe River based on the Water Rights Adjudication Act. The riparian
landowners challenged the narrow statutory period to determine their water rights as
an unconstitutional taking of their vested rights. In re Upper Guadalupe, 642 S.W.2d at
444.
ll4. Id. (defining usufructuary as "the right to use, enjoy, and receive the profits of
property that belongs to another.").
115. Id.

Issue 1

TAKINGS & TRANSITIONS

67

mined that a four-year time period, coupled with sufficient notice, was
adequate to determine the scope of the riparians' use of water. 116 In
Texas, a right to use water beneficially forms the basic premise of a
vested water right. 117 Texas law considers non-use of the water as wasteful, and individuals cannot acquire a right to a wasteful use of water. 118
Pursuant to the Water Rights Adjudication Act, the Texas Water
Rights Commission eliminated rights that riparians asserted after the
effective date of the Irrigation Act of 1895 119 and limited riparian rights
to actual use between 1963 and 1967. 120 As a result, the Water Rights
Adjudication Act eliminated claims to future uses in excess of water
used during those years but provided for actual and public notice on
several occasions prior to making final determinations. 121 Adopting the
language of the Supreme Court of Oregon, the court held that the
Texas legislature's statutory mechanism for transition cannot be arbitrary, unreasonable, or unduly burdensome. 122 Where one could not so
characterize the government action, the court concluded that the riparian's failure to make use of the property right did not render the statutory forfeiture of that right a taking for which just compensation was
. d .123
reqmre
Similarly, in In re Deadman Creek Drainage Basin, the Washington
Supreme Court found that inaction by riparian landowners resulted in
a statutory reversion of the water rights to the state rather than a compensable taking. 124 The court noted that Washington's 1917 water code
116. Id. at 445 (citing Tex. Water Rights Comm'n v. Wright, 464 S.W.2d 642, 646-47
(Tex. 1971)).
117. Id. at441; TEX. WATERCO0EANN. § 11.026 (2000).
118. In re Upper Guadalupe, 642 S.W.2d at 445.
119. The Irrigation Acts of 1889 and 1895 implemented the dual system of water
rights in Texas, meaning that the state appropriates certain waters by permits but still
recognizes the rights of riparian owners. Id. at 440.
120. Id. at 444.
121. The state appropriates flood waters, the waters on lands granted by Spain and
Mexico, and the ordinary flow and underflow of streams on riparian lands granted
after July 1, 1895. TEX. WATER CooEANN. § 11.001 (b).
122. In re Uj1per Guadalupe, 642 S.W.2d at 445 (citing In re Willow Creek, 144 P. 505,
514 (Or. 1914)). The court emphasized that the mechanism must be "salutary and in
the interest of an orderly regulation of the use of water to be made by skilled officers
who have particular knowledge in that line."
123. Id. at 445-46 (citing Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 530 (1982) ("It is the
owner's failure to make any use of the property - and not Lhe action of the State - that
causes the lapse of the property right; there is no 'taking' that requires compensation.
The requirement that an owner of a property interest that has not been used for 20
years must come forward and file a current statement of claim is not itself a 'taking.'")). See also In re Yellowstone River, 832 P.2d 1210, 1219 (Mont. 1992) (holding
that a statute providing for the abandonment of water rights for failure to timely file
claims did not constitute a compensable taking).
124. In reDeadman Creek Drainage Basin, 694 P.2d 1071, 1077 (Wash. 1985). Here,
the State of Washington appealed a 1982 stream adjudication that held the changes to
the 1917 water code did not diminish the water available to riparians.
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established prior appropriation as the dominant system of water law in
the state. 125 In 1918, shortly after the passage of the water code, the
court held that "a riparian owner intending future use could not prevent condemnation by a nonriparian for an immediate use" of water. 126
In this case, the court concluded that users could only acquire new
water rights through the permit system. 121 Existing rights not applied
to a beneficial use did not qualify as vested rights and were therefore
lost. 128 The court emphasized the history and movement of case law
and legislative action toward the establishment of prior appropriation
and the elimination of riparian law as sufficient notice to riparians to
file claims for rights other than vested rights, including consumptive,
recreational, and aesthetic riparian rights. 129 Moreover, the transition
mechanism provided a fifteen-year period for riparians to file their
water rights, which the court found constituted adequate notice to riparian landowners to perfect their rights. l!IO
In contrast to the majority of takings outcomes reflected in Texas
and Washington, the California Supreme Court found that enactment
of a transition statute did not authorize the State Water Resources
Board to extinguish a future use of water unless the Board could show
that it could otherwise promote conservation policies as effectively. 131
In re Long Valley Creek represents the rare case where a court has recognized a future riparian right. 132 However, the ruling in favor of riparians represents a technical victory at best because the court interpreted the Board's powers broadly, enabling the Board to place significant limitations on future riparian water rights. 133 The court held that
the Board possessed the authority to define the scope of an unexercised riparian right, including lowering the priority of an unexercised
riparian right in relation to all present and actively exercised water
rights, which presents a fairly broad scope of government action under
125. Id. at 1072.
126. Id. at 1075.
127. Id. at 1072.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1077.
130. Id. at 1076.
131. In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Sys., 599 P.2d 656, 668 (Cal. 1979). In 1966,
nine claimants filed a petition with the Board for a determination of the water rights
along the Long Valley Creek system. The petitioner, Donald Ramelli, filed a notice of
exceptions to the Board's final determination of his water rights. For approximately
sixty years prior to the determination, Ramelli and his predecessors watered approximately eighty-nine acres of riparian land. In his petition before the Board, Ramelli
claimed prospective riparian rights to an additional 2,884 acres. The Board approved
Ramelli's claim to the eighty-nine acres and rejected his claim for prospective irrigation water for the remaining acreage.
132. Id. at 668-69.
133. Id. at 661. Pursuant to California's Water Code, the Board is authorized to
determine all claimed rights, based upon appropriation, riparian, or other bases of
right, to the use of water in a stream system. CAL. WATER CODE§ 2501 (Supp. 2007).
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the corresponding Penn Central factor. 134 However, the court declined
to construe the water rights determination procedure as enabling the
Board to extinguish completely the petitioner's future riparian rights.1!5
California had previously recognized that a riparian right exists
whether or not exercised and that dormant riparian rights are paramount to active appropriative rights.1 56 The court also recognized the
inherent inability of private lawsuits to provide "clarity, certainty, and
security to water rights and water users." 157 The court relied on the
language of and statutory definitions in the Water Code,1!18 which declares a policy of conservation of water resources and application to
beneficial, non-wasteful, and reasonable uses. 159 In light of these considerations, the court found clear authorization for the Board to define
and limit such prospective riparian rights. 140
Although the petitioner argued that he had a vested right to a future, non-quantified amount of water, the court found that the doctrines of beneficial and reasonable use continued to apply to any water
right. 141 Thus, to the extent that a future right violated these doctrines,
courts could not properly consider the right as vested. 142 The court reemphasized the state interest in promoting clarity and certainty in water rights, which would in tum "foster more beneficial and efficient
uses of state waters .... " 145 In addition, no property rights exist in the
unreasonable use of water, where courts can only determine reasonableness by considering all the needs in the stream system. 144 Thus, accepting the full scope of a vested future water right undermines state
efforts to further the public interest by stabilizing present water rights.

134. In re Long Valley Creek, 599 P.2d at 669 & n. 15.
135. Id. at 662-63.
136. Id. at 660.
137. Id. at 661.
138. Id. at 661-62, n.4.
139. CAL. WATER CODE§ 100 (Supp. 2007) ("It is hereby declared that because of the
conditions prevailing in this State the general welfare requires that the water resources
of the State be put to beneficial use to the fullest extent of which they are capable, and
that the waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable method of use of water be prevented, and that the conservation of such water is to be exercised with a view to the
reasonable and beneficial use thereof in the interest of the people and for the public
welfare.").
140. In re Long Valley Creek, 599 P.2d at 661. The California Water Code states that
every decree for determination of water rights shall declare "the priority, amount,
season of use, purpose of use, point of diversion, and place of use of the water ...
[and] other such factors as may be necessary to define the right" to use the water with
respect to each party. CAL. WATER CODE§ 2769 (Supp. 2007).
141. In re Long Valley Creek, 599 P.2d at 663.
142. Id. at 661, n.3.
143. Id. at 668.
144. Id. at 665.
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B. THE TRANSITION TO REGULATED RIPARIANISM
As discussed earlier, Florida's Water Resources Act of 1972 signaled
the state's transition to regulated riparianism. 145 Similar to the transitions discussed above, the takings inquiry hinges on the interpretation
of the nature of the riparian's property right in water. Transitions
from common law riparianism to regulated riparianism are also unlikely to effect a compensable taking of a future water right. In addition to
the lack of a vested property right in future uses, courts focus on the
failure or non-action of riparians to comply with statutory requirements for obtaining permits, rather than the character of the government action. 146
The Florida Supreme Court held that a developer did not have a
constitutionally protected right in the water beneath its property and
thus could not succeed on a takings claim for just compensation. 147
Here, the court framed the property right in water as usufructuary rather than recognizing ownership in the corpus of water. 148 Because of
the migratory and transient nature of the water and its temporary location on the owner's property, the court limited the property right to
use and not ownership of the corpus of water. 149 The court held that
the provision of the Act that gave riparians two years to transition into
the permit system did not effect a taking, noting the failure of the riparian to obtain permits within the statutory timeframe. 150 Thus, loss of
the water right resulted from the riparian's abandonment, not from
145. The Act divides responsibility for water management into five districts, organized not along political lines but instead along natural hydrological boundaries for a
more accurate representation of both supply and needs. FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 373.069(1)
(Supp. 2007). All water users are required to obtain permits for use of water, excluding domestic uses and other exemptions for minimal adverse impacts on water resources. Id. § 373.219(1). The permits may last for up to fifty years for municipalities
and public service corporations, but permit holders must apply to renew their permits
at the end of the duration. Id. § 373.236. See supra notes 104-108 and accompanying
text.
146. See, e.g., Viii. of Tequesta v.Jupiter Inlet Corp., 371 So. 2d 663,671 (Fla. 1979).
147. Id. at 670. The Water Resources Act of 1972 integrates the treatment of surface
and ground water. FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 373.019(20) (Supp. 2007). In this case,Jupiter
Inlet Corporation planned to build a 120-unit condo complex, located approximately
1,200 feet from Tequesta's well field, which drilled into a shallow-water aquifer. Tequesta, 371 So. 2d at 665. As a result of excess withdrawals, intrusion of salt water threatened the shallow water aquifer as a result of the pressure imbalance between the water
level in the saline inter-coastal waterway and the water level in the shallow-water aquifer. Id. Because Jupiter was denied a permit to withdraw water from the shallow-water
aquifer, Jupiter filed suit for inverse condemnation and an injunction due to the excessive pumping by Tequesta. Id.
148. Tequesta, 371 So. 2d at 667 (ownership in reference to water rights has never
meant that the overlying property owner had a property or proprietary interest in the
corpus of the water itself).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 671.
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any state action resulting in a compensable taking. 151 The court found
that mere impairment of private property, rather than actual and direct encroachment, was consequential damage that did not entitle the
owner to just compensation. 152

C. THE ZONING ANALOGY
Under these pre-determined allocation systems, restricting the ability of a riparian to initiate new uses of water is analogous to restricting
the future use of real property through zoning laws, the enactment of
which the seminal Euclid ruling first recognized as constitutional. 153 In
the same way that modem life necessitates zoning laws to achieve a
balance between unchecked development and the public welfare benefits of organized development, modem demands on water supplies also
necessitate a compromise between human consumptive use and protection of the natural environment. Both zoning laws for real property
and the transition to a pre-determined allocation system of water law
address the exercise of an unspecified future right to expand uses.
Legislatures enact both types of laws based on predictions about future
conditions or values. In addition, the effects of zoning laws and riparian water law transitions extend to a group of similarly-situated individuals, including the affected individuals themselves. Moreover, the
restrictions ultimately benefit and further the public interest.
As a matter of substantive due process, zoning is unconstitutional
where the zoning provisions are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable and
have no substantial relation to public health or welfare. 154 Along the
spectrum of valid zoning purposes, courts have recognized the validity
of zoning for protection of the environment. 155 For example, when a
landowner challenged the validity of a zoning ordinance that limited
current and future use of land to agriculture in an environmentallysensitive area, the New Jersey Supreme Court emphasized that prevention of damage to the environment "constitutes a particularly strong
justification for prohibiting inimical uses. "156 Other state courts have
upheld similar uses of zoning to achieve environmental goals. 157
151. Id.
152. Id. at 669 (citing Seldon v. City of Jacksonville, 10 So. 457, 461 (Fla. 1891) ).
Here, the petitioner also attempted to equate the permit denial to an effective ouster
of the overlying real property. Id. at 670. However, the court rejected this argument,
noting that the developer still retained beneficial use of the property without the water
permit and that the developer nonetheless developed the property to its highest and
best use, whereas in similar airspace cases, the owners were deprived of all beneficial
use of their property. Id. See generally supra note 73.
153. Viii. ofEuclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926).
154. Id. at 395.
155. Gardnerv. NJ. Pinelands Comm'n, 593A.2d 251,258 (NJ. 1991).
156. Id. In passing the New Jersey Pinelands Protection Act, the legislature sought
to protect and preserve the land and water resources and to deter scattered develop-
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Whether zoning laws effect compensable takings under the Fifth
Amendment, however, is an inquiry that resonates under either the
two per se categorical takings or the Penn Central balancing factors. 158
Government efforts to achieve water resource protection would stagnate if faced with a takings claim every time it effected a reduction of
property value. 159 As noted earlier, the Fifth Amendment Takings Doctrine does not prohibit the government from enacting regulations on
private property, but it requires compensating individuals who bear an
excess of the regulatory burden. 160
Within the Takings Doctrine, the idea of conceptual severance applies to both zoning laws and water law transitions. 161 In these situations, distinct temporal frames separate the rights of the property owner or the riparian: the present right of use and the future, expanded,
or additional right of use. 162 In Penn Centra~ the majority opinion referred to this idea by noting that '" [ t] aking' jurisprudence does not
divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine
whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated." 163
Instead, a holistic determination examines "the character of the action
and ... the nature and extent of the interference with rights in the
parcel as a whole .... "164 In Lucas, the landowner argued that sever-

ment in the Pinelands. Id. at 254. The regulatory takings claim in this case was decided under the framework that the Court provided in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S.
255, 260-61 (1980), which the Supreme Court later abrogated in Ling/,e, 544 U.S. at
540, as conflating the substantive due process with takings jurisprudence.
157. See, e.g., Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So.2d 1374, 1381 (Fla. 1981)
(upholding denial of permit to build along the Florida coast where increased density
would cause adverse environmental impacts to an ecologically sensitive shoreline); F.S.
Plummer Co., Inc. v. Town of Cape Elizabeth, 612 A.2d 856, 860 (Me. 1992) (upholding zoning ordinance to be valid exercise of town's police power); Home Builders
Ass'n of Cape Cod, Inc. v. Cape Cod Comm'n, 808 N.E.2d 315, 321 (Mass. 2004)
(upholding validity of zoning an entire town as a district of critical planning concern
to protect the water resources).
158. See Lingle v. Chevron, U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540 (2005) (abrogating the
Agins taking test as a due process test with "no proper place" in takings jurisprudence).
See also supra Part I.
159. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (citing
Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,413 (1922)).
160. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 536-37 (citing First Eng. Evangelical Lutheran Church of
Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 314 (1987)).
161. See generally Danaya C. Wright, A New Time for Denominators: Toward a Dynamic
Theory of Property in the Regulatory Takings Relevant Parcel Analysis, 34 ENVIL. L. 175, 190214 (2004) (providing a detailed discussion of severance); Margaret Jane Radin, The
Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 1667, 1676 (1988).
162. Wright, supra note 161, at 177.
163. Penn Centra~ 438 U.S. at 130.
164. Id. at 130-31 (emphasis added).
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ance of a portion of his land deprived the land of all economically
beneficial value. 1" 5
However, the Court in Tahoe-Sierra firmly circumscribed this approach, and noted its flaw is because the "aggregate must be viewed in
its entirety," and thus the destruction of one strand in the bundle of
sticks does not amount to a taking. 166 The Court held that a thirty-twomonth moratorium on building, which an environmental planning
and development agency ordered to study growth in the Lake Tahoe
region, did not constitute a categorical taking and courts should evaluate such circumstances using the Penn Central balancing factors. 167
Applying the "parcel as a whole" evaluation, the majority opinion
noted that an interest in real property has both geographic and temporal dimensions that a court must consider together. 168 These dimensions are equally applicable to water rights, where the "metes-andbounds" geographic dimension translates into the less concretely defined volume of water for riparian use. 169
The ability of a property owner to prevail on a takings claim by severing a future right from the present right would render futile attempts to zone and plan land-use. When riparian water rights transition into a pre-determined allocation system, a court should not find a
taking upon considering the restriction on the expansion of the future
riparian right in context with the entire riparian right. Having rejected
or simply not entertained this conceptual severance as applied to zoning, courts seem poised to reject this form of temporal severance following the Court's ruling in Tahoe Sierra. 110 In applying the "parcel as a
whole" evaluation to real property, courts should consider several factors: the landowner's economic expectations of the property; whether
and the extent to which one treats the property as a single economic
unit; the degree of continuity between property interests; the acquisition dates of the property interests; and the effect of the regulation on
the remaining lands. 111 While courts have articulated these factors in
the real property context, they could undertake a similar analysis for
165. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1009 (1992). In Lucas, the petitioner was a part owner of the development from which he purchased two single parcels in an area that was "notoriously unstable." Id. at 1038 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
The majority viewed the two single parcels in isolation, independent of the petitioner's
prior ownership and development of the surrounding acreage, and found that the two
parcels had no value after the application of the government regulation. Id. at 1020
(majority opinion).
166. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'! Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
327 (2002) (citing Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979) ).
167. Id. at 306, 326-27.
168. Id. at 331.
169. Id. at 331-32.
170. Temporal severance is "the taking of a temporal slice of the property pie over
time." Wright, supra note 161, at 214.
171. Brace v. United States, 72 Fed. Cl. 337, 348 (Fed. Cl. 2006).
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water rights. For example, although a riparian acquires the entirety of
a riparian right on the date the riparian acquires real property, the
reasonable use doctrine limits the riparian's economic expectations
arising from a future expansion. 172 The effect of the transition on the
present water right is non-existent, and the initiation of a future right
interrupts the continuity between water uses.
Even given a compensable private property right, courts overwhelmingly find that zoning and its inevitable restrictions on the use of real
property do not effect takings for which the government must pay just
compensation under the Fifth Amendment. 173 Aside from the relatively
narrow categories of per se takings, the remainder of takings challenges fall under the Penn Central balancing test, focusing primarily but
not exclusively on the economic impact of the zoning regulation. 174
For example, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts found that a zoning
regulation prohibiting residential structures on land in a coastal conservancy district did not effect a compensable taking, even where the
ordinance became effective after the landowner acquired the property. 17s
Evaluating the claim under Lucas, the court found that the undeveloped lot retained a minimum value of $23,000, not including nonresidential uses such as recreation, fishing and shell fishing, and installation of floats, which the ordinance specifically permitted. 176 The
court noted that the Lucas total deprivation claim does not rest on the
deprivation of the single, subjective use that the landowner intends for
her property. 177 Applying the Penn Central balancing factors instead,
the court emphasized that the property's remaining value mitigated
the economic impact, and that the property's exposure to wind erosion, flooding, and other natural elements decreased the property
owner's reasonable investment-backed expectations. 178 Thus, the court
found that the sum of these factors did not amount to a compensable
taking.179
172. Id.
173. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262 (1980) (finding that zoning
ordinances benefited land owners as well as the community, and thus did not effect a
taking that required compensation).
174. See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
175. Gove v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 831 N.E.2d 865, 867 (Mass. 2005).
176. Id. at 869 n. 7, 872.
177. Id. at 872.
178. Id. (citing Lingle v. Chevron U.SA. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 544 (2005)). In Gove,
the landowner inherited the land and was thus not a bona fide purchaser for value who
invested reasonably in land fit for development. Id. at 874. The court held that the
remaining value of $23,000 suggested more than a "token interest." Id. at 872.
179. Id. at 865. See also Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374, 1382
(Fla. 1981) (holding that denying a permit to build in a substantial wetland area did
not constitute a taking where the primary evidence of economic impact was Estuary's
own "self-serving statement" and where Estuary's expectations were based on subjective
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In a similar case, a Florida court held that land-use regulations that
restricted the landowner's future use of property in a resource protection area did not effect a compensable taking. 180 The zoning of the
resource protection area addressed conseivation concerns expressed
by state legislation. 181 The landowners failed to show that the regulation denied "all or a substantial portion" of the beneficial uses of their
property, even though the restrictions affected more economically valuable uses of the property. 182 Also applying the Penn Central balancing
factors, the court found that the mere diminution of the value of the
landowner's property was insufficient to establish a deprivation of all or
a substantial portion of the beneficial use of the property. 183
Although courts and litigating parties have used the zoning analogy
sparingly in the water rights context, it is particularly germane for resolving takings claims of future riparian water rights. Where a riparian
in Wisconsin failed to obtain the necessary permits under the regulated riparianism system, the state supreme court emphasized that the
impairment of a water right does not amount to a compensable taking.184 In conducting the takings inquiry, the court recognized the
broad authority and interest of the state to prevent "the public harm of
dry riverbeds replacing flowing streams. "185 The court analogized the
transition process to zoning, describing the transition process as affecting "all in a particular classification alike. "186 Because the damage that
the defendants suffered was only incidental and not an unreasonable
burden to bear for the public good, the court found that no taking had
occurred. 187
The zoning analogy anchored the dissenting opinion of FrancoAmerican Charolaise, an exceptional case where the Oklahoma Supreme
Court found a compensable taking of a constitutionally protected future riparian right. 188 In this case, the Oklahoma Supreme Court exexpectations to be able to build as it wished rather than reliance on existing regulations).
180. Glisson v. Alachua County, 558 So. 2d 1030, 1038 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
The protection area contained wetlands, exceptional upland habitat, hammock zones,
and active use zones. Id. at 1032. Each portion of the protection area permitted increasing use for development, from no construction activities in the wetlands to full
development in the active use zones. Id. at 1032-33.
181. Id. at 1036-37.
182. Id. at 1037.
183. Id.
184. Omernik v. State, 218 N.W.2d 734,743 (Wis. 1974).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 744.
188. Franco-Am. Charolaise, Ltd. v. Okla. Water Res. Bd., 855 P.2d 568, 582-83 (Okla. 1990). The Oklahoma Water Resources Board determined the water rights of existing users along Byrd's Mill Spring and then allocated the remaining amount of water
to the City of Ada. Id. at 571. The riparian owners contested this allocation as eliminating their future water rights. Id. at 576.
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panded the scope of the vested private property right to include presently exercised and future unexercised rights to use water, bound by
the doctrine of reasonableness. 189 The court declared that riparian
owners enjoy a "vested common law right to the reasonable use of the
stream ... [that is] a valuable part of the property owner's 'bundle of
sticks' and may not be taken for public use without compensation," 190
pursuant to the state constitution. Departing from a majority of states,
the Oklahoma Supreme Court found that the statutory mechanism to
perfect riparian water rights failed to protect the full scope of the
rights, highlighting the central role of the doctrine of reasonableness.191
However, the dissent forcefully disagreed with the majority's disregard of the zoning analogy. 192 As in zoning, the dissent opined that the
legislature is free to decide that a non-continuous, future exercise of a
riparian right is injurious and wasteful of water as a public resource. 193
While Oklahoma's transition to prior appropriation may limit a riparian landowner's non-quantified future exercise of his right, the regulations neither physically deprived the landowner of the present use of
the water nor deprived the landowner of all economic use of his land. 194
The majority found an outright taking of the riparian right rather than
simply a restriction, 195 which seems to implicate temporal severance of
future rights from present rights warned against by precedent. Moreover, as concluded by the Texas and Washington Supreme Courts, the
curtailment of the future exercise of a riparian right results from the
riparian's inaction, rather than a compensable taking by government
189. Id. at 578.
190. Id. at 571.
191. Id. at 577. The court found that the 1963 water law amendments, upon which
the Board determined water rights along the stream, were "fraught with a constitutional infirmity" in abolishing the right of riparian owners to assert prospective reasonable
uses of stream water. Id. Under this statutory mechanism, riparians must assert future
rights as appropriators instead of being free to use a non-quantified amount, within
the bounds of reasonableness, at any given time in the future. Id. at 573. Furthermore, the system required quantification of a previously non-quantified amount, contrary to the basis of riparian rights. Id.
192. Id. at 582-83 (Lavender,]., dissenting).
193. Id. at 584.
194. Id. at 583. The dissent argued that the prospective or future reasonable use is
not a vested right, in part because of the reasonable limitations - including forfeiture to which the riparian rights are subject. Id. at 582. The dissent also argued that the
majority failed to adequately recognize legislative efforts to phase out riparian law and
implement prior appropriation in Oklahoma. Id. at 584. In 1993, the Oklahoma legislature responded to the holding in Franco-American by passing legislation that replaced
"the incompatible dual systems of riparian and appropriative water rights ... with an
appropriation system of regulation" governed by the principles of beneficial use of
water and priority in time. Heldermon v. Wright, 2006 OK 86, ,i 9, 152 P.3d 855, 859
n.21 (Okla. 2006) (citing OKL. STAT. tit. 82, § 105.l(A) (2007)). To date, the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma has not ruled on the constitutionality of this statute.
195. Franco-American, 855 P.2d at 577.
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action. 196 Under a comprehensive Penn Central analysis, these considerations tend to compliment the dissent in Franco-American rather than
the majority opinion.
These riparian transition cases, buttressed by the zoning analogy,
demonstrate the difficulty for a riparian water rights holder to succeed
on a takings claim for future, unexercised use, giving states wide, but
not unlimited, latitude to transition from existing riparian water law
provisions into more environmentally sensitive and sensible provisions.
While present uses may translate into vested water rights, courts view
rights to future uses as exceedingly tenuous and disruptive of an already unstable water rights regime. 197 Thus, courts are hesitant to
attribute a vested and constitutionally protected property right to these
future rights. 198 Even in the rare case where courts recognize a vested
property right in a riparian right to future use, courts nonetheless attempt to reconcile the future right in light of the purposes and benefits of the system of water law from which riparianism transitioned. 199
This framework helps protect the environment and water resources for
states but may have the unintended consequence of encouraging riparian landowners to establish unnecessary but reasonable present uses
to protect their rights in the future. With an expanded list of uses,
states may appropriate water previously reserved for future uses to other environmentally beneficial uses. For future riparian takings claims,
this trend suggests that state legislatures may continue to strengthen
water laws and, with adequate safeguards for due process, minimize
payment of just compensation for the enactment of environmentally
protective measures.

III. APPROPRIATIVE RIGHTS IN TRANSITION
In situations where prior appropriation rights are in transition, the
takings issue arises with the reduction of water allocations for active,
present uses for efficiency purposes or due to compliance with statutory regulations. When addressing just compensation under the current
Fifth Amendment Takings Doctrine, courts have generally found that
compliance with federal regulations does not effect compensable takings of private property rights through classifying the claim as a contract issue with relevant monetary damages. 200 As such, the question is
not whether the state has the regulatory authority to constrain property
196. In re Water Rights of the Upper Guadalupe Segment of the Guadalupe River
Basin, 642 S.W.2d 438, 444 (Tex. 1982); In re Deadman Creek Drainage Basin, 694
P.2d 1071, 1077 (Wash. 1985).
197. See In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Sys., 599 P.2d 656,661 n.3 (Cal. 1979).
198. Id. at 668-69.
199. See Franco-American, 855 P.2d at 577.
200. See Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 504, 534 (Fed. Cl.
2005).
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uses. The rulings of the Supreme Court reveal that states have the authority to constrain uses of property for the purposes of environmental
protection, to conserve natural resources by requiring greater efficiency, and to legislate more efficient administration. 201
The transition of prior appropriation laws concurrently reflects an
independent need for environmental protection and the inability of
the prior appropriation system to conserve or protect water resources.
The weaknesses of the prior appropriation system hinder adequate
protection of natural watercourses and the surrounding environment. 202 The sense of certainty induced by the priority system, overlain
with piecemeal resolution of conflicts and additional federal constraints, is often misleading. 203 Gaps in the recording of priority exist
throughout prior appropriation states because many water appropriations from valuable watercourses remain unquantified. 204 In addition,
the loss of water rights through forfeiture and abandonment undermine the definitiveness of priority. 205 The maze of state regulations and
amendments cloud the question of certainty and require detailed examination into the historical developments of water law. 206
Furthermore, the prior appropriation system encourages premature development of water sources and potentially unnecessary use. 207
Appropriators benefit from establishing a history of use, regardless of
the application or wisdom of the use. 208 Strict adherence to prior appropriation is also problematic during times of water shortage. Junior
appropriators receive water only after the senior appropriators call for
their full allocation; thus, the junior appropriators tend not to receive
any water at all. 209 Because users of this common resource do not share
the risk of shortage evenly, senior appropriators may continue unproductive, inefficient uses of water while junior appropriators suffer the
loss of potentially highly productive uses of water. 21 ° Finally, even
where legislatures have passed environmental protection measures in
accordance with the public interest, the measures tend to apply not to
201. Sax, supra note 6, at 262. See also generally Echeverria, supra note 64 (discussing
the Supreme Court's 2005 takings jurisprudence).
202. See A. Dan Tarlock, Western Water Law and Coal Development, 51 U. COLO. L. REv.
511,529 (1980); Wilkinson supra note 36, at 322.
203. See A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of Prior Approp,iation in the New West, 41 NAT.
RESOURCES]. 769, 780-81 (2001).
204. Dellapenna, supra note 5, at 22.
205. Tarlock, supra note 203, at 780.
206. See Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 504, 538 (Fed. Cl.
2005). See infra notes 229-237 and accompanying text for a discussion of Klamath.
207. Tarlock, supra note 203, at 780.
208. See Robert J. Glennon & Thomas Maddock, III, In Search of Subjlow: Arizona's
Futile Effort to Separate Groundwater from Surface Water, 36 ARIZ. L. REv. 567, 568-69
(1994).
209. Id. at 569.
210. Dellapenna, supra note 5, at 22.
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the vast majority of existing appropriations but instead to the relatively
small minority of new appropriations. 211
A. TRANSITION TOWARD INCREASED EFFICIENCY

In the quest for new sources and supplies of water in prior appropriation states, states and their water management agencies look toward increasing the efficiency of existing water uses to retain water for
maintaining in-stream flows or to permit new, consumptive uses of water.212 As discussed above, a non-wasteful use of water qualifies the concept of beneficial use. 213 Generally defined, waste is the amount of diverted water that exceeds reasonable needs according to customary
practices. 214
As states transition toward increased efficiency, existing appropriators will have a stronger basis for a takings claim, whereas new appropriators will have no basis upon which to allege a takings claim because
the new appropriations of water are subject to the more stringent requirements. For existing applications of water, states and their water
agencies tend to employ a combination of incentives to encourage appropriators to increase efficiency and thus reduce wasteful, existing
applications of water. 215 Because these incentives are voluntary and
waste enforcement tends to be lenient, 216 appropriators have virtually
no basis upon which to argue a compensable takings claim. However,
an eventual push for legislative action may generate takings claims as a
result of transitions toward increased efficiency. Viewed under the
Penn Central factors, however, a court reviewing this type of takings
claim will likely find for the state and not require payment of just compensation. While the economic impact on the appropriator may be
significant, such efficiency legislation is unlikely to completely eliminate appropriative rights. In addition, with foreseeable increased emphasis on conservation of water resources - particularly given the climate and geography of the West - the appropriator's investmentbacked expectations should be minimal. Moreover, such legislation
would have widespread impacts on similarly-situated individuals, lessening the burden of the government action.

211.
212.

Id. at 28.
See Janet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search for
Efficiency in Western Water Use, 28 ENVrL. L. 919, 983 (1998).
213. See supra Part I.A.
214. Neuman, supra note 212, at 933 (citing Steven]. Shupe, Waste in Western Water
Law: A Blueprint for Change, 61 OR. L. REv. 483,491 (1982)).
215. Id. at 983.
216. Id. at 985.
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B. TRANSITION TOWARD COMPLIANCE WITH ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES
A more dynamic, ongoing transition in prior appropriation states is
the transition toward compliance with environmental statutes. From
an environmental perspective, one of the biggest obstacles to the conservation of water resources and aquatic ecosystems is the inability to
curtail water uses. 217 However, mandatory compliance with federal environmental statutes in the prior appropriation regime minimizes this
obstacle and enables protection of water resources. 218 Enforcing these
requirements, however, provokes highly contested takings litigation.219
The statutory regulation that most frequently appears in prior appropriation systems is the Endangered Species Act ("ESA"), which seeks to
protect the habitats of threatened and endangered species as a means
of protecting the species themselves. 220 With its clear preservation
mandate, the Supreme Court described the ESA as "the most comprehensive legislation for the preservation of endangered species ever
enacted by any nation." 221 It requires all federal departments and
agencies to ensure that their actions do not jeopardize the continued
existence of any endangered or threatened species, including jeopardizing species through the destruction or adverse modification of habitat. 222
Although reducing an appropriator's allocation of water does not
deprive the water user of all water, the ESA nonetheless provokes lengthy litigation over its requirements to leave sufficient in-stream flows
for the protection of endangered aquatic species.223 Aside from the
exceptional and heavily criticized ruling in Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District v. United States,2 24 the Court of Federal Claims has taken one
of two approaches: either reframing the claim as a contracts question

217. See generally A. Dan Tarlock & Sarah B. Van de Wetering, Western Growth and
Sustainahle Water Use: If There Are No "Natural Limits, " Should We Worry About Water Supplies?, 27 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 33 (2006) (discussing the water limits question).
218. See Reed D. Benson, Deflating the Deference Myth: National Interests vs. State Authority under Federal Laws Affecting Water Use, 2006 UTAH L. REv. 241, 298-99 (2006).
219. See, e.g., Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 504, 507 (Fed. Cl.
2005).
220. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (b) (2000).
221. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978).
222. 16 U.S.C. §§ 153l(c), 1536(a) (2). The Act defines conserve as "to use and the
use of all methods and procedures which are necessary to bring any endangered species or threatened species to the point at which" the protection of the Act is no longer
necessary. Id. §1532(3).
223. See, e.g., Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 333 F.3d 1109, 1113-15 (10th Cir.
2003) (discussing extensive litigation under the Endangered Species Act to maintain
sufficient in-stream water for the minnow).
224. See Klamath Irrigation, 67 Fed. CI. at 538 (criticizing Tulare Lake Basin Water
Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 318-21 (Fed. CI. 2001)).
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or evaluating the claim under the Penn Central factors. 225 Found primarily in western states, these contracts exist where the federal government assists in constructing water infrastructure. 226 Contract terms
define the property nature of contracted water rights and federal government violation of the contract requires the payment of damages,
regardless of compensation under the Fifth Amendment takings law. 227
However, where a court finds that the government action is outside the
scope of the contract, the court is more likely to apply Fifth Amendment takings law as in Tulare. 228
The Klamath River Basin court applied this reframing of water contracts, holding that the plaintiffs' claim arose under contract law and
not takings jurisprudence. 229 The Court of Federal Claims first examined the nature of the plaintiffs' property right, which independent
sources such as federal, state, or common law defined, not the Federal
Constitution. 230 The court concluded that based on a series of legislative acts in 1905, the United States held the vested water rights associated with the Klamath project. 2' 1 The court found that the plaintiffs
had protected property interests based on contracts with the United

225. See, e.g., Klamath Irrigation, 67 Fed. Cl. at 534. See also Allegretti & Co. v. County
oflmperial, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 122, 131-32 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (disagreeing with Tulare's
conclusion and instead applying the Penn Central analysis).
226. Gray, supra note 11, at 17. See also generally Douglas L. Grant, ESA Reductions in
Reclamation of Water Contract Deliveries: A Fifth Amendment Taking of Property?, 36 ENVrL. L.
1331 (2006) (arguing that water rights by contract with the Bureau of Reclamation will
often be considered protected by the Fifth Amendment).
227. Gray, supra note 11, at 17. See generally Grant, supra note 226, at 1350-53 (discussing Bureau of Reclamation water service contracts creating property rights).
228. Tulare, 49 Fed. Cl. at 314. In O'Neill, the Ninth Circuit formulated this test for a
federal government breach of contract: the plaintiff must prove that the contract provides for full water service under conditions of hydrological and regulatory drought;
and contract terms must expressly and unmistakably protect plaintiff from the effects
of new laws that alter the terms of the contract or laws that render the fulfillment of
the terms of the contract illegal. O'Neill v. United States, 50 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 1995).
In addition, the Supreme Court in Winstar added that the plaintiff may recover damages for a breach of the contract if the contract grants the government regulation impaired right and if the contract anticipates the regulation by expressly assigning liability for regulatory impairment to the government. United States v. Winstar, 518 U.S. 839
(1996).
229. Klamath Irrigation, 67 Fed. Cl. at 534. Here, the National Marine Fisheries Service and Fish and Wildlife Service concluded in a final biological opinion that 2001 was
likely to be the "driest year on record" and that the habitat of the Coho salmon, the
Upper Lake Klamath shortnose, and the Lost River suckerfish required the increase
and maintenance of water levels and river flows. Id. at 513. The Bureau of Reclamation implemented a reasonable and prudent alternative that called for the termination
of water delivery in 2001. Id.
230. Id. at 515, 519 (citing Maritrans Inc. v. United States, 342 F.3d 1344, 1352 (Fed.
Cir. 2003); Cal. Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 158
(1935)).
231. Id. at 523.
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States. 252 However, because the United States acted in a proprietary
capacity, as opposed to a sovereign capacity, when it entered into the
contracts, the plaintiffs' claims arose under contract law rather than
takings law. 255 The Bureau did not breach the contract under the sovereign acts doctrine, which recognizes that "the Government ... must
remain free to exercise its powers .... "254
Under the contracts framework, the court found that the plaintiffs'
beneficial interests were not absolute rights because appurtenancy,
beneficial-reasonable use, and, most importantly, contractual provisions that released the United States of liability for all shortages limited
the rights. 255 The release of liability included hydrological shortages
and "any other cause that impacts the availability of water through the
system," which the court interpreted to include the regulatory drought
caused by implementation of the alternative. 236 In ruling that the United States acted in a proprietary capacity, the court noted that the
plaintiffs still had available to them all contractual remedies to obtain
damages. 257
In a similar case, the Court of Federal Claims instead used the Penn
Central regulatory takings framework to evaluate a water district's allegation that implementation of a biological opinion effected a taking of
their water rights. 238 The Casitas Water District operated a water
project on behalf of, and according to, directives of the Bureau of Reclamation.259 However, California's State Water Resources Control
Board issued Casitas's permit to use and divert water. 240 Admittedly
tempted to accept Casitas' argument that the action resulted in the
232. Id. at 531.
233. Id. The court reasoned that the contract either bound the Bureau to certain
promises to provide water or to pay damages for a breach. Id. at 532. The contract did
not confer on plaintiffs a right to protection from a taking. Id.
234. Id. at 536 (quoting Yankee Atomic Elec. Co. v. United States, 112 F.3d 1569,
1575 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). The test of determining the proprietary or sovereign capacity
of the federal government is "whether, on balance, that legislation was designed to
target prior governmental contracts." Yankee Atomic, 112 F.3d at 1575. Courts consider
legislation by the federal government sovereign as long as its impact on contracts is
"merely incidental to the accomplishment of a broader governmental objective." Klamath Irrigation, 67 Fed. Cl. at 537 (quoting United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839,
898 (1996)).
235. Klamath Irrigation, 67 Fed. Cl. at 535.
236. Id. See also infra note 252.
237. Klamath Irrigation, 67 Fed. Cl. at 532.
238. Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States (Casitas JI), 76 Fed. Cl. 100, 103 (Fed.
Cl. 2007). Casitas II followed Casitas Municipal Water District v. United States ( Casitas I),
in which the court found that under the sovereign acts defense, the Bureau of Reclamation did not breach a contract when it required Casitas to operate the water project
pursuant to a NMFS-issued biological opinion. Casitas I, 72 Fed. Cl. 746, 755 (Fed. Cl.
2006). Casitas II centered on Casitas' alternative contention that the implementation
of the biological opinion effected a taking. Casitas II, 76 Fed. Cl. at 101.
239. Casitas II, 76 Fed. Cl. at 101.
240. Id. at 102.
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functional equivalent of a physical taking, the court interpreted the
Tahoe-Sierra clarification of physical takings and regulatory takings to
preclude finding a categorical physical taking. 2•1 The court declined to
accept Casitas' assertion that restriction of water use results in a total
loss of value, although the court acknowledged that the effect of the
regulation may have been the functional equivalent of a physical taking. 2•2 The biological opinion required Casitas to relinquish a diversion
of 3,200 acre-feet of water per year, or approximately 11 % of the volume of water its license permitted it apply to beneficial uses and less
than 3% of the volume of water its license permitted it to divert. 243
The outcomes in Klamath and Casitas contrast with an earlier 2001
case where the Court of Federal Claims found that implementation of
Endangered Species Act requirements effected a taking from water
appropriators and water contract recipients in California's Central Valley.244 In this heavily criticized case,245 the court stated that the promissory assurances contained in the contract formed the basis of the plaintiffs' rights, and that not even the public trust doctrine, the doctrine of
reasonable-beneficial use, or state nuisance law could change them. 246
Here, the court held that the implementation of the reasonable and
prudent alternative contained in the biological opinion effected a per
se physical taking of the plaintiffs' property. 247 Relying on Causby, 248 the
court emphasized that the distinction between a mere impairment of
the use of property and a physical invasion turns on the question of
whether the intrusion is "so immediate and direct as to subtract from

241. Id. at 105-6 (stating that Tahoe Sierra "compels [the court] to respect the distinction between a government takeover of property (either by physical invasion or by
directing the property's use to its own needs) and government restraints on an owner's
use of that property").
242. Id.
243. Id. at 102. Casitas' license permitted it to divert up to 107,800 acre-feet per year
and apply up to 28,500 acre-feet per year to beneficial uses. Id. at 102 n.3.
244. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 314, 319
(Fed. Cl. 2001).
245. See infra note 254 and accompanying text.
246. Tulare, 49 Fed. Cl. at 322. The Bureau and the Department concurrently operated the Central Valley Project and the State Water Project, which contracted to provide water to the plaintiffs, a water agency and a water district. Id. at 315. California's
State Water Resources Board granted water permits to the Federal Bureau of Reclamation and California's Department of Water Resources. Id. Under the mandate of the
ESA, the National Marine Fisheries Service and the Fish and Wildlife Service issued a
biological opinion that continued delivery of water under the contracts would further
jeopardize the endangered delta smelt and the winter-run Chinook salmon. Id. The
biological opinion included a reasonable and prudent alternative, as mandated by the
ESA, which limited both the time and manner of pumping water out of the stream
system. Id.
247. Id. at 315-16, 320.
248. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
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the owner's full enjoyment of the property and to limit his exploitation
of it." 249
Applied to water rights, the court noted that "a mere restriction on
use - the hallmark of a regulatory action - completely eviscerates the
right itself since the plaintiffs' sole entitlement is to the use of the water."250 The court found that the government substituted itself as the
beneficiary of the water contract rights and thus occupied the plaintiffs' property, rendering the water right valueless. 251 Implementation
of the biological opinion alternatives caused a "regulatory drought,"
reducing the amount of water available for delivery under the contracts. 252 Under the Board's authority pursuant to the public trust doctrine and in response to the prevailing drought conditions in the Valley region, the Board implemented reasonable and prudent alternatives, reducing the amount of water available to the plaintiffs. 253
Critics have noted that the holding in this case fails to consider the
background principles that would have inherently limited the plaintiffs' water rights under the contract. 254 The court in Tulare failed to
consider whether ESA enforcement applied to the contracts and
whether it should limit the plaintiffs' rights as third-party beneficiaries
249. Tulare, 49 Fed. Cl. at 319 (quoting Causby, 328 U.S. at 265).
250. Id. (citing Eddy v. Simpson, 3 Cal. 249, 252-53, 53 Freeman 408, 410 (1853)
("[T]he right of property in water is usufructuary, and consists not so much of the
fluid itself as the advantage of its use")).
251. Id. The court rejected the government's reliance on the Penn Central balancing
factors. Id. The government argued that the plaintiffs' claim could not succeed both
because the preemptive federal environmental protection regulation limited reasonable investment-backed expectations and protection for endangered and threatened
fish species, and because the economic loss was minimal in comparison to the overall
value of the contract. Id. at 318-19. In its analysis, the court conflated language from
both per se physical invasions takings jurisprudence and regulations that deprive
property of all economic value, despite finding a taking based on the former category.
Id. at 318.
252. Id. at 320. The term "regulatory drought" refers to water shortages caused by
legal requirements to provide for environmental protection. See Gray, supra note 11, at
18. These shortages would not occur but for the legal requirements and tend to exacerbate the impacts of existing natural drought. Id.
253. Tulare, 49 Fed. Cl. at 315. The Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District alleged
a loss of at least 58,820 acre-feet of water in the three year period between 1992 and
1994, whereas the Kern County Water Agency alleged the loss of 319,420 acre-feet over
the same period. Melinda Harm Benson, The Tulare Case: Water Rights, the Endangered
Species Act, and the Fifth Amendment, 32 ENVn.. L. 551, 560 (2002).
254. Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 504, 538 & n.59 (2005).
See generally JOHN D. ECHEVERRIA, GEORGETOWN ENVn.. LAW & PoL'Y INST., WHY TuLARE
LAKE
WAS
INCORRECTLY
DEQDED
6
(Aug.
2005),
http:/ /www.law.georgetown.edu/ gel pi/ current_research/ documents/RT_Pubs_Law_
TulareLakelncorrect.pdf; Brittany K. T. Kauffman, ¾'hat Remains of the Endangered Species
Act and We5tern Water Rights After Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District v. United
States?, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 837, 869 (2003); Cori S. Parobek, Of Farmers' Takes and
Fishe5' Takings: Fifth Amendment Compensation Claims ¾'hen the Endangered Species Act and
We5tern Water Rights Collide, 27 HARV. ENVn.. L. REv. 177,212 (2003).
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whose rights derived from federal and state contracts with the Board.255
Later in Klamath, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' reliance on Tulare,
stating that "with all due respect, Tulare appears to be wrong on some
counts, incomplete in others and, distinguishable, at all events." 256 Furthermore, in Casitas, the court conceded that it based its holding in
Tulare on the "finality of the plaintiffs' loss rather than upon the character of the government's action." 257

C. THE AMORTIZATION ANALOGY
A single court's diversity of approaches illustrates the potential inconsistency of future takings rulings in prior appropriation transitions.
However, drawing from the language of amortization in land-use law is
a means to address takings claims concerning ESA requirements and
water conservation measures. In this amortization analogy, individuals
should have a reasonable time to recover their financial investment in
their water infrastructure, and amortization of wasteful or nonbeneficial uses should avoid a Fifth Amendment takings claim. While
using the contracts framework and expansive release of liability language may permit the government to have greater control over water
resources and function for individual litigation, a move towards incorporating amortization from land-use laws would result in a more uniform conservation policy across prior appropriation states.
The transition to compliance with federal environmental statutes
such as the ESA is comparable to amortization provisions that eliminate non-conforming uses in land-use law. 258 The majority of jurisdictions uphold the constitutionality of these provisions, which must provide a reasonable method of and time for elimination of the nonconforming use. 259 Courts may also -:onsider the relative benefits to the
255. Klamath Irrigation, 67 Fed. Cl. at 538.
256. Id.
257. Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 100, 104 (Fed. Cl. 2007).
258. See Sax, supra note 6, at 265.
259. This majority view is contrasted by the views of states such as Pennsylvania,
where the state supreme court held that "the amortization and discontinuance of a
lawful pre-existing non-conforming use is per se confiscatory" and in violation of the
state constitution. Pa. Nw. Distrib., Inc. v. Zoning & Hearing Bd. (Moon), 584 A.2d
1372, 1376 (Pa. 1991). In Moon, the plaintiff obtained the necessary paperwork to
open an adult book store in the Township of Moon. Id. at 1373. Four days later, with
suspect efficiency, the Zoning Board passed an ordinance imposing heavy restrictions
on the location of adult enterprises and gave non-complying businesses a ninety-day
period to comply with the ordinance. Id. The plaintiff was unable to comply and challenged the constitutionality of the provision. Id. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
found that the plaintiff had a vested property right by the lawful non-conforming use
and found the amortization provision offensive in that both restricted future uses and
extinguished a lawful non-conforming use on an expedited timetable. Id. at 1376. As
discussed below, the Court of Federal Claims used similar reasoning to find a taking of
water rights. See supra notes 244-253 and accompanying text.
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public compared to individuals' private injury or hardship, as well as
the economic investment of the individual and whether the individual
can transfer or recover its investment through a permitted use. 200
Where these factors are met, courts have generally held that amortization provisions are constitutional and do not require compensation
under the Fifth Amendment because there is no constitutional bar to
retroactive regulatory legislation. 261
The majority view that such amortization provisions are constitutional prevails in states like California. In City of Los Angel£s v. Gage, a
California Court of Appeals held that an amortization provision that
prohibited a defendant from continuing his non-conforming use did
not effect an unconstitutional taking of the defendant's property
rights. 262 The amortization provision only restricted the location of the
defendant's business and provided a reasonable and ample time for
the defendant to move. 263 The court found that the elimination of existing uses did not amount to a taking because the defendant still had
reasonable use of his property as residential, pursuant to its original
•
264
zomng.
The court noted that the fundamental obstacle posed by nonconforming uses to comprehensive zoning was "one of degree," and
distinguished restrictions on present use from restrictions on future
use, recognizing but upholding the retroactive effect of the ordinance. 265 While not specifically employing the Penn Central factors, the
court nonetheless emphasized the marginal economic impact upon
the landowner in concluding that the ordinance did not effect a com260. 10 IA CJ.S. Zoning & Land Planning§ 209 (2005) .
261. See Sax, supra note 6, at 265.
262. City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 274 P.2d 34, 45 (Cal. Ct. App. 1954). The defendant purchased lots on which he built a two-family residential building, using part of
the building to conduct a wholesale retail plumbing supply business. Id. at 36. In
1946, after a series of zoning reclassifications that all expressly permitted Gage's use of
the property, the City passed an amortization provision for the discontinuance of nonconforming uses within five years of the effective date. Id. at 37. Eight years later,
Gage continued to operate his business in the residential zone, and the City brought
suit against Gage to enjoin his non-conforming use and to comply with the comprehensive zoning plan. Id. at 44.
263. Id. at 44.
264. Id. at 45.
265. Id. at 44.
The distinction between an ordinance restricting future uses and one requiring the termination of present uses within a reasonable period of time is
merely one of degree, and constitutionality depends on the relative importance to be given to the public gain and to the private loss. Zoning as it affects every piece of property is to some extent retroactive in that it applies to
property already owned at the time of the effective date of the ordinance.
The elimination of existing uses within a reasonable time does not amount to
a taking of property nor does it necessarily restrict the use of property so that
it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose.
Id.
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pensable taking. 266 Furthermore, viewing this case under a Penn Central
lens, the defendant's limited investment-backed expectations most likely resulted because the defendant continued operation of his nonconforming business for more than three years after the five-year expiration period had ended. 267
The Indiana Supreme Court also upheld a zoning ordinance that
required the registration of non-conforming uses. 268 The failure to register resulted in forfeiture of the non-conforming use. 269 The court
concluded that under the Fifth Amendment takings doctrine, "[a] zoning ordinance that provides for the forfeiture of unregistered nonconforming uses does not fall into either [category of per se takings)." 2' 0
The new ordinance did not cause the plaintiffs to suffer a physical invasion because it merely restricted the use of the rental property at
issue, and the ordinance reduced the value of the property by 25-40%,
far less than the threshold of denial of all economically beneficial use
of the property. 271
In prior appropriation states, the restrictions on water use imposed
by the ESA and other conservation measures function to effectively
amortize non-conforming uses of water. In this situation, the public
benefit is the protection of environmental and aesthetic values, and
the harm to the individual appropriator is a reduction of the amount
of appropriated water. By imposing conservation measures, the original amount no longer "conforms" to the water allocation plan for a
particular river basin. Unlike individual contract litigation under the
ESA, amortization of excess allocations of water will uniformly address
water conservation issues in prior appropriation states.
In the takings context, the amortization analogy gives courts a robust framework upon which to uphold conservation measures enacted
in prior appropriation states. Although the amortization cases tend to
focus explicitly on the authority of the government to enact such
measures, the discussion and reasoning implicate the Penn Central fac-

266. Id. (noting that the cost of relocating the plumbing business amounted to less
than 1 % of Gage's minimum gross business for five years).
267. Id.
268. Bd. of Zoning Appeals of Bloomington v. Leisz, 702 N.E.2d 1026, 1031 (Ind.
1998). In this case, the plaintiffs purchased real property from owners who had failed
to register the existing lawful non-conforming use under a newly passed zoning ordinance. Id. at 1027. This case signaled the state's return to the majority view from the
minority view on the constitutionality of amortization provisions. Id. at 1032.
269. Id. at 1027.
270. Id.atl029.
271. Id. For example, the Ninth Circuit found that a zoning ordinance that reduced
a property's value from $2 million to $100,000, a 95% reduction, did not amount to a
compensable taking. William C. Haas & Co., Inc. v. San Francisco, 605 F.2d 1117,
1118, 1120 (9thCir.1979).
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tors that govern non-categorical takings. 212 The character of the government action feeds into the authority of the government to enact
conservation measures and represents an adjusted balance of benefits
and burdens, rather than an unfair targeting of particular individuals.
Increasing and foreseeable prioritization of environmental values and
the limited nature of the property right in water should temper individuals' subjective expectations in investing in both riparian and prior
appropriation water rights. Finally, the overwhelming public gains in
simultaneously stretching water resources for human use and retaining
water to sustain aquatic ecosystems should offset the economic impact
of reduced water delivery. This last prong of the Penn Central analysis
corresponds most readily with the amortization analogy, enabling
courts to lend greater protection to these conservation measures.

CONCLUSION
In the takings landscape for transitions in state water law systems,
individual's water rights affected by a transition of state water laws face
significant obstacles to establishing a successful claim for conservation.
Even among other natural resources, water rights are a unique species
of property rights, subject to a maze of federal and state interests that
inherently limit the property nature of such rights. Because the takings inquiry necessarily depends on a court finding a constitutionally
protected, vested, and compensable property right, these individuals
must prove this decisive first element of the takings claim.
Where riparians claim a taking of future rights resulting from a
transition of state water laws into prior appropriation or regulated riparianism, a vested property right in the future use of water is particularly difficult for one to prove. Simultaneous needs for stability in the
water law system and for protection of the environment and water resources drive these transitions. Recognizing these needs, courts are
willing to give states room to maneuver within the bounds of the Fifth
Amendment takings doctrine without triggering the just compensation
requirement. One can analogize these transitions to zoning real property, where benefits to the community restrict individual property.
Where prior appropriators claim a taking of present rights resulting from transitioning to compliance with federal environmental statutes, courts avoid the takings inquiry and attendant constitutional issues by reframing the case under contract law instead of constitutional
law. Recent rulings of the Supreme Court, which narrow the types of
cases that fall under the per se physical occupation takings category,
guide courts that undertake the constitutional analysis. While well272. In post-Lingle takings jurisprudence, the substantial due process component is
no longer a basis for a court to find compensable taking. See supra notes 158-160 and
accompanying text.
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drafted contract language benefits the government in enacting water
conservation measures, a more sound and uniform approach is for
legislatures to incorporate amortization into prior appropriation, facilitating a transition into more environmentally sensitive and sensible
water laws.
As demand for water for human use and consumption increasingly
conflicts with demands to augment or otherwise maintain water levels
in natural watercourse systems, the takings conflicts that appear, primarily due to western states' compliance with federal environmental
statutes, will likely shift eastward into traditional riparian states. In the
future, riparian states may also experience a form of regulatory
drought that gives rise to takings litigation. Careful expansion of the
reasonable use doctrine that defines the bounds of a riparian water
right could effectively halt many takings claims, as well as meticulous
contract drafting and limitations on damages. Moreover, framing the
conflict as a Penn Central inquiry will provide greater room for the government to persuade courts. Where riparians claim a taking of future
rights to water as a result of federal environmental statute implementation, their legal arguments will mirror those discussed in this Article.
The central problem for riparians remains the same, the difficulty of
establishing the basic private property right in water.
Under the current Fifth Amendment takings doctrine, environmental protection goals, veiled as transitions in water laws, are likely to
succeed without triggering the requirement for just compensation.
This takings litigation generates environmental benefits in the form of
maintaining water supplies and the attendant benefits of water quality,
habitat and ecosystem preservation, and hydrologic cycle function.
Ultimately, however, the environmental benefits reflect not courts'
enthusiastic embrace of environmental values but instead, the relatively
few cases where holders of water rights prevail in takings jurisprudence.
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INTRODUCTION
Wetlands protection is vital to the environment and to communities.1 Yet, "no federal legislation is specifically designed to govern the
preservation and use of wetlands." 2 Instead, the United States regularly
utilizes the Clean Water Act ("CWA") 3 to deal with wetlands.4 Specifically, section 4045 is the main legislation that the federal government
uses to regulate wetlands, because it applies to activities where people
"physically change waters of the United States."6 Wetlands are often
appealing to developers and farmers, who may need to change the
landscape in order to fit their needs. 7 Applying section 404 to wetlands
has been "controversial,"8 mainly because in section 404, Congress
subordinated private landowners' interests to environmental interests. 9
Property owners are often unsure if the section applies to their land,
and determining whether it does or not can cause delay and expense. 10
Additionally, the reach of the federal government over land use and

1. RONALD KEITH GADDIE &JAMES L. REGENS, REGULATING WETLANDS PROTECTION at
vii (2000).
2. Id. at 36.
3. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000) ).
4. See Douglas R. Williams & Kim Diana Connolly, Federal Wetlands Regulation: An
Overoiew, in WETLANDS LAW AND POLICY: UNDERSTANDING SECTION 404 1, 1 (Kim Diana
Connolly et al. eds., 2005) [hereinafter WETLANDS LAW AND POLICY] (characterizing§
404 as "the centerpiece of the federal government's wetlands regulatory program").
5. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000).
6. Robin Kundis Craig, Beyond SWANCC: The New Federalism and Clean Water Act
Jurisdiction, 33 ENVfL. L. 113, 117 (2003).
7. See Michael C. Blumm & D. Bernard Zaleha, Federal Wetlands Protection Under the
Clean Water Act: Regulatory Ambivalence, Intergovernmental Tension, and a Call for Reform, 60
U. COLO. L. REV. 695,697 (1989).
8. GADDIE & REGENS, supra note 1, at 29.
9. See David H. Getches, Foreword, 60 U. COLO. L. REv. 685, 687 (1989); see also
Michael K Braswell & Stephen L. Poe, Private Property vs. Federal Wetlands Regulation:
Should Private Landowners Bear the Cost of Wetlands Protection?, 33 AM. Bus. LJ 179, 181
(1995) (examining whether "private landowners or the public [should] bear the cost
of preserving and protecting" wetlands from a takings perspective).
IO. See Scott L. Greeves, Note, Federal Regulation of the Discharge of Dredged or Fill Material into Wetlands: Options and Suggestions for Land Devdopers, 19 J. CORP. L. 135, 136
(1993) (stating that the CWA's application to wetlands "ha[s] a significant impact on
the land development industry").
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land development, topics generally fit for State regulation, 11 seems unrestrained under the ONA. The federal government's incursion into
such regulation raises significant constitutional issues. This Article
provides a solution that allows the ONA to remain a valid exercise of
government authority, while also providing suitable protections for
State rights.
The term "wetland" describes an "area in which the characteristics
of the soil, vegetation, and wildlife are primarily controlled by water." 12
Although this definition is quite broad, wetlands generally include
"swamps, marshes, and bogs." 1' Wetlands provide a myriad of beneficial functions to the environment and people. 1• Such functions include helping control flooding and erosion, providing unique habitat
for a variety of animals, including endangered ones, and filtering water
that eventually makes its way into groundwater or lakes and rivers. 15
Private landowner's rights compete with the environmental and
public interests that the ONA protects. Yet the controversy does not
come from the federal government using private property to protect
the environment for the public good. 16 The major contention lies with
the process by which the government decides whether section 404 applies to a landowner's property. Congress delegated that decision making authority to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") .1' A landowner may have difficulties determining when the Corps will require
compliance with the ONA, because the ONA covers "navigable waters."18 The Corps' decision that the CWA applies can be surprising in
some situations, and to some landowners it must also appear to be arbi-

11. See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs
(SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001) (recognizing "the States' traditional and primary
power over land and water use"); Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30,
44 (1994) (stating that land use regulation is a "function traditionally performed by
local governments").
12. Dennis W. Magee, A Primer on Wetland Ecology, in WETI.ANDS LAW AND POLICY,
supra note 4, at 27 [hereinafter Magee].
13. GADDIE & REGENS, supra note 1, at 18.
14. See Magee, supra note 12, at 27; Oliver A. Houck & Michael Rolland, Federalism
in Wetlands Regulation: A Consideration of Dekgation of Ckan Water Act Section 404 and
Related Programs to the States, 54 Mo. L. REV. 1242, 1244-50 (1995); Ducks Unlimited,
Habitat
Conservation,
http:/ /www.ducks.org/Conservation/Habitat/1596/HabitatHomepage.html
(last
visited November 18, 2007); ENVIl... PROT. AGENCY, FuNCTIONS AND VALUES OF WETI.ANDS
(2001), http:/ /www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/ pdf/fun_val.pdf [hereinafter EPA
WETI.ANDS FuNCTIONS].
15. See Magee, supra note 12, at 37-38; EPA WETI.ANDS FuNCTIONS, supra note 14.
16. This conflict exists; however, this Article will not address it. Battles between
private interests and public interests are best fought and resolved in the legislature and
are outside the scope of this Article.
17. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a), (d) (2000).
18. See id. See also Greeves, supra note 10, at 138-39.
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trary. 19 The situation addressed in Rapanos v. United Statd0 exemplifies
the consequences that result from unclear application of the CWA. 21
As this Article demonstrates, the CWA does not support the broad
interpretations that some courts and the Corps adopted subsequent to
the CWA's enactment. 22 A CWA analysis that takes into consideration
constitutional issues provides a reading that discounts varying interpretations of "navigable waters" employed by courts and the Corps. This
Article's clarification avoids basing the CWA's applicability solely on
the "navigable waters" definition, contains the CWA within the bounds
of the constitution, and preserves States' rights with regard to land use
regulation. 2' Prior Commerce Clause precedent provides courts with a
more stable platform for interpreting the CWA than any attempt to
discern the meaning of "navigable waters." The CWA's section 404
should be read to extend federal authority only over (1) traditionally
navigable waters of the United States24 and any wetlands with an adjacent surface connection thereto and (2) attempts by landowners to
discharge dredged or fill materials into other waters (including wetlands) only where such discharge will substantially affect the navigability of traditionally navigable waters.
Part I of this Article provides a brief overview of the CWA and section 404. Part II covers Congress's power over waterways and the Corps
and the Supreme Court's historical interpretations of "navigable waters," including the Court's recent decision in Rapanos. Finally, Part III
utilizes the Constitution, statutory interpretation tools, and Supreme
Court precedent to set forth an interpretation of "navigable waters"
that provides guidance to the Corps and courts for applying the CWA's
section 404. Part III also identifies why courts should adopt this interpretation and addresses its potential consequences.

19. See GADDIE & REGENS, supra note 1, at 37.
20. Rapanos v. United States (Rapanos II), 547 U.S. 715(2006).
21. See id. In 1994, the United States filed a civil action against John Rapanos for
filling wetlands located entirely on his property without a permit and in contravention
to the CWA. United States v. Rapanos (Rapanos /), 376 F.3d 629, 632-34 (6th Cir.
2004). Twelve years later, the legality of Rapanos's action and his ability to develop his
land are still in question. See Rapanos II, 547 U.S. at 757 (remanding to lower court for
further consideration). Rapanos is explored more fully in Part II.C.
22. See discussion infra Part II.B.
23. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (stating that "nothing in [the Clean Water
Act] shall ... be construed as impairing or in any manner affecting any right or jurisdiction of the States with respect to the waters (including boundary waters) of such
States").
24. See discussion infra Part IIA.2. Traditionally navigable waters of the United
States are those that "are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for [interstate or foreign] commerce." The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (IO
Wall.) 557,563 (1871).
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I. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT AND
SECTION 404
Congress's amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act25 in 1972 signified its recognition of the importance that water
quality has on the environment and the nation. 26 The 1977 amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act resulted in the Clean
Water Act ("CWA") legislation. 27 The CWA is a significant piece of federal jurisdiction dealing with water. 28 The statute protects the nation's
waters by prohibiting the discharge of pollutants into those waters. 29
Under the CWA, pollutants can be "dredged spoil," and "rock, sand,
[and] cellar dirt," among many other things. 30 Congress also recognized, though, that in certain situations, an absolute ban on discharge
would be unreasonable and included several exceptions from the general prohibition against polluting. 31 Section 404 is one such exception,
and allows the Corps to issue permits that allow "the discharge of
dredged or fill material into the navigable waters." 32
The CWA's use of the term "navigable waters" creates much of the
uncertainty that surrounds section 404. 33 Section 404 allows permits
for discharge "into the navigable waters." 34 The CWA defines "navigable waters" as "waters of the United States." 35 This language has led to
25. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500,
86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387)).
26. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 132 (1985).
27. The 1977 legislation amended§ 518 to allow the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to be commonly referred to as the Clean Water Act. Clean Water Act of 1977,
Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387
(2000)). See William Goldfarb, Changes in the Clean Water Act Since Kepone: Would They
Have Made a Difference?, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 603,604 n.7 (1995).
28. GADDIE & REGENS, supra note 1, at 28 (calling the CWA the "most significant
piece of legislation affecting water quality and the regulation of waterways in the United States").
29. 33 U.S.C. § 13ll(a) ("[T]he discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be
unlawful.").
30. Id. § 1362(6). The complete list of "pollutants" includes: "dredged spoil, solid
waste, incinerator residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes,
biological materials, radioactive materials, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment,
rock, sand, cellar dirt and industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into
water." Id.
31. See id. § 1311 (a) (providing exceptions from the prohibition so long as the
entity seeking to discharge complies with specified sections within the CWA).
32. Id. § 1344. Congress delegated the authority to issue § 404 permits to the
Corps, while giving the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") the power to veto
any decision by the Corps to issue a permit. See id. § 1344(a), (c). The EPA also has
authority to develop guidelines for the Corps to follow when reviewing permit applications. Id.§ 1344(b).
33. See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs
(SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159, 167 (2001).
34. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a).
35. Id.§ 1362(7).
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confusion regarding the extent to which federal power extends over
various bodies of water, including wetlands. Uncertainty arises when
private landowners do not know whether they are subject to the CWA
because they cannot determine whether their wetlands constitute "navigable waters." 36 The interpretation provided herein eliminates this
uncertainty, because it focuses on the landowner's activity. A landowner will have greater notice regarding his potential exposure to federal
regulation because he can evaluate the extent of his activity and how it
will change the wetland. 37
II. NAVI GABLE WATERS BEFORE THE CLEAN WATER ACT AND
"NAVIGABLE WATERS" AFfER

This Part first details the very beginnings of federal authority over
navigable waters. As shown in Part III, these beginnings are important
in analyzing the CWA's scope under the Commerce Clause and also
provide a solid basis upon which to establish a concrete interpretation
for future use. This Part also outlines the Corps' historical interpretations of "navigable waters," as well as Supreme Court decisions concerning those interpretations. The Corps' interpretations show its understanding of the expansion of federal power under the Commerce
Clause. As discussed in Part III, these interpretations also highlight the
Corps' apparent neglect for the language and construction of the CWA
and the limits on Congress's Commerce Clause power. The Supreme
Court's splintered decisions demonstrate its struggle with the CWA and
"navigable waters" and provide precedent for Part Ill's analysis.
A. WHEN NAVIGABLE WATERS WERE THOSE THAT WERE
NAVI GABLE IN FACT

Congress began exerting authority over navigable waters because of
their use in interstate commerce. 38 Courts have left Congress's power
36. For purposes of the CWA, determining the definition of a wetland is not necessary because the CWA covers "waters of the United States" and does not distinguish
between wetlands and waters. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7), (8) (defining "navigable waters"
and "territorial seas," but not "wetlands"). Section 1344(g) (1) establishes that wetlands
are properly considered "navigable waters." Id. § 1334(g)(l). See also discussion infra
Part III.Al.
37. Under current CWA standards, a landowner's activity may be regulated based
purely on the extenuated hydrological connection between the wetland and a separate
waterway several miles away. See Rapanos v. United States (Rapanos JI), 547 U.S. 715,
734 (2006).
38. See The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 557-60 (1871) (reviewing a federal
statute requiring licenses for vessels "transport[ing] any merchandise or passengers");
Gilman v. City of Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713, 713-15 (1865) (reviewing federal
statutes defining boundaries for ports); The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53
U.S. (12 How.) 443, 447-48 (1851) (examining a federal statute extending district
court jurisdiction over navigable waters).
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to regulate such navigable waters practically unbounded. 39 However,
courts originally recognized only those waters actually used for interstate commerce or with the potential for use in interstate commerce as
navigable waters.4° Thus, the only determination a court had to make
to find that Congress had power over a body of water was whether or
not that body of water was navigable in fact and whether the use or
susceptible use was for interstate commerce. 41
1. Congressional Authority Over Navigable Waters
Federal jurisdiction over navigable waters springs from the Commerce Clause. 42 The Supreme Court in Gibbons v. Ogden•' held that the
Commerce Clause gave Congress the power to regulate navigation. 44
However, the Commerce Clause does not give the federal government
power to regulate "[t]he completely internal commerce of a State."45
As a result, the Court held that Congress could regulate navigation
related to interstate or international commerce. 46
Later, in Gilman v. City of Philadelphia, the Court explained that
Congress's Commerce Clause power extended to any "requisite legislation" that Congress saw fit to enact.47 This means that Congress's jurisdiction over navigable waters is not restricted merely to the regulation
of navigation upon those waters48 but also extends to "the broad regulation of commerce granted the Federal Government." 49 So Congress
can regulate navigable waters (as defined below by The Daniel Balf0 )
without any additional link to interstate commerce. A waterway's navigability subjects it to complete federal control.51 This control provides
the basis for the first prong of this Article's suggested interpretation of
the CWA. Additionally, when Congress is acting pursuant to the
Commerce Clause, not only is its authority over navigable waters abso39. See Gilman, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) at 724-25.
40. See discussion infra Part 11.A.2.
41. See The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) at 563.
42. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Congress shall have power "[t)o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.").
43. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
44. Id. at 193 (recognizing that commerce "comprehends, and has been always
understood to comprehend, navigation within its meaning; and a power to regulate
navigation, is as expressly granted, as if that term had been added to the word 'commerce'").
45. Id. at 195.
46. Id. at 197.
47. Gilman v. City of Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713, 724-25 (1865).
48. See United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 426 (1940).
49. Id. at 426-27.
50. See discussion infra part II.A.2
51. See Ap,palachian El,ec. Power Co., 311 U.S. at 426-27 ("Congressional authority
under the commerce clause is complete unless limited by the Fifth Amendment.").
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lute, but its authority over non-navigable tributaries of those waters is
also quite broad with relation to maintaining navigation. 52 After the
Supreme Court established Congress's power over navigable waters, a
new question arose: what are navigable waters?
2. The Daniel Ball Defines Traditionally Navigable Waters
Because Congress enjoys a broad range of authority over navigable
waters, the only limiting boundary upon the federal government's
reach over waters within the States may be the federal judiciary's definition of "navigable waters." 53 Historically, use of the term navigable
waters did not lead to wide disagreement. One of the earliest uses of
the term came in the Supreme Court's decision in The Daniel Ball
There, the Court stated that navigable waters are those that "are used,
or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water." 54 The
Court distinguished "navigable waters of the United States" from those
of the States noting that the former navigable waters "form in their
ordinary condition by themselves, or by uniting with other waters, a
continued highway over which commerce is or may be carried on with
other States or foreign countries. "55 As defined in The Daniel Ball, navigable waters of the United States are commonly referred to as "traditionally navigable waters" or "navigable in fact." 56

52. See United States v. Grand River Dam Auth., 363 U.S. 229, 233 (1960) ("When
the United States appropriates the flow either of a navigable or a nonnavigable stream
pursuant to its superior power under the Commerce Clause, it is exercising established
prerogatives and is beholden to no one."); Oklahoma v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S.
508, 525-26 (1941) (recognizing flood control as a valid extension offederal authority
over navigable stream tributaries).
53. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 564 (1871) (holding that Congress's
Commerce Clause power over navigable waters "authorizes all appropriate legislation
for the protection or advancement of either interstate or foreign commerce").
54. Id. at 563.
55. Id. The mode by which commerce can be carried on includes the utilization of
"[v]essels of any kind that can float upon the water." The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.)
430, 441-42 (1874).
56. The Supreme Court stated that a river is navigable in fact when it has "a capacity for general and common usefulness for purposes of trade and commerce." Appalachian Eke. Power Co., 311 U.S. at 431 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). Additionally, the waterway "must be used, or available to use, for commerce of a
substantial and permanent character." Id. at 432 (internal citations omitted). The
Supreme Court has approved the Corps' traditional understanding that "' [a] determination of navigability, once made, applies laterally over the entire surface of the waterbody.'" Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 171-72 n.6 (1979) (citing Navigation and Navigable Waters, 33 C.F.R. § 329.4 (1978)).

Issue 1

FEDERAL]URJSDICTION

99

B. THE CORPS' AND THE COURT'S INTERPRETATIONS OF THE CLEAN
WATERAcr's "NAVIGABLE WATERS"

Following enactment of the 1972 amendments, the Corps issued
regulations in 1974 for "issuing or denying authorizations" to discharge
into the "navigable waters." 57 These regulations defined "navigable
waters" as waters affected by oceanic tide or waters that "are presently,
or have been in the past, or may be in the future susceptible for use for
purposes of interstate or foreign commerce."58 This initial definition
by the Corps practically mirrors the definition of navigable waters expressed in The Daniel Ball. 59 The 1974 regulations also provided insight
into determining which waters were "navigable waters" by further defining the nature of the commerce involved, discussing the presence of
improvements to the waterway, and providing an overview of the timeline for meeting such characteristics. 00 Additionally, these regulations
indicated the potential for judicial extension of authority past that of
traditionally navigable waters. 61
Judicial interpretation was not far behind the Corps' initial interpretation. The district court in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
Callaway declared the Corps' interpretation unlawful. 62 The court,
without explanation, found that Congress meant to "assert[] federal
jurisdiction over the nation's waters to the maximum extent permissible under the Commerce Clause."63 Although Callaway did not elaborate on how far the Commerce Clause would allow federal jurisdiction
to expand, recent Supreme Court decisions provide that guidance.&!
These Supreme Court decisions indicate that the maximum extension
under the Commerce Clause does not mean the furthest expansion
57. See Navigation and Navigable Waters, 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d) (1974).
58. Id.§ 209.120(d)(l).
59. See supra Part 11.A.2. Navigable waters of the United States are those that "are
used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for
[interstate or foreign] commerce." The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. at 563.
60. See33 C.F.R. § 209.260(e), (g), (h).
61. The regulations stated that defining navigable waters is "ultimately dependent
on judicial interpretation, and cannot be made conclusively by administrative agencies." 33 C.F.R. § 209.260(b). Ten years after the Corps' initial interpretation, the
Supreme Court held that an administrative agency's interpretation of a statute was
conclusive so long as the statute was ambiguous and the agency's interpretation was
reasonable. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 84243 (1984). Also of note is a regulatory provision that stated "a private water body, even
though not itself navigable, may so affect the navigable capacity of nearby waters as to
nevertheless be subject to certain regulatory authorities."
33 C.F.R. §
209.260(g) (1) (iii). This provision shows that the Corps recognized that the CWA extended federal jurisdiction on the basis of navigation.
62. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C.
1975).
63. Id.
64. See infra Part III.A.3.
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imaginable. Unfortunately, the Corps did not have that guidance following Callaway.
As a result of Callaway, the Corps issued new rules extending jurisdiction beyond traditionally navigable waters. 65 In 1975, the Corps
adopted a definition that enlarged the CWA's scope over wetlands. 66
This definition asserted additional jurisdiction over intrastate waters
utilized by people involved in interstate commerce. 67 The Corps' new
interpretation of the CWA involved not only deciphering the language
used in the CWA but also analyzing Congress's Commerce Clause power as a way to bring other waters under the scope of the CWA. 68 Yet the
Corps failed to recognize the nexus between the CWA's jurisdiction
and navigation. Rather than limit the activities that would trigger the
CWA to those affecting navigation, the Corps brought all activities potentially affecting interstate commerce of any kind within the CWA's
scope. 69 The Supreme Court deemed this reasoning erroneous in Solid
Waste Agenty of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engi,neers
("SWANCC').'0 Part III explains further how this error conflicts with
recent Supreme Court decisions requiring clear intent from Congress
for such expansion.
In new regulations issued for public comment in 1977, the Corps
explicitly stated that it was broadening the definition of "navigable waters" as much as constitutionally permissible based on the CWA's legislative history.' 1 This broadening expanded federal jurisdiction over
"waters ... such as isolated wetlands and lakes, intermittent streams,
prairie potholes, and other waters [not connected to navigable waters],
the degradation or destruction of which could affect interstate commerce. 'm United States v. Ri,verside Bayview Homes, /nc. 73 later assessed this
interpretation, which the Corps adopted in 1978. 74

65. The Corps' Federal Register publication stated that its regulations were "in
response to the order of' the court in Callaway. Permits for Activities in Navigable
Waters or Ocean Waters, 40 Fed. Reg. 31,320 (July 25, 1975).
66. Id. at 31,324 (defining navigable waters to include "coastal wetlands, mudflats,
swamps, and similar areas that are contiguous or adjacent to other navigable waters.").
67. Id. (defining navigable waters to include:
[i]ntrastate lakes, rivers and streams ... that are utilized: [b]y interstate travelers for water-related recreational purposes; [£]or the removal offish that are
sold in interstate commerce; [f]or industrial purposes by industries in interstate commerce; or [i]n the production of agricultural commodities sold or
transported in interstate commerce).
68. Id. at 31,320.
69. See generally id. at 31,320-31.
70. See generally infra notes 86-104 and accompanying text.
71. Regulatory Program of the Corps of Engineers, 42 Fed. Reg. 37,144, 37,144 n.2
(July 19, 1977) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 323.2) (stating such expansion was based
on legislative history that pointed to Congress's attempt to make the CWA's reach as
broad as possible).
72. Id. at 37,144.
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The Supreme Court in Riverside Bayview reviewed a provision in the
Corps' regulations that extended jurisdiction to "all wetlands adjacent
to navigable or interstate waters and their tributaries."'5 The landowners in Riverside Bayview sought to develop land upon which the Corps
had previously built a dike to stop flooding from Lake St. Clair. 76 In its
review of the Corps' regulations, the Court utilized the Chevron deference test." The Court stated that it would defer to the Corps' construction if the construction was reasonable and did not conflict with
Congressional intent. 78 The Court recognized that the Corps, in determining when it had jurisdiction over a particular discharge of fill
material, had the difficult task of determining the "point at which water ends and land begins."'9 The legislative history and policies behind
the CWA helped the Supreme Court determine whether the Corps'
interpretation was reasonable. 80
The legislative history included a conference report regarding an
amendment that would have restricted the Corps' jurisdiction under
section 404 to traditionally navigable waters. 81 The Court concluded
that Congress's failure to adopt the amendment showed some indication that it intended to stretch its Commerce Clause power to a point
beyond traditionally navigable waters. 82 Along with the Court's deter-

73. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. (Riverside II), 474 U.S. 121
(1985).
74. See33 C.F.R. § 323.2 (1978).
75. Riversidell, 474 U.S. at 129.
76. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. (Riverside I), 729 F.2d 391, 39293 (6th Cir. 1984).
77. Chevron U.SA., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984). Under Chevron, a reviewing court looks to:
whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the
intent of Congress is clear ... the court, as well as the agency, must give effect
to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. . . . [I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court
is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.
Id.
78. Riverside II, 474 U.S. at 131.
79. Id. at 132.
80. Id.
81. See id. at 136; Bradford C. Mank, The Murky Future of the Clean Water Act After
SWANCC: Using a Hydrological Connection APfrroach to Saving the Clean Water Act, 30
ECOLOGYL.Q. 811, 836 (2003).
82. Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 133 (noting that the term "navigable" was of "limited import"). This emphasis on the failed amendment was criticized in Solid Waste
Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs (SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159, 185
(2001) (Stevens, J. dissenting). Additionally, in 2003 an amendment that would have
expanded the CWA's jurisdiction failed to make its way out of the House Subcommittee on Water Resources and Environment. See H.R 962, 108th Cong. (2003) (Thomas). The 2003 amendment would have removed the term navigable waters and extended jurisdiction to:
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mination that wetlands had various effects on the waters around them,
the Court cited the amendment's failure as additional support for
holding that the Corps' interpretation extending federal jurisdiction
over any "wetlands adjacent to other bodies of water over which the
Corps has jurisdiction" was reasonable. 85 The Court did not examine
the Corps' exertion of authority over other waters that were involved in
some aspect of interstate commerce not related to navigation. 84
In 1985, the Corps again expanded its definition of "navigable waters," this time to include wetlands adjacent to other waters over which
the Corps had previously extended jurisdiction.85 These regulations
were similar to the ones considered in SWANCC6 in that they asserted
jurisdiction over waters without any consideration of the navigability of
those waters or those waters' relationship to navigable in fact waters. 87
The regulatory provision considered by the Court in SWANCC was the
"Migratory Bird Rule." 88 The Migratory Bird Rule extended federal
authority over intrastate waters that could be used by birds traveling
acfoss state lines or birds protected by migratory bird treaties. 89 The
Corps interpreted the CWA to grant jurisdiction over waters "the destruction of which could affect interstate ... commerce" of any form. 90
all waters subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, the territorial seas, and all
interstate and intrastate waters and their tributaries, including lakes, rivers,
streams (including intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands,
sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, natural ponds, and all
impoundments of the foregoing, to the fullest extent that these waters, or activities affecting these waters, are subject to the legislative power of Congress
under the Constitution.
Id. The amendment also included statements regarding the various effects that activities not related to navigability could have on interstate commerce. Id.
83. Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 134-35.
84. Id. at 123-24 & n.2.
85. See Permits for Discharges of Dredged or Fill Material Into Waters of the United
States, 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(a) (1985). The waters adjacent to a wetland and subject to
this regulation were those: "(i) Which are or could be used by interstate or foreign
travels for recreational or other purposes; or (ii) From which fish or shellfish are or
could be taken and sold in interstate or foreign commerce; or (iii) Which are used or
could be used for industrial purposes by industries in interstate commerce." Id.
86. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 159.
87. See Definition of Waters of the United States, 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (2006). See also
Gregory T. Broderick, From Migratory Birds to Migratory Molecu/,es: The Continuing Battle
Over the Scope of Federal Jurisdiction Under the Clean Water Act, 30 COLUM. J. ENVfL. L. 4 73,
490 (2005).
88. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 164; Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of
Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206, 41,217 (Nov. 13, 1986) (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 328.3).
89. Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. at
41,217 (The Migratory Bird Rule also asserted jurisdiction over waters used "as habitat
by 'endangered species'" or "to irrigate crops sold in interstate commerce."). See
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 164.
90. See Rebecca Eisenberg, Note, Killing the Birds in One Fell Swoop: Solid Waste
Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 15
FORDHAM ENVrL. L. REV. 253, 266-67 (2004).
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The Corps based this interpretation on the 1972 Conference Committee's Statement which stated that "[t]he conferees fully intend that the
term 'navigable waters' be given the broadest possible constitutional
interpretation unencumbered by agency determinations."91
The court of appeals held that the "'Migratory Bird Rule' was a reasonable interpretation of the Act" based on the "cumulative impact
doctrine." 92 The cumulative impact doctrine allows a "single activity
that itself has no discernible effect on interstate commerce [to] still be
regulated if the aggregate effect of that class of activity has a substantial
impact on interstate commerce."9' In analyzing the Corps' Migratory
Bird Rule, the Supreme Court noted the inconsistency between the
Corps' original interpretation of "navigable waters" in 1974 and the
expanded interpretation that the Court was considering under the
Migratory Bird Rule. 94 The legislative history of the 1977 amendments
did not demonstrate Congress's intent to have "navigable waters" interpreted as broadly as possible.95 The same amendment considered in
Riverside Bayview failed to prove such intent when considered by the
Court in SWANCC. 96 Unconvinced that either the CWA's plain language or its legislative history provided a basis for the Corps' Migratory
Bird Rule, the Court rejected expanding the CWA's reach under Congress's increasingly expansive Commerce Clause power without a clear
statement from Congress. 97 Important constitutional questions raised
by the Migratory Bird Rule, including the invasion on States' traditional rights over land use regulation, supported invalidating it. 98
The rulings from Riverside Bayview and SWANCC did not fully resolve the question of how far the Corps' section 404 jurisdiction extended under the CWA. The CWA covered wetlands adjacent to traditionally navigable waters after Riverside Bayview.99 But waters totally isolated from traditionally navigable waters did not fall under the CWA in
SWANCC even if those waters played a part in interstate commerce. 100
Between these two decisions lays a large gray area that neither Riverside
Bayview nor SWANCC clearly addressed. 101 Additionally, SWANCC sug91. S. REP. No. 92-1236, at 144 (1972), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3776, 3822.
92. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 166 (citing Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S.
Army Corps ofEng'rs, 191 F.3d 845, 850-52 (1999)).
93. Id. at 166.
94. Id. at 168. The Court then held that the Corps had not produced any evidence
tending to show that the Corps' interpretation of Congress's intent was incorrect in
1974. Id.
95. Id. at 168-71.
96. Id. at 170.
97. Id. at 171-74.
98. Id. at 174.
99. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 138-39 (1985).
100. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 171-72.
101. See Mank, supra note 81, at 853-54. Such gray area includes, for example, ponds
or holding basins separated from non-navigable tributaries of traditionally navigable
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gested that courts consider Congress's use of "navigable" in determining jurisdiction under the CWA, reviving the importance of navigability
in interpreting the CWA'sjurisdiction. 102 In Riverside Bayview, the Court
severely limited any emphasis on "navigable" in "navigable waters." 10'
Yet, SWANCC did not determine to what extent the CWA covered various wetlands or the extent to which a body of water needed to be navigable. This lack of clarity resulted in varying interpretations at the
lower court levels. 104 The Supreme Court's decision to hear the Rapanos case seemed to indicate that the Court would take the opportunity
to provide clear guidelines.
C. SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN RA.PANOS

Rapanos gave the Supreme Court the opportunity to provide a clear
standard for interpreting "navigable waters" and "waters of the United
States" in the CWA. 105 However, the Court did not reach a majority
opinion on any interpretation. Instead,Justice Scalia penned a plurality opinion. 106 This opinion vacated the court of appeals decision and
remanded the case back to the lower courts. 107 Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment only and wrote his own opinion. ws Finally, Justice Stevens wrote one of the dissenting opinions. 109 This Part discusses
the opinions and the potential consequences of the divided decision.
The Supreme Court's decision in Rapanos combined two cases
from Michigan where the landowners sought to fill wetlands (or perform related excavation work) on their respective properties in order
waters by man-made ditches or wetlands abutting roadside ditches that eventually deposit into traditionally navigable waters. See generally In re Needham, 354 F.3d 340, 34546 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that "the United States may not simply impose regulations
over puddles, sewers, roadside ditches and the like; under SWANCC 'a body of water is
subject to regulation ... if the body of water is actually navigable or adjacent to an
open body of navigable water.'"); United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698, 705-08 (4th
Cir. 2003).
102. See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 172 (holding that an interpretation could not be
adopted that would "read[] the term 'navigable waters' out of the statute" and that
Congress had its jurisdiction over traditionally navigable waters "in mind as its authority for enacting the CWA").
103. Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 133. See also Mank, supra note 81, at 847.
104. See, e.g., Needham, 354 F.3d at 344-45; Deaton, 332 F.3d at 709-10; Headwaters,
Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526, 533 (9th Cir. 2001). See also Broderick,
supra note 87, at 500-13; Craig, supra note 6, at 130-36.
105. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 730 (2006).
106. Id. at 718 (joiningJustice Scalia's opinion were ChiefJustice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito). ChiefJustice Roberts also wrote an opinion concurring with the
plurality. Id. at 757 (Roberts, CJ., concurring).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 759 (Kennedy,]., concurring in judgment only).
109. Id. at 787 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (joining Justice Stevens were Justices Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer). Justice Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion and joined Justice
Stevens' opinion. Id. at 811 (Breyer,]., dissenting).
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to commence commercial development. 110 The Army Corps of Engineers did not issue a permit to either party.m The wetlands at issue did
not have adjacent surface water connections with navigable in fact waters. Instead, the wetlands had various connections to drains or ditches
before eventually reaching navigable in fact waters. 112
1. Justice Scalia's Plurality Opinion

The plurality opinion articulated an interpretation derived from
the CW'A's use of the term "waters" in "waters of the United States."m
First, rejecting a traditional navigable waters interpretation, 11• Justice
Scalia found that the CW'A's use of "waters of the United States" as the
definition for "navigable waters" 115 added to the scope of "navigable
waters." 116 However, Justice Scalia cautioned that Congress' use of "the
qualifier 'navigable' is not devoid of significance." 11 ' A provision in the
CW'A referring to "navigable waters [] other than" traditionally navigable waters 118 also suggested that "navigable waters" should "include[]
something more than traditional navigable waters." 119

110. One party in Rapanos began filling one property to develop a shopping center.
United States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 632 (6th Cir. 2004). The other parties' commercial development plan was vague. See id. at 633. The parties in Carabell v. U.S. Army
Corps ofEngineers initially sought a permit to fill their property for the development of a
"130-unit condominium complex." Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 391 F.3d
704, 706 (6th Cir. 2004). However, an administrative law judge for the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality ("MDEQ") ordered the MDEQ to issue a permit
for a "112-unit alternative condominium development." Id. Nevertheless, the nature
of both projects was commercial.
lll. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 763-65 (Kennedy,]., concurring in judgment).
ll2. Justice Scalia described one wetland as being separated from a "man-made
drainage ditch" by a "4-foot-wide man-made berm" that did not allow the wetland to
drain into the ditch. Id. at 730 (plurality opinion). The ditch then drained "into
another ditch or a drain, which connects to Auvase Creek, which empties into Lake St.
Clair." Id. Whether Auvase Creek is navigable in fact is not clear, but Lake St. Clair
definitely fits within the traditional meaning of navigable waters. Id. The other wetlands at issue apparently did have a surface connection to a drain that eventually emptied into a traditionally navigable water. Id. at 762-63 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
judgment). One of the wetlands may have experienced its surface connection with the
drain towards which it flowed through seasonal runoff. Id. at 730 (plurality opinion).
113. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2000).
114. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 730-31. See supra Part 11.A.2.
ll5. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
116. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 730-31.
ll7. Id.at731.
118. Section 404 creates an opportunity for States to set up their own permitting
system for the "discharge of dredged or fill material" with the approval of the EPA
Administrator. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(g) (1). This section, though, is limited to:
[N]avigable waters (other than those waters which are presently used, or are
susceptible to use in their natural condition or by reasonable improvement as
a means to transport interstate or foreign commerce shoreward to their ordinary high water mark, including all waters which are subject to the ebb and
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Justice Scalia then focused on the CWA's use of "waters" in "waters
of the United States." 120 The dictionary definition of "waters" revealed
that "waters of the United States" includes "only relatively permanent,
standing or flowing bodies of water." 121 According to Justice Scalia, the
dictionary's definition is consistent with the traditional definition of
"navigable waters" because "navigable in fact" waters must have the
"ordinary presence of water." 122 That is, without the continuous presence of water, a waterway cannot support navigation. Justice Scalia also
asserted that the CWA's policy of maintaining and preserving States'
right support a reading narrower than the Corps' asserted authority. 12'
Such a narrow reading also helps avoid any constitutional questions
that may arise from the Corps' attempt to extend its authority up to the
limits of the Commerce Clause. 12• Justice Scalia predicted that the
CWA would not support a broad extension without Congress expressly
stating that it intended such. 125 The SWANCC Court pronounced a similar sentiment, 126 which supports this Article's conclusion that courts
must examine the CWA within the context of Congress's regulation of
navigation.
Applying his interpretation of "waters of the United States" to wetlands, Justice Scalia maintained that only wetlands that had "a continuous surface connection to bodies that are 'waters of the United
States' in their own right" are adjacent. 127 The CWA covers waters that
provide for no "clear demarcation" between a permanent body of water and the wetlands. 128 Finally, Justice Scalia developed a two-part test
for determining whether the CWA's authority extends to certain wet-

flow of the tide shoreward to their mean high water mark, or mean higher
high water mark on the west coast, including wetlands adjacent thereto).
Id.
119. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 731.
120. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
121. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 732. The plurality found that the use of waters as opposed
to water "show[ed] plainly" that navigable waters in the CWA did not "refer to water in
general." Id. Instead, the definition for waters referred to "water 'as found in streams
and bodies forming geographical features such as oceans, rivers, [and] lakes,' or 'the
flowing or moving masses, as of waves or floods, making up such streams or bodies.'"
Id. (alterations in original).
122. Id. at 734.
123. Id. at 737. The CWA's first section states that Congress intended to "recognize,
preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution." 33 U.S.C. § 125l(b).
124. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 738.
125. Id.
126. See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs
(SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159, 171-74 (2001).
127. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 742. Justice Scalia uses "continuous" to mean the opposite of intermittent or occasional. Id. at 729.
128. Id. at 742.
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lands. 129 The test's first part asks whether the water body connected to
the wetland is "a relatively permanent body of water connected to traditional interstate navigable waters." 130 The second part requires that
this connection be a "continuous surface connection" making it difficult to differentiate between the ending point of the wetland and the
beginning point of the traditionally navigable waterway. 131 The plurality opinion vacated the lower court decisions and remanded the case
for a determination under this test. 132

2. Justice Kennedy's Opinion, Concurring in the Judgment
Justice Kennedy agreed with the plurality that the Court should vacate and remand the case. 133 However, Justice Kennedy did not agree
with the Justice Scalia's interpretation and instead adopted a "significant nexus" approach. 134 He rejectedJustice Scalia's analysis because it
did not conform to the CWA's language and the Court's previous cases.135 Justice Kennedy criticized Justice Scalia's requirement for "permanent standing water or continuous flow," because "torrents thundering at irregular flows" could just as easily pollute downstream waters as
a continuous stream of considerably less volume. 136 Justice Kennedy
also declined to accept the assertion that the CWA only covers wetlands
with a "continuous surface connection to other jurisdictional waters." 137
Justice Kennedy appeared to overly emphasize the CWA's environmental policies in rejecting Justice Scalia's reasoning. 138 Such emphasis,
although well-intentioned, does not properly give effect to the statute's
language or balance with the CWA's other expressed policy of maintaining federalism. 139
Justice Kennedy turned to Riverside Bayvieu/4° where the Court
stated that the CWA applied to wetlands that had "significant effects on
water quality and the aquatic ecosystem[s]" of "adjacent waterways." 141
This language would expand regulation over more wetlands than
would be covered if the CWA required the wetland and other water to

129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 757.
133. Id. at 787 (Kennedy,]., concurring).
134. Id. at 759.
135. Id. at 768.
136. Id. at 769.
137. Id. at 772.
138. See id. at 767-69 ("The plurality's ... requirement ... makes little practical sense
in a statute concerned with downstream water quality.").
139. See infra Part Ill.D.
140. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
141. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 772-73 (quoting Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 135, n.9).
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have a surface connection. 142 A significant nexus, which allows a wetland to come under the authority of the CWA, exists if the wetland "either alone or in combination with similarly situated lands in the region, significantly affect[s] the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other covered waters more readily understood as 'navigable."' 143
Because the lower courts did not appropriately address the significant
nexus between the wetlands and other waters, Justice Kennedy agreed
with the plurality's judgment to vacate the court of appeals decision
and remand the cases for further analysis."•
3. Justice Stevens' Dissenting Opinion
Justice Stevens criticized bothJustice Scalia's andJustice Kennedy's
opinions for not giving proper deference to the Corps. 145 Employing
146
Chevron, Justice Stevens gave deference to the Corps' decision to assert authority over wetlands that could have potential effects on traditionally navigable waters. 147 So long as those wetlands are "bordering,
contiguous, or neighboring," they still have characteristics that can
affect water quality of other waters of the United States, and thus the
CWA covers them. 148 Under the second Chevron step, Justice Stevens
found the Corps' interpretation reasonable because it "advance[d] the
purpose of the Act." 149 The Corps' interpretation was faithful to the
CWA's language because the Corps was regulating wetlands that could
control the flow of water to traditionally navigable waters and potentially affect downstream waters. 150 This connection also gave sufficient
import to the CWA's use of the term "navigable waters" to permit the
Corps' interpretation under the statute. 151

D. WHERE TO Go FROM HERE
Although Rnpanos presented the Court with a fairly suitable medium for articulating a firm standard that courts could use to evaluate
future conflicts regarding the interpretation of the CWA's "navigable
waters," no such standard garnered a majority. Rnpanos failed to pro142. Id. at 742 (plurality opinion) ("[O]nly those wetlands with a continuous surface
connection" to other navigable waters are adjacent and therefore covered by the
CWA).
143. Id. at 780 (Kennedy,]., concurring).
144. Id. at 786-87.
145. Id. at 787-88 (Stevens,]., dissenting).
146. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984),
supra note 77 and accompanying text.
147. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 788 (Stevens,]., dissenting).
148. Id. at 805-06.
149. Id. at 804-05.
150. Id. at 804.
151. Id. at 787-88, 805-06.
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vide to landowners, courts, and the Corps clear guidance regarding the
limits of federal jurisdiction under the CWA. Instead, district courts
and courts of appeals now have different standards for deciding CWA
cases that tum on whether the body of water or wetland falls under
"navigable waters" pursuant to the CWA. The plurality opinion, although providing a clearer surface water connection test, does not carry with it the command of a majority opinion. The Corps is likely to
utilize the test only to forgo determining the existence of a significant
nexus when the wetland has a surface connection with a permanent
body ofwater. 152
As noted in United States v. Chevron Pipe Line Co., applying the significant nexus test will only result in further litigation until the courts
agree on a reasonable standard for the test. 153 As ChiefJustice Roberts
pointed out in his concurring opinion, courts will continue to evaluate
most cases individually. 154 As Justice Stevens predicted in his dissent, 155
and as cases following Rapanos have made apparent, most courts have
followed Justice Kennedy's approach. 156 However, the Rapanos split
decision will most likely do little to stem litigation under the CWA, possibly even increasing litigation over which standard is binding. 157 Landowners will still need to invest money into administrative and judicial
processes before developing their land.

III. "NAVI GABLE WATERS" DEFINED BY THE CLEAN WATER
ACT AND THE CONSTITUTION

The Supreme Court's failure to present clear guidance in Rapanos
could potentially lead to another CWA case coming before the Court.
For example, one circuit could adopt Justice Scalia's interpretation
while a sister circuit adopts Justice Kennedy's significant nexus approach. The same uniform law could apply to landowners in neighbor152. For example, a wetland with a surface water connection to a traditionally navigable water will have a per se significant nexus with "waters of the United States," and
thus, the Corps need not show any more to bring it under federal jurisdiction.
153. United States v. Chevron Pipe Line Co., 437 F.Supp.2d 605, 613 (N.D. Tex.
2006) (holding that the significant nexus standard "leaves no guidance on how to
implement its vague, subjective centerpiece").
154. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 758 (Roberts, CJ., concurring).
155. Id. at 810, n.14 (Stevens,]., dissenting).
156. See, e.g., United States v.Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 66 (1st Cir. 2006) (remanding to
the district court for further proceedings under Justice Kennedy's standard); United
States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 725 (7th Cir. 2006) (remanding the case
to the district court for further proceedings under Justice Kennedy's standard); N. Cal.
River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 457 F.3d 1023, 1025, 1029-30 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding thatJustice Kennedy's opinion was controlling in interpreting the term navigable
waters).
157. Cheuron Pipe Line, 437 F.Supp.2d at 613 (acknowledging Rapanos but finding no
controlling standard, therefore, utilizing pre-Rapanos Fifth Circuit case law to interpret
navigable waters).
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ing states in fundamentally different ways. This inconsistent application could benefit individuals of one state at the expense of another
state. Yet the Court generally recognizes that federal regulation should
prevent a discrepancy among states rather than promote it. 158 Should
such a situation arise, this Article provides an interpretation of "navigable waters" that would provide lower courts with a clear rule to apply.
Forgoing a wandering probe into what constitutes "waters of the United States," the navigation presented in this Article incorporates the
Supreme Court's Commerce Clause framework as a means to determiningjurisdiction under the CWA. This framework recognizes federal power to regulate activities substantially affecting interstate commerce. This focus on activities is the key to discerning the CWA's
proper scope of jurisdiction. 159 Section 404 jurisdiction over "navigable
waters" should extend only to (1) traditionally navigable waters of the
United States 160 and any wetlands with an adjacent surface connection
thereto and (2) the discharge of dredged or fill materials into other
waters (including wetlands) only where such discharge will substantially affect the navigability of traditionally navigable waters.
A. FINDING MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN THE CLEAN WATER ACT'S TEXT
AND THE CONSTITUTION

An accurate interpretation of "navigable waters" must look to the
CWA, its legislative history, and constitutional rules that guide federal
power. The CWA's language and history indicate that "navigable waters" goes beyond traditionally navigable waters. 161 However, constitutional components such as federalism and the Interstate Commerce
Clause force a stricter reading than what the Corps gives "navigable
waters." After inspecting the factors necessary for interpreting the
CWA, this Article's interpretation emerges by balancing the various
considerations.
1. Traditionally Navigable Waters and Wetlands with Adjacent
Surface Water Connection Thereto Are "Navigable Waters"
Under the Text of the Clean Water Act

The CWA's language brings wetlands with adjacent surface water
connections to traditionally navigable waters within its scope. The Da-

158. See Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 282
(1981) ("The prevention of this sort of destructive interstate competition is a traditional role for congressional action under the Commerce Clause.").
159. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
160. See supra Part 11.A.2.
161. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2000)). See also S. REP. No. 92-1236, at
144 (1972), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3776, 3822.
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niel Ball first recognized traditionally navigable waters. 162 The ONA
allows states to implement permitting programs over "navigable waters"
except those that are traditionally navigable and the "wetlands adjacent
thereto." 163 Thus, the ONA is clear that "navigable waters" covers traditionally navigable waters and wetlands with adjacent surface water connections to such waters. Extending jurisdiction over wetlands with an
adjacent surface water connection to traditionally navigable waters resolves the inherent difficulty of distinguishing when aquatic geographic features no longer constitute "waters." 154 The ONA should cover adjacent wetlands with a surface water connection to traditionally navigable waters because deciding where one waterway becomes a separate
non-navigable waterway is nearly impossible when the wetland connects the traditionally navigable water with land. Additionally, one can
presume that any activity taking place with regard to the wetland has a
substantial effect on the navigability of the waterway, especially when
considered in the aggregate, because the water from the wetland is the
same water that makes up the traditionally navigable waterway.

2. Congressional Use of the Term "Navigable Waters"
The Supreme Court has struggled with the CWA's extension over
"navigable waters," 165 defined as "waters of the United States." 166 As expressed in SWANCC, Congress most likely "intended the phrase 'navigable waters' to include 'at least some waters that would not be deemed

162. See supra Part 11.A.2.
163. 33 u.s.c. § 1344(g) (1).
164. See id. In United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 132 (1985),
the Court noted that:
[T] he transition from water to solid ground is not necessarily or even typically
an abrupt one. Rather, between open waters and dry land may lie shallows,
marshes, mudflats, swamps, bogs - in short, a huge array of areas that are not
wholly aquatic but nevertheless fall far short of being dry land. Where on this
continuum to find the limit of "waters" is far from obvious.
165. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (a) (the "discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be
unlawful"); § 1362(12) (defining "discharge of a pollutant" as "any addition of any
pollutant to navigable waters from any point source");§ 1344(a) (authorizing permits
for "discharge [s] ... into the navigable waters").
166. Id. § 1362(7). The Court initially seemed to restrict that term's importance in
Riverside Bayview, finding that "the Act's definition of 'navigable waters' as 'the waters
of the United States' [to be] of limited import." Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 133.
Then, in its decision in SWANCC, the Court gave more meaning to the use of "navigable waters" by stating that the term showed that Congress was mindful that traditional
federal jurisdiction over waters came from the navigability of such waters. Solid Waste
Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs (SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159, 171
(2001). In Rapanos,]ustice Scalia stated for the plurality that the "qualifier 'navigable'
is not devoid of significance." Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 731 (2006).
Justice Kennedy found that the word "navigable" "must be given some effect." Id. at
779 (Kennedy,]., concurring).
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'navigable' under the classical understanding of that term. "' 167 In order
to exert legislative power under the Commerce Clause, Congress
needed to base the CWA on an area which fell under its Commerce
Clause power. 168 Congressional power over traditionally navigable waters is practically limitless. Thus, enlisting its power over traditionally
navigable waters in the CWA, Congress could regulate traditionally
navigable waters to prohibit discharge of pollutants into those waters. 169
Yet, the terms of the CWA and its legislative history indicate that Congress intended the CWA to extend authority beyond traditionally navigable waters. 170 How far beyond traditionally navigable waters Congress intended to extend the CWA is not inherently clear, but the explanation below provides an answer.
Justice Scalia's interpretation 1' 1 failed to refine jurisdiction under
the CWA. Interpreting "navigable waters" as support for an "ordinary
presence of water" means "navigable waters" allows jurisdiction over
any waters, regardless of whether they are navigable, potentially navigable, non-navigable, isolated, interstate or intrastate, as long as the waterway is not temporary. Thus,Justice Scalia's emphasis on "navigable
waters" provides little insight into the jurisdiction of the CWA, because
it only distinguishes between temporary water flows and relatively permanent bodies of water. 1'2 This distinction draws nothing from the
term "navigable;" rather it draws mainly from "waters," which the definition also uses. 1'3
Justice Kennedy's position that ''.jurisdiction over wetlands depends
upon the existence of a significant nexus between the wetlands in
question and navigable waters in the traditional sense" is also unnecessary.1'4 Justice Kennedy basically argues that if a waterway comes under
the CWA's jurisdiction based on his significant nexus test, then the
waterway is sufficiently "navigable." 1'5 This step seems unnecessary and

167. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 171 (quoting Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 133).
168. See supra Part II.A. 1.
169. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (a).
170. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7). See aLrn S. REP. No. 92-1236, at 144 (1972), as reprinted in
1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3776, 3822 ("[T]he term 'navigable waters' [should] be given the
broadest constitutional interpretation unencumbered by agency determinations which
have been made or may be made for administrative purposes.").
171. Justice Scalia stated that Congress's utilization of "navigable" in the operative
term "includes, at bare minimum, the ordinary presence of water." Rapanos, 547 U.S.
at 734 (plurality opinion). In Rapanos, Justice Scalia, although noting that the use of
"navigable" was not without "significance," first stated that it was unnecessary to determine to what extent Congress's use of "navigable" "restrict[ed] the coverage of the
Act." Id. at 731.
172. Id. at 734.
173. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) ("The term 'navigable waters' means the waters of the United States.") (emphasis added).
174. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 779 (Kennedy,]., concurring).
175. See id. at 780.
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merely alleviates the past practice of appointing some emphasis to "navigable waters" rather than solely depending on the CWA's definition.
A court's focus should be on the definition and the factors that determine the extent to which Congress can regulate waterways. Rather
than grant influence to the term "navigable waters," this Article's interpretation merely recognizes that Congress used the term as a signal
for indicating the source of its regulatory authority.
3. Waters of the United States

As shown above, determining federal jurisdiction under the CWA
requires more than interpreting the term "navigable waters," because
the CWA defines the term as "waters of the United States." 176 The definition is important because it is controlling. 177 Unfortunately, "waters
of the United States" seems to offer no more guidance than "navigable
waters." 118 One effect of Congress having used "waters of the United
States" is that the C"'WA distinguishes between national waters and state
waters. 179 The CWA does not purport to regulate navigable waters that
have no potential for use as highways in interstate commerce. Thus,
courts cannot base federal jurisdiction on the navigability in fact of
completely in-state waters that have no connection to traditionally na. bl e waters. iso
viga
Another effect of the phrase "waters of the United States" is that it
conveys a broader meaning than "navigable waters of the United

176. 33 u.s.c. § 1362(7).
177. See United States v. Rowland, 464 F.3d 899, 905 (9th Cir. 2006) ("When a word
is defined in a statute, courts are not at liberty to look beyond the statutory definition.") (quotations omitted). This arguably includes not looking to the signaling term
that Congress used to refer to the definition. See also Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S.
37, 42 (1979) ("A fundamental canon of statutory construction is that, unless otherwise
defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common
meaning.") (emphasis added).
1 78. Even if a term is defined, the definition can still require interpretation. See 2A
NORMAN]. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATIJTORYCONSTRUCilON § 47:07 (6th ed. 2000).
179. "Navigable waters of the United States" refers to traditionally navigable waters,
i.e., waters navigable in fact that can be used for interstate commerce. See Kaiser Aetna
v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 166 n.l (1979) (describing "navigable waters of the
United States" as "navigable in fact, and used for commerce").
180. The Commerce Clause only covers interstate and foreign commerce, it does
not cover completely in-state navigable waters that have no potential use as highways
for interstate or foreign commerce based purely on their being navigable in fact. But a
navigable in fact waterway may be completely intrastate yet still subject to federal government regulation when, through its connection with other navigable in fact waters, it
forms a highway used in interstate commerce. See The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. ( 10 Wall.)
557, 564 (1870) (noting that the Grand River, which is completely within the State of
Michigan, was a traditionally navigable water because of its connection to Lake Michigan). See also supra Part 11.A.2.
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States." 181
By defining "navigable waters" as "waters of the United
States," Congress's intent to expand CWAjurisdiction over more than
just traditionally navigable waters is apparent. Congress's use of a general term to define a narrow term signals a more expansive reading. 182
Structural aspects of the CWA support the idea that Congress intended
a broad reading when it chose "waters of the United States" to further
define "navigable waters." 18' As noted by Justice Scalia in Rapanos, section 404(g) 184 shows that Congress acknowledged that "navigable waters" included more than those traditionally navigable. 185 Congress did
this by specifically pulling waters within the jurisdiction of the CWA
that are not traditionally navigable waters. 186 Finally, the CWA's legislative history shows that at least some in Congress intended that courts
interpret "navigable waters" as broadly as the constitution will allow. 187
The conclusion is that Congress intended "navigable waters" to refer to its Commerce Clause power over traditionally navigable waters
but at the same time, also intended the CWA to extend beyond those
traditionally navigable waters. The distinction between navigable waters of the United States (traditionally navigable waters) and waters of
the United States is important because Congress has varying powers
over each category. Its authority over navigable waters of the United
States is plenary. 188 However, Congressional authority over additional
waters-those that make up the difference between traditionally navigable waters and waters of the United States-is limited. 189 Congress
cannot regulate those additional waters as channels of commerce because no one uses them to transport commerce. 190 Congress can, however, regulate activities bearing a relationship to those waters but only
if the activities substantially affect interstate commerce. 191 Folded into
this power to regulate activities substantially affecting commerce is
181. Navigable waters of the United States usually refers to traditionally navigable
waters. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 792 (2006); see also 33 U.S.C. §
1362(7) (defining "navigable waters" as "waters of the United States, including the
territorial seas.") The Court in Riverside Bayview found that by further defining navigable waters Congress intended to exert authority over waters "that might not satisfy
traditional tests of navigability." United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474
U.S. 121, 133 (1985).
182. See]AMES WII..IARD HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES 57 (1982) ("[W]here a statute uses generic rather than specific words there seems reason to presume that the
legislature intends an expansive rather than a restrictive reading.").
183. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 267-68 n.6 (1997) ("The legislative intent
of Congress is to be derived from the language and structure of the statute itself ... .").
184. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(g) (1).
185. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 734.
186. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
187. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
188. See supra Part II.A 1.
189. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 731-32.
190. Craig, supra note 6, at 121.
191. See infra note 198 and accompanying text.
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Congress's ability to regulate non-navigable waters with regard to such
waters' potential to affect the navigability of traditionally navigable waters.192 But non-navigable waters are immune from Congressional regulation if they are free from activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce. 193
This conclusion is born from cases that extended Congress's power
over non-navigable tributaries. 194 Those cases concentrate on the activity that Congress has chosen to regulate. For example, in Federal Power
Commission v. Union E/,ectric Co., the Supreme Court held that Congress
had the ability to oversee dam construction on non-navigable water195
ways where the dams produced electricity for interstate transmission.
Congress's clear authority over interstate electricity transmission allowed it to regulate the electricity producing activity even when the
activity involved a waterway over which it did not have plenary powers.196 Importantly, the Court did not say that Congress would have
been able to construct the dam irrespective of its purpose. The Commerce Clause, by extending power to Congress through navigation,
197
does not grant wholesale federal regulation of non-navigable waters.
This interpretation bears scrutiny under more recent Commerce
Clause cases. One of the three categories over which Congress enjoys
Commerce Clause power is "activities having a substantial relation to
interstate commerce . . . i.e., those activities that substantially affect
interstate commerce." 198 If the activity Congress chooses to regulate
meets this test, then the regulation is constitutional regardless of
whether the activity is purely an intrastate activity. 199 Accordingly,
courts should base the CWA's jurisdiction with respect to waters that
are not traditionally navigable on the activity that the Corps is attempt192. See Oklahoma v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 525-26 (1941) (extending
federal regulatory control over a non-navigable tributary of a traditionally navigable
water via analogy to federal control over non-navigable portions of a traditionally navigable water).
193. See infra note 197 and accompanying text.
194. See Reed D. Benson, Deflating the Deference Myth: National Interests vs. State Authority under Federal Laws Affecting Water Use, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 241, 252-53 (2006) ("[T]he
Commerce Clause justified federal authority over seemingly any water-related activity
with a connection to commerce, 'quite without regard to the federal control of tributary streams and navigation."') (quoting Fed. Power Comm'n v. Union Elec. Co., 381
U.S. 90, 94 (1965)).
195. Fed. Power Comm'n, 381 U.S. at 94.
196. See id.
197. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 174 (1979) (describing Congress's Commerce Clause power over activities affecting interstate commerce as one
existing "irrespective of whether navigation, or, indeed, water, is involved."). When
one takes away the activity, Congress's authority to regulate goes with it.
198. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558--59 (1995). The other two categories
are "channels of interstate commerce ... [and] instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce .... " Id. at 558.
199. See id. at 559-60.
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ing to regulate. Under this inquiry, the focus is on the activity's effects
rather than on where the activity happens.
The Lopez categories fit nicely with Congress's undisputed power to
extend federal jurisdiction over traditionally navigable waters. 200 Traditionally, the Court defined navigable waters as waters that are navigable
in fact or which "are susceptible of being used" as channels of interstate commerce. 201 As a result, the Commerce Clause framework correctly acknowledges Congress's ability to regulate these waters with
little, if any, limit. 202 Congress's only concern needs to be about whether an activity substantially affects interstate commerce when the regulation is not over channels of interstate commerce (or instrumentalities
of interstate commerce). 20' That is, when Congress regulates channels
of interstate commerce, it need not concern itself with making sure it is
regulating an activity substantially affecting interstate commerce. 204 Yet,
when Congress moves outside the channels, it must then look to activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. 205 For example, the
Commerce Clause gives Congress the authority to regulate nonnavigable tributaries that flow into traditionally navigable waters based
on the tributaries' potential to affect navigability of traditionally navigable waters. 206 Classifying the regulation imposed on those tributaries
as regulation imposed on an activity that substantially affects interstate
commerce assists in understanding this reading. Remembering that
interstate commerce comprehends navigability, 207 when an activity substantially affects navigation, it affects interstate commerce. Accordingly, Congress can properly regulate activities on non-navigable tributaries when those activities substantially affect navigation, but it cannot
regulate non-navigable tributaries independently.
If Congress can regulate any activity substantially affecting interstate commerce, then why should one interpret the CWA more narrowly to regulate only those activities affecting navigation? The answer lies
in the CWA's language. The CWA covers activities that, without further expression by Congress of their substantial effect on interstate
commerce, can only be a proper extension of Commerce Clause power
200. The Dani,el Bal~ 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 564 (1870).
201. Id. at 563.
202. See LojJez., 514 U.S. at 558 ("Congress may regulate the use of the channels of
interstate commerce."). See also Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S.
241, 256 (1964) (noting that Congress's broad power over channels of commerce is
without dispute).
203. See LojJez., 514 U.S. at 559.
204. See id. at 558.
205. See id. at 559.
206. See Oklahoma v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 525-26 (1941) (holding that
Congress has the power to enact flood control measures with regard to a non-navigable
tributary of the Mississippi River because such flooding has the potential to affect interstate commerce on the Mississippi River).
207. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
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if Congress is exercising its plenary power over traditionally navigable
waters. 208 In other words, the federal government is exercising its
Commerce Clause powers over channels because the CWA does not
require that the activities substantially affect interstate commerce nor
are the activities inherently related to interstate commerce absent their
effect on waterways. Without a jurisdictional directive, 209 the CWA cannot boundlessly move beyond waters that Congress can regulate by its
channels of commerce power. 210 Because Congress utilized its plenary
powers over traditionally navigable waters and also intended to extend
the CWA's jurisdiction beyond those waters, any extension must flow
from that plenary power. As shown above, that plenary power includes
regulating activities on non-navigable tributaries that could affect the
navigability of a traditionally navigable waterway. Regulation not over
channels or instrumentalities of commerce must be over "activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce;" 2n so to stay within
the Commerce Clause framework and maintain a nexus to the authority under which Congress acted, courts should read the CWA to extend
to activities that will substantially affect a traditionally navigable waterway's navigability. 212
Further support that the CWA does not extend to every waterrelated activity with a substantial relation to interstate commerce is the
Supreme Court's rejection of this reasoning in SWANCC. 213 If the CWA
does not extend to all activities substantially affecting interstate commerce that involve non-navigable isolated waters, then the CWA cannot
be read to extend jurisdiction to activities on non-navigable tributaries
without regard to the activities' effects on navigation. An activity involving an isolated wetland or pond to has the same potential to affect
interstate commerce without relation to navigability as the same activity
taking place on a non-navigable tributary. That is, the only difference
208. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b) (1) (2000) (stating that section 1344
guidelines should be based on criteria enumerated in§ 1343(c), covering discharges
into the ocean). Section 1343(c)'s criteria are based mainly on the "degradation" of
the waters. Id. § 1343(c) (1). For example, § 1343(c) states that guidelines "shall include ... the effect of disposal of pollutants on ... plankton, fish, shellfish, wildlife,
shorelines, and beaches ... [and] on marine life .... " Id. Section 1344 also gives the
EPA veto options over permits when "the discharge of such materials into such area
will have an unacceptable adverse effect on municipal water supplies, shellfish beds
and fishery areas (including spawning and breeding areas), wildlife, or recreational
areas." Id.§ 1344(c).
209. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-62 (1995) (discussing reading a jurisdictional element
into a statute to avoid constitutional questions).
210. See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs
(SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159,174 (2001).
211. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.
212. Interstate commerce encompasses navigation, so an activity affecting navigability can properly be characterized as one affecting interstate commerce. See Oklahoma
v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508,523 (1940).
213. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 173-74.
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between a non-navigable tributary and an isolated pond, which
SWANCCheld not to be under the CWA'sjurisdiction, is the tributary's
capability to affect the navigability of the traditionally navigable waterway.214 If the CWA indeed gave the federal government regulatory
power over any and all activities affecting interstate commerce that
involved non-navigable tributaries, then courts would inevitably extend
that jurisdiction to isolated waters. Courts would base an extension of
jurisdiction over non-navigable tributaries, beyond that relating to the
tributaries' potential to affect navigability of navigable in fact waters,
purely on the potential to affect interstate commerce without regard to
navigability. Thus, any activity involving water that affected various
facets of interstate commerce would make such water "navigable" under the CWA. If the CWA extended this power to non-navigable tributaries, then isolated waters would also come under this umbrella. This
is contrary to the holding in SWANCC. 215
Take for an example the Migratory Bird Rule. 216 Up until the
SWANCC decision, the EPA and the Corps interpreted the CWA to extend federal jurisdiction over waters on which any activity that had the
potential to affect interstate commerce took place. 211 The Court in
SWANCC invalidated the Migratory Bird Rule because Congress did not
intend to stretch its power to the questionable extent of the Commerce
Clause. 218 Indeed, in SWANCC, the Court correctly held that to exert
federal power over isolated waters, Congress would need to state explicitly that such regulated activity had the potential to substantially affect
interstate commerce. 219 Thus, Congress's power to regulate nonnavigable tributaries and non-adjacent wetlands rests on its power to
regulate activities affecting navigation, because the CWA does not extend the authority to regulate any activity affecting interstate commerce unless the activity involves a traditionally navigable waterway. 220
Section 404 also illustrates why examining Congress's power to regulate navigation helps explain jurisdiction under the CWA. Section
404 gives states the ability to control filling and dredging over CWAcovered, non-traditionally navigable waters. 221 Yet, Congress reserved
214. Id. at 174. Cf. Oklahoma, 313 U.S. at 523 ("And it is clear that Congress may
exercise its control over the non-navigable stretches of a river in order to preserve or
promote commerce on the navigable portions.").
215. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 166. See also supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
216. See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 164. See also supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
217. See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 162, 166. See also Mank, supra note 81, at 818; supra
notes 62-74 and accompanying text.
218. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 174.
219. See id. at 172 (a clear statement is expected if Congress intended the CWA to
extend to the limits of its Commerce Clause power). See also United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 610 (1995) (Souter,]., dissenting).
220. See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 171-72.
221. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1344(g), (t) (2000). See also supra note 118 and
accompanying text.
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the absolute power to "maintain navigation" for the federal government.222 This recognizes states' traditional power over the waterways
themselves and reduces federal involvement in an area that would otherwise be off limits to federal jurisdiction but for an activity that substantially affects navigation. Additionally, the CWA directs the Corps to
take into account "the economic impact of the site on navigation and
anchorage" when determining where to designate permits under section 404. 223 This also supports understanding the CWA as an exercise
of Congress's power to regulate navigation. 22• The result of reading the
CWA as an expression of Congress's power to regulate navigation is
that non-navigable tributaries are not automatically "waters of the
United States" and not all dredging and filling activities occurring on
those waters would fall within the jurisdiction of the CWA.225 Only
those activities that have a substantial effect on navigation of traditionally navigable waters fit within CWAjurisdiction.
B. SUBSTANTIAL EFFECT DOES NOT EQUAL SIGNIFICANT NEXUS

Justice Kennedy's significant nexus test appears similar to the
Commerce Clause's substantial effect requirement. 226 The similarity is
in appearance only, because the tests' mechanics bear no similarities
and manifest the error in the Supreme Court's thinking when evaluating CWA jurisdiction. The significant nexus that Justice Kennedy required is between the waterway in question and a traditionally navigable waterway. 221 The difficulty in deciding at which point a disconnected waterway achieves a significant nexus with a traditionally navigable waterway is indubitable. 228 Justice Kennedy's test also ignores the
reality that the effects a waterway has on another waterway is completely dependent on the scope and intensity of the activity taking place on
the waterway involved in the activity. The substantial effect test is less
esoteric and properly frames the inquiry in terms of Congress's Com-

222. 33 u.s.c. § 1344(t).
223. Id.§ 1344(b).
224. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 193 (1824) ("[A] power to regulate
navigation, is as expressly granted, as if that term had been added to the word 'commerce."').
225. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1344(a), 1362(7).
226. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 780 (2006) (Kennedy, J. concurring).
See also supra note 174 and accompanying text ( outlining Justice Kennedy's significant
nexus test).
227. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 779.
228. See United States v. Chevron Pipe Line Co., 437 F.Supp.2d 605, 613 (N.D. Tex.
2006) Qustice Kennedy's "test leaves no guidance on how to implement its vague, subjective centerpiece.").
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merce Clause power. The activity itself must be one that substantially
affects navigation on traditionally navigable waters. 229

C. DOCTRINE OF ADMINISTRATIVE DEFERENCE NOT SUITABLE FOR
"NAVIGABLE WATERS"

Justice Stevens argued in his dissent that Chevron deference to the
Corps could be a possible remedy for providing an interpretation of
"navigable waters." 230 Arguably, courts should concede to the Corps'
interpretation because "navigable waters" is ambiguous. However, a
court, as "the final authority on issues of statutory construction," must
first look to the CWA to determine whether the statute resolves the
"precise question at issue. "231 The question here is what the boundaries
for federal jurisdiction under the CWA are. A narrower interpretation
than the one suggested by this Article would not give effect to Congressional intent, which is evident from the CWA, that courts give "navigable waters" a broader interpretation than traditionally navigable waters. 232 An interpretation under the CWA that pushes the CWA's jurisdiction broader than this Article's suggested interpretation potentially
violates the Constitution as an improper exercise of Congress's legislative power. The interpretation sandwiched by these two invalid readings and represented by this Article is Congress's answer to the "precise
question." Because the final answer is derived from the statute and
controlling constitutional law, 233 agency deference is unnecessary. 234
229. Admittedly, a court may find that an activity has a substantial effect on interstate commerce (i.e., navigation) through the cumulative effects doctrine ushered in
by Wickard v. Filburn. 317 U.S. 111, 127-29 (1942) (allowing a court to consider an
individual's acts "taken together with that of many others similarly situated" for purposes of determining whether Congress can regulate the activity under the Commerce
Clause). See supra note 93 and accompanying text. Whether this limits or expands the
federal government's jurisdiction under the CWA is outside the scope of this Article.
230. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 788 (Stevens, J. dissenting). See also supra Part 11.C.3. Indeed, the Court in Riverside Bayview deferred to the Corps' interpretation. United
States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131-32 (1985). See supra notes
77-80 and accompanying text.
231. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat'I Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9.
232. See Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 133. See also supra Part III.A.2.
233. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (describing the rule as "where an otherwise acceptable
construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will
construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary
to the intent of Congress"). See also Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895)
("[E]very reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from
unconstitutionality."); Nat'I Labor Relations Bd. v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 507
(1979) (declining to construe a statute in a manner that would require the Court to
resolve constitutional questions); Catlwlic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 510 (Brennan,]., dissenting) (quoting Int'I Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1961)).
234. Justice Stevens argued that deference should be given to the Corps because it
was better situated to determine factors regarding environmental effects. Rapanos, 547
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D. THIS ARTICLE'S INTERPRETATION GIVES EFFECT TO ALL POLICIES OF
THE CLEAN WATER ACT

Congress clearly expressed a policy in the CWA to protect the Nation's waters. 235 However,just as clear is the CWA's policy of respecting
states' rights. 236 Implicit in all Congressional legislation, including the
CWA, is the intent to pass legislation that bears constitutional scrutiny,
such as legislation within the Congress's authority and not in violation
of structural principles (e.g., federalism). 2' 1 This Article's interpretation not only sets forth a clear standard to apply for future CWA cases
but it also promotes the CWA's diverse policies.
First, this Article's suggested interpretation helps avoid a possible
federalism issue. 238 States traditionally have the power to regulate
health and the environment for their citizens. 239 By adopting the interpretation set forth in this Article, courts will be able to steer clear of
interpreting the CWA in a way that threatens to invade these rights.
Rather than extend federal jurisdiction to a point where it has questionable constitutional support, the foundation for this Article's interpretation is the stalwart substantial effects template.
Federalism is a constitutional issue that deserves consideration independent of the CWA's language, but the CWA further underscores
federalism's importance by specifically acknowledging and implementing federalism in its text. 240 This "statutory federalism" is evident in the

U.S. at 804 (Stevens, J. dissenting). See also supra Part II.C.3. A response to this is that
the CWA also contains policies concerning constitutional issues, which the Court is in
the best position to decide. See infra Part III.D.
235. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 125l(a) (2000).
236. Id.§ 125l(b).
237. See, e.g., id. ("It is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect
the primary responsibilities and rights of States .... ").
238. "'Federalism' refers to the balance of power created in the United States Constitution between a ... limited federal government and ... relatively unfettered state
governments." See Craig, supra note 6, at 119-20. In order to secure the rights of the
people, "the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct
governments .... " THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison). "In the tension between
federal and state power lies the promise of liberty." Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,
459 (1991). When the federal government eliminates that tension, usurping power
from the states, the principle of federalism is diminished and the protections that it
affords are lost. Thus, courts usually loathe interpreting a statute in a way that endangers federalism without a clear statement from Congress, because it is Congress that
has "substantial discretion and control over the federal balance." United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 577 (1995).
239. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 29-30 n.38 (2005) (pursuant to their traditional police powers, states may protect the "health, welfare, and safety of their citizens") (citation omitted).
240. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (b). The CWA also respects states' rights with regard to water
allocation. Id.§ 125l(g).
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CWA's permitting sections such as section 404. 241 Congress's direct
recognition of the complex balance between state and federal interests
should direct an interpretation faithful to this principle. 242 The Supreme Court in SWANCC stated that Congress did not "express[] a desire to readjust the federal-state balance" in the CWA,243 so one must
read the CWA to sustain the balance between federal power and state
power consistent with the Constitution. This Article's interpretation
succeeds in following Congressional intent by allowing the federal government to expand its authority under the CWA up to the point where
state jurisdiction bumps against that expansion as recognized by the
Supreme Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
This interpretation supports a second policy, the CWA's expression
of environmental protection. 244 Although this Article's interpretation
may seem to hinder federal attempts to regulate certain wetlands and
waterways, the interpretation's strength lies in its establishment of a
clear line. Once Congress and states are able to foresee the CWA's
reach with certainty, then Congress will enact additional legislation to
fill in any potential gaps. As the CWA stands now under R.apanos, states
are rightfully hesitant to set up regulatory schemes that courts could
find preempted depending on the ebb and flow of the CWA's jurisdiction.245 Additionally, Congress and states must view environmental consequences in light of the CWA's environmental and constitutional balancing approach, so environmental effects cannot be the only captain
of the interpretative ship.
This Article's interpretation circumscribes federal jurisdiction,
which may result in some negative effects resulting from the loss of
federal jurisdiction over certain wetlands. Under this Article's interpretation, section 404 only applies to wetlands that have an adjacent
surface water connection with traditionally navigable waters and
dredged or filled wetlands to the extent that the dredging or filling
would have a substantial effect on the navigation of traditionally navigable waters. Wetlands' benefits are not dependant on the government
that regulates them. Wetlands not covered by section 404 still provide
water filtration, wildlife habitat, and flood control. Yet, if those wetlands lose protection, then those benefits are at risk of disappearing. 246
241. See, e.g., id.§§ 1316(c), 1317(b), 1342, 1344. See also Craig, supra note 6, at 12225.
242. See Craig, supra note 6, at 122.
243. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Anny Corps of Eng'rs
(SWANCG), 531 U.S. 159,174 (2001). Seealso33 U.S.C. §125l(b).
244. See33 U.S.C. § 125l(a).
245. See id. § 1370. See also JON KUSLER, Ass'N OF STATE WETLAND MANAGERS, INC., THE
SWANCC DECISION; STATE REGULATION OF WETLANDS TO FILL THE GAP 18 (2004),
http://www.aswm.org/fwp/swancc/aswm-int.pdf.
246. If states failed to extend their environmental laws to cover the wetlands that
would come under their jurisdiction, then some wetlands may have limited protection
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This is especially troubling given the track record of some states with
regard to their wetlands protection. 247
Federal regulation prevents some issues that can arise when states
are left to regulate the environment by themselves. The nature of ecosystems and the roles that isolated areas can play with respect to the
environment as a whole forms the basis of this view. 248 Federal regulation provides uniform standards so that one state is not able to implement lax standards that detrimentally affect the environment of another state with more stringent standards. Additionally, the benefits from
environmental regulation can often pass to states downstream or
downwind. 249 This provides a disincentive for both the upstream state
and the downstream state. 250 The upstream state does not realize the
full benefit of the costs that it incurs implementing the regulatory
scheme. 251 The downstream state may have a tendency to put off regulation in the hopes that the upstream state will take the initiative, thereby providing the downstream state with the environmental benefits
without incurring any costs. 252 In these instances, federal regulation is
necessary so that states are subject to the same regulations with respect
to protecting the environment.
Similar to the potential for states to under-regulate wetlands is the
risk of an interstate "race to the bottom."253 The phrase "race to the
bottom" describes the result when states competing for commercial
development "race from the desirable levels of environmental quality"
and instead compete to provide the most industry-friendly environmental regulations. 254 The resulting regulations are typically less than
optimal from an environmental perspective. 255 Federal regulation eliminates the need for states to compete in such a race to the bottom. 256
from development or ruin. Gregory L. Sattizahn, The Ebb and Flow of the C/,ean Water
Act: Redefining C/,ean Water Act jurisdiction After SWANCC, 8 GREAT PLAINS NAT.
RESOURCESJ. l, 18 (2004).
247. See, e.g., Kusler, supra note 245, at 12. See al,so Ducks Unlimited, Wetlands Conservation, Waterfowl Habitat Restoration, Research, http:/ /www.ducks.org/ conservation (last
visited Jan. 10, 2008) (expressing the rate at which the United States is losing wetlands
as "more than seven football fields every hour").
248. Tobias Halvarson, Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United
States Army Corps of Engineers: The Failure of "Navigability" as a Proxy in Demarcating
Federal jurisdiction for Environmental Protection, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 181, 199 (2002).
249. See Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-t<>the-Bottom" Rationa/,e for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1222
(1992).
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. See Halvarson, supra note 248, at 199.
254. Revesz, supra note 249, at 1210.
255. Seeid.atl216-17.
256. One problem with the "race to the bottom" theory is that it is an argument
against the political process within the state. If elected representatives in the state
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Regardless of the consequences that could potentially flow from
this Article's suggested interpretation, they are not ones courts can
properly weigh. The Constitution and the statute's language provide
that the proper interpretation should be the main concern with the
CWA. By doing so, this Article gives meaning to the CWA's purposes,
including both environmental protection and sustaining federalism,
while staying within statutory and constitutional boundaries.

CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in &panos brought to light the difficulty of applying the CWA to wetlands. Wetlands provide numerous
valuable contributions to the environment, and federal regulation protecting the wetlands is likely the most effective way to prevent their
destruction. Unfortunately, the CWA does not extend to cover all bodies of water, including wetlands that may have an impact on the environment through a variety of ways, such as flood control and water
filtration. Instead, the language Congress used in the CWA pronounces only one interpretation of the CWA. Congress's use of "navigable waters" defined as "waters of the United States" 257 extends the
CWA's jurisdiction only over (1) traditionally navigable waters of the
United States and any wetlands with an adjacent surface connection
thereto and (2) the discharge of dredged or fill materials into other
waters (including wetlands) only where such discharge will substantially affect the navigability of traditionally navigable waters. This reading
properly gives effect to the CWA's protection of federalism and avoids
expanding federal jurisdiction under the CWA past constitutional limits.

legislatures are willing to adopt regulations favoring industry more than the environment, then perhaps such regulations are the ones properly adopted and federal oversight should not overrule those state adopted regulations. The argument that environmental interests are more important than founding principles is difficult for one to
make. See U.S. CONST., art. IV,§ 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in
this Union a Republican Form of Government .... "). See also, In re Duncan, 139 U.S.
449, 461 (1891) ("[T]he distinguishing feature of [a Republican] form is the right of
the people to choose their own officers for governmental administration, and pass
their own laws in virtue of the legislative power reposed in representative bodies, whose
legitimate acts may be said to be those of the people themselves .... "). Yet, environmental groups can be more effective at the national level and environmental protection is easier to value at a federal level, circumstances that support having political
battles involving the environment take place in Congress rather than in state legislatures. See Revesz, supra note 249, at 1223-24.
257. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2000).

CASE NOTE
IDAHO INSTREAM STOCK WATERING RIGHTS ON
FEDERAL IAND
I. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................... 125
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURE ....................................................... 126
A. LU Ranching Co. v. United States ........................................... 126
B. Joyce Livestock Co. v. United States .......................................... 126
III. ISSUES ..................................................................................... 127
IV. DISCUSSION ........................................................................... 128
A. Acquiring Stock Watering Rights on Federal Land ........... 128
1. Obtaining a General Water Right on Federal Land .... 128
2. Idaho's Constitutional Requirements for Instream
Stock Watering Rights ................................................... 129
3. The Predecessors' Instream Stock Watering Rights
on Federal Land Passed Appurtenant to Patented
Ranch Deeds .................................................................. 132
B. Factors that Affect Priority Dates of Stock Watering
Rights on Federal Land ...................................................... 134
1. Taylor Grazing Act Applicants are not Required to
List Water Rights on the Application ........................... 134
2. Class I Grazing Rights Affect Priority Dates ................. 134
C. The United States' Claim oflnstream Stock Watering Rights
on Federal Land .................................................................. 135
V. CONCLUSION ........................................................................ 136

I. INTRODUCTION
Raising cattle in the parched, water-deprived West requires an
enormous amount of land. Although the Homestead Act and the
Stock-Raising Homestead Act authorized homesteads on federal land
of up to 640 acres, this was still not sufficient land to run a successful
livestock operation. Therefore, pursuant to the 1934 Taylor Grazing
Act ("Act") ,1 ranchers also began grazing on nearby federal land to
adequately feed and water their cattle. Although federal law permitted
ranchers to use the rangeland, state law recognized watering rights
1.

Taylor Grazing Act, 43 U.S.C. § 315 (2000).
125
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within that land. Prior to 2007, Idaho recognized instream stock watering rights on federal land. However, the state lacked a definitive opinion on elements for obtaining those rights, whether those rights automatically passed appurtenant to the patented ranch land, how the
Act affected the priority date of such rights, and how the United States
could establish its own stock watering rights on federal land. In February 2007, the Supreme Court of Idaho addressed these issues in companion cases Joyce Livestock Co. v. United State/ and LU Ranching Co. v.
United States. 3
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURE
A. LU RANCHING Co. V. UNITED STA 17!,'S
LU Ranching Company ("LU") ran a cattle operation in Owyhee
County, Idaho and purchased approximately 5,000 acres of land in
1976. Through the purchase and pursuant to the Act, LU acquired
grazing rights on three allotments.
LU claimed a May 20, 1872 priority date for instream stock watering rights on federal land within the allotments. The United States
objected. By reviewing patents and affidavits, a special master determined the priority date of all LU's water rights to be June 10, 1876, the
date when LU's earliest predecessors began using federal land and the
water located on that land. LU and the United States both requested a
review by the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of
Idaho. The district court held that private parties could appropriate
water on federal land before and after the adoption of the 1934 Act; an
instream stock watering right required an intent to appropriate and an
application to a beneficial use, but did not require a physical diversion;
instream stock watering rights on federal land were appurtenant to a
livestock owner's ranch property; and such appurtenant rights would
pass in a conveyance only if it were the grantor's intent.
The district court held that the special master should have analyzed
each claimed water right separately. It reviewed the facts of each grazing allotment and determined priority dates ranging from 1937 to
1950, dates that were all subsequent to the Act. LU appealed and the
United States cross appealed.
B. JOYCE LNEsTOCK Co. V. UNITED STATES

Joyce Livestock Company ('Joyce") is another cattle operation located in Owyhee County, Idaho, owning approximately 10,000 acres of
land. Relying on the earliest patents in its chain of title, Joyce claimed

2.
3.

Joyce Livestock Co. v. United States, 156 P.3d 502 (Idaho 2007).
LU Ranching Co. v. United States, 156 P.3d 590 (Idaho 2007).
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an 1898 priority date for its instream stock watering rights on nearby
federal land. The United States claimed overlapping stock watering
rights on the same stream but with a priority date of 1934, the date of
the Act.
A special master recommended denying Joyce's claimed water
rights and recommended granting the United States' claimed water
rights. The special master based his decisions on a showing of intent.
He claimed Joyce's predecessors did not intend to appropriate because
they did not attempt to exclude other ranchers from using the same
water source. Alternatively, he reasoned the United States demonstrated an intent to appropriate water, diverted water, and applied it to
a beneficial use by making available and managing the rangeland.
Therefore, he reasoned, the United States established a priority date
that coincided with the date of the Act,June 28, 1934.
Contrary to the special master's suggestions, the district court recognized Joyce's water rights but not the United States' rights. The district court held that Joyce's act of livestock watering demonstrated an
intent to appropriate. The district court added that because the predecessors' applications did not suggest any beliefs in previously acquired water rights, the predecessors could not have established water
rights prior to the Act. Accordingly, the court recognized stock watering rights, but with a date of April 26, 1935, the date when one of the
predecessors filed his grazing permit application. The district court
refused to recognize the United States' watering rights because the
federal government could show no evidence that it grazed its own cattle on its own land. Under Idaho law, a lessee who obtained a water
right owned that right, unless he was acting as the lessor's agent. Because the United States could not show any of the predecessors were
acting as its agents, the district court refused to recognize any of the
government's claimed water rights. Joyce and the United States both
appealed.

III. ISSUES
In LU, the Supreme Court of Idaho addressed whether the district
court erred in determining the priority dates of LU's stock watering
rights or in holding that instream stock watering rights on federal land
were appurtenant to private property. In ]ayce, the same court addressed whether the district court erred in holding that Joyce obtained
a stock watering right on federal land, in determining the priority
dates of Joyce's stock watering rights, or in denying the United States'
claim of stock watering rights. The ]ayce court thoroughly analyzed all
issues between both cases. The court broke down the issues into the
following three broad categories: 1) acquiring stock watering rights on
federal land; 2) factors that affect priority dates o{ stock watering
rights; and 3) the United States' claim of stock watering rights on federal land.
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IV. DISCUSSION

A. ACQUIRING STOCK WATERING RIGHTS ON FEDERAL LAND

The Joyce court first explained that state law establishes instream
stock watering rights on federal land. It next differentiated between
Idaho's statutory and constitutional methods of acquiring water rights.
Applying the law to the facts, the court found that Joyce's predecessors
acquired instream stock watering rights through the constitutional method, and also found that those rights passed appurtenant to the patented ranch deed all the way up to Joyce.
1. Obtaining a General Water Right on Federal Land

The court discussed a private appropriator's ability to establish a
non-navigable water right on federal land. This right stems from the
Desert Land Acts of 1877,4 which severed public lands from the water
located on those lands. 5 While the land remained in the federal govemment' s control, the water became part of the public domain. 6 A
private appropriator may establish rights in the public domain water,
but must follow state law to establish those rights. 7
The court also rejected the United States' argument that possessing
a water right on federal land excluded others from the land or from
water sources on that land. This was because a water right did not
grant exclusive use or ownership of that water. 8

4. Desert Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 321-323, 325, 327-329 (2000).
5. Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82, 95 (1937).
6. Id. See also Desert Lands Acts, 43 U.S.C. § 321 ("(T]he water of all lakes, rivers,
and other sources of water supply upon the public lands and not navigable, shall remain and be held free for the appropriation and use of the public for irrigation, mining, and manufacturing purposes subject to existing rights.").
7. See, e.g., Ickes, 300 U.S. at 95 ("Acquisition of the government title to a parcel of
land was not to carry with it a water right; but all nonnavigable waters were reserved for
the use of the public under the laws of the various arid-land states.") (citing Cal. Or.
Power Co. v. Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 162 (1935)); Keiler v. McDonald, 218 P. 365,
366 (Idaho 1923) ("The predecessors in interest of respondents lawfully initiated a
valid right to the use of the water of this spring, which was then upon unpatented government land .... This constitutes a valid appropriation under the laws of this state.")
(citations omitted); Le Quime v. Chambers, 98 P. 415, 417 (Idaho 1908) ("[T]he appellants' water right had attached in conformity with the state law and the act of Congress prior to the filing of respondent's homestead entry, and that respondent consequently acquired his right in and to the land from the United States subject to the
prior right of way and water location of appellants.").
8. Idaho Conservation League, Inc. v. State, 911 P.2d 748, 749-50 (Idaho 1995)
(stating proprietary rights to use water are held subject to the public trust); Graham v.
Leek, 144 P.2d 475, 480-81 (Idaho 1943) (holding two or more parties may obtain a
water right from the same source).
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2. Idaho's Constitutional Requirements for
Instream Stock Watering Rights
After establishing that state law controls water rights on federal
land, the jayce court explained Idaho's requirements for an instream
stock watering right. The court held that under Idaho's constitutional
method of appropriation, an appropriator must only put water to a
beneficial use to acquire an instream stock watering right. Neither
intending to beneficially use nor diverting water is required. The court
found that Joyce's predecessors did put water to a beneficial use and
therefore obtained a valid instream stock watering right.
The j<ryce court explained that until 1971 an appropriator could divert through either the constitutional or the statutory method. 9 This
option disappeared in 1971 with the amendment ofldaho Code Annotated Sections 42-103 and 42-201. 10 Under the amended statutes, any
new appropriator had to comply with the statute's license and permit
requirements. However, Idaho continued to recognize older appropriations established through the constitutional method. 11 The court
further explained the constitutional method was not limited to appropriations made after the existence of the state constitution. 12 This is
because the constitution did not create a new set of requirements.
Rather, it merely reflected "prevailing customs and rules" 13 such as the
prior appropriation method. Therefore, an appropriator could have
utilized the constitutional method prior to the constitution's enactment.14
The court next clarified Idaho's constitutional requirements for instream stock watering rights. The analysis began with Article XV, Section 3 of the Idaho Constitution, the provision authorizing prior ap15
propriation. This provision acted only as a general grant of authority
9. See Freemont-Madison Irrigation Dist. & Mitigation Group v. Idaho Ground
Water Appropriators, Inc., 926 P.2d 1301, 1303 (Idaho 1996) ("Until 1971 Idaho recognized two methods of appropriating water of the state both of which were equally
valid: the statutory method of appropriation and the constitutional method of appropriation. ").
10. See IDAHO CODE ANN.§§ 42-103, 42-201 (2007).
11. RT. Nahas Co. v. Hulet, 752 P.2d 625, 628-29 (Idaho Ct. App. 1988) (stating
that since 1971, the permit method is the exclusive method to acquire water rights, but
use of the constitutional method, prior to that time, is still valid).
12. Idaho ratified its constitution in 1889 and approved it in 1890. ]ayce, 156 P.3d
at 509.
13. Sarret v. Hunter, 185 P. 1072, 1075 (Idaho 1919).
14. Many Idaho cases upheld water priorities that predated the state constitution.
See, e.g., Hillcrest Irrigation Dist. v. Nampa & Meridian Irrigation Dist., 66 P.2d 115
(Idaho 1937); Branstetter v. Williams, 57 P. 433 (Idaho 1899); Drake v. Earhart, 23 P.
541 (Idaho 1890).
15. This section states that "[t]he right to divert and appropriate the unappropriated waters of any natural stream to beneficial uses, shall never be denied, except
that the state may regulate and limit the use thereof for power purposes."
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and did not enumerate any specific procedures for appropriation, 16 but
Idaho common law shaped the specific elements. Idaho courts held
that the constitutional method required only two elements for a general water right: a diversion and an application of water to beneficial
use. 1' Even more relevant, the state courts held that the constitutional
method required only one element for instream stock watering rights:
the application of water to a beneficial use. 18 Fortunately for cattle
grazers, Idaho recognized stock watering as one such beneficial use. 19
Idaho's single element requirement meant that Joyce's predecessors
only had to water "their livestock in the springs, creeks, and rivers on
the range they used for forage" 20 to establish an instream stock watering right. The court found the predecessors did undertake these actions and therefore obtained instream stock watering rights on federal
land.
To strengthen its position that instream stock watering required
only one element, the court scrutinized and dismissed the district
court's reasoning behind an additional intent element. The court
stated that the lower court was not clear about what kind of intent element it required, stated that the lower court misread a previous Idaho
Supreme Court case, and offered policy reasons for not requiring an
intent element.
The court first pointed out the lack of clarity in the lower court's
intent requirement. The intent could have been an intent to obtain a
recognized water right, or it could have been an intent to apply water
to a beneficial use. 21 However, the court held the distinction to be immaterial because Idaho's constitutional method did not require any
type of intent.
The lower court's finding of an intent element developed from misreading a previous Idaho Supreme Court case, Hidden Springs Trout
Ranch, Inc. v. Hagerman Water Users, lnc. 22 In Hidden Springs, the state
supreme court quoted American Jurisprudence Second, saying generally a valid appropriation required a "bona fide intent to apply it to
some beneficial use." 2' However, the Hidden Springs court also quoted
the more specific Idaho source Sarret v. Hunter, which held " [ t] he test
of a valid appropriation of water is its diversion from the natural source
16. State v. United States, 996 P.2d 806, 811 (Idaho 2000).
17. Id.; Fremont-Madison Irrigation Dist. & Mitigation Group, 926 P.2d at 1303;
Cantlin v. Carter, 397 P.2d 761, 765 (Idaho 1964); Morgan v. Udy, 79 P.2d 295, 299
(Idaho 1938); Fureyv.Taylor, 127 P. 676,678 (Idaho 1912).
18. State, 996 P.2d at 811.
19. Stevensen v. Steele, 453 P.2d 819, 826 (Idaho 1969).
20. Joyce, 156 P.3d at 509.
21. Id. at 510.
22. Hidden Springs Trout Ranch, Inc. v. Hagerman Water Users, Inc., 619 P.2d
1130 (Idaho 1980).
23. Id. at 1132-33 (quoting AM.JUR. 2D Water.5 § 321 (1975) ).
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and its application to a beneficial use." 24 The American Jurisprudence
reference merely stated the general approach to appropriation while
the Sarret reference clarified Idaho's differing standard. The lower
court erroneously interpreted the American Jurisprudence reference
as establishing an additional intent element.
The court added that an intent element did seive a purpose in
some Idaho appropriations,just not in the constitutional method. Unlike the constitutional method, the statutory or permit method of appropriation required an intent to apply water to a beneficial use. 25
More specifically, the applicant had to first apply to the state engineer
for a permit. 26 The state engineer would then consider, among other
things, whether the applicant "contemplate[d] the application of water
to a beneficial use." 21 After the applicant received a permit, he then
had to "timely complete the diversion and apply the water to a beneficial use." 28 The applicant would then go back to the state engineer to
prove the beneficial use intended by the diversion. After meeting this
burden, the state engineer would issue a license, with the priority date
relating back to the permit issue date. 29 The court described the statutory method of appropriation only to distinguish it from the constitutional method. Because Joyce's predecessors appropriated through
the constitutional method, none of the statutory requirements applied
and they only needed to have applied water to a beneficial use.
After pointing out the differences between the constitutional and
statutory methods of appropriation, the court discussed some policy
reasons against an intent element. It held that no separate intent element should be required because "[y]ou could certainly infer that a
person who diverts water and applies it to a beneficial purpose intended to do so . . . . [T]he intent is shown by the person's action."30
However, this statement may open the door for argument. The court
offers no support for its claim and makes a big assumption that a
rancher always intends to apply water to a beneficial use.
In fact, the United States made a similar argument, pointing out
that without a mental element, "a livestock grazer could appropriate
water without actually being aware of the fact."' 1 This argument suggests ranchers could obtain a windfall benefit when their cattle stumble
upon an unknown water source. The court dismissed the argument,
24. Sarret v. Hunter, 185 P. 1072, 1074 (Idaho 1919).
25. Id. at 1074 ("[W]hen one makes application for a permit to divert and appropriate water, the query is ... upon what lands he intends to apply it, and to what use
does he expect to put it when so applied.").
26. jayce, 156 P.3d at 511.
27. Id. (quoting REV. CODES OF IDAHO § 3254 ( 1908)).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 512.
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stating an intent element would require the following: 1) evidence
showing the rancher knew of water sources and that his cattle would be
using those sources; and 2) evidence showing the rancher knew he
could obtain instream stock watering right from those sources. 32 The
court explained that common sense dictated that the first element
would always be true. This is because "[i] t is inconceivable that a
rancher would either homestead or purchase land and invest hundreds
of head of livestock without having made any investigation as to whether there was sufficient water available for the livestock to survive."33 To
the second element, the court explained that Idaho never required
water appropriators to be "lawyers or seers."34 Because the constitutional method of appropriation followed local custom, a rancher could
have conceivably appropriated water prior to the existence of any water
laws.
3. The Predecessors' Instream Stock Watering Rights on Federal
Land Passed Appurtenant to Patented Ranch Deeds
The court explained the predecessors' instream stock watering
rights on non-connected federal land were appurtenant to the patented ranch properties, and the rights passed with the properties even
though they may not have been mentioned in the deed. The court
added that the rights would not automatically pass with the property if
the parties expressly reserved them or clearly intended to not include
them in the conveyance. This was a significant issue in the case, as it
was a matter of first impression for Idaho. Because Idaho lacked previous decisions on this particular matter, the court looked to easement
law for guidance.
The court began by dismissing the United States' contention that
"[a]n instream stock watering right appropriated on a public grazing
allotment" required a physical connection to base property. 35 The
court explained that appurtenance has never hinged upon a physical
relationship. Nelson v. johnson36 concerned an easement around a
spring. Both the easement and spring were located on a piece of land
not physically connected to the rancher's homeland. Nonetheless, the
Neslon court found the easement to be appurtenant to the homeland.
It supported its decision by stating the easement was "a beneficial and
useful adjunct of the cattle ranch, and it would be of little use apart
from the operations of the ranch. Moreover, in case of doubt, the

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 513.
Nelson v.Johnson, 679 P.2d 662 (Idaho 1984).
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weight of authority holds that the easement should be presumed appurtenant. "57
Citing Bothwell v. Keefer, 38 the court next held that an appurtenant
water right passed with land, despite not being mentioned in the
deed. 59 The Bothwell court decided the water issue after consulting
easement law. The Idaho Supreme Court supported the analogy to
easements because "water rights and easements were sufficiently similar to have the relevant law applicable to appurtenant easements apply
to appurtenant water rights." 40
Joyce adopted two rules from Bothwell First, it decided that water
rights passed appurtenant despite not being mentioned in the deed.
Second, it decided that water law may look to easement law for guidance. Based on the second rule the court held that, similar to the
easements in Nelson, Joyce predecessor's stock watering rights on separate land were "beneficial and useful adjuncts to their cattle ranches
and would be of little use apart from the operations of their ranches." 41
The court combined the rulings from Bothwell and Nelson, establishing
that stock watering rights on federal land without any physical relationship to the ranch property will pass as appurtenances despite not being
mentioned in the deed.
The court further clarified the attributes of an instream stock watering right, rejecting the district court's holding that an appurtenant
water right passed with property only if that were the grantor's intent.
Conversely, the court held "[u]nless they are expressly reserved in the
deed or it is clearly shown that the parties intended that the grantor
would reserve them, appurtenant water rights pass with the land even
though they are not mentioned in the deed and the deed does not
mention 'appurtenances."'42 Because nothing in the record suggested
Joyce's predecessors intended to reserve water rights, the predecessors
conveyed ranch land along with the appurtenant water rights.
Although the United States' argued the statute of frauds required
water rights to be expressly mentioned in the deed, the court quickly
rejected this claim too. The court explained that a separate writing or
express mention of the appurtenant water rights would be required
only if the parties attempted to convey water rights separate from the
land. Because Joyce's predecessors conveyed the land and water rights
together, the statute of frauds had no effect on the conveyance.

37. Id. at 664-65.
38. Bothwell v. Keefer, 27 P.2d 65, 61:H>7 (Idaho 1933).
39. Juyce, 156 P.3d at 514. The Bothwell court addressed an appurtenant water right
in general and not an appurtenant water right on un-connected federal land.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 515 (citing Silverstein v. Carlson, 797 P.2d 856 (Idaho 1990); Bothwel~ 27
P.2d 65).
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B. FACTORS THAT AFFECT PRIORI1YDATES OF STOCK WATERING RIGHTS
ON FEDERAL 1.AND

The district court in LU and Joyce determined priority dates based
on when the predecessors applied for Taylor Grazing Act land. However, this court found the district court erred in two main areas. One
error concerned the effect of not listing water rights on the application, and the other concerned the effect of Class I grazing rights.
1. Taylor Grazing Act Applicants are not Required to List

Water Rights on the Application
The court first clarified that applicants did not need to identify any
water rights on the application. This is because the federal government granted grazing permits, not water rights. State law, not federal,
determined water rights.
The district court also incorrectly interpreted the question on the
application that asked, "Do you own or control any source of water
supply needed or used for livestock purposes? Describe it?" Unlike the
district court's characterization, this question did not ask about water
rights on federal land. Instead, it asked about water the applicants
owned or controlled for livestock purposes. It could not have been
about water rights because such rights do not confer any ownership of
or control over that water.4 3 Further, because the question was not
about water rights, the failure to list any such rights could not constitute abandonment. Abandonment requires "both the intent to abandon and the actual surrender or relinquishment of the water rights." 44
Nothing on the application, including the questions about ownership
and control, suggested that failure to list water rights could be an intent to abandon.45
2. Class I Grazing Rights Affect Priority Dates
The court also faulted the district court for not considering a predecessor's Class I grazing rights. The government issued Class I permits only to stock owners who owned base property "and who had
grazed the public range during the five years just prior to the Taylor
Act's enactment." 46 Because one of Joyce's predecessors possessed a
Class I permit, the district court should have recognized at least one
priority date that predated the Act by at least five years.

43.
that a
44.
45.
46.

Hutchison v. Watson Slough Ditch Co., 101 P. 1059, 1063 (Idaho 1909) (stating
right to divert is not a right to exclusively own).
Joyce, 156 P.3d at 516 (citing Sears v. Berryman, 623 P.2d 455 (Idaho 1981)).
Id.
Public Lands Council v. Babbitt, 529 U.S. 728, 734 (2000).
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The court agreed with the district court's decision to determine
priority dates by looking at the predecessors separately. However, the·
court disagreed with the lower court's method of reviewing those facts.
It vacated the lower court's determination of priority dates, and remanded for redetermination consistent with its opinion.

C. THE UNITED STATES' CIAIM OF INSTREAM STOCK WATERING RIGHTS
ON FEDERAL LAND

The United States advanced a few theories of why the lower court
erred by rejecting its claim of water rights. The court rejected all of
the arguments and agreed with the lower court's decision.
The United States claimed instream stock watering rights "based
upon its ownership and control of the public lands coupled with the
Bureau of Land Management's comprehensive management of public
lands under the Taylor Grazing Act." 47 The court recognized that the
United States permitted ranchers, through implied license or express
permission, to graze livestock on public lands. However, this permission was not sufficient to establish water rights. The United States
could have established water rights in this scenario only if the ranchers
were acting as agents of the federal government.48 Because none of the
ranchers were agents of the United States, the federal government had
no claim to their water rights.
The court also rejected the United States' argument that it acquired water rights under Idaho Code Annotated section 42-501, which
stated that the BLM "may appropriate for the purpose of watering livestock any water not otherwise appropriated, on the public domain."
Although this statute was specific to the permit method, the United
States claimed it should apply to the constitutional method as well.
The court reiterated that the constitutional and permit methods were
separate systems of appropriation, and the constitutional method for
instream stock watering required that the appropriator actually water
stock.
In addition to asserting the two claims above, the United States also
asserted that Idaho water law conflicted with the Act. The federal government did not mention any specific conflicting provisions, but stated
Idaho water law violated the purposes of the Act. The government
claimed that permitting private water rights on federal land would
monopolize the federal land and prevent others from grazing in the
same area. The court responded by pointing out the government's
misunderstanding of water law. The court clarified that a water right
47. Joyce, 156 P.3d at 518.
48. Id. at 519 ("If the water right was initiated by the lessee, the right is the lessee's
property, unless the lessee was acting as the agent of the owner." (citing First Sec. Bank
ofB!ackfootv. State, 291 P. 1064 (Idaho 1930))).
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does not confer any possessory interest; it does not grant ownership
nor does it grant the right to trespass on another's land to access water.49

V. CONCLUSION
The jayce court clarified many Idaho water law issues including the
elements of a constitutional instream stock watering right, whether an
appurtenant watering right on federal land automatically passes with a
ranch conveyance, which factors affect priority dates, and whether the
United States may establish stock watering rights on federal land.
However, the court failed to fully explain the policy behind not requiring an intent element under the constitutional method. Subsequent
decisions may further address the United States' argument of windfall
benefits to unknowing constitutional method appropriators. They may
also clarify why, if ranchers always intended to apply water to a beneficial use, the state legislature required an intent element under the statutory permit method.
Kurt Kropp

49. Id. at 520 (citing Idaho Conseivation League, 911 P.2d 748 (Idaho 1995); Branson v. Miracle, 687 P.2d 1348 (Idaho 1984)).
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FEDERALIST SOCIETY
PROFESSOR EAGLE: Good afternoon, ladies, and gentlemen. My
name is Steven Eagle. I teach at George Mason University School of
Law across the river in Arlington, Virginia, and I'd like to welcome
each of you to our Federalist Society program on Enforcement of the
Clean Water Act. This is one of a series of programs that the Federalist
Society holds to educate the public, legislators, and staff about important issues of the day.
This program is being recorded and will be available on the Federalist society website. And many individuals have been downloading
and listening to these programs, so I'm pleased that we have that extended audience as well as those who are here in person this afternoon.
Historically, Congress's power to regulate water has been premised
on the Commerce Clause and the importance of waterways in interstate commerce. Thus, there's been little question that dredging and
filling navigable water bodies and their tributaries are appropriate subjects for federal regulation. However, the difficulty in determining
precisely where waters end and land begins led the United States Supreme Court in 1985, in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, to
agree with the Army Corps of Engineers that it was in reasonable to
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interpret the term "waters" to encompass wetlands adjacent to waters as
more conventionally defined.
At the same time, environmentalists, heeding the environmental
Pioneer ofJohn Muir's famous dictum that when we try to pick out any
thing by itself, we find it hitched everything else in the universe - based
on this, they argued that comprehensive water quality regulation was
required and argued for extensions of waters that could be regulated
under the Clean Water Act.
After much litigation in the federal courts, in a 2006 plurality decision, in Rapanos v. United States, the Supreme Court limited the scope
of the Clean Water Act's protection of navigable waters to include only
those bodies of water that are permanent, standing, or continuously
flowing, and thus did not apply to channels through which water flows
only some of the time.
In the wake of the Rapanos decision, Representative James Oberstar
of Minnesota has sponsored that Clean Water Restoration Act of 2007.
That would permit the Environmental Protection Agency and the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers to enforce the Clean Water Act on wetlands,
streams, and ponds that are not a part of the traditional navigable waterways and their tributaries.
We have with us today a distinguished panel that will discuss the
constitutional and practical issues regarding comprehensive water regulation under the Oberstar proposal. In the order in which they will
be speaking, our panelists are Robert Percival, who is the Robert F.
Stanton professor of law and director of the Environmental Law program at the University of Maryland. He served a on the Board of Directors of the Environmental Law Institute and is the contributing editor of For Environment and Natural Resources for the Federal Circuit Bar
journal He is the principal author of the widely used casebook, Environmental Regulation: Law, Science, and Policy, and has lectured extensively on environmental law topics in the United States and abroad.
Professor Percival received his BA from McAllister College and his
M.A. andJ.D. degrees from Stanford University. He clerked for Judge
Shirley M. Hofstetter of the Ninth Circuit and for Supreme Court Jusrice Byron R. White. In addition to other achievements that I don't
have time to mention now, he also coaches his law school's championship softball team.
John H. Adler, who will speak second, is professor of law and Director of the Center for Business Law and Regulation at Case Western
Reserve University School of Law, where he teaches courses in environmental, regulatory, and constitutional law. Professor Adler is the
author or editor of three books on environmental policy, and his artides have appeared in numerous scholarly and popular publications.
He also appears on radio and TV and covers environmental and legal
topics for National Review Online. He is also a regular contributor to the
legal blog, The Volokh Conspiracy. In 2004, Professor Adler was awarded
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the Federalist Society's annual Paul M. Bator Award, given to an academic under 40 for excellence in teaching scholarship and commitment to students.
Prior to joining the Case Western faculty, Professor Adler clerked
for Judge David Sentelle in the DC Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit, and from 1991 to 2000, he worked at the Competitive Enterprise
Institute here in Washington, where he directed the environmental
studies program. Professor Adler holds a BA magna cum laude from
Yale University and a JD summa cum laudefrom the George Mason University school of Law. One of an academic's greatest pleasures is to
savor the accomplishments of a former student, so I'm especially
pleased to welcome Jonathan here.
Patrick A. Parenteau is professor of law and director of the Environmental and Natural Resources Law Clinic at Vermont Law School,
where he previously was director of the Environmental Law Center.
He also teaches in the environmental studies program at Dartmouth
College. Professor Parenteau's previous posts include Vice President
for Conservation with the National Wildlife Federation, general counsel to the New England Regional Office of the EPA, commissioner of
the Vermont Department of Environmental Conservation, and he has
been of counsel with the Perkins Coie law firm in Portland, Oregon.
He is the recipient of the National Wildlife Federation's Conservation
Achievement Award for 2005 in recognition of his contributions to
wildlife conservation and environmental education. Professor Parenteau holds a B.S. from Regis University, aJD from Creighton University, and an LL.M. in environmental law from George Washington University.
M. Reed Hopper oversees the Pacific Legal Foundation's endangered species and Clean Water Act litigation. Prior to joining the Pacific Legal Foundation in 1987, he served as both an environmental
protection officer and hearing officer in the US Coast Guard, enforcing the Clean Water Act in the Gulf Coast. He has managed large environmental compliance programs and written numerous environmental standards. He has litigated precedent-setting environmental and
land use cases, including the recent Rapanos case in the US Supreme
Court of which I'm sure we'll hear more about this afternoon.
Each panelist is going to make a short presentation, followed by a
limited opportunity for rebuttal and conversation among the panel.
And then we come to one of the most important parts of the program,
which is an opportunity for you to ask questions of our panel.
So we'll start, then, with Professor Percival.
PROFESSOR PERCIVAL: Thanks, Steve. It's a real pleasure to be
here. The timing of this was perfect because it gave me an excuse to
skip a faculty meeting this afternoon.
I actually live just a few blocks away from here, and every time I
speak for the Federalist Society, I do have to note that as a resident of
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the District of Columbia, I think the absolute number one most important Federalism issue is the fact that I don't have any voting representation in Congress. I've lived here for 28 years, and I would hope that
the Federalist Society would focus a little more on that. It's nice to see
some action finally in Congress on that.
It shouldn't be a partisan issue because, if you look at history, President Bush's grandfather, Prescott, a Republican senator from Connecticut, was a great champion of DC voting rights, and in fact, along
with Republican President Eisenhower, helped to get the 23rd
Amendment through Congress. So we at least have voting representation for president. It would be nice if the bill that currently has the
brilliant political compromise with giving Utah the ecstasy gets voted
on soon in the Senate. I always have to say that when speaking to the
Federalist Society because it's near and dear to my heart.
We have a baseball team now, which is great. Now just give us voting rights.
The topic of today's discussion is also very important because we
have a situation now that is really intolerable no matter what side of the
political fence you sit on. Due to the Supreme Court's decision in the
R.apanos case last year, the law is completely confused with respect to
the scope of federal jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act. I testified
before Congressman Oberstar's committee on July 17, and my remarks
are sort of a condensed version of that. If you want to see that testimony in more detail, it's online at the Committee's website.
Basically, I'd like to make four points. First, Congress properly
recognized in 1972 when it passed the original version of the Clean
Water Act that a comprehensive approach would be necessary to protect the nation's waters. Thus, it intended to exercise the fullest extent
of its constitutional powers when it adopted legislation requiring permits for all discharges of pollutants or dredged or filled material that
would degrade the nation's waters.
Second, the courts properly recognized that Congress had acted
wisely when it entrusted the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency with responsibility for implementing
this program. Thus, in its 1985 mverside Bayview decision, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously deferred to these agencies in upholding
their broad application of the Act to wetlands contiguous to open waters.
Third, as the result of two sharply decided Supreme Court decisions, not just the R.apanos decision in 2006, but also the SWANCC decision in 2001, everyone agrees that confusion now reigns over the scope
of federal jurisdiction to protect the nation's waters. This confusion
benefits no one and can only be dispelled by the adoption of new legislation clarifying the scope of the Act.
Fourth and finally, Congress has ample constitutional authority to
restore the Act to its initial premises. First, Congress intended to pro-
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vide comprehensive protection to the nation's waters. The Clean Water Act was enacted in 1972 to create a comprehensive federal regulatory program to ensure that the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation's waters would be protected. Congress realized it
was doing something quite expansive when it adopted that Act because
it thought it was necessary. And in fact, the Supreme Court recognized
that early on in 1981 when, in the case of Milwaukee v. Illinois, the Supreme Court held that the Clean Water Act was so comprehensive that
the federal common law of interstate nuisance had been preempted by
this.
This is quoting Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in a case. "In
view of the breadth of federal regulatory authority contemplated by the
Act itself and the inherent difficulties of defining precise bounds to
regulable waters" - oh, excuse me. I'm quoting from Riverside Bayview.
Here's what Justice Rehnquist had to say in 1981. Justice Rehnquist said that "the problem of controlling water pollution is difficult
and technical; doubtless the reason Congress vested authority to administer the Act and administrative agencies possessing the necessary expertise." He opined that courts were particularly unsorted to resolving,
through sporadic and ad hoc application of federal common law, the
disputes over the extent of federal regulation. Thus, even the justice
most clearly associated with championing state sovereignty and constitutional limits on federal authority acknowledged the comprehensive
scope of the Clean Water Act and the wisdom of deferring to expert
judgments of the agencies charged with implementing it.
Then in 1985, we get the Riverside Bayview case where the Court was
asked to decide whether the Act applied to a wetland that was not itself
a navigable water in the sense of being navigable, in fact, but was adjacent to navigable waters. And there, the Court unanimously, in a decision by my old boss Justice White, said that we should defer to the
Corp'sjudgment because of the breadth and comprehensiveness of the
Clean Water Act. And that's when he wrote, "In view of the breadth of
federal regulatory authority contemplated by the Act itself and the inherent difficulties of defining precise bounds to regulable read global
waters, the Corp's ecological judgment about the relationship between
waters and their adjacent wetlands provides inadequate basis for a legal
judgment that adjacent wetlands may be defined as waters under the
Act."
Now, that decision is still good law in the sense that the four justices in the plurality in Rapanos did not purport to overturn it. They did,
however, try to confine it to its facts without challenging, though, the
underlying reasoning of the Act, which I suggest supports a broader
interpretation of the Act.
Now what's happened as a result of the Rapanos decision? Confusion reigns. That confusion was illustrated by Professor Eagle's introduction where, in giving the holding in Rapanos, he quoted Justice Sea-
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lia's plurality opinion. However, the Court split 4-1-4 in Rapanos. The
four dissenting justices, led by Justice Stevens, explicitly rejected the
notion that the Act only applied to contiguous, standing, or flowing
bodies of water. Justice Kennedy, who agreed with neither the four
dissenters nor the four in the plurality, expressly rejected that. So we
have five of the Justices of the Court rejecting Justice Scalia's radical
new interpretation of the Clean Water Act.
Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion in the judgment, basically said that the Corps should, on a case-by-case basis, determine
whether there's a significant nexus between the waters, the wetlands it
seeks to regulate, and the navigable waters downstream. That approach was rejected by the other justices. And yet, it is in fact the law
that has to be applied today because it's an approach that is closest to
what would be determinative in another case they came up because the
four justices in the dissent said they basically would defer to the Corps'
judgment.
So the result is that you have a situation where the law of the land and its law that no one knows exactly how to apply Justice Kennedy's
significant nexus test because he just made it up himself - is that
represents the views of a single justice that were rejected by all other
eight members of the Supreme Court. And I submit that that is causing confusion that is simply intolerable because no one knows what the
true scope of federal jurisdiction is. So it certainly would be appropriate in those circumstances for the Congress to step in and clarify the
law.
It's also interesting to note that when the SWANCC decision came
down initially in 2001, the EPA and the Corps had actually proposed
adopting new regulations. But 41 of the 43 states who responded to
the Agency's request for comments opposed any significant narrowing
of the Corps' jurisdiction, as did roughly 99 percent of the 133,000
other comments that were submitted, which convinced the White
House to withdraw that proposal and not to redefine the waters of the
United States in response to the SWANCC decision.
I submit that this actually should not be a partisan issue because
the Bush administration fully defended both the Corps and EPA in the
Rapanos case, and they were joined by - most of the states who filed
amicus briefs came in on their side, arguing in fact that as a matter of
federalism it was important to have strong federal regulatory authority
in order for them to be able to deal with the transboundary pollution
that could otherwise be caused by wetlands being destroyed in upstream states.
Now, the only way to clarify this would be to adopt legislation. The
Oberstar bill effectively would adopt what Justice Breyer suggested in
his separate dissent in the Rapanos case, simply stating that it's the intent of Congress in the Clean Water Act to extend federal jurisdiction
to its constitutional limit. That does not mean that there's no limit to
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federal jurisdiction. It still would have to be demonstrated that the
waters that were going to be regulated would have a significant impact
on interstate commerce in order for them to be able to be regulated
under the Commerce Clause or, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in the Gonza/,ez v. Raich case, it would have to be demonstrated that
it's necessary to regulate those wetlands in order to avoid undermining
a larger federal regulatory program.
I submit that there is no question that Congress has the constitutional authority to extend federal jurisdiction to the limit of its constitutional authority. That's essentially a tautology. That, I think, would
be the easiest solution in these circumstances. Otherwise, you'd have a
situation where, even if destruction of a wetland would have a significant effect on interstate commerce and cause substantial environmental damage, it would not be regulated under the Act.
So that's why I think the Congress is doing the right thing by considering this legislation, to clear up this confusion.
Thank you.
PROFESSOR EAGLE: Thank you, Professor.
Next, we have Professor John Adler.
PROFESSOR ADLER: Thank you, Steve. It's a pleasure to be here.
Like Bob, I'm getting to miss a faculty meeting today as well. So just
for all of you, if you're looking to invite law professors to events in the
future, find out when their faculty meetings are, and you'll have a
much easier time getting them to come.
I should also just say that when I was a DC resident and I used to
see - they started coming out of the license plates that said "No Taxation without Representation," I was just hoping they were going to get
rid of my taxes. But that didn't happen either.
Now Bob and I would certainly agree, and in fact I think probably
all of us on the panel would agree, that certainty in the law is a very
good thing and that we would like to see greater certainty in terms of
what is covered under the Clean Water Act, what activities and what
lands and what waters are subject to federal regulation and what ones
are not. This is not only important for the regulated community that
needs to know what things it needs to ask the federal government
permission for, but it's also important for nonfederal actors that are
involved in environmental protection. States need to know where federal authority ends and state authority begins. Nongovernmental conservation organizations need to know where to devote their resources
so they can complement the efforts of the federal government in terms
of protecting the environment.
But the problem is that the confusion in this area didn't begin with
Rapanos, and enacting legislation such as the Oberstar legislation that's
been proposed, won't do anything to end the confusion about the
scope of federal regulation over waters and wetlands. Ever since the
Clean Water Act was first adopted, there was some uncertainty and
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confusion and debate over the precise scope of its authority. Initially,
the Army Corps of Engineers did not think, for example, the navigable
waters of the United States included wetlands, and that was not resolved until litigation in 1975 brought by the Natural Resources Defense Council that resolve that issue in favor of the Corps having more
regulatory authority than it thought it had. And after being thrown
into that briar patch, interestingly enough, the Corps of Engineers did
not appeal the federal district court's judgment.
The migratory bird rule that was adopted in the 1980s certainly engendered some additional confusion and debate over the scope of the
Clean Water Act. The various delineation manuals adopted by the various federal agencies that have some role in dealing with wetlands
prompted quite a bit of confusion. Some folks will remember the infamous 1989 wetland delineation manual that greatly expanded those
lands that were considered wetlands and therefore subject, through
the dredge and fill permitting requirements under Section 404, and
Supreme Court decisions prior to Rapanos certainly created confusion
as well.
The Lopez decision in 1995, which I'm sure we'll talk about quite a
bit, that struck down the Gun Free Zones Act for exceeding the scope
of Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause, was recognized
by many at the time as casting a shadow over the federal government's
definition of waters and its assertion of authority under the Clean Water Act. In fact, one noted environmental scholar said that the Corps
and EPA regulations were clearly out of bounds post-Lopez.
This same scholar said that he thought the agencies could rewrite
the regulations to achieve much the same purpose but that, as written,
insofar as they asserted authority over waters and wetlands, that would
merely affect interstate commerce as opposed to significantly affect
and could assert authority if that effect was even simply potential, as
opposed to actual. That assertion of jurisdiction was broader than allowed for by the Court in Lopez. And that scholar was not some raving
libertarian ideologue or opponent of federal government authority. It
was our colleague Richard Lazarus, who works not far from here, writing in the Environmental Forum, the magazine of the Environmental
Law Institute.
This SWANCC decision certainly increased some of the uncertainty
when it took a step toward applying the Court's Lopez holding to the
Clean Water Act, and then certainly Rapanos has added to the uncertainty still and the confusion still.
I would suggest that if we want an end to this confusion, we don't
want this legislation. We don't want the guidance that the Bush administration recently promulgated either. The thing that would do the
most to reduce confusion would be a notice and comment rulemaking
that would actually clarify in the sort of detail that is required to pro-
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vide actual guidance where federal authority ends and other authority
begins.
I should just note among other things, one of the problems with
the guidance is that it adopts this theory that either the Justice Department has adopted and that Justice Stevens suggested, that there
might be waters out there that fail to satisfy Justice Kennedy's significant nexus test but somehow satisfied with Scalia plurality and the dissent and would therefore be subject of federal jurisdiction. I think that
is one of several areas where the guidance goes astray. I think the waters that satisfied the Scalia plurality and the dissent but do not satisfy
Kennedy is a null set. Justice Scalia, in a footnote, makes clear that the
continuous surface water connection that he posits as the basis for jurisdiction is a necessary but not sufficient condition for federal authority, and yet that the additional connections that he would require would
certainly satisfy Justice Kennedy as well. So the guidance is not going
to end the confusion. And I think there are aspects of the guidance
which suggest things about the opinion which I don't think are accurate.
Now what happens if we eliminate the word "navigable" from the
Clean Water Act? Does that suddenly end the confusion? In one
sense, we might say, well, you know, this means we get to regulate everything. Right? We get to regulate all water; all interstate waters, all
intrastate waters, all impoundments thereof, so we're creating, regulating not just natural waters but those that are artificially created, salt
ponds. If our colleague, Professor Connelly were here, she would yell
at me if I suggested that this would give the federal government authority to regulate swimming blows and birdbaths.
I'm not suggesting the Corps would try and do so, but I think eliminating the word "navigable" certainly could lead one to that conclusion, just as the Corps of Engineers has stated in the Federal R.egister that
if it wanted to, it could regulate somebody riding a bicycle across the
wetlands because the bicycle would be lifting up and redepositing dirt
as it went along, and that it could regulate walking on wetland if it
shows chose to.
I think that that's not what the Corps would actually try to do, but I
think the real reason why eliminating "navigable" does not create certainty or eliminate confusion is because all it does is it begs the question, what does the statute do by its own terms? It says, well, we're
going to regulate waters to the fullest extent of Congress's constitutional power. Okay, but that's precisely the question that needs to be
answered is, what is the scope of Congress's constitutional power? And
one thing we know from Lopez, one thing we know from SWANCC, and
one thing we still know from Rapanos is that Congress's power in this
area is not unlimited.
We know that in the SWANCC decision, the majority explicitly reinterpreted the Clean Water Act narrowly and explicitly construed the
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extent of jurisdiction narrowly in order to avoid what it said were very
difficult and potentially problematic constitutional questions about the
scope of federal authority, and it was going to adopt the traditional
canon of construction to read a statute narrowly to avoid a constitutional question.
Now some folks have suggested, oh, but this canon disappears suddenly disappears in the Rapanos decision. And that is a misreading of
the Rapanos decision. Certainly, the plurality decision notes that - but
Justice is Kennedy himself in the Rapanos decision makes clear that one
basis for his significant nexus test is that it avoids the constitutional
problem. He says, "As exemplified by the SWANCC, the significant
nexus test itself prevents problematic applications of the statute."
Kennedy makes clear that adopting some broader test, such as that
embraced by the minority or as called for in this proposed legislation,
would involve problematic applications of the Clean Water Act and
would call into question Congress's constitutional authority over certain waters.
Unless one believes that Kennedy had a change of heart on that
view, a majority of the Supreme Court still believes that asserting regulatory authority over all waters inter- and intrastate, irrespective of their
connection to navigable waterways, would raise serious constitutional
questions.
Now as I mentioned, if one really wanted to eliminate uncertainty,
what could one do? One thing one can do is have a new notice and
comment rulemaking identifying categories of waters and wetlands and
the characteristics that would be indicative of a significant nexus. And
Justice Kennedy in his opinion gives lots of indications, and in fact in
some respects provides a roadmap of the sorts of things that could be
done in a rulemaking.
., One of the things he suggests is permissible, and I think at least
some of the justices that signed on to the Scalia plurality would accept
as well, would be the Corps of Engineers and EPA identifying certain
types of waters and certain types of wetlands that, because of certain
types of characteristics, would be very likely to have a significant nexus
to navigable waterways. Justice Kennedy, for example, in explaining
the holding or justifying the holding of lliverside Bayview Homes explains
that that's essentially what was done. The claim is not that every single
wetland adjacent to a navigable waterway has to be proven to have a
significant nexus with navigable waterways but that it would be reasonable for the Corps of Engineers to make that assumption and explain
that sort of assumption. That is something the core and the EPA could
do.
I want to spend a couple minutes on what I think they should do
because, while I do think they should engage in notice and comment
rulemaking, I don't think they should do so with the aim of seeking to
reassert as broad regulatory authority as they sought to exercise in the
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past. Rather, I think they should take a different course. I think those
who are interested in improving the quality of water protection in this
country, the aim should not be to have the federal government regulate as much as it can but rather to have the federal government focus
on those things which only the federal government can do or which
the federal government is in a particularly good position to do.
Whether we like it or not, the EPA and the Corps of Engineers
have limited budgets. They are not suddenly going to get thousands of
new staff when this or similar legislation is enacted to review permits
and to evaluate activities, and they will have a choice of either, as one
environmental commenter put it, issuing permits like a piiiata or simply sitting on permits and not issuing anything at all.
Or they will just, as they often do, act arbitrarily. There was an empirical study several years ago looking at the Corps of Engineers' evaluation of individual permit applications, finding that despite what we
would expect the Corps of Engineers, it gave no consideration, at least
in the actual records of the permit applications and the review process,
there was no evidence the Corps of Engineers gave any consideration
to the actual ecological impacts of permit applications prior to asking
for mitigation requirements. That certainly is not the sort of program
that we should be defending. And expanding the Corps jurisdiction
and expanding EPA's jurisdiction will encourage more of that sort of
regulatory activity rather than the sort that we should want.
So what should we ask the Corps of Engineers and EPA to do when
it comes to waters and wetlands? Well, we should be asking them, and
if there is legislation, what legislation should be focused on, is ensuring
that federal efforts are focused on those areas where there are clear
federal interests. And certainly, that involves protecting interstate waterways. I would note that the Clean Water Act, as Bob noted, is so
comprehensive as to preempt interstate water pollution or interstate
common-law nuisance actions but not intrastate common-law nuisance
actions. Similarly, the federal interest is stronger when we're talking
about interstate pollution problems, when an upstream state is doing
something that could damage a downstream state, but not nearly so
strong when we're dealing with water uses and land uses, the effects of
which are primarily felt locally or even regionally. It's one thing for
the federal government to be focused on preventing the pollution and
obstruction of interstate navigable waterways; it is another thing to be
worried about the filling of every prairie pothole or the modification of
arroyos and the like throughout the nation.
I think I should maybe just want to get into this in discussion. I
think there is an argument to be made, as well, that federal authority
under Rapanos or to enforce the NPDES program, for example, is
broader, or as a practical matter is broader, than for Section 404 because there are activities that we could characterize as upstream that
would result in the discharge of a pollutant because of their down-
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stream effects but would not themselves be occurring in waters in the
United States.
I think that the federal government should leave room for states
and non-regulatory programs and nongovernmental conservation organizations. We often say, and it's certainly said again and again in this
legislation, well, the reason we have everything the federal government
does in this area is because states and everyone else failed, and it's not
quite clear to me that that's the case. In the context of wetlands, state
governments regulate it first, and today many state governments regulate better. Every state in the continental United States with more than
ten percent of its land area classified as wetlands regulated before the
NRDC v. Callaway opinion that applied to the Clean Water Act to wetlands.
The first state to do so was Massachusetts in 1963 in the case ofWater Quality- and I'm going to be super quick because I'm getting the
hook - the First National Water Quality Inventory looking at the decade prior to enactment of the Clean Water Act found significant improvement in many waterways. The Cuyahoga River fire of 1969, something that occurred close to where I live now, is often taken as a symbol
of how bad things could get before the federal government intervened.
What people forget is that river fires of that sort had once been common. In the late 19th century and early 20th century, they were common not just in Cleveland but in many major cities and industrial
areas. That was an environmental problem that had been addressed,
and things were often in a good direction.
If we're concerned about protecting waters and wetlands, there are
a lot of other things that we should be going instead of expanding authority of the Clean Water Act. One, which I know won't be popular,
we would, for example, get rid of ethanol subsidies that discourage
participation in conservation programs, which in the case of prairie
potholes has a very significant negative effect, and expanding the scope
of the Clean Water Act, I would know, will have very little effect on protecting those wetlands.
And my time is up. Thank you.
PROFESSOR EAGLE: Thank you,John.
Okay, Professor Parenteau.
PROFESSOR PARENTEAU: Well, unlike my colleagues, I'm not
happy to be in DC. It was 42 degrees at my house this morning. It was
nice and cool, and I was looking forward to a crisp early autumn day in
the Green Mountains of Vermont with my little cider press out front
and my kids kicking a soccer ball around and the gentle twilight of a
nice cool New England evening. Ah, alas.
We do have a little bit of Yankee wisdom I'll share with you from
Vermont, and that is if it ain't broke, don't fix it. And so the question
obviously is what's broke? And does the Oberstar bill fix it? And
what's broke is that we no longer have anything resembling a workable,
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understandable, predictable tool for determining the scope of federal,
geographic jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act. And who broke it
was the five-member majority of SWANCC. SWANCC is the source of
the problem. Rapanos has compounded it, but SWANCC is the problem.
And the problem is that Justice Rehnquist and his colleagues in
their infinite wisdom thought it was necessary to "give some effect" to
the term 'navigable' in the designation of 'navigable waters', waters of
the United States, under the Clean Water Act. You see, up until that
point we were all quite happy - well, more or less - with a settled scope
of federal jurisdiction. Did you know that? That we had a settled
scope offederaljurisdiction prior to SWANGO. We did. Thirty years of
it; over 30 years of it.
And maybe be a little different than some of my colleagues, I don't
think there's really been any inconsistency whatsoever from EPA on
the scope of the Clean Water Act right from day one. The very first
General Counsel's opinion in 1973 on the scope of the Clean Water
Act nailed it and said that we will exercise our jurisdiction to the fullest
extent of Congress's constitutional authority under the Commerce
Clause.
So there really hasn't been a whole lot of inconsistency, notwithstanding some of the justices' of the Supreme Court attempt to create
such inconsistencies over the history of the Clean Water Act leading up
to SWANCC. It was basically the entire tributary systems of navigable
waters. That's what the regulations said after NRDC v. Callaway. That's
what they've always said. That's what they say today.
The Courts have never struck down the regulations. It struck down
a migratory bird rule which wasn't a rule at all; it was language in a
preamble. Rapanos didn't strike down any regulations. They remantled the case for some more thinking and cogitating. So the regs
that have been on the books since NRDC v. Callaway are still there.
And the scope of federal jurisdiction articulated in those regulations is
the same. It's always been the same, and it's been consistently upheld
by the courts over 30 plus years repeatedly. In fact, it was upheld by
the courts post-SWANCC by five circuit courts - we'll ignore the Fifth
Circuit for now - and all district courts to have considered the question. Something like a total of 50 or 60 opinions of the lower courts
since SWANCC have all upheld that jurisdictional scope of the Clean
Water Act - even the Fourth Circuit. A very conservative panel, I might
add, of the Fourth Circuit in Deaton saw no constitutional problems
whatsoever with asserting jet federal jurisdiction over the entire tributary systems of the nation's navigable waters. So that's what's broke.
That's what's broke, and the Supreme Court broke it, and there's only
one place we can fix it, and that's here. And that's Oberstar for now,
unless somebody's got a better idea. So not surprisingly, I think Oberstar's bill is a good idea. I think in fact it's the only idea.
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Now let's be clear about what we're not debating here. We're really not debating whether the 404 dredge-fill permit program is an ideal
wetlands protection statute because it is not. It isn't even a good regulatory statute because it doesn't regulate historically and even today the
major source of wetlands loss, which is drainage; not the addition of
dredged material. That's not even a complete regulatory program.
Aside from the fact that it probably doesn't make sense for the federal government to be regulating each and every wetland loss all over
the country- there's a shock coming from me perhaps, but it doesn't
make sense - but it is by default the only national wetland protection
program we have. So those of us who've spent a lifetime trying to
make it work and defending it are sort of stuck. I wish somebody
would put forward a real national wetlands protection law, like Justice
Scalia called for in Rapanos. I love it. And if it was all voluntary, and all
money, and buy all hundred million acres of remaining wetlands,
whoopie. But that's probably not going to happen, so we're left with
404.
And 404 has been the wage on this issue, notwithstanding that the
jurisdictional predicate for the Clean Water Act covers everything. It
covers the 402 program. It covers the hazardous and oil spill liability
program - everything. TMDLs, water quality standards, 319 non-point
source pollution grant programs, everything is predicated on the jurisdictional scope of the Clean Water Act. So it is incredibly important to
the whole national approach to dealing with water quality problems.
But the 404 program has been a wedge, and as my colleague, Bob
Percival has articulated here, there's basically three Supreme Court
decisions. In Riverside, unanimously the Court got it right. I'd give
them a B+ because they probably should have gone even further and
completely resolved the question of Congress's constitutional authority
and the scope of the jurisdiction over non-adjacent or isolated wetlands, of which there are none. Really, the better term for these wetlands that I've come up with is jurisdictionally challenged wetlands.
That's really a more logical way of thinking about them because of
course there is no such thing as an isolated wetland, and Stephen
Eagle has made that point clear from John Muir's famous quote.
In SWANCC, they got it wrong. Five of them got it spectacularly
wrong. And then in Rapanos Carabel, they didn't get it at all. So we can
no longer look to the Supreme Court for any guidance on this question, and in the lower courts since SWANCC - and I believe Reed Hopper is going to address this, so I won't steal any of his time or th under once again, I'm seeing the same pattern. It's a little different and a
little more disjointed than what we saw post-SWANCC. I'm seeing the
same thing. I'm seeing the circuit courts insisting on not rolling back
the jurisdiction of the Clean Water Act, as somewhat like to see it, and
trying to invent various theories and formulae for how to find jurisdic-
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tion over waters that might otherwise be questionable under at least
the plurality ruling in SWANCC.
So I have four points too. One, Congress has to straighten this
mess out. The buck has to stop here. Guidance that's been issued nice try. Actually, I'm not as critical of it as some of my friends and
colleagues in the community. I think given the mess that the agencies
were given with Rapanos; they did the best they could, close enough for
government work. But it isn't going to result much of anything. The
field staffs that I've talked to, the EPA staff, the Corps staff, have no
idea how to implement it in any logical fashion with the resources that
they have. Guidance isn't going to fix it.
Rulemaking - I hear a lot of talk about rulemaking. Three or four
of the justices in Rapanos Carabel said, oh, we need rules. Rules can't
resolve statutory intent. It's not going to happen. First of all, the rules
themselves aren't going to happen. This administration isn't going to
promulgate a rule. I'll eat your car if they do.
Secondly, I don't know what the next administration's going to do,
but it's going to take a hell of a long time before they do it. So waiting
for Godot, waiting for a rule to fix it all, it's not going to happen.
Courts - yeah, well, you know, the courts will muddle through, just like
Roberts. Chief Justice Roberts in his very helpful way, his very leadership way, said muddle through. So that's what they'll do. And my prediction is they'll muddle through finding jurisdiction more often than
not. Now, so how do you like that?
In the meantime, of course, wetlands will be lost by default. The
Corps will look the other way, throw up its hands, don't know, developers will go ahead and hope they don't get caught. The more sophisticated developers with a lot of financial risk involved are going to be
very leery and nervous about proceeding as if, yes, well, we're fine. We
don't need a permit here. So it's not a good situation.
Point two; I did think Oberstar will fix the problem as much as it
probably can be fixed. It does, in my view, simply codify the existing
regulatory scope of the Clean Water Act, the one, as I said, has been
upheld for three decades. I don't think it expands it. If it does, it's
some creative argument in lawyering that would do it. It's not intended to expand it. I don't think it will expand it. I think it codifies
the pre-SWANCC world, which as I say was a world that most people
had figured out how to live with at least. I think it's certainly consistent
with the post-SWANCC case law that I referred to - the Oberstar bill, I
mean - and the jurisdiction in any existing regulations.
So I did think Oberstar is the only way to fix this Supreme Court
problem. Whether the language of Oberstar does it, whether it goes
far enough, whether it could be tweaked and improved, well, those are
good questions. But as a starting point, certainly at the markup vehide, good piece oflegislation.
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Point three; I don't see any constitutional problem. ELI just put
out a nice quickie - not quickie, but succinct - study of all the constitutional bases, the Commerce Clause, Treaty Power, Property Clause,
Necessary and Proper Clause. I commend it to your attention; I don't
have time to talk about it. But it's a good piece of work, and I think it
puts to rest any serious doubt about Congress's constitutional authority
to protect the waters of the United States.
Point four, I think the broad federal jurisdiction that I'm talking
about here is absolutely necessary to achieve the purpose of the Clean
Water Act, which, after all, is not to preserve the navigable capacity of
the nation's waters but to restore and maintain their chemical, physical, and biological integrity, and you're not going to do that with a statute based on a 1954 dictionary definition. I'm sorry, but it won't
work. We have to think ecologically.
It's not necessary for the law to be in perfect sync with science, but
the closer we can get law to scientific reality, at least approaching what
science is telling us about the complexity of aquatic ecosystems, I think
that's a good thing. That's better than a law that's diverging off into
another direction which has nothing to do with our understanding of
how ecological systems work, the interrelationship of streams and wetlands and rivers and lakes and estuaries. We can't intelligently manage
our activities and ourselves unless we think that way, and the law
should reflect that thinking - in other words, an ecosystem-based
thinking.
A few quick factoids for you. This whole battle is about headwaters.
This is about first and second order streams and their associated wetlands. That's what we're talking about. That's the battleground that
we're talking about. That's where 70 percent of the flow of the navigable waters comes from. That's where about 60 or 70 percent of the
public water supplies are found. That's where 45 percent of the point
sources that are regulated currently under the Clean Water Act are
found. Those are important resources. We've got to protect them.
Thank you.
PROFESSOR EAGLE: And last, Reed Hopper.
PROFESSOR HOPPER: It certainly became apparent during Professor Eagle's introductions that if I'm going to get equal billing with
my colleagues, I need to increase my curriculum vitae.
There are, in addition to the difficulties the Rapanos decision
created in not settling the question as to the full scope of the commerce power or the full scope of the Clean Water Act, I think there are
some very specific areas of agreement with which at least five members
in the majority would accept:
Number one, that there are indeed constitutional limits to the
commerce power and that it cannot be relied upon to regulate all waters in the United States;
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Number two, that a mere hydrological connection between a wetland and a navigable in-fact water is not sufficient, even under the
Clean Water Act, to establish federal jurisdiction;
Number three, that insubstantial connections between wetlands
and navigable in-fact waters are insufficient to establish jurisdiction
under the Clean Water Act.
Justice Kennedy with a quite clear on this point him, and of course,
the Scalia plurality was quite express about it. In addition, I would
suggest that we have agreement among the four in the plurality and
Justice Kennedy that the SWANCC decision did more than invalidate
the migratory bird rule but rather prohibited federal jurisdiction over
isolated ponds and wetlands. This should have put to rest the argument that SWANCC merely applied to the migratory bird rule and is
limited to its facts. It's much broader than that.
I think the final point that there is some agreement on in the Supreme Court under the Rapanos decision is that Riverside Bayview is to
be limited to its facts. Justice Kennedy suggested that the only factual
situation addressed by the Court, was a wetland abutting a navigable infact water and that the Corps could not rely on that case to categorically regulate wetlands that abut or are adjacent to non-navigable waters.
So I think that that's those are significant clarifications, and they would
be advantageous were they to be followed by the Corps and the EPA
and were they to be accepted by the courts below.
Well, where do we stand post-Rapanos with respect to the litigation?
The big debate after Rapanos now is which is the controlling opinion?
Is it the Kennedy significant nexus test, or is it the Scalia plurality
which limits federal regulation to navigable-in-fact waters and those
traditional bodies of waters like rivers, lakes, and streams that are relatively permanent and wetlands that abut and are indistinguishable
from those covered waters?
Well, Rapanos Carabel are back in the district court on remand,
and under the Sixth Circuit rubric the federal government will be able
to establish jurisdiction under either the Scalia plurality approach or
the Kennedy significant nexus test, either one. We've had a few circuit
courts that have addressed Rapanos, and one is the Ninth Circuit in City
of Healdsburg, in which case the Ninth Circuit determined that the controlling opinion is the Kennedy significant nexus opinion. The court
applied the Marks v. Hill rule that says that the controlling opinion is
that opinion that would be agreed to by those who concurred in the
judgment and which is the most narrowly drawn. And without much
more analysis than that, this Ninth Circuit decision came down on the
side of the significant nexus test.
The Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Gerke, also concluded that
the significant nexus test is controlling in Rapanos because, in its words,
it was the least restrictive of federal authority. So, we have these two
circuits that say that the only standard on which jurisdiction may be
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based is the significant nexus test, as per Kennedy in the Rapanos deciSIOn.

But we now have a conflict between those circuits in the First Circuit in United States v. Johnson. In the Johnson case, the court said that
the Gerke decision was wrong, that it makes just as much sense to declare that the controlling opinion is the one that's the most restrictive of
federal authority, not the least restrictive. In any event, the court said
it really can't tell which is controlling opinion, so either the Scalia plurality or the Kennedy significant nexus test could be applied. So we
have a split between those of the Ninth and Seventh and the First. The
Pacific Legal Foundation represents Gerke and Johnson, and we have
filed petitions to the Supreme Court in those cases. They're now pending. We're asking the Court to resolve the conflict as to the controlling
opinion in Rapanos. So again, we're back in the court, and it's anybody's bet as to whether or not we'll get any resolution.
Now another couple of cases to keep an eye on that are coming up
in the circuits is US. v. Lucas. This is a criminal case that has been
briefed and argued in the Fifth Circuit, and it raises the question as to
what the jurisdiction of the Corps and specifically what is the controlling opinion under Rapanos. You may recall that it was the Fifth Circuit
the ruled prior to Rapanos that the SWANCC decision was correct and
that it limited federal authority under the Clean Water Act to actual
navigable waters and wetlands abutting those waters.
Then, the Second Circuit is considering currently at a case called
Simsbury-Avon v. Metacon. We're representing Metacon Gun Club in
the case. In that case, the district court determined that the wetlands
in that particular case were not jurisdictional under both the Kennedy
significant nexus test and the Scalia plurality.
Well, what is been a federal response now we have this Rapanos decision? As has been mentioned, we have the EPA and the Corps guidance. In our view, this is just business as usual. What will not be regulating categorically will be regulated based on the significant nexus
rubric. We think that will be a pro forrna effort, even thought Justice
Kennedy requires a site-specific analysis. It's not going to take much
for hydrologists to determine that wetlands in the region have a significant impact. The Corps of Engineers is already on record, argued in
the Johnson case and other cases, that all wetlands are significant by
definition.
We think that this guidance really goes too far in that it authorizes
the categorical regulation of wetlands that abut non-navigable waters.
As was previously mentioned, under the plurality test it's not enough
that the wetland abut a non-navigable water that may be a permanent
feature. It must be indistinguishable such that you can't tell where the
water ends and the land begins. You've got to have a connection like
that. That was upheld Riverside Bayview.

Issue 1

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46

CONFERENCE REPORTS

155

Also, Justice Kennedy said that the agencies cannot regulate categorically wetlands adjacent to non-navigable waters without adopting
new regulations. So these new guidelines are inconsistent with both
the plurality and Justice Kennedy's opinions. They also, I think, don't
constitute merely an interim situation. I think that the intent is that
this guidance would take the place of any future regulations. I think
that's a mistake. And expressly, the guidance does not come to grips
with the SWANCC decision. Although the court was quite clear in
SWANCC, and as I indicated earlier, all factions on the court interpreted SWANCC to prohibit regulation of isolated ponds and water
bodies. The Corps still asserts regulation over those types of water features.
Well, what about the Oberstar bill? Contrary to my colleagues, I
disagree that there has been 30 years of consistent regulatory interpretation as to federal jurisdiction. Quite the contrary. GAO was able to
establish that that's the case in both SWANCC and in Rapanos. The
majority and the plurality castigated the Agency for its ever-changing
definition of regulations. In 1974, two years after the promulgation of
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, the Corps said that its jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act only extended to traditional navigable waters. In SWANCC, the Supreme Court said that was a correct
interpretation. Also, the migratory Bird rule was not adopted until
after Riverside Bayview. The Court did not assert jurisdiction over drainage ditches and the like until after Riverside Bayview. There has certainly not been a consistent interpretation.
Now, as to the notion that this bill merely codifies the current regulations, that is patently wrong. I'll give you an example. The current
regulations exclude from federal jurisdiction wetlands adjacent to other wetlands. That does not appear anywhere in the Oberstar bill. I
also disagree respectfully with Professor Percival, who said that this bill
would not apply except in cases where it is established that there is an
appropriate connection with interstate commerce. That's exactly why
this bill is unconstitutional. It does not include any jurisdictional requirement. It categorically states that Congress has the authority to
regulate all waters without limit. That's clearly unconstitutional.
As I said, one of the things that's clear from Rapanos and should've
been clear from SWANCC was that there are limits to the commerce
power. And again, Roberts castigated the Government for not having
recognized that from its prior decision in SWANCC. I would just add
that I think that what is really required here - we'll never reach a situation where there's clarity, but I think what's really required here to
achieve some clarity and to protect wetlands, at the same time recognizing constitutional limits, is for the government, through regulation,
to adopt the plurality approach in the Rapanos decision.
Thank you very much.
PROFESSOR EAGLE: Thank you, Mr. Hopper.
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And now before we get the questions, I'd like to ask the panelists,
starting with Professor Percival, whether they have any brief comments
occasioned by the other presentations.
PROFESSOR PERCIVAL: Yes, just a couple of brief comments.
I'm glad to see Jonathan make the point that the Corps has limited
resources, and so they're not going to be regulating birdbaths. Usually
when we have these debates, you hear all kinds of outrageous anecdotes, and we didn't do that today. I do have to disagree with Jonathan, though, that a rulemaking can fix this because what's unclear is
how far the legal authority goes, so how can an agency define rules
when it doesn't know exactly how far its legal authority goes?
With respect to Mr. Hopper's argument about the bill by Oberstar,
that it's clearly unconstitutional, I just absolutely don't see how they
can be because the bill says we're extending federal jurisdiction to the
limits of our constitutional authority. This is what Justice Breyer said in
his separate dissenting opinion. He said his view is that the authority
of the Army Corps of Engineers under the Clean Water Act extends to
the limits of congressional power to regulate interstate commerce.
All Congress needs to do is to confirm that that is what its intent is,
and that will have the effect of verifying things. Jonathan says that
won't clarify things, but what it will do is it'll make clear that in a case
like R.apanos, those wetlands, wetlands that are adjacent to nonnavigable tributaries and navigable waters, are clearly covered and that
the only dispute will be constitutional challenges. Is this so insignificant that Congress didn't have the constitutional authority because it
has no impact on interstate commerce? That will be what the legal
challenges will be limited to, instead of having all these debates about
what did Congress intend.
Justice Scalia said, well, this decision might have environmental
impacts; that's what our critics will say is that we're harming the environment. He said it's not my problem. It's Congress's fault because
I'm interpreting what Congress did. Congress is the one they can set
Justice Scalia straight by saying this was our intent, what Justice Breyer
said it was, to extend federal jurisdiction to the limits of Congress's
constitutional authority.
PROFESSOR EAGLE: Thank you, Bob.
John.
PROFESSOR ADLER: Just a couple of quick things. One come on
that last point, I think in legislation the clearest way to avoid these sorts
of problems would be to include a jurisdictional element in the system.
This is something that's done traditionally in federal criminal law. The
federal arson statute is a good example because the Supreme Court's
actions parse the jurisdictional element there. It only applies to arsons
that substantially affect interstate commerce. And the Supreme Court,
in a unanimous opinion in 1999, I think, U.S. v. Johns, explained what
that would be. This is something Congress does all the time. The fed-
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eral partial-birth abortion ban includes a jurisdictional element. It
only applies to procedures performed in or affecting interstate commerce. That would be a way to remove constitutional questions from
this sort of legislation.
It would, though, require in prosecutions or in challenges to jurisdiction that the agency actually put forward evidence of a substantial
effect on interstate commerce. And that may be a drag on agency resources or something that the agency doesn't want to do.
Really quickly, I disagree with Pat that - we do have national wetland protection programs. We don't have any national, other than
404, national wetland regulation program. But regulation is not the
only way of protecting wetlands and other environmental resources.
Throughout the 1990s, various non-regulatory incentive-based programs were restoring and creating in excess of 200,000 acres of wetlands per year. This is several times more than the gross acreage that
was created or restored under Section 404 mitigation, and the failure
rate for these programs is much lower because these programs were
done by people that actually cared about the ecological function of the
wetlands, rather than by developers that were happy to simply tum on
a hose if it would get them a permit.
Science doesn't get us out of this. Ecological interconnection, yes.
It's ubiquitous. It's everywhere. So what? So is economic interconnection; so is social interconnection. The complexity and interconnectedness of systems does not by itself justify centralized regulatory programs anymore than the interconnectedness of dynamic economic
systems would justify simple economic planning.
PROFESSOR EAGLE: Thank you,John.
Pat.
PROFESSOR PARENTEAU: Well, I'd like Jonathan and Reed to
draw the line on the map for me where is the limit of Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause. I wish we had a map of any watershed - pick up watershed, Chesapeake Bay. Where does it stop, Jonathan or Reed? Where does it stop? What's a principled way to draw
that line on a map?
PROFESSOR EAGLE: Reed, any comments?
PROFESSOR HOPPER: Well, I would say with respect to the constitutionality of the proposed bill, it doesn't save a bill to say that we
can regulate anything we want, to the limits of the Commerce Clause.
That does not save the bill from going too far. It does not save it from
constitutional attack.
This proposed bill simply says that we intend to regulate to the limits of the commerce power, but we don't believe there are any limits to
the commerce power, and therefore we're going to regulate all waters.
I think that that's clearly unacceptable to a majority of the members of
the Supreme Court and clearly inconsistent with any reasonable interpretation of the commerce power.

158

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 11

The other thing I would just add to what Professor Adler said, I was
interested to read not too long ago the April Report on the President's
Wetland Program in which it was reported that through voluntary efforts between or among federal and state and private interests in the
past two years, conservation of wetlands had occurred to the extent of
500 million acres, and an equal amount had been created compared to
the 25,000 acres that had been saved or improved under the Clean
Water Act.
The Clean Water Act is not the flagship for environmental protection or wetlands protection specifically. Other efforts have greater resuits. The debate here is really not about merely what can we do to
determine the scope of the Commerce Clause or what can we do to
protect wetlands to the maximum extent possible. We have to recognize that, notwithstanding our desire to improve the human condition,
we must do so in a way that's constitutional and recognizes the rule of
law. In this case, regulation of local wetlands should and do devolve
upon the states and not just the federal government.
PROFESSOR EAGLE: Thank you, Reed.
Now it's time for questions. I have two requests of you. First, because we do not have a hand-held microphone, please make your question short and simple so that I can repeat it for the tape. And second,
please end your question with a question mark.
Yes, sir.
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: Professor, I'd ask about the scope
(inaudible). It appears that the scope of the bill invokes the Necessary
and Proper Clause, the Treaty Powers, and I guess (inaudible) the panelists, is the implication of those constitutional authorities, wouldn't
that be broader than the Commerce Clause?
PROFESSOR EAGLE: Okay, the question is that the invocation in
the Oberstar bill of the Necessary and Proper Clause and the Treaty
Clause, in addition to the Commerce Clause, affect the bill's constitutionality?
PROFESSOR PERCNAL: I think so. I think the treaty Power is a
plenary power. Missouri v. Holland is one of the hallmarks, of course,
of constitutional jurisprudence on the scope of Congress's treaty power. I don't think that just simply waving the talisman of the Treaty
Power does it.
I think what you have to do is connect the specific wetland resources that are most questionable under the Commerce Clause, which
would be prairie potholes, playa lakes, Carolina bays and the like, as
habitat for the birds that are protected by four international conventions, two protocols, both of the latest protocols aimed at habitat conservation with the, duh, you don't have ducks without wetlands. So in
my view, although I think there's a strong Raich-based Commerce
Clause rationale for protecting these so-called isolated wetlands, to me,
I think a stronger constitutional basis for Congress's doing that with
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regard to habitat that is necessary to fulfill the United States obligations under these four conventions, I think the Treaty Power is golden
for that kind of rationale.
I'd like to see more of that kind of basis developed in the legislative
record underlying whatever is done, Oberstar, whatever else.
PROFESSOR EAGLE:John.
PROFESSOR ADLER: Yes, a couple of things. The Necessary and
Proper Clause is not a freestanding power. It merely makes explicit
what was generally understood, which is if you're going to have the
power to regulate commerce, there may be things that you need to do
to effectuate that power.
And so for example, in this context, if the power to regulate commerce clearly includes power over navigability, which is something I
think is incontestable, the Necessary and Proper Clause - Congress can
do certain things that aren't actually in navigable waters to protect
those navigable waters. I think that's the logic at the end of the day
underlying a significant nexus test, is that the Necessary and Proper
Clause allows you to work around this area, but it doesn't allow you to
do something that's freestanding. I don't think invocation of the federal property power does all that much unless you're talking about
federal lands, which there's already a plenty of authority.
I don't think the Treaty power does all that much. I think Missouri
v. Holland is a very short, over-interpreting case. It dealt with a transboundary resource, and so I don't think it could be used as a freestanding plenary authority for these sorts of regulations. One very basic
structural reason for that is that it would be bizarre to have a situation
where the president and two-thirds of the Senate could, in cooperation
with a foreign power, grant to Congress powers that were withheld to it
under Article 1. I mean, structurally that just would not make sense. It
only makes sense if we're talking about something like a transboundary
resource. Missouri v. Holland that was migratory birds.
I would just note, though, with prairie potholes just as an example,
what's the biggest threat to prairie potholes? Well, farming. I believe
this bill preserves the agricultural exemption from the other exemptions that are built into Section 404. So if we're really concerned with
prairie potholes, we shouldn't be worried about trying to reverse Rapanos. We should be worried about better encouraging farmers to plow
over prairie potholes rather than protect them. And that has nothing
to do with Section 404 of the Clean Water Act. That has to do with
other things that are going on.
PROFESSOR PARENTEAU: As far as the Commerce Power goes,
prior to Gonza1.ez v. Raich, I think there was a narrow set of activities
where people were dirt-biking for fun, that had nothing to do with
Congress that might endanger species, where you had some question
could that be regulated. But Gonza1.ez v. Raich, by saying you can prohibit growing medical marijuana in your backyard because it's integral
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to preserving the integrity of this larger federal regulatory program I
think has now resolved that. So in my view, the Commerce Power
would cover just about anything that's necessary for Congress to protect, to preserve the integrity of the nation's waters. But it can't hurt to
also cite the Treaty Power.
PROFESSOR EAGLE: Thank you.
Reed, did you want to hop in here?
PROFESSOR HOPPER: Yes. Pat referenced the 1920 Holland case
in which the Supreme Court indicated that the treaty could constitute
an independent basis for regulation. However, the caveat is that the
treaty be constitutional. One would infer from that that the treaty
would be constitutional if it was within the enumerated powers granted
to Congress but does not extend those powers.
What was the other issue?
PROFESSOR EAGLE: Necessary and Proper.
PROFESSOR HOPPER: Oh yes, with respect to the Necessary and
Proper Clause, Justice Thomas, I think, stated in the Raich case that if
the regulation exceeds the commerce power, then it's neither necessary nor proper for further regulation. So I don't think that Raich allows for free-wheeling regulation under the Congress power.
PROFESSOR EAGLE: Okay, next question. Yes.
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: Yes, thank you. Bruce Meyers with
the Environmental Law Institute. And thanks to Professor Parenteau
for the plug to our common law paper. Actually, I have a question for
Mr. Hopper, and I mean this as fairly serious question. The latest version of the draft of Oberstar, that I see anyway, the definition of "waters
of the United States" suggests that X, Y, and Z-A, B, C water types are
waters that are included to the fullest extent of our power under the
Constitution, our legislative power. And I guess I'm just wondering, I
think one of the other panelists may have even characterized this as a
tautology. How on its face could that be unconstitutional? What
would make that language unconstitutional? I understand that there
could be a dispute over what the line is and how you would draw it and
(inaudible). But what about that bill would make the (inaudible) unconstitutional?
PROFESSOR EAGLE: Let me just repeat the question if I may.
The question is given that the Oberstar bill does contain descriptions
of types of water that would be included under the bill, what is it that
makes it too general to be constitutional?
PROFESSOR HOPPER: Let me read the language from the proposed Act itself. I think I've got the latest version. "Waters of the
United States" defined. The term "waters of the United States" means
all waters subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, the territorial seas,
and all interstate and intrastate waters and their tributaries, including
lakes, rivers, streams, including intermittent streams, mud flats, sand
flats, wetlands, sluice, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, natu-
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ral ponds and all and impoundments of the foregoing to the fullest
extent that these waters or activities affecting these waters are subject
to the legislative power of the Congress."
That caveat, as I was saying, you know, "that are subject to the legislative power of Congress" does not save it because this language, by its
terms, applies to all waters in the United States, and I think it's clear
from both SWANCC and Rapanos that at least a majority of the Court
would not accept that all waters are within even the furthest limit of the
commerce power.
PROFESSOR PERCIVAL: But Reed, then, what's the significance
of saying to the extent of powers under the Constitution? You're just
reading that out of the bill and saying, therefore, it's unconstitutional.
PROFESSOR HOPPER: This language calls - this language is an
abdication of Congress's role to determine the extent of its own Commerce Clause power. This calls for the courts to determine where the
line is. That's one of the problems with it.
PROFESSOR PERCIVAL: But it's not saying we want to regulate it
whether we can or not constitutionally. It says we want to regulate to
the limit of our constitutional powers.
PROFESSOR HOPPER: What it's saying is we will regulate all waters until were told by the court that we can't.
PROFESSOR PARENTEAU: I think he's right actually. I think
Reed's right on that. But it doesn't matter what Bob Percival and I
think about the extent of the Commerce Clause. It matters what Anthony Kennedy thinks. And we're all trying to figure that out. I mean,
he clearly- I agree with Jonathan on this. He clearly is troubled by the
current regulations. And so, a law that simply codifies them is asking
for trouble. I'll be honest about that.
Unless this Congress, if it enacts something, does more than simply
invoke, you know, some kind of magical incantation that we're using
all the authority we have, I don't know that it's going to survive. I
don't know that it's going to survive. We need five votes. We don't
need four; we need five. And those of us who care about this issue
have got to figure out how we get Kennedy on this, and we don't have
him yet. So I'll leave it there.
PROFESSOR PERCIVAL: But it clearly would blow away Scalia saying this is what Congress really meant, this really crabbed interpretation. So, you've completely reversed Scalia's opinion, and that has accomplished something really major. And so now, everything is now
waged on what are the limits of the constitutional power, not on the
limit of what Congress intended.
PROFESSOR ADLER: Ifl couldjustjump in.
PROFESSOR EAGLE: One or two sentences.
PROFESSOR ADLER: Two sentences. First sentence, if the goal is
certainty, punting this to the courts and saying we can regulate it as
much as we can regulate, certainly doesn't do that. So if this is a tauto-
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logical version of the bill, your certainty argument for the bill goes
away.
Second sentence - Rapanos was decided after Gonza/,ez v. Raich, and
Justice Kennedy still makes reference to the constitutional concerns
that motivated the Court's decision in SWANCC as the basis for significant nexus test, which suggests that Justice Kennedy believes that even
after Gonza/,ez v. Raich, there is a limit to Congress's authority in this
area, that regulating, for example, wetlands adjacent to non-navigable
tributaries would implicate.
PROFESSOR EAGLE: Thank you.
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: I'd like to ask Professor Hopper what
he thinks, whether the Oberstar bill will clarify or further develop the
issue of actions by private conservationists, say, prairie potholes (inaudible) rancher or farmer who wants to create new wetlands and puts a
permanent dam across a ditch (inaudible) creek to the stream and
create a cattail marsh for ducks and waterfowl and so on, or if he wants
to take an isolated prairie pothole and (inaudible). Do you think it'll
be clearer or less clear (inaudible) prison for destroying wetland when
he's actually created it?
PROFESSOR EAGLE: Let me just repeat the question. The question is will the Oberstar bill clarify the legality of the actions of private
conservationists who, in the course of engaging in conservation, create
new wetlands.
Reed.
PROFESSOR HOPPER: Well, I think it will clarify that activity in
any water of the United States is subject to federal regulation unless it
falls within one of the farm exemptions, which themselves are ambiguous, until the first court gets a hold of this and overlays its interpretation of the Act.
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: I'm curious about the panelists'
thoughts on the impact of this legislation on cooperative federalism,
given the corrective language so that all waters would not reach
ground waters and also historic role in the cooperative (inaudible).
PROFESSOR EAGLE: Okay. The question is what does the panel
think will be the impact of this very broad and comprehensive bill on
cooperative federalism?
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: and also the possibility of preemption.
PROFESSOR EAGLE: And the possibility of preemption.
PROFESSOR PARENTEAU: I think the states are going to support
it, the majority. The vast majority of the states are going to support it.
How they're going to do that politically with, you know, the vagaries of
the National Governors Association and other entities to deal with, I
don't know. I think Bob already cited these statistics to you, but when
the advance notice of proposed rulemaking, the trial balloon that was
floated by the Bush administration following SWANCC, the, how far
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should we roll back the jurisdiction of the Clean Water Act and PRM,
resoundingly - I forget what it was - between 35 and 40 states came in
and said don't you dare roll back the jurisdiction of the Clean Water
Act. Maybe we didn't like it 30 years ago, but we'd rather have what we
know, the devil we know, than one we don't. And our programs are
predicated on the scope of the Clean Water Act as it's been interpreted
and applied over those 30 years. Leave it alone. And of course, that's
what the Bush administration ultimately decided to do.
When the Rapanos case came up, same thing. I forget how many
amicus briefs there were from the states, but in excess, more than half
of the states weighing in on the side of the federal government. Even
in those cases, which, you know, admittedly were pushing the envelope
pretty hard on federal jurisdiction.
So I don't - the concern that's being raised about federalism, I
don't think it's real. I don't think the states want to see the federal
government exiting from the field of Clean Water Act protection and
regulation. I just don't believe it.
PROFESSOR ADLER: I think there's some serious questions there.
I mean certainly the question of whether or not this would call for federal regulation of groundwater or authorize that is a big question.
Whether or not the effect this would have on certain irrigation systems,
certain water systems, is, I think, a real question. I know in the hearing
was held on the bill, there was some discussion of that. I think it's
something that really hasn't been looked at.
One quick point on federalism, federalism is not there to protect
the states. Federalism is not about the states. Federalism is about the
people. The point of federalism is not to say the federal government is
to do whatever wants as long as the states say okay because there are
lots of times when the states would be happy to have the federal government give them money and regulate in place of the states so the
states don't have to be accountable for those decisions. I mean that as
a federalism that some might argue, but that's not the federalism that
our Constitution sets up.
And so, the fact that states are happy to get the benefits of these
wetland regulatory programs and are really eager to get them as long
as they don't have to bear the political and financial costs themselves,
as states, of implementing them, tells us nothing about whether or not
federalism principles are implicated by expanding federal authority in
this way.
PROFESSOR EAGLE: Questions? Yes, sir.
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: Yes. I think one of the things that's
disconcerting about the Oberstar bill, getting back to this, is the delegation of authority, essentially a legislative function, to the administrative agencies, and I'd like the speakers to comment on how (inaudible)
or could Congress say, you know, we pretend to legislate here to the
fullest extent of our authority, and we want people punished to the
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fullest extent of the law, as long as it's not cruel and unusual. It seems
to me it's like punting the issue out of the legislature into some other
(inaudible).
PROFESSOR EAGLE: Okay. The question is whether the Oberstar
bill, by purporting to regulate to the fullest extent of Congress's constitutional authority, implicitly delegates to regulatory agencies those
specific determinations which Congress itself is constitutionally mandated to do under the non-delegation doctrine.
PROFESSOR PERCIVAL: I certainly don't view it that way. I view
it as basically a narrow response that says we think the Court got it
wrong in both SWANCC and Rapanos. We think the four justices in the
dissent were correct in saying that we had indeed adopted a very comprehensive regulatory program. The Court itself has said several times
that they're not really as capable as the expert administrative agencies.
Certainly if the Agency goes hog wild, they can always have their rules
struck down as arbitrary and capricious, and the Courts have been continually active in doing that.
But here, we've got a situation where, as a result of those decisions,
there's mass confusion, and there's been a substantial cutback in federal regulatory authority. And by Congress weighing in and saying
you've got it wrong in those cases, we'll go back to how the dissent read
the law in both cases, I don't see as any major new delegation.
PANELIST: After American Trucking, I don't think there are as
many legs left in non-delegation doctrine. I mean, the court says has to
be an intelligible principle in the legislative delegation. And in that
case, the intelligible principle was that EPA was directed to protect the
public health. So that's an intelligible principle, then I think Oberstar
safely passes that kind of test.
PROFESSOR HOPPER: I don't think this is a delegation to the
agencies. It's quite clear that Congress is intending here to regulate all
waters. This is a delegation to the judicial branch from the legislative
branch, and I think that's an abdication.
PROFESSOR PARENTEAU: Whether or not it's an abdication, I
again say I don't think it's a good thing to do. I think the Congress
ought to develop a much better record for the, even the codification of
the existing regulatory scope of the Clean Water Act. I think it would
be a mistake if Congress doesn't take that seriously and develop the
kind of record that would pass muster with Mr. Justice Kennedy.
PROFESSOR ADLER: Let me agree with Pat, which is something
that happens so rarely, that Congress should take more responsibility
in the nitty-gritty and the details. I didn't call for that because, you
know, that's just something Congress doesn't do anymore. It's not
routine - and I probably shouldn't say that in this building - but it's
now routine for members of Congress to vote for legislation and say
the courts will sort out if there are parts of this that are unconstitutional. When we saw folks from the right doing that with campaign
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finance. We saw folks from the left doing that with the Detainee
Treatment Act and the Military Commissions Act. I mean, that's a
common thing to do today. I think it does undermine accountability.
I think it does abdicate legislative responsibility. So, too, do members
of Congress not making for themselves an independent judgment on
the constitutionality of a legislative act itself a basis for whether or not
they will vote against something.
But we're not operating in that environment. We're operating in
an environment where what aspects of a water body make it connected
or not connected to navigable waters is the sort of thing that an agency
is going to determine or a court is going to determine. And given
those choices, I would rather it be done by an agency through notice
and comment rulemaking rather than in a context of litigation both
because I think it's more responsive to public concerns but also the
things that make litigation good for resolving a dispute between parties, in my view, make it bad for formulating nationally applicable publie policy because the issues are framed by adversary parties.
PROFESSOR PARENTEAU: Let me ask my colleague here a question. Suppose President Clinton directs her EPA to develop a rule to
resolve the conflict over the scope of the Clean Water Act, and her
agency goes back in history to the origins of the EPA's position on this
and reinvents all of the reasons why the scope of the Clean Water Act,
which has historically been asserted, is the proper scope of jurisdiction.
Are you willing to accede to that simply because it appears in a rule? I
mean, if another administration resolves the statutory intent question
in favor of a very broad scope, well beyond Scalia's test, would you say,
okay, that's good?
PROFESSOR ADLER: Well, I think it can avoid the need for caseby-case determination of the scope offederal authority. I don't think it
could allow the federal government to regulate beyond the constitutional scope of the Commerce Clause, but it certainly could help clarify
what sorts of waters are bound up with navigable waters because you
have a question - in that context you have a legal question about what
is the scope, the constitutional scope of power, as well as a factual question about whether or not activity in a certain area has an effect on
something with the federal interest of a significant magnitude that
could justify federal regulation.
And I think certainly the factual part of that question is the sort of
thing that an agency could do. And there are many types of regulation
that I might not like as a policy matter that I think as a constitutional
matter would satisfy that test.
I should also note that once you go back and look at a Scalia plurality very closely and look at the words that he uses - without saying it
explicitly, Scalia makes clear that his opinion is a Chevron Step 2 opinion. It is not a "this is the only meaning of the Clean Water Act." It is
instead "the Corps of Engineers adopted an impermissible construe-
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tion of the Clean Water Act, so to resolve this case, we have to give a
construction of it." But that construction could be trumped by a permissible construction issued by an agency as a result of notice and
comment rulemaking. That's the holding of Brand X
So I mean, it's fairly clear that a Clinton administration or an Obama administration or a Paul administration or whatever administration you folks want would be able to adopt a rule that is quite broad,
and that certainly covers far more than a case-by-case application of
Rapanos is likely to cover.
PROFESSOR EAGLE: Let me exercise the moderator's prerogative
and ask a question of the panel. Water, its impoundment and flow, its
chemical, physical, and biological properties, inevitably are affected by
land uses. Could one, therefore, having enacted the Oberstar bill,
have laid the foundation for federal agencies to, on a national basis,
regulate land use throughout the United States?
PROFESSOR HOPPER: Well, I'll take a shot at that. First of all, it
already does. Under the current regulations, the Corps of Engineers
does not simply look at the effect on the water. It has a multitude of
factors that it not only evaluates when it's looking at a 404 permit but
imposes mitigation for, including aesthetics and energy and land use
and recreation, anything you can think of. It's very broad. And of
course, under the Oberstar bill, you have this language here that we
intend to exercise to the fullest extent of these waters or activities affecting these waters, which means land use. So this bill would not only,
I think, offer a plenary type - you know, convert the commerce power
into general police power with respect to water but also with respect to
land use.
PROFESSOR PARENTEAU: When Congress amended the Clean
Water Act in 1987, it added one new goal: to try to protect against nonpoint source pollution. But it didn't really do much of anything to the
Act to try to accomplish that goal. The Oberstar bill does nothing to
change the definition of point source or discharge of dredged or fill
materials. So the answer to your question is very simple. It's no.
PROFESSOR EAGLE: Yes.
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: One last question if I may. If you
look at the findings of the Oberstar bill, it basically recites portions of
(inaudible) the states' primary role in regulating water within its
boundaries and also managing land use activities within its sovereign
boundaries. In this case, the bill actually does not use the term "primary." I'm curious whether or not findings in a subsequent amendment to the Clean Water Act could in fact (inaudible).
PANELIST: Probably not. Findings don't count for a whole lot anyway, in my view. But, I mean, you know, the Lopez, Morrison, Raich line
of cases has been inconsistent, at best, in terms of looking at findings
and how salient are they and so forth.
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But I think it's not true that merely because the Oberstar bill
doesn't recite the primacy, that somehow that goes away. The case law
actually has given some weight to that particular verbiage in the findings section of the law, particularly where it comes to things like enforcement issues and whether an interpretation of the Act would very
directly contravene state sovereignty or autonomy. But those are so
rare, the instances where that actually happens is so rare that I don't
think it's terribly significant, at least in my experience.
PROFESSOR EAGLE: Other -yes ma'am.
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: (Inaudible) (Off-mic) gloss over what
I see as a fairly significant expansion of federal jurisdiction in the
Clean Water Act, and that is to include, to get at upland activity, and
that is - I think the language, Mr. Hopper, you read, I think goes to
conclude activities that may affect (inaudible). So you go from regulating discharges from a point source to a navigable water, waters of the
US, to now this kind of (inaudible) language to include activities that
may affect - I'm just recalling PROFESSOR EAGLE: The general thrust of the question is, is the
Oberstar bill expanding the jurisdiction of the federal government
over waters to an extent we haven't yet discussed?
PROFESSOR PERCIVAL: It doesn't change the trigger for the Section 404 permit process, which is discharge of dredge or fill material.
So that would still have to take place for it to be covered in a 404 permit requirement.
PROFESSOR ADLER: I should say, though, there are lots of activities that would certainly not trigger 404 but that would constitute the
discharge of a pollutant, which is essentially the addition of a pollutant,
to what could be characterized as an impoundment of water. That is
the real kind of loaded part of the definition is saying any impoundment of water because it says, you know, it lists all the different types of
waters and says all impoundments of the foregoing.
Now Bob and I will agree, the Corps of Engineers isn't going to try
and regulate birdbaths. But can we think of various activities that involve the impoundment of water to some degree that have significantly
large ecological effects that might be worth the EPA's time but that are
not currently regulated by federal law? Sure. We can think of all sorts
of things. And where that water is modified or added to in some way
so as there to could be a discharge, again I think so, but it doesn't necessarily have to be the physical addition of atoms of a substance.
Right? Heat, for example, can be the trigger for regulation.
So I mean some of his ambiguity there, and aggressive administration, I think, could really run with that language. You know, how
would a court respond to that? I don't know.
PROFESSOR HOPPER: I think Oberstar can be clearer, frankly,
on the point about - what it's really getting at, I think, is that the focus
of the regulatory program are economic activities, but it's only a subset
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of those activities that's actually regulated, and those are the ones that
have a discharge from a point source.
So your point is fair that it could be clearer, I think, in the text and
perhaps the legislative history, to the extent that's relevant anymore, of
the bill that what we're really - we're not talking about changing the
scope of the regulatory program with respect to activities. What we're
talking about is the aggregate effect of the activities we do regulate,
which are discharges, do have a significant effect on interstate commerce. That seems to me with they're trying to get at.
PROFESSOR EAGLE: Is the overall thrust of Oberstar to eliminate
the concept of non:iurisdictional waters?
PROFESSOR ADLER: That's the attempt. That's the goal.
PROFESSOR PARENTEAU: I put the question to those of you who
have concerns about this aggrandizement of federal authority, where
would you draw the line? It's a serious question. Take out a map of
the Chesapeake Bay and show me where you're going to draw the line
and tell me how you did it. You know, do you want to stop it at firstorder tributaries? Okay, here's the man who's going to step up to the
plate. First order tribs are out. What's - off mic - what's the biggest
problem with the Chesapeake Bay? Nitrogen and phosphorus. Right?
Where does the biggest removal come from? First and second order
streams. You want to take them out? Fine. You'll never recover the
Chesapeake Bay. End of story.
PROFESSOR EAGLE: Pat is suggesting that PANELIST: I'll ask the same question of you, and ask you where
you think you that line should be drawn.
PROFESSOR PARENTEAU: I don't think it should be drawn.
Okay? I don't think it can be drawn.
PROFESSOR EAGLE: Okay.
PROFESSOR PARENTEAU: And I don't think there's anything in
the Constitution or the Forefathers' papers or the Convention or anything else that says it has to be drawn. I think this whole business of a
limiting principle and end-point is fiction, pure and simple. If Congress can articulate a rational reason for extending its jurisdiction in
order to restore the Chesapeake Bay all the way to where it begins, I
think constitutionally it's entitled to do it.
PROFESSOR EAGLE: Question, yes.
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: What do you consider a border of the
United States, or what do you consider as a water that is - basically
what you're talking about is (inaudible) all the way to headwaters and
so on and so forth that are examples of where regulation has gone
beyond what one might normally consider as a "headwater" and gotten
into things like upland issues and the like. And arguably, potentially
(inaudible) individual property, down their driveway to the rain gutter.
And is there a line to be drawn there?
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PROFESSOR EAGLE: The question is does permissible regulation
under the Oberstar bill stop at the headwaters of secondary streams, or
does it go to include people's driveways and drainage ditches in front
of their house?
PROFESSOR PARENTEAU: Did you want me to keep going, or do
you want to get some other voices?
All right. How many of the natural streams are ditched in the
United States? There are data on this, you know. Guess? How many?
How many natural streams are now ditches? A third. What do you do
with them? Are they out? They're still tributaries. They may be
ditches, but they're tributaries, and the Corps has tried to wrestle with
this problem of what do you do with ditches for a long time. There's
no good answer to it. There's no good answer to it. If it's a purely
upland ditch, it goes from Point A to Point B and it's not functioning
as a tributary, is it a water of the United States? No, and the Corps says
it's not. Is it potentially a point source? I don't know. Maybe. Justice
Scalia seems to think it is.
But see, I don't think there's a constitutional answer to questions
like yours. It's a good question. It's a very good question. But you
know what? I don't see that you can draw some bright line and say all
ditches are out or all ditches are in because some ditches are streams
by another name, and they're still tributaries even though they stink
and they suck. But they're still tributaries because that's all that's left
in some tributary systems.
PROFESSOR EAGLE: Albert Einstein once said that the job of
science is to define things as simply as possible but no simpler. Listening to this discussion makes me ask, is the sometimes reviled Kennedy
approach, talking about sufficient nexus, as good as we can get?
PROFESSOR ADLER: Yes. The thing is that - two quick points on
this. One is the fact that line-drawing is difficult doesn't mean that
there aren't categories, and the fact that the Constitution enumerates
certain powers presupposes that there are things beyond those powers.
Now, do we always know the precise contours of those lines? Of course
not. But we know the category of things Congress can't do is not a null
set. And so, any approach that renders it a null set, we know can't be
correct. We know what night is and we know what day is, but we have
twilight. And when precisely does day turn into night. Well, you know,
there may be some scientific definition about the precise level light.
That's an arbitrary line because someone ne3eded to draw a line, and
none of us sitting there watching the sun go down is going to say ahhah, now it's night. Yes, the sun's below the horizon, but it's still pretty
bright out. Is that day? Is that night?
Same sort of thing - line-drawing is difficult, but we still know there
are these categories there, separate. The fact that, that when we apply
regulatory apparatus to things like wetlands or waters, it gets difficult
and it's hard to draw the lines. And one of the reasons it would be bet-
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ter for agencies and Congress to take their constitutional obligations
seriously is so that courts don't have to try and do it on the fly on a
case-by-case contest.
Kennedy's significant nexus approach is as good as a court is going
to be able to do because Kennedy knows that there are waters that are
beyond the scope of Congress's power. There are waters that are within its power. There are places where they mix and they interact. And
if he had an infinite amount of time and an infinite number of clerks
with (inaudible) background, he might be able to figure out that line,
but that line wouldn't reflect the judgment of a legislative body. So it
wouldn't reflect the popular will in any way.
It would be much better if Congress and the agency, in trying to
delineate jurisdiction, knew that there were certain answers - we can
regulate everything which is not acceptable - and try to focus on, okay,
what are those waters that are sufficiently close to commerce that when
regulating commerce, we can regulate those as well, knowing that
there are things that may be beyond that and that we may have to use
other tools than regulation to deal with. You might have to use incentives. You might have to use cooperative federalism. You might have
to rely on non-regulatory approaches. We do that in lots of other
areas. The fact that there's a constitutional limit to using a specific
tool to address a specific problem doesn't mean the problem isn't important. It doesn't mean that we're not serious about addressing it.
We recognize that in the national security context. We recognize that
in the context of criminal law enforcement. It's about time we recognize that in environmental law as well.
PROFESSOR PERCNAL: This whole discussion amazes me that we
should be focusing on precisely where do you draw the line in the most
extreme case, when Rapanos was anything but that. It was absolutely
clear that Rapanos's wetlands were covered under the existing definitions. He hired a consultant who told him that. He then told him
bury all your papers; you're fired. He went ahead and defied the
Corps and as a result was criminally convicted. His criminal conviction
was affirmed. The Supreme Court refused to intervene to overturn his
conviction. It was a massive project that was going to have very significant ecological connections. Justice Kennedy himself says the government will have no problem satisfying my significant nexus test in the
case of Rapanos.
What Oberstar is trying to do is to overturn what really is an outrageous outcome in a case where we've suddenly taken a giant step back;
in a case where it wasn't one of those cases involving "is this really an
extreme interpretation of the Act." The question was whether a wetland adjacent to a non-navigable tributary of a navigable water very,
very close to the wetland where the Iliverside Bayview case led to a unanimous Supreme Court decision affirming federal jurisdiction,
whether that was subject to federal regulatory authority. I think the
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four dissenters got it exactly right, that the Kennedy test is going to
cripple the Corps further by requiring all these case-by-case analyses.
Now Kennedy did say new regulations would help. Chief Justice
Roberts said maybe we would defer to new regulations, although it's
hard to understand how he could do that and also join Justice Scalia's
opinion. But maybe they'll listen to Jonathan and his view that it's a
Chevron Step 2, and maybe Scalia would change his opinion in response to regulations.
Nothing the Oberstar bill does would change the Corps' regulation. If they wanted to somehow greatly expand what they actually require a 404 permit to do, they would have to propose new regulations
and get those adopted. All the Oberstar bill is trying to do is to reverse
the Rapanos decision and the SWANCC decision and side with the dissenters in both cases. And that was absolutely clear from anyone who
attended the July 17 hearing and all the discussion.
PROFESSOR EAGLE: Any other questions?
(No response.)
PROFESSOR EAGLE: Well, if not, thank you all very much for attending. I think the panel has done some excellent presentations, and
I'd like to thank them.
(Applause.)
(Panel concluded.)

WATER MARKETING
CLE INTERNATIONAL

Denver, Colorado

December 10, 2007

Taylor E. C. Hawes, Associate Counsel for the Colorado River
Water Conservation District, provided the first presentation of the day.
She framed the discussions to follow by introducing the subject of water marketing. She stated that practitioners use the term "water marketing" broadly to describe both arrangements in which private parties
purchase water rights and sell them to third parties and arrangements
in which private or public entities lease or contract water to third parties but retain ownership of the rights. The anti-speculation doctrine
limits water marketing in Colorado to only allow appropriation if the
water is put to a beneficial use. Under Colorado statutory law, no appropriation of water may occur when the basis of the proposed appropriation is a speculative sale or transfer of the water rights to persons
who are not parties to the appropriation. Therefore, in Colorado, private parties may only purchase water to market to third parties if they
have firm contractual commitments with third parties lined up for the
use of water once a project is completed. Ms. Hawes, then discussed
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the ways in which municipalities, irrigation districts and water conservancy and conservation districts can engage in water marketing. Notably, the Colorado statutes create a limited exception to the antispeculation doctrine allowing municipalities and government agencies
to contract to provide water services outside of city limits through
agreements such as distributor agreements, connector agreements,
and non-potable water contracts. State law allows water conservation
districts to develop water resources within the district boundaries and,
depending upon the enabling act of the district, may be able to sell or
lease the water. Within water conservancy districts, state law also allows
the districts to develop and market water within the district boundaries. Irrigation districts may distribute contracted water to irrigators
within their districts and market excess water outside the district as well
as contract for additional water from federal Reclamation projects.
Next, Alexandra L. Davis, Assistant Director for Water at the
Colorado Department of Natural Resources, discussed the State's perspective on water marketing. This involved an overview of water use in
Colorado and a discussion of the different uses competing for the limited supply of water. Ms. Davis projected that, as agriculture remains
the dominant water use in Colorado, future water markets will primarily involve transfers of water from the agricultural sector. Recognizing
the pressure to transfer agricultural water to municipal and industrial
uses, Ms. Davis outlined several alternatives to traditional "buy and dry"
agricultural water transfers.
These include interruptible supply
agreements, rotational fallowing arrangements, water banks, alternative cropping and/ or irrigation practices, and use of stored or average/ wet year statewide supplies. Ms. Davis concluded that water markets can help reduce uncertainty related to future water supply availability and are an important resource for meeting the current and future water needs of Colorado.
The morning concluded with complimentary presentations on
the seller's and buyer's perspectives on water marketing. Bob Lembke,
President of United Water and Sanitation District in Greenwood Village, provided the seller's perspective. Mr. Lembke stressed that an
important goal of water marketing transactions needs to be maintaining value in the property rights for farmers. Because of the common
adverse socioeconomic impacts to farmers from traditional "buy and
dry" transfers, farmer-oriented transfers are key to the transition from
agricultural to municipal uses. Consequently, marketing needs to be
more than just buying and selling; it requires addressing the needs of
the parties by providing a reliable product to the needed place of use
at a price profitable for both parties. Mr. Lembke offered a basic three
part process for a successful sale. First, consider who the buyers are
and what their needs are. Second, assess and model the carrying capacity of the individual water rights. Third, determine the method of
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storage for the transaction, recognizing that underground storage is
key in water portfolios.
Peter Binney, the Director of Utilities for the City of Aurora
Water, provided the buyer's perspective. Mr. Binney explained that
the challenge for buyers is to create cost-effective and schedulesensitive portfolios. With complicating issues such as population
growth, instream flow uses, the variability of hydrological cycle, and the
limits of existing infrastructure capacity, water markets are becoming
very important in accomplishing the challenge presented to buyers.
Aurora plans to acquire their water needs through several measures,
including demand reduction, incorporation of reclaimed water, recapture of reusable water and acquisition of agricultural waters. Mr. Binney concluded his presentation with a brief description of one of Aurora's innovative answers, the Prairie Waters project. According to Mr.
Binney, the project is trying to move wet water to customers via a pipeline from Brighton to Aurora.
After the lunch break, Amelia Whiting of Trout Unlimited discussed "buying water for fish" through acquisition of instream flows.
The presentation addressed the use of water markets as a mechanism
to secure flows necessary for the health of streams. She first discussed
non-market approaches to obtaining instream flows such as regulatory
mandates prescribed by the Endangered Species Act and the acquisition of instream flow appropriations by the Colorado Water Conservation Board ("CWCB"). Acknowledging that in Colorado instream flow
appropriations may only be held by the CWCB, Ms. Whiting addressed
several methods of obtaining instream flow rights such as forbearance
agreements, acquisition of storage rights or storage space for stream
flow enhancement, and acquisition of senior rights by the CWCB. Ms.
Whiting argued that the CWCB could strengthen their acquisition of
water rights program by adding staff, providing incentives to senior
water right holders to sell or lease their rights, changing statutory law
to allow owners to lease water to the CWCB on a long term basis, and
exploring the privatization of instream flow acquisition. At the end of
the presentation, Ms. Whiting was joined by Linda Bassi, Chief of
Stream and Lake Protection at the CWCB who briefly discussed the
benefits of acquisition of existing rights rather than appropriation of
new, very junior, rights.
Next, Cliff Wilson, Managing Principal at H20 Consultants
provided a brief overview of his business' operations. H20 Consultants
identifies wholesale water rights opportunities for water districts and
municipalities and provides capital for transactions in order to secure
funding for acquisition of water rights. They therefore often enter into
transactions with the seller and the buyer of water resources and act as
principals in the transactions. H20 Consultants also identifies water
storage locations and mechanisms and develops strategies to maximize
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water resources through conjunctive water supply plans involving surface and groundwater.
To conclude the discussion on water markets, Peter Nichols of
Trout, Raley, Monta o, Witwer & Freeman, teamed up with Leo Eisel,
Principal Engineer at Brown and Caldwell, to discuss practical ideas for
creating sustainable alternatives for agricultural transfers. Mr. Nichols
began by discussing the so-called "Super Ditch," or more formally, the
Lower Arkansas Valley Rotating Land Fallowing-Water Leasing Program. At its core, the Super Ditch is simply a brokerage clearinghouse
for water rights that enables the agricultural communities to retain
ownership in the water rights and prevents land from being permanently "dried up." Echoing the recommendations of the previous
speakers, Mr. Nichols suggested that the Super Ditch Company will
need to provide a reliable source of water for municipalities and create
an alternate source of profit for agriculture for it to be successful. Furthermore, some of the key remaining issues to address before the Super Ditch comes to fruition include: I) variation in yield and water
value among ditches, 2) delivery issues to irrigated land with less water
in the ditch, 3) what land will not be irrigated and when, 4) farmer
concern about diminished productivity after fallowing, 5) the actual
organization and creation of a "Super Ditch" company, and 6) municipality interest in working with this type of an entity as opposed to the
traditional "buy and dry" method.
Dr. Eisel broadened the discussion by assessing several of the
current ideas for creating practical alternatives to "buy and dry," including the Arkansas River Basin Water Bank Program, the Arkansas
Basin Roundtable Water Transfers Committee, the Super Ditch Company, paying Kansas in water for the decision in Kansas v. Colorado, and
changing water for instream flow purposes. In evaluating these ideas,
Dr. Eisel offered several thoughts and conclusions to consider when
attempting to create any successful alternative: I) are these alternatives
seeking to limit inter-basin transfers or to market water, 2) is limiting
the transfers to in-basin customers really helping the implementation
of sustainable agriculture and rural communities, 3) certainty of a
permanent sustainable supply is required by both water utility managers and those customers seeking to use this water for instream flow
purposes, 4) alternatives to buy and dry need to be focused on areas
that will remain agricultural and will not immediately become residential, and 5) the process needs to be simple and participants can reduce
costs by collectively doing the necessary engineering.
Nora Pincus & Maria Hohn

BOOKNOTES
The Honorable Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., The Public's Water Resource:
Articles on Water, History, and Culture, CLE in Colorado, Inc., 2007:
1900 Grant St., Suite 300, Denver, CO 80203; (303) 860-0608;
http:/ /www.cobar.org/cle; 424 pp.; $19.95.

Reviewed by Daniel A. Vigil 1
As a student and teacher of water law, I greatly appreciate and val-

ue this artful body of work because it masterfully captures both the
spirit and letter of water law. It brings the rivers, the lakes, the land,
and the diverse people to life. At some points, the reader can hear the
water trickle and see the furrowed faces of the farmers. The Public's
Water Resource is a perfect blend of history, water law, and poetry.
The work is exceptionally well written, understandable, and well
documented. It contains hundreds of footnotes; dozens of useful and
relevant graphs, charts, and photographs; and many enlightening and
inspiring poems. The work communicates on many levels: intellectual,
emotional, metaphysical, and spiritual. Once you have read the poem
"Enduring Sense of American Selves," you will understand why it can
be called a spiritual and metaphysical work. Experienced water lawyers, hydrologists, water engineers, and history buffs will find this work
an interesting and valuable resource; the novice will find it to be the
best place to begin exploring the topic. In fact, for the new students,
the book contains a section entitled "Citizen's Guide to Colorado Water Law," which Justice Hobbs wrote specifically for the laity.
Any history and study of Colorado water law also is a history and
study of the people who have used and tamed the waters. Justice
Hobbs superbly addresses and explains the water systems, the culture,
and the daily life of Colorado's diverse populations, starting with Colorado's indigenous population. The chapter "Two Story House" highlights the composition of Colorado's diverse history. The chapter
drives home the point that for those who dwelled at Mesa Verde long
ago, as well as for those of us who dwell in Colorado today, water was
and still is the focal point of life. The author's respect and admiration

1. Daniel A. Vigil is Assistant Dean for Student Affairs and teaches water law and
legal ethics at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law. Prior to that, he was an
Associate Dean at the University of Colorado Law School, where he taught for nearly
twenty years. This book review was previously published in 36 The Colorado Lawyer 64
(Dec. 2007).
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for the cliff dwellers is clear from the way he approaches and addresses
the subject.
The chapter "The Role of Climate on Water Institutions in the
Western Americas" discusses several interesting and important topics,
including drought, paleohydrology, Machu Picchu, ice cap reconstruction data, and Powell's observations of Native American and Mormon
water practices. Especially fascinating is the discussion of the "dust
bowl years" and their impact on water use and conservation. The author states, "The Dust Bowl years motivated the Colorado Legislature
to find better ways to manage water locally."
Another chapter worth noting, "Colorado's 1969 Adjudication and
Administration Act: Settling In," is a true gem packed with many nuggets of valuable legislative history. The author discusses the Act of
1879; the 1881 Adjudication Act; the 1903 Adjudication Act; the Act of
April 9, 1919; the Adjudication Act of 1943; the 1965 Ground Water
Management Act; and the 1969 Adjudication and Administration Act.
To grasp and master water law, one first must understand the legislative history and the issues and pressures that led to the legislation.
This chapter provides that history.
The book includes a chapter entitled "A Decade of Colorado Supreme Court Water Decisions 1996-2006." This chapter addresses
many very important water law doctrines, such as water as a public resource, beneficial use and anti-speculation, can and will, due diligence,
change of water rights, invalid enlargement, augmentation plans, instream flows, and in-channel recreational rights. In this extremely valuable chapter, the author explains difficult and obscure doctrines and
makes them understandable. It is to the reader's benefit that the author participated in many of the water law decisions from a position on
the Colorado Supreme Court Bench.
Without a doubt, this book is fascinating and enlightening-a valuable and scholarly work that will be consulted for generations. I highly
recommend it, and I plan to make it required reading for my water law
students.

Lloyd Burton, American Indian Water Rights and the Limits of Law,
University Press of Kansas (1991); 192 pp; $16.95; ISBN 0-7006-0601-7;
soft cover.
American Indian Water Rights and the Limits of Law is a thorough water policy study of the history of American Indian water rights and the
methods of managing disputes over these rights. The author, Professor Lloyd Burton, teaches at the University of Colorado at Denver,
where he coordinates the public law curriculum and directs the Environmental Policy, Management, and Law program.
The study traces the long and eventful history of American Indian
water rights and the role of the law in adjudicating those rights. Bur-
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ton analyzes numerous water disputes and negotiations following the
Supreme Court's 1908 holding in Winters v. United States, which created
reserved-water rights for tribal reservations. Furthermore, the book
analyzes the state of American Indian water policy and law in the early
1990s, and the future direction of the negotiation and adjudication
processes. Burton's solutions seek to achieve "socially just resource
distribution without additional environmental despoliation." Burton
argues that more effective and reliable dispute resolution alternatives
will provide American Indian tribes, the federal government, and state
and local governments with positive solutions to the ongoing water
wars amongst these entities
Chapter 1, Reflections in a Glass Bead, lays out the history of American Indian water rights adjudications and its underlying themes. A
major theme goes back to history's initial accounts of interactions between European settlers and American Indian tribes; namely, the settlers' acquisition of the future area of Manhattan for beads and trinkets
worth twenty-four dollars. This idea of tribes trading rights to natural
resources for symbolic wealth exists today in water rights litigation and
negotiation. Additionally, Burton focuses on a metaphor from Herman Hesse's Das Glaspersperlenspiel (The Glass Bead Game) which describes the "intellectual elite who have taken it upon themselves to
transmit the essence of high culture down through the ages by means
of an elaborately structured transaction, or game." According to Burton, a small group of influential people conducted water resources
management in a similar vein for much of the twentieth century.
However, today new groups are joining this game. American Indian
tribes constitute many of these groups.
Chapter 2, The Development of American Indian Water Rights, introduces the "ship with three rudders," an apt description of constitutional separation of powers' effects on historical developments in American
Indian water law. The judiciary "rudder" views tribes as "nationlike
entities," while the executive and legislative branches treat the tribes as
ethnic minority groups. Given the importance of the tribes' federalreserved water rights set forth in Winters v. United States, these distinct
concepts of the tribes' autonomy create a veering water rights ship.
Winters stands for the proposition that American Indian tribes impliedly retained water rights when land was set aside for their reservations.
However, the tribes lacked the political power to enforce the Winter.s
doctrine and therefore the executive and legislative branches did not
account for these rights. Examples of this enforcement inability are
evident in the Reclamation Act of 1902 and the Colorado River compact negotiations in 1922. The Reclamation Act of 1902 built huge
irrigation systems; however, these systems served non-Indian entities
despite the tribes' substantial water rights. Furthermore, the Colorado
River compact negotiations did not include tribal representatives even
though the tribes' reserved-rights claims constituted the largest claim
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among the negotiating parties. Accordingly, Winters federally reserved
water rights did not factor into the allocations in the compact.
The Supreme Court quantified these Winters rights in the landmark
1963 case Arizona v. California, determining that the rights reserved
enough water for the "practicably irrigable acreage" on each reservation. However, despite the Court's support of the Winters doctrine,
Congress and the executive continued to "ignore the Indian right or to
subvert it indirectly (by facilitating non-Indian water appropriation
under state laws)."
While tribal sovereignty has increased in areas like criminal jurisdiction, child welfare, and energy resource development; American
Indian tribes have less control over water resources. Chapter 3, Legal
Issues and Dispute-Managing Methods in Contemporary Water Rights Conflicts, boils this lack of control down to uncertainty in areas such as jurisdiction of water rights' adjudications, quantification of water rights,
uses of reserved waters, authority over management of water resources,
and legal representation. The resolution of these issues will determine
the tribes' economic and social futures.
Burton tackles each of these issues in Chapter 3. First, the Supreme Court's changing composition from 1976 onwards made the
Court's rulings more deferential to the states. Burton outlines numerous cases delineating this emerging states' rights mentality and state
courts' restrictive views of tribal water rights. Accordingly, this creates
uncertainty for the tribes as to the jurisdiction in water cases. Second,
tribes continue to disagree over whether the quantifying of Winters
rights is in each tribe's best interest. Burton believes "the weight of
opinion is probably against quantification because the sense of indeterminacy created by a legitimate, unquantified reserved-rights claim is
one of the Indians' principal sources of bargaining power." Third,
despite the Arizona v. California "practicably irrigable acreage" quantification, Winters holds that the purposes for creating a reservation determine the amount of water reserved for that reservation. The Arizona
quantification provides for agricultural uses; however, considerable
uncertainty exists for the tribes concerning the amount of selfdetermination they have for other uses of water. Fourth, one of the
most controversial issues in Indian water rights is the tribes' ability to
market and lease their water to non-Indian users. As water resources
grow scarcer, this debate will continue flaring because the sale of water
could provide the tribes with an enormous economic boon. Fifth, tribes are becoming more willing to take legal action against polluters of
their water despite the uncertainty of their authority over water quality
management.
Finally, the federal government has historically
represented the tribes as a trustee in court. However, some tribes see
this as a conflict of interest for the government and seek to represent
themselves at the bargaining table.
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Having identified pertinent issues facing the tribes in Chapter 3,
Burton explores negotiated settlements as a dispute resolution tool in
Chapter 4, The Peril and Promise of Negotiation: A Closer Look. Negotiated
settlements increased in popularity in the 1980s; however, they are not
a novel concept. These settlements date back to the Winters doctrine,
and feature "concerted efforts to get the tribes to relinquish a reservedrights entitlement in return for the guaranteed provision of a lesser
quantity of water." Burton traces these settlements from the 1910 Kent
Decree between the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indians and non-Indian
Arizona water users to the 1989 Utah Ute Water Rights Settlement Bill.
While the distinctive features of these agreements change over time,
Burton argues these negotiated settlements resemble the colonial
trade of trinkets and beads for Manhattan because the tribes essentially
trade reserved water rights for "token wealth."
Early negotiations involved substantial pressure on the tribes and
resulted in generally unfavorable settlement terms. However, this level
of coercion caused a lack of durability and some of these settlements
spawned significant water litigation. Moreover, the tribes entered settlements throughout the 1960s deferring or surrendering senior water
rights in exchange for unfulfilled promises and "illusory" economic
development. Burton believes these settlements "resemble delaying
actions rather than just and durable solutions." Contemporary settlements exhibit some of these qualities as well. However, some of these
settlements use interest-bearing trust funds to cover the costs of keeping the settlements in effect. These trust funds "offset Congress's historic inattention to promises made to the Indians .... " Additionally,
two settlement acts contain damages clauses. Therefore, if the promised water is not delivered the federal government must pay damages
to the tribes. These clauses are controversial because while they provide tribes with economic compensation for unfulfilled promises, they
also effectively allow the federal government to condemn a tribal water
right for simple monetary compensation. Despite these advantages to
the tribes, these agreements still result in a net loss of water resources
because the tribes forfeit their reserved rights in exchange for a lesser
amount of wet water.
Chapter 5, Groundwater Rights, Planning, and Bargaining in SouthCentral Ariwna, builds on this background of negotiated water settlements by focusing on the Ak Chin and Tohono O'Odham Settlement
Acts of 1978, 1982, and 1984. In each of these settlements, the tribes
chose the political process over the legal process due. The negotiated
settlements featured the trading of theoretical paper water for wet water. Both tribes are located in south-central Arizona, and Burton lays
out a history of the water issues confronting this area of the country.
The O'Odham settlement began with the tribe filing a lawsuit against
numerous defendants, including the city of Tucson, claiming reserved
rights to the groundwater of the basin and an aquifer beneath the res-
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ervation. The Supreme Court fortified the tribe's position with its
decision in Cappaert v. United States, which extended the reserved-rights
doctrine to groundwater. However, the mounting costs of litigation
soon led the tribe to the bargaining table. The eventual settlement
featured a $15 million trust fund, $10.5 million cooperative fund, marketing rights, and 37,800 acre-feet of water annually to two areas of the
reservation. Additionally, if the promised water is not delivered, the
settlement holds the government liable for damages.
The Ak Chin approached Congress amid sinking lands from massive groundwater removals and following the Supreme Court's decision
in Caeppert. The tribe's proposal waived all of their claims to past,
present, and future water rights claims in exchange for an adequate
and quantified amount of water each year. This agreement, sponsored
by Congressman Morris Udall, passed both houses of Congress and
became law. However, the government began missing deadlines on its
85,000 acre-feet annual obligation, and in 1983 the parties revised the
agreement. While the Ak Chin agreement does not have the appropriations insurance of the O'Odham agreement, the damages provision
is superior because it bases damages on the replacement cost of the
water. Accordingly, the market value of the water is the amount the
government must pay the Ak Chin and, as water grows scarcer in the
western United States, this could represent a significant expenditure
for the government. Moreover, it makes the risk of an effective condemnation less likely because of this substantial cost.
Burton closes his study by looking at the future of negotiated settlements in Chapter 6, Conclusion: Improving the Prospects for Negotiated
Settlements. He notes that tribes are now looking to "secure in fact the
water resources they have previously held in theory." While negotiated
settlements have common features such as using interest-bearing trust
funds in financing implementation of agreements, many differences
remain. Most importantly, marketing rights to non-Indian users and
damages provisions are not a mainstay of all negotiated settlements.
Burton chalks this up to a system that still crushes the weak and rewards the strong. The benefits of a negotiated settlement to a particular tribe remain tied to intangibles, such as having a champion in Congress and the abilities of legal counsel. Accordingly, efforts to streamline the process through comprehensive settlement legislation should
be undertaken. Burton also proposes the formation of an American
Indian Water Rights Commission to assist in intergovernmental water
resource planning, the acquisition and analysis of data, the drafting
and recording of model agreements, the standardization of procedural
guidelines for negotiations, and providing facilitators and sponsorship
for negotiations.
American Indian Water Rights and the Limits of Law is an exhaustive
study of the history of American Indian water rights adjudications.
While to a novice the study's detail can be confusing and difficult to
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track, Burton ably aggregates these details into overarching themes
and issues. This results in a fascinating overview of tribal water rights,
the current state of negotiations, and the future issues facing the tribes,
western states, and the federal government. As water resources become sparse in the western United States, Burton's study can serve as a
thorough analysis of history's errors and successes in tribal water rights
negotiations. Hopefully these errors will be accounted for in future
adjudications and legislation, resulting in more thorough and fair settlements between tribes, states, and the federal government.
Matt Larson

Susan Hunter, Richard W. Waterman, Enforcing the Law: The Case of
the Oean Water Acts, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., Armonk, NY (1996); 249 pp;
$43.95; ISBN 1-56324-682-1, soft cover.
Congress and President Clinton put forth a message that law enforcement must be strict and severe. With regard to the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act of 1972, otherwise known as the Clean Water Act
("CWA"), this message is still not clear. There is unambiguous evidence that regulatory enforcement in the area of environmental protection has not been very effective. In Enforcing the Law, Hunter and
Waterman evaluate the motivations of enforcement personnel, the
constraints they face, and how they perceive the entities they regulate.
Hunter and Waterman argue that the level of the bureaucratic response directly correlates to the diversity of the regulatory environment. The authors conclude that the regulatory environment consists
of the various actors that agency personnel deal with on a regular basis,
the economic conditions relevant to the problem being regulated, the
organizational structure employed by the various regulating agencies,
the manner in which the agencies interact with each other, the way in
which pertinent legislation is written, the demographic population for
the regulatory action, and the nature of the externality being regulated. Each state and region deals with different geography, economic
basis, population densities, and political pressures. Because the control of surface water pollution occurs in a large and diverse regulatory
environment, the regulators operate flexibly in their approach, allowing for drastic variations by region.
The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") shapes the institutional setting with its largely discretionary role in both organization
and rule making in the National Pollutant Discharge and Elimination
System ("NPDES"). EPA functions with a centralized control by the
Administrator and decentralized authority over its functional units.
EPA's decentralizing tendency, its frequent delegation to the states,
and the considerable discretion given to EPA officials accentuated the
already apparent regional differences. EPA's dual contradictory objectives of national consistency and the accommodation of state and re-
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gional goals has forced EPA to be more flexible in its enforcement and
forced EPA officials to adopt a more pragmatic approach to navigate
the two goals. For the enforcement of the NPDES, EPA establishes
minimum standards but leaves many of the operational details of implementation to EPA regional offices and to the states.
Hunter and Waterman identify that bureaucratic discretion inherently performs a role in the application of pragmatic enforcement.
Personal attributes and attitudes along with political factors influence
the behavior of bureaucrats during their decision making process.
Because of the discretion, rules are in place in the organization to
guide the decision-making process and to limit the discretion of the
employees. Additionally, organizational rules and norms constrain the
individuals within. To find out more about the NPDES enforcers, the
authors conducted a survey using EPA data. They found that the average NPDES enforcer is well educated in sciences or engineering, has
children, is between the ages of thirty and thirty-nine, makes between
fifty and seventy thousand dollars per year, highly participates in the
election process, most took alternate transportation to work or carpooled, and most kept their heat down to sixty-five degrees. Most enforcers are slightly conservative about economic issues and slightly liberal about social issues, but also agree with the statement that a clean
and safe environment does not require drastic changes. Overall,
NPDES enforcers are not radical either politically or economically.
Interestingly only twenty-four percent of the respondents thought that
water pollution was the most problematic environmental concern and
should be the top priority of environmental enforcement. The average
employee dealt with 52.8 permittees, the median being 30. Enforcement employees regularly conduct inspections and permit reviews;
recommend and take corrections actions including writing warning
letters, notices of violation, and administrative orders; and most
perceive they have some or a great deal of discretion in these tasks.
Almost half said they give some consideration to the condition of local
economy when making decisions. Seventy-three percent said they take
into account extenuating circumstances when determining how to enforce law. Given the NPDES enforcers outlook, it is not unexpected
that they have adopted a pragmatic approach.
Hunter and Waterman determined that bureaucratic discretion actually coexists with the hierarchal political control of the bureaucracy.
Bureaucratic discretion is an essential element of enforcement in
agencies because of the diverse regulatory environment and unavoidably vague procedures and laws. Discretion, while criticized, has allowed
for the enforcement of the CWA in a wide variety of complicated cases.
While much of the criticism centers around the assumption that
elected officials are passive in the bureaucratic process, considerable
research has challenged this premise.
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Three competing theories have emerged that propose a relationship between bureaucratic discretion and hierarchal political control
of the bureaucracy. First, the most long-established argument is that
discretion could promote a bureaucracy that is unaccountable to
elected officials. Second, political hierarchy could diminish efforts at
bureaucratic discretion. Third, elected officials would exert control
from the top, constraining bureaucratic activities, while bureaucrats
would exert some discretion while enforcing the law within a certain
acceptable range. The authors set out to test these three models by
examining the EPA water office using the methodological approach
used by Wood and Waterman (1993, 1994) and taking into account the
different enforcement philosophies of the regional offices. Hunter
and Waterman found strong and expansive evidence of hierarchal political control across two of the three branches of the federal government, Congress and the Judiciary. They also ascertained that the
budget, the most important hierarchal factor, is positively associated
with enforcement actions. The authors determined no relation between employment rates or seasonal impacts on EPA's actions. The
study suggested that the state of the economy, but not media interest,
affected the NPDES enforcement. Hunter and Waterman asserted
these findings enforce that bureaucratic discretion and hierarchal control coexist. Further, they found that the greater the number of inspections, the fewer the number of cases referred to the Justice Department, suggesting that the states that are more active with low-level
enforcement are less active with high-level enforcement activities.
Concerning Judicial Department referrals, they found that the greater
the penalties, the more referrals to the justice department. The authors' analysis points to the third theory as the most viable explanation
for these results. Because of the lofty goals of the CWA and the lack of
funding and enforcement personnel, it is not surprising that EPA utilizes both broad bureaucratic discretion and a pragmatic approach.
The authors ascertained that states often play a larger role than the
federal government in the implementation and enforcement of the
CWA. Thirty-eight states have established their own programs that
have either met or exceeded the requirements of the CWA and have
established primacy for their NPDES programs, allowing them to principally control the CWA process. The states utilize three main organizational structures with regard to primacy: the "miniEPA" approach, or
those who base their organizational structure on the EPA; the "superagency" structure that combines environmental programs with other
programs; and the health agency model to administer water pollutant
programs, used by those states that are often agricultural.
Bargaining and persuasion characterize the cooperative relationship between the states and the federal EPA. In its oversight role, EPA
sends notices of violations to the states when a NPDES permit violation
occurs. EPA interacts with the states regarding funding for various
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state programs and EPA provides assistance to the states as needed.
While not all are equally committed, the states have played an essential
role in the permitting process, compliance monitoring, and enforcement. The states are typically more aggressive in issuing permits and
performing inspections than they are at higher-level enforcement.
Primacy states issue more NPDES permits, and states that employ the
miniEPA structure issue the most major permits, followed by the superagencies, and then the health agencies, suggesting that organizational
structures matter. While primacy states issue more permits, seventy
percent of the enforcement activity occurred in just twelve non-primary
states, showing that few states are as committed to aggressive enforcement as EPA. The regional organization of the EPA, primary delegation to the states, and the states' organizational structures all have significant consequences for NPDES enforcement. Hunter and Waterman assert that the direction of environmental enforcement has been
toward the delegation of authority to the state level, which is a cause
for concern if most states are not aggressively enforcing the CWA.
The role political influence plays at the state level accounts for
some of the variations in enforcement among the states. States are
highly political arenas and vary considerably in environmental support.
Enforcement is more aggressive in states where public participation is
higher, in states with more pro-environment representatives, and in
states with more professional legislatures. Economic factors, interests
groups, diversity of populations, differences in water usage and quantity, and perceptions of the sources of water pollution problems in each
state provide a different explanation for variations amongst the states.
Five of the six variables studied by the authors related to the level of
NPDES enforcement response: demographic variables; water quantity
and usage, and perceptions of the sources of water pollution problems;
organizational structure; economic factors; and interest-group variables. Interestingly, the study showed no direct correlation between
politics and the enforcement response.
Hunter and Waterman conducted a study looking at the percentages of phosphorous, dissolved oxygen, and dissolved solids constant
in relation to demographic, water, and organizational variables to find
out if the diverse regulatory environment relates to policy outcomes.
They found that policy outcomes relate to the diverse regulatory environment in a negative manner, raising environmental justice concerns.
The study also suggests that those states that utilize health agencies as
opposed to miniEPA or superagency organizational structures have
poorer water quality. Thus, organizational structure again does matter.
Hunter and Waterman determined that states employ various and often dubious methods to measure water quality. Inconsistent measuring
methods along with nonstandard and poor recordkeeping result in
significant gaps in the enforcement process. The authors urge the
states to adopt one or more consistent measuring tools.
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Hunter and Waterman ascertained that because of the incredible
diversity in the regulatory environment, strict enforcement is unlikely
to occur, but implementing several steps could promote a strict approach. If EPA can obtain more funding, EPA could increase the
number of enforcement personnel, making strict enforcement more
feasible. Another step would be to fortify the provisions of environmental laws at both the state and federal levels. Additionally, EPA
could make the burden of proof against violators more reasonable.
Another change would be to ensure a portion of the money from civil
penalties makes it to EPA or to the state environmental agencies. In
addition, an increase in administrative fines and an increase in permitting costs would aid in strict enforcement. Hunter and Waterman
found that to accomplish minimizing the variations of enforcement
across the states we must promote the strict approach, utilize technological development, change the focus from outputs to outcomes, or
change the focus of the NPDES enforcement to one that tries to internalize the costs of pollution.
Lastly, critics have said that environmental regulation has failed because the command and control regulatory approach is inflexible. The
authors determined that moving toward an economic-incentive based
method would offer a variety of different approaches that would aim at
internalizing the external costs of pollution. According to proponents,
this system would be more efficient, effective, and easier to implement.
Hunter and Waterman conclude that in the framework of a diverse
regulatory environment, economic incentives may be a more suitable
system.
Kathleen Brady

Carl J. Bauer, Siren Song: Chilean Water Law as a Model for
International Reform, Resources for the Future, Washington D.C.
(2004); 172 pp; $33.95; ISBN 1-891853-79-1, hard cover.
Siren Song provides an overview and analysis of the free-market Chilean Water Model in the context of international water reform. Bauer,
a water researcher with extensive experience in Chile and elsewhere,
brings a social science perspective to the largely economic discussion
on water rights in developing Chile. The author takes the reader
through background on the international water policy debate, an historical overview of the free-market Chilean system, the issues surrounding reform of the Water Code, a present-day analysis of its successes
and failures, and a look towards the future.
This book evaluates the 20-plus year history of the Chilean Water
Model in order to provide the reader with insight into the Chilean experience and to highlight the significance of Chilean water policy in
the international arena. The Chilean Model has treated water rights as
heavily privatized, fully marketable commodities, and the international
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economic community has largely hailed this free-market approach as a
success. However, likening the Chilean Model to the alluring but dangerous song of a siren, Bauer attempts to show that initial praise of the
system has failed to recognize some of its severe inadequacies. In
short, he examines whether the current free-market framework is capable of handling modern water issues, such as inter-basin management and environmental quality. Furthermore, as applied within the
international context, the author explores the lessons learned from the
Chilean Model and argues for a more qualitative and diverse economic
approach.
The first chapter, The International Context: The Water Crisis and Debates about Water Policy, focuses on international trends in water use and
water management perspectives. Multiple competing interests are driving the current global water crisis, including social, economic, and environmental demands. As such, three themes have dominated international water policy debates: 1) integrated water resource management
("IWRM"), 2) economic approaches that rely on market incentives,
such as the Chilean Model, and 3) emphasis on poverty and social inequity. The IWRM approach recognizes the need for comprehensive
and interdisciplinary water management and closely parallels concepts
of sustainable development. The so-called Dublin Principles articulate
this approach and call for recognition of water as an "economic good."
The chapter then explores the conflicting perspectives on the "economic good" principle, from narrow, market-oriented policies that
focus on costs, to broader approaches that incorporate human rights
and other values. The Chilean Model has been in the international
spotlight because it represents the extreme of market-oriented policies,
and because it received widespread promotion by the World Bank.
Nonetheless, Bauer asserts that this early support was premature and
lacked empirical data on whether the Chilean Model truly marked victory for neoliberal economists.
Chapter two, The Free-Market Model: Chil,e's 1981 Water Code, provides
an historical overview of how the Chilean system developed and the
unique attributes that affect its current implementation. The 1981
water reforms embraced the laissez faire economic principles of the
incumbent military government regime and resulted in vast changes to
the water system. The new Water Code separated water rights from
land ownership and privatized their use, almost eliminating any form
of government control, such as permits, taxes, or fees. This new neoliberal system was a vast pendulum swing away from the agrarian reforms
of the 1960s, which resulted in a social redistribution of water where all
water rights were in the public domain. The purpose, in part, of the
1981 reforms was to provide economic incentives for private investment in the country's deteriorating infrastructure of dams and canals.
However, over the last twenty years since the Water Code's implementation, Chile has struggled to reconcile the free-market model with
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its changing social system, as discussed in the next chapter, Reforming
the Reform? Policy Debate Under Chilean Democracy. During the 1980s,
there was little debate over the water policy because the government
remained under military control and the water system was still in its
early stages of implementation. However, many changes occurred in
Chile at the beginning of the 1990s, including a transformation to a
democratic government, rapid economic growth, and emerging issues
with putting the system into practice. Hence, the new legislature called
for reforms to the Chilean Model because of social inequities created
by the large water monopolies, inefficiencies resulting from non-use
and hoarding of water, the inability of the private sector to fix the
crumbling infrastructure of Chile's water system, and the failure of the
Water Code to address other emerging water issues such as water quality.
Over the subsequent decade, two major rounds of proposed reform
took place. The first wave of proposed reform failed largely because it
attempted to solve efficiency issues through a use-it-or-lose-it policy for
non-use, which neoliberal members heavily objected to. The second
round reform was more limited and pragmatic, proposing fees for nonuse, judicial oversight of water disputes, and consideration of in-stream
flow rights to promote water quality and environmental protection;
nonetheless, the proposed amendments met strong opposition which
paralyzed the legislature. Finally, in 1997, the legislature passed very
limited amendments to the Water Code, but the debate continues over
whether the rejected tax and fee structures could strengthen the legal
security of water rights, provide incentives to use water, or increase
efficiency within the system. Arguably, the free-market system has been
far from a complete success in Chile, and the country has continually
struggled to amend its shortcomings.
Chapter four, The Results of Chilean Water Markets: Empirical Research
Since 1990, provides an external examination of whether the Chilean
Model has succeeded. In the international arena, Chile's free-market
approach is so representational of neoliberal policies that the debate
has become ideological instead of pragmatic. Therefore, organizations
such as the World Bank have lauded the Chilean Model as a success
while ignoring some of its lackluster performance in practice. The
United Nations, however, has been more careful in its assessment, taking notice of the large gaps in the economically driven system, such as
social and environmental policy. Nonetheless, the overall trend in the
early 1990s was a lack of any real data on system performance, leading
to exaggerated or misguided claims. Bauer then discusses some of the
more recent research on the system, finding that the market was generally inactive for the first decade and that problems have surfaced
regarding efficiency, monopoly, reallocation, and the strength of title.
Recent analysis suggests that the current system is too inflexible to deal
with more comprehensive problems, such as environmental impacts
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and water quality, return flows, paper versus actual rights, inter-basin
management, multiple use, non-consumptive use, seasonal flows, infrastructure, and social equity. The author then reviews a number of case
studies regarding management for non-consumptive water uses in a
number of different basins. Ultimately, the system is somewhat paralyzed because the Constitution vests very little authority in the water
agencies or courts to address water disputes, and thus far amending
the Constitution for water reform has proven difficult.
In the final chapter, Conclusions and Lessons about the Chilean Experience, Bauer asserts that there is growing consensus on the need to
reform the Chilean Model to address the global water crisis. Based on
the original goals of the 1981 amendments, the Chilean Model
achieved increased legal security for private water rights, freedom of
use, autonomy, and developing hydropower infrastructure; however, it
failed to increase efficiency or provide for private development of water infrastructure, and it resulted in power monopolies. Furthermore,
the Chilean Model is ill-equipped to handle the more modem water
issues of river basin management, resolution of conflicts, social equity,
and environmental protection. Therefore, in answering the essential
question of whether the Chilean Model, a narrow and free-market approach to water economics, is compatible with IWRM, the author asserts that the answer is no. The Chilean Model is part of an ongoing
debate on how we should define water rights, and Bauer proposes that
a better alternative would be interdisciplinary, provide for public participation and representation in the process, and be more flexible to
deal with evolving conflicts.
Siren Song adds an informed and pragmatic voice to the debate on
whether the Chilean Model provides a successful blueprint for water
reform. The book presents a much needed counterpoint to globally
influential organizations, such as the World Bank, that have championed the free-market approach while ignoring its inadequacies.
Bauer avoids some of the classic ideological pitfalls when discussing
water policy and instead relies on a scientific, results-based approach in
his analysis. At a time when the global water crisis is at the forefront of
environmental concerns, understanding the strengths and weaknesses
of this infamously free-market system is paramount for any practitioner
who desires an in-depth understanding of economic water policy.
Moreover, Siren Song reiterates the call for better social and environmental policies in water use and management.
Sarah Quinn
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Fred Pearce, When the Rivers Run Dry: Water - The Defining Crisis of
the Twenty-First Century, Beacon Press, Boston, MA (2006); 324 pp;
$26.95; ISBN 0-8070-8572-3, hard cover.
When the Rivers Run Dry: Water - The Defining Crisis of the Twenty-First
Century tells the story of the dire state of the world's rivers and the
growing world water crisis. Fred Pearce, an author who has written
about water-related issues for over twenty years, traveled to more than
thirty countries researching and examining the current state of vital
water sources across the globe. His vast insight combines scientific,
economic, and historic perspectives to examine the present state of the
world's most important water sources. Pearce divides the book into ten
sections, each with appropriate subchapters, with every section building on the last.
Pearce intends this book to act as a journey of discovery on the
world's rivers. He aims to explore the evolution of the current water
crisis, where the water is going, and what happens when rivers run dry.
The book, however, is not only about rivers. It also examines how the
world uses its water and how the population can restore rivers and other water sources to ensure a long and healthy hydrological future.
The first section, When the Rivers Run Dry . . . The Crops Fail, examines the amount of water humans use in any given day, discusses the
perverse nature of the water cycle, and assesses the dangers of salt poisoning caused by over-irrigation. Pearce introduces the reader to what
economists call "virtual water." This term conceptualizes the water
involved in the growing and manufacturing of agricultural products
traded around the world. For example, in a given day, one may wear a
t-shirt made of cotton from Pakistan, eat rice from China, and drink
coffee from Central America. He discusses the global trade in virtual
water, emphasizing that the population is unaware that every day it is
appropriating water from rivers in far away lands. Pearce analyzes the
water cycle and explains that current water management techniques
attempt to control the water cycle to allow water availability anywhere
at anytime. He notes the ironic nature of the water on this planet, remarking how the largest aquifers are located under deserts with no
chance of refilling and how the greatest rivers lie in some of the most
uninhabitable areas of the globe. Pearce also covers salt poisoning of
crops caused by over-irrigation in Pakistan, a phenomenon that threatens to destroy the same region that once prospered from exploiting
the Indus River.
The second section, When the Rivers Run Dry ... We Mine our Children's Water, discusses how the world is pumping water from underground sources at an uncontrolled and reckless pace. As the rivers
begin to fail, underground sources provide nearly a third of the world's
water. Pearce scrutinizes the "green revolution" which was largely built
on irrigation. He notes that while the population has doubled in plac-
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es like India, the fear of starvation and famine has subsided in large
part due to abundant supplies of irrigation water. Unregulated use of
groundwater in many third-world countries allows farmers to plunder
groundwater resources faster than the rains can replenish them. This
is creating a "water farming" boom in many countries that is part of a
greater "tragedy of the commons." This section also scrutinizes the
mass poisoning occurring in India and Bangladesh due to high
amounts of fluoride and arsenic in tube wells. Locals drilled these
wells on the premise that, despite polluted surface water, the groundwater was clean. Millions of local farmers across the impoverished
world are pumping the water from beneath their fields. Pearce notes
that this revolution is due to the failure of government-built irrigation
systems, as well as advances in technology that allow local farmers to
drill far deeper into the earth. Accordingly, water tables are plunging
and water projects like Colonel Qaddafi's Great Manmade River in
Libya are contributing to this unsustainable groundwater revolution.
¼'hen the Rivers Run Dry . .. The Wet Places Die, Pearce's third section,
criticizes the current trend of attempting to tame the wetlands. Drainage and irrigation canals, dykes, dams, dredges, solid waste, rice patties, and shrimp farms are destroying wetlands. Next to rainforests,
wetlands contain the most productive ecosystems on Earth. Drainage
canals, shipping canals, and upriver dams are destroying, respectively,
the Sudd in southern Sudan, the Pamanal in the heart of South America, and the Okavango in southern Africa. Pearce also explores the disappearing Hamoun wetland between Pakistan and Iran, and the drying
floodplains in northern Nigeria. These atrocities are a direct result of
government funded hydroelectrical and irrigation projects upstream,
which Pearce contributes to short-term private gains succeeding over
long-term common gains. Pearce concludes this topic with a discussion of the Mekong in Southeast Asia. The Mekong is the least modified of all major rivers on the planet, and the people who live around
this river possibly value it more than any other river on earth. However, as societies in Southeastern Asia urbanize, it will be a battle between
engineers and fisherman, factories and fisheries, and, ultimately, wetlands and dams.
The fourth section, ¼'hen the Rivers Run Dry ... Floods may not be Far
Behind, describes the current state of the Yellow River in northern China. Pearce notes that floods and droughts have always coincided in
China and that every year of low flows increases the chance of a future
lethal flood. Further, he postulates that modern engineering has only
exacerbated this problem by desiccating the river through massive irrigation. Dubbed the "hanging river," the Yellow River is, in many places, elevated high above the floodplain as increasing deposits of silt remain in the river bed. The dykes on the river are raised ever higher to
keep the river within its banks. The consequences of containing the
river become greater with time and disaster looms. As Pearce posits, it
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is only a matter of time before there is a breakdown of the dykes and a
breakout of the river. Pearce observes that drought partially caused
the crisis on the Yellow River and remarks that many rivers around the
world have seen similar declines in moisture. There is more water than
ever in some places, while other parts of the globe are experiencing
droughts of epic proportions. Pearce perceives this uncertainty of river
flows and the human need for secure water resources as a major crisis
of the next century.
The fifth section, When the Ilivers Run Dry ... Engineers Pour Concrete,
discusses modern water engineering projects and their effect on the
rivers they dam. The world once considered large dams to be symbols
of modernism, economic development, and mankind's control over
nature. However, Pearce notes that currently most environmentalists
view large dams as engines of environmental destruction. Large dam
projects have devolved from modern wonders of the world to engineering follies. Dams often do not deliver "as advertised" and frequently
cause, rather than prevent, the floods that they are designed and
created to stop. He explains that the needs of irrigation and drinking
water require a full reservoir, yet flood protection requires an empty
reservoir. Hence, although inept dam management and inadequate
spillways may also cause floods, Pearce comments that floods are often
due to this contradictory hydrological requirement that the population
places on dams. Pearce notes that the massive reservoirs that lie behind many of the world's dams are losing large quantities of water to
evaporation. Furthermore, reservoirs alter the decomposition of a significant amount of the world's vegetation. The vegetation that is under the newly flooded reservoir, he explains, creates large amounts of
methane gas and contributes substantially to global warming.
The sixth section, When the Rivers Run Dry . . . Men Go to War Over
Water, highlights two pressing conflicts. The first is the continuing
conflict between Israel and Palestine. In the midst of this religious
conflict, there is a constant struggle to control the water in this arid
region. Israel controls a majority of the water and the new security
fence between the two states could not be more hydrologically divisive,
as it cuts off many Palestinian villagers from their water resources in
the hills of the West Bank. Additionally, Pearce asserts that water may
have been a motivating factor in l 967's Six-Day War between Israel and
its Arab neighbors. The second conflict Pearce mentions is the constant struggle between India and Pakistan in the Kashmir region of
India. The geography dictates that India always has the option to impede one of Pakistan's most important sources of water, the Chenab
River. India plans on damming the Chenab, but claims that it will not
divert water away from the river, and will only channel its water downstream through turbines to create electricity. Pakistan is concerned
that if a future conflict arises between the two nations, India will sever
this crucial water supply. Pearce observes that many countries share
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the big rivers in their respective regions. He also notes that tensions
are often high over a potential water war, as in Pakistan, because a
downstream nation is essentially at the mercy of an upstream nation.
When the llivers Run Dry ... Civilizations Fall, the seventh section,
discusses how the manipulation of rivers can create civilizations, but
can also lead to their demise. Many civilizations are "hydraulic civilizations" that are organized around the need to manage water. Civilizations built on intensive water use are often at the mercy of climate
change or are susceptible to the overuse of water, such as the salting of
fields from over-irrigation. Conversely, civilizations built on less intense and more modest uses of water can be more flexible in the face
of change and are more sustainable. Pearce features two examples of
possible hydrological breakdown in our modern cities. He first discusses the diminishing flows on the Colorado River and the population
boom in the West. He then examines the disappearance of the Aral
Sea in Central Asia. As farming in these arid areas has caused a multitude of irreversible problems, both cases offer vivid examples of the
devastation caused by the overuse of water.
The eighth section, When the Rivers Run Dry . . . We Go Looking for
New Water, explores the concept of "bringing water to the people" and
the notion that "water flows uphill to money." Pearce scrutinizes how
many of the world's largest water projects are intended to run against
the flow of nature. He also notes that the urge is spreading to build
big projects that allow a nation to take water to the people. China,
India, Spain, Greece, Russia, the United States, and the Congo, to
name a few, are all planning large projects that run against the flow of
nature. Pearce cautions against these actions and recommends that
countries try to solve water problems by creating solutions that go with,
rather than against, the flow of nature. Pearce notes that one man's
waste is another man's source of water. As an example, he mentions
that farmers in India often irrigate their crops with contaminated water. While irrigating with sewage is not shocking or terrible, irrigating
with effluent is disastrous and very dangerous. In this section, Pearce
also observes the concept of closed basins. He uses the Salton Sea and
the All American Canal as examples of the dangers of creating areas
where the rivers no longer reach the sea. Further, he explores the
questionable and expensive methods of drawing more water by seeding
clouds, using dew ponds, harvesting the fog, and desalination, distillation, and reverse osmosis. Pearce believes that better management of
water and avoiding wasteful uses will likely yield better and cheaper
results than the above methods.
The ninth section, When the Ri,vers Run Dry . . . We Try to Catch the
Rain, studies various water-gathering techniques. Pearce witnessed the
successes of water cellars used to catch rainwater in rural China. He
observed ponds constructed in India to catch monsoon water, slow the
run-off, and refill the aquifers. Check dams serve the same purpose.
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By slowing run-off flows, these techniques allow water to soak back into
the earth and recharge the aquifers below. Pearce witnessed entire
villages utilizing these social energy and water saving techniques.
Rainwater harvesting is a worldwide technology and Pearce notes that
most of the potential savings are occurring in rural Africa.
The tenth and final section, When the Rivers Run Dry ... We Go with
the Flow, attempts to usher in a new way of thinking about water as the
world's most renewable resource. Pearce suggests that engineers try to
give rivers back their floodplains and work with the forces of nature,
rather than against them. Pearce notes that taming the rivers often
makes them more unruly and that if engineers do not give the rivers
more room, they will eventually take it for themselves. Pearce proposes
that cities become more porous. Cities should create drainage systems
that try to capture and store the water, rather than having it drain
quickly. Pearce advocates the theory of "more crop per drop" and recommends "drip irrigation," noting the innovation of using cheap plastic tubing in India which allows poor farmers to achieve greater yields
with less water. He advises that the world is in need of a "blue revolution" to escape the agricultural "green revolution." He indicates the
need for new solutions in agriculture, currently the greatest waste of
water on the planet-with cotton being the worst offender. There must
be reconsideration of where crops are grown. Rather than bringing
the water to agriculture, agriculture needs to occur where water is
available. Pearce implies that there should be concern regarding food
production for an increasingly populous world and bringing clean
drinking water to the world's poor. He recommends that, in an ever
uncertain greenhouse world, we need to learn how to ride the water
cycle, rather than replace it.
When the Rivers Run Dry manages to take the reader on a worldwide
journey to explore rivers, wetlands, aquifers, dams, canals, farms, and
regions that are critical to the planet's hydrological future. During this
journey, Pearce educates the reader on pressing issues that are of not
only local, but also of global importance. He combines examples of
problems with anecdotes of problem-solving. Pearce provides an unyielding global-view of the current state of the world's water. When the
Rivers Run Dry is an interesting and important read for anyone concerned about our hydrological future.
David Riddle
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Bonnie G. Colby & Katherine L. Jacobs, Eds., Arizona Water Policy:
Management Innovations in an Urbanizing, Arid Region, RFF Press,
Washington D.C. (1st ed. 2007); 247 pp; $65.00; ISBN 1-933115-34-3,
hard cover.
Arizona Water Policy comprehensively analyzes the state's complex
water resource management experience, exploring both its successes
and failures, in an effort to provide practical guidance to other arid
regions facing rapid development and massive, sustained population
growth. Each chapter of this book is a separate article on a relevant
facet of Arizona's water management experience, authored by water
experts across a variety of different yet intrinsically related fields.
Chapter One frames the discussion of Arizona water law and water
management techniques by introducing several themes relevant to the
topics addressed in ensuing chapters, including: supply and demand,
social concerns, sustainability, the importance of integrating land use
decisions with water supply planning, and managing the impact of climate change.
Chapters Two and Three provide a historical overview of Arizona's
water management experience. Chapter Two contains a broad survey
of water use methods historically employed within the state, as well as
modern, innovative practices that have ultimately allowed for rapid
development despite a profound scarcity of water.
Chapter Two also points out that Arizona's experience is unique in
that its transition from a primarily agricultural economy to a heavily
urban area has been relatively free from conflict among traditionally
competing interests. The authors posit that water continues to find the
highest possible economic use, as housing subdivisions are currently
the most economically valuable crop or commodity under production
in the state. Chapter Two concludes that water in Arizona is the "consummate shared enterprise," as urban, rural, and tribal communities
must coexist and share demand for a scarce and over-allocated resource that, somewhat counter-intuitively, acts as a politically cohesive
force among these otherwise disparate interests.
The historical narrative continues in Chapter Three, but focuses
specifically on the evolution and impact of state and federal water law
in Arizona. Chapter Three covers surface water and prior appropriation; water rights federally "reserved" to the state's numerous Native
American tribes by Winters v. United States; laws governing groundwater;
multi-state appropriation of Colorado River water; and state law innovations in efficiency due to effluent reuse and water transfers. The
legal infrastructure related to underground water storage and recovery
is of particular importance in Arizona, given the region's natural aridity and its junior priority use on the Colorado River. Chapter Three
also finds that Arizona's utilization and innovative management of its
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vast aquifer system has greatly enhanced the state's ability to manage
supply.
Chapter Four focuses on the sources of water supply within Arizona, taking into account the state's physical and geological features and
hydrological climate conditions. Arizona's supply of renewable surface
water is limited to precipitation, runoff, and its limited share of water
from the Colorado River, delivered via the Central Arizona Project
("CAP"). Moreover, only a small percentage of annual precipitation
within the state actually results in runoff, and the available renewable
surface water supply is already fully appropriated. Chapter Four concludes that active development of groundwater sources and systematic
monitoring of aquifer conditions is a crucial component of Arizona's
water management programs and is necessary to sustain the projected
pace of population growth and urban development occurring in the
state.
Chapter Five engages in a technical discussion of issues related to
global climate change and the potential effects of such change in arid
or semi-arid regions. Arizona is already in a very tenuous position as its
major source of renewable surface water, the Colorado River, is heavily
dependant on climatic conditions and weather patterns occurring far
from Arizona's borders. This dependence underscores the importance
of Arizona's continued reliance on efficient groundwater management
practices and regulatory programs.
Chapter Six examines various types of water transactions utilized by
the state to manage high precipitation variability, consistent water scarcity, and periodic drought. Surface water rights in Arizona are not
subject to significant legal constraints and are readily transferable.
However, the system for groundwater transfers implemented by the
Groundwater Management Act of 1980 to facilitate groundwater rights
transfers within designated Active Management Areas ("AMA") is more
complicated, using a mandatory permitting system to account for such
transfers. Outside of the AMAs, however, there is very little regulation
or monitoring of groundwater rights. This chapter also discusses the
different types of groundwater rights, municipalities' innovative attempts to ensure supply through water farming, the Arizona Water
Banking Authority ("AWBA"), and the history of water transactions in
the state. Ultimately, Chapter Six concludes that voluntary water
transactions used to transfer water to different locations and different
economic uses can be an effective tool for water managers attempting
to combat the state's natural aridity. However, they can also lead to
undesirable social and environmental problems which are difficult to
resolve.
Chapter Seven discusses the critical state of freshwater biological
diversity in Arizona, the most biologically diverse state without a coastline in the United States, which contains the second highest number
of plant and animal species endemic only to itself. Existing water use

196

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 11

patterns, based on promoting economic value by facilitating agricultural use and urban development, have resulted in severely altered
stream flow regimes. Continuing changes to these altered water use
patterns constitute a further threat to riparian habitat and Arizona's
native species, which are unable to quickly adapt to changes encountered as a result of human consumption patterns. Consequently, the
majority of the state's riparian habitat has either been lost entirely, or
is severely threatened. Chapter Seven concludes with lessons for other
regions facing similar situations in order to promote a better connection between land use decisions and water policy, primarily by providing landowners with incentives to minimize environmental impact in
biologically sensitive regions.
Chapter Eight also addresses Arizona's separate legal treatment of
groundwater and surface water, maintaining that this "disconnect between water law and hydrology" detrimentally impacts biological diversity within the state. Specifically, this chapter examines the environmental problems caused by dams and groundwater pumping, stemming from Arizona's separate legal treatment of surface water and
groundwater. Despite clear scientific evidence that groundwater and
surface water sources are directly connected, Arizona's differing legal
treatment of these sources further exacerbates the delicate biological
balance in the state's riparian regions and makes the integration of
environmentally sensitive water management and land-use solutions
difficult to achieve.
Nevertheless, Chapter Eight discusses the various efforts that currently exist to protect riparian habitat within the state, such as the Upper San Pedro Partnership ("USPP"), a multijurisdictional, federally
funded attempt to promote and implement conservation methods and
compensate for continuing aquifer overdraft and its attendant environmental consequences. This chapter concludes that federal environmental protection laws may offer the only means of meaningful
environmental protection in Arizona. However, the intermittent application of these laws, which are dependent on highly specific conditions such as the presence of an endangered species, will result in only
limited success.
The environmental focus continues in Chapter Nine, which examines Arizona's water quality protection programs. These programs
focus primarily on attempts to address long-standing issues related to
the salinity of Colorado River water, Arizona's major source of reliable
freshwater supply. Specifically, this chapter deals with the federal and
state regulatory framework put in place to address water quality and
salinity, and the difficulties resulting from the salinity increase in
reused and recycled water.
Chapter Ten addresses agricultural use in Arizona, where crop irrigation accounts for 80 percent of freshwater use in the state, although
this number is declining in the face of intense competition due to the
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robust population growth resulting in an exponential increase in the
level of urban demand. This chapter also discusses the effect of federal
farm policy on Arizona's water supply, as well as the impact of global
trade disputes within the World Trade Organization on agricultural
policy. Chapter Ten asserts that federal policy decision-making and
global economic trends tend to have a disproportionate impact on water management decisions within the state, making state and regional
water planning efforts more difficult.
Chapter Eleven discusses various regulatory programs used to implement urban water management techniques, focusing on the
Groundwater Management Act and the designation of five active management areas encompassing most of the urban areas within the state.
This program is an innovative approach characterized by legislative
flexibility, which allows each AMA to retain unique management objectives, and has allowed urban development in Arizona to proceed at a
rapid pace despite the chronic shortage of readily available surface
water in the region. A key provision of Act, the Assured Water Supply
("AWS") Program, requires a land developer to demonstrate the availability of a 100 year supply of water, both physically and legally, as a
precondition for subdivision.
Despite Arizona's strong regulatory approach within the designated
AMAs, groundwater remains essentially ungoverned in the large rural
areas of the state. Chapter Twelve discusses the lack of comprehensive
water management programs in these rural areas and highlights the
weaknesses inherent in such a fragmented approach. For example,
outside the AMAs, the adequate water supply rules permit subdivision
without a demonstrable 100 year supply, provided that a seller of land
notifies the first buyer of any house or lot that a proven supply has not
been shown to exist.
Chapter Thirteen details Arizona's efforts to develop groundwater
recharge and recovery programs and the importance of these efforts in
ensuring a sustainable water supply. This chapter discusses Arizona's
innovative permitting and accounting system, which allows for the replenishment of groundwater with surface water or effluent and provides
water managers with a great deal of flexibility to manage supply and
demand in a relatively cost-effective manner. Chapter Thirteen also
discusses the institutions created to administer the state's crucial
groundwater storage and recovery programs, both public and private,
and their importance in meeting water management goals and setting
policy objectives.
Chapter Fourteen addresses Arizona's extensive experience with
tribal water rights and the importance of resolving these disputes fairly
and efficiently. The authors point out that unsettled tribal claims
create uncertainty regarding supply and availability, which in an arid
region like Arizona greatly hinders the state's ability to plan and manage future water supplies effectively and efficiently. Moreover, an im-
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portant characteristic of Arizona's tribal water settlements, offreservation leasing provisions for unused tribal water, allow the tribes
to generate income from unused water rights while allowing non-tribal
lessees to put this water towards a higher economic use - another innovative water planning and management tool.
Arizona Water Policy provides a comprehensive overview of Arizona's
history and experience developing and administering its water supply.
In addition to providing keen insight for other arid regions facing urban development and massive population growth, this book also provides water law practitioners with practical guidance regarding the various aspects of state, federal, and tribal law influencing water use and
policy in the state of Arizona today.
Cameron M. Banko
Kenneth M. Murchison, The Snail Darter Case - TVA versus the
Endangered Species Act, University Press of Kansas (2007); 234 pp;
$15.95, ISBN 978-070061505-6; soft cover.
Kenneth M. Murchison's The Snail Darter Case is part of the Landmark Law Cases & American Society series printed by the University
Press of Kansas. The book outlines in detail one of the seminal cases
in environmental law, TVA v. Hill, a case which pitted the powerful
interests of a federal agency against the tiny snail darter and environmental groups opposed to the completion of the massive Tellico Dam
in Tennessee.
In TVA v. Hill, the United States Supreme Court held that the text
of the Endangered Species Act ("ESA") prevented the Tennessee Valley Authority ("TVA") from taking any action which would jeopardize
the existence of an endangered species or destroy its critical habitat.
This included the completion of the Tellico Dam, a project that the
TVA began almost 10 years before Congress passed the ESA and had
already cost the TVA close to $100 million. Although legal analysts
often see the case as one of conflicts of techniques of interpretation,
the Supreme Court's decision in TVA v. Hill was, Mr. Murchison argues, "merely one part of a long struggle; it did not begin or end the
fight over the Tellico Dam."
The book begins with a discussion of the historical development of
the TVA and its decision to construct the Tellico Dam. Much of Chapter One discusses the broad power of the TVA to justify water resource
projects and the dubious factors the TVA employed in determining
that construction of the Tellico Dam would have a positive benefit-cost
ratio.
Chapter Two outlines the development in the late 1960's and early
1970's of new environmental protections that permitted challenges to
development projects. First, there was an increase in judicial sensitivity
to environmental challenges to development projects. Second, Con-
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gress enacted two new federal statutes, the National Environmental
Policy Act ("NEPA") in 1970 and the ESA in 1973.
The dam opponents' initially brought suit under NEPA in 1971,
claiming that the TVA did not comply with the requirement to file an
environmental impact statement ("EIS"). This NEPA action is analyzed in Chapter Three. In an opinion by Judge Taylor in the Eastern
District of Tennessee, the opponents were granted an injunction which
prevented the TVA from completing the Tellico Dam until it completed an EIS. The TVA's arguments, first that NEPA did not apply
because the TVA began construction of the Tellico Dam before Congress enacted NEPA, and second that the TVA had put forward a draft
EIS, were not successful. The TVA first attempted to appeal the injunction, but the Sixth Circuit upheld Judge Taylor's order. When this
failed, the TVA completed its final EIS and then returned to Judge
Taylor in 1973 to request that he dissolve the injunction. Finding that
the TVA had complied with the requirements of an EIS under NEPA,
Judge Taylor dissolved the injunction, finding that the TVA's decision
to proceed with the project was not arbitrary.
Chapter Four tells the story of the discovery of the snail darter and
how a law student and professor, both at the University of Tennessee,
became convinced that completion of the Tellico Dam would violate
the ESA. Dr. David Eitner, the expert ichthyologist for the opponents
of the Tellico Dam in the NEPA litigation, discovered the snail darter
while preparing for his possible testimony. He called the fish he found
a snail darter because the snails in the fast moving shoals of the Little
Tennessee were its principal source of food. Dr. Eitner convinced the
Fish and Wildlife Service to list the snail darter as an endangered species and to designate the Little Tennessee as its critical habitat.
Once again, the opponents of the dam filed suit in the Eastern District of Tennessee, this time in a 1976 action claiming that completion
of the dam would violate the ESA. And, once again, the dam opponents found themselves before Judge Taylor requesting an injunction.
But this time, Judge Taylor did not find their argument convincing.
Instead, Justice Taylor found that violation of the ESA did not necessarily require an injunction in the case of the Tellico Dam. Instead,
because Congress authorized the completion of the Tellico Dam more
than seven years before it passed the ESA and continued to appropriate funds, the dam was so close to completion, and the TVA had made
every attempt to relocate the snail darter,Judge Taylor refused to issue
an injunction.
The plaintiffs appealed Justice Tayor's refusal to enjoin completion
of the dam to the Sixth Circuit. This time, the appellate court reversed
the district court's judgment, finding that the completion of the Tellico Dam would violate the ESA, and that the language of the ESA required the court to issue an injunction. Although the appellate court
was "sympathetic" to Judge Taylor's analysis of the equitable factors, it
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also found that the separation of powers doctrine prevented the court
from preempting congressional action in the name of equity or expediency.
Chapter Five discusses the battle before the Supreme Court. And
much of the chapter is devoted to detailing how the court completely
reversed its initial position. Mr. Murchison incorporates the papers of
the Supreme Court to reveal that four of the justices favored granting
the writ of certiorari while also issuing a summary reversal of the Sixth
Circuit without oral argument. However, unable to form a consensus,
the Supreme Court decided to hear oral arguments. The grant of certiorari created problems for the Carter administration, because two
agencies, the Department of Interior and TVA, had opposing views.
The attorney general decided to endorse the TVA position, but permitted the Department of Interior to attach a second brief to the filing.
Following oral arguments, Justice White and Chief Justice Burger reversed their positions, and Chief Justice Burger authored an opinion
that upheld the Sixth Circuits granting of an injunction. Mr. Murchison suggests that the decision by the Chief Justice was a tactical one,
which permitted the Chief Justice to draft a narrow opinion that focused on the ESA as an exceptional statute.
Ultimately, the TVA completed the Tellico Dam. Chapter Six outlines the political machinations that the TVA and Congress employed
to exempt the Tellico Dam from the ESA. First, Congress created the
Endangered Species Committee, which had the power to exempt a
federal agency from the ESA if it found that certain conditions applied.
But the Committee denied the Tellico Dam an exemption. Failing
this, Congress tried a second tact. It exempted the Tellico Dam from
the ESA in an appropriations bill in 1979. This was in spite of a House
rule against changing substantive law by appropriation act. The TVA
closed the dam in November of 1989 and the reservoir was filled to its
normal level approximately one month later.
In Chapter Seven, Mr. Murchison discusses the complicated legacy
left by the fifteen year dispute over the Tellico Dam. The snail darter
survived, ostensibly through the relocation efforts of the TVA. The
TVA was ultimately victorious, but cost the agency vast sums of money
and replaced its image as an agency guided by the rational power of
experts with one that relied on raw political power. And finally, Mr.
Murchison argues, the purported benefits that the TVA promised from
the Tellico Dam never did materialize.
In summary, The Snail Darter Case is a powerful and well-written
summary of a monumental case. While at times the amount of detail is
overwhelming, Mr. Murchison more than makes up for such slow parts
with a masterful weaving of politics and legal theory that examines the
possibilities and limitations of legal protection for the environment.
Patrick Green/,eaf
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Maine v.Johnson, 498 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding that the Environmental Protection Agency properly granted authority to the State
of Maine for the regulation of discharge of pollutants into territorial
waters of certain Indian tribes and that the EPA erred by exempting
two tribal-owned facilities from state regulation).
The Clean Water Act ("CWA"), grants power to the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") to issue permits for the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters. The State of Maine ("Maine") applied to
take over discharge permitting in Maine. The application presented
questions regarding Maine's authority relating to the southern tribes,
comprising the Penobscot Nation and the Passamaquoddy Tribe
("southern tribes"). After several extensions, the EPA approved
Maine's program for all areas outside the disputed Indian territory.
The EPA later decided that Maine had authority to regulate the nineteen discharge facilities that were located outside Indian territories,
but discharged within territorial waters of the southern tribes. The
EPA did not approve the State's plan regarding two tribal-owned facilities located on tribal land that discharged into waters within the southern tribes' territories. The EPA was concerned that Maine's program
might not ensure high enough water quality standards to protect the
southern tribes' right to fish for individual sustenance.
The southern tribes claimed the EPA erred in approving Maine's
program regarding the nineteen non-tribal facilities. They argued that
the Settlement Acts, which govern Maine's authority relating to Maine
tribes, reserved the tribes' authority to regulate pollution by nonIndians within tribal territory and that the EPA had an obligation to
ensure tribal control over their natural resources. Maine defended the
EPA in its decision regarding the nineteen non-tribal facilities, but
contended that it erred in its decision with respect to the two tribalowned facilities.
The Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act and the Maine Implementing Act (collectively "the Settlement Acts"), expanded Maine's
authority over Indian tribes in exchange for recognizing the tribes'
sovereignty in regard to internal tribal affairs. The Settlement Acts
201

202

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 11

stated that southern tribes and "any lands or natural resources owned
by them" were subject to Maine law. However, another pertinent section of the Settlement Acts states that, within their territories, tribes
have the rights and duties of a municipality, subject to laws of Maine,
provided that the state not regulate internal tribal matters. The southern tribes believed that discharges into navigable waters in tribal territory from the nineteen facilities owned outside the territory and the
two that lie in their territory fell under the scope of internal tribal affairs. Maine denied that even the two discharges lying within tribal
territory fell under such category. The EPA disagreed with both positions, claiming the two discharges within tribal territory fell under the
scope of internal tribal affairs, while the nineteen non-Indian facilities
did not.
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit agreed
with both the EPA and Maine that the state should regulate the nineteen facilities that lay outside tribal territory per Maine's approved
program. The court had a difficult time deciding who should control
the two discharges lying entirely in tribal territory because there was no
precedence on whether the facilities were internal tribal affairs. The
court paid attention to the intervener's argument that Maine had already acquired permitting authority over all sites within the state because the EPA did not disallow Maine's application within the original
time restrictions, they gave up their right to issue permits within the
state afterwards. The court eventually rejected this notion because
Maine and the EPA both agreed to extend the deadline. The court
found that, because Maine did not take the discharge facilities "in
trust," as required for them to be regulated pursuant to statute, the
statute did not apply. From this, the court decided that the matter was
not one of internal tribal affairs, nor could federal law allow tribes to
supersede either the CWA or Maine law. The court vacated the order
and remanded the case so it could be amended in accordance with its
decision.
Kathlyn Bullis

NINTH CIRCUIT
Consejo de Desarrollo Economico de Mexicali, A.C. v. United
States, 482 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that claims seeking to
enjoin the lining of a portion of the All-American Canal, thereby preserving seepage across the United States-Mexico border, were (1) moot
due to the passage of the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006; (2)
barred because the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over
deprivation of property claims; and (3) barred because the district
court lacked jurisdiction over claims against the United States because
the United States did not waive sovereign immunity).
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On July 19, 2005, several plaintiffs, including: Consejo de Desarrollo Economico de Mexicali, A.C. ("Consejo"), Citizens United for Resources and the Environment ("CURE"), and Desert Citizens Against
Pollution ("DCAP"), filed this action in the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada seeking to enjoin the construction of a new
concrete lined portion of the All-American Canal in order to preserve
continued seepage from the Canal. The district court dismissed many
of the counts in the original complaint and the Plaintiffs filed an
amended eight-count complaint on February 23, 2006, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Consejo brought the first four counts on
behalf of a class of beneficial users of the Mexicali Aquifer, which water
seeping from the unlined portion of the All-American Canal into Mexico periodically recharged. Count one alleged a deprivation of property rights regarding the seepage in violation of the class' constitutional
rights to substantive and procedural due process. Count two alleged a
constitutional tort based on the Mexicali Valley by the Secretary of the
Department of the Interior ("Secretary") and the Commissioner of the
Bureau of Reclamation ("Commissioner") usurping water users' water
rights. Count three alleged that the Secretary and the Commissioner
have an affirmative duty to implement the All-American Canal Project
in a manner that results in the reasonable use of water resources in the
Mexicali Valley and that water rights priorities in the present context
are subject to the doctrines of equitable apportionment or equitable
use. Count four claimed that the Secretary and the Commissioner are
estopped from operating the canal in any manner that would stop the
seepage that has recharged the Mexicali Aquifer for the last sixty-three
years.
The City of Calexico intervened to join all other plaintiffs in count
five which alleged a violation of the National Environmental Policy Act
and the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). The Plaintiffs claimed
that the Secretary and Commissioner failed to prepare a Supplemental
Environmental Impact Statement despite five new circumstances that
arose after the Secretary issued the project's Final Environmental Impact Statement in 1994. DCAP and CURE brought the final three
counts alleging violations of the Endangered Species Act, the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, and the Settlement Act. The district court granted
the United States' motions to dismiss counts one through six and ordered that counts seven and eight were time-barred. In addition to
filing timely appeals, plaintiffs filed a motion for an injunction pending appeal. The motions panel of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit heard and granted the motion for an injunction
pending appeal.
After the court heard oral arguments, the President signed the Tax
Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 ("2006 Act") into law. Section 395
of the 2006 Act dealt directly with the lining project stating, "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, upon the date of enactment of this
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Act, the Secretary shall, without delay, carry out the All American Canal Lining Project." In response to the Act, the United States filed a
motion to remand counts five through eight with instructions to dismiss them as moot. The Plaintiffs opposed the motion claiming the
2006 Act violated the Tenth Amendment, the judiciary's Article III
powers, the Equal Protection Clause, and deprived them of their protected interests without procedural due process oflaw.
The court held that the 2006 Act did not violate the Tenth
Amendment because the Federal Government was not able to commandeer funds that the State of California had already granted for the
completion of the lining project. The court then held that Congress
did not invade the judiciary's Article III powers by passing the 2006 Act
because the Act did not direct the court to make any findings or particular application of law to facts. Regarding the claim that the 2006
Act violated the Equal Protection Clause by selectively denying the Latino' s of the Imperial Valley their rights to a healthy environment, the
court held that DCAP did not have standing to bring the claim because
DCAP did not demonstrate that any of the members of DCAP would
individually have the right to sue. The court reasoned that because
representing the interests of Latinos is not germane to DCAP's organizational purpose, and because a discrimination claim based on suspect
class requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit,
DCAP did not have standing. Finally, the court held that the due
process claim was nonjusticiable as a political question because Congress' decision not to hold a hearing on general legislation was a procedural decision that the Constitution fully allowed. The court further
held that the claims made under counts five through eight were moot
based on the above.
The court held that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction for the first four claims in the amended complaint. The court
held that jurisdiction over a claim of unjust deprivation of property
rights lies with the Court of Federal Claims, not the district courts.
Further, the court held that sovereign immunity barred Consejo's final
three claims because the United States did not consent to have its officials sued when acting in their official capacity, nor did the United
States itself consent to be sued. Consejo argued that the United States
had waived sovereign immunity under section 702 of the APA. However, the court held that section 702 of the APA was merely a procedural
statute that did not constitute waiver of sovereign immunity unless
coupled with another relevant statute.
Consequently, the court vacated the temporary injunction pending
appeal and remanded the case to the district court for dismissal.
Tim Fiene
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N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993 (9th Cir.
2007) (holding that a pond, which is part of a larger wetland and located adjacent to a navigable water, is within the Clean Water Act's
jurisdiction where a significant nexus exists through intermittent surface connection and an underground aquifer and because pond waters
significantly affect the physical, biological, and chemical integrity of
the navigable river).
In December 2001, Northern California River Watch ("River
Watch") filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California alleging that the City of Healdsburg
("Healdsburg") violated the Clean Water Act ("CWA") by discharging
sewage from its waste treatment plant into waters covered by the Act
without first obtaining a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit. Healdsburg appealed the district court's finding that the Pond is subject to the CWA and claimed that the Pond is
exempt because the CWA excludes waste treatments systems and active
excavation operations. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's decision.
In 1967, Basalt Rock Company ("Company") began excavating gravel and sand from land adjacent to the Russian River. After the Company completed its operation, the excavation pit filled up with water
from the underlying aquifer and formed Basalt Pond ("Pond"). The
Pond contains 58 acres of surface water and wetlands and a levee separated it from the Russian River ("River"), a navigable water. Water
passes from the Pond to the River through an underground aquifer
and by seeping through the separating levee. Healdsburg discharged
enough effluent annually to nearly fill the Pond, which would overflow
if the Pond did not drain into the aquifer, and ultimately into the River.
First, the court considered whether the Pond was subject to the
CWA because it is a wetland that is adjacent to a water of the United
States. Wetlands adjacent to navigable waters are regulable waters of
the United States. The Army Corps of Engineers' ("Corps") regulations define wetlands as an area that is "inundated or saturated by surface or groundwater." The regulations further specify that "adjacent
wetlands" are those that are "separated from waters of the United
States by man-made dikes or barriers, natural river berms, beach dunes
and the like." There was no dispute as to whether the Russian River is
navigable and therefore a water of the United States. Both parties
agreed that the Pond and the River overlie the same aquifer and that
the land separating the two is saturated below the water table. Further,
the Pond's receding shoreline turned much of the area that was originally the Pond into wetland. Thus, the court determined that the
Pond and surrounding area was within the CWA'sjurisdiction and con-
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stituted "waters of the United States" because it is an "adjacent wetland" within the Corps' regulatory definition.
Although the court had already found that the Pond was within the
CWA's jurisdiction, the court next looked at whether the Pond qualified as a water of the United States based on whether a "significant
nexus" existed between the Pond and River. A significant nexus exists
if "the wetlands, alone or in combination with similarly situated lands
in the region, significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of other covered waters." The court found that there was a
significant nexus because (1) a physical connection existed through
both a hydrologic and a surface connection between the River and
Pond, (2) an ecological connection existed because both the River and
Pond support similar populations of fish, mammals, and birds, and (3)
Healdsburg's discharge of sewage directly resulted in higher concentrations of chloride in the River downstream from the Pond, and thereby affected the chemical integrity of the River. Thus, the court affirmed the district court's finding that the Pond's effects on the River
are "not speculative or insubstantial" and have a significant impact on
the "chemical, physical, and biological integrity" of the River.
The court rejected Healdsburg's argument that the Pond fell within the CWA's exception for waste treatment systems and for ongoing
excavation operations. The waste treatment exception is intended to
exempt "either water systems that do not discharge into waters of the
United States or waters that are incorporated in an NPDES permit as
part of a treatment system." Because the Pond is neither incorporated
in an NPDES permit nor a closed system treatment pond, it did not fall
under this exemption. The excavation operation exception applies
only to bodies of water that are currently under excavation. The court
determined that using the pond to discharge wastewater from the
treatment plant and to deposit mining waste from other locations did
not constitute an ongoing excavation operation. Therefore, the court
affirmed the district court's conclusion that the excavation operation
exception did not apply because the Company abandoned its excavation activities in 1984 and there was no "ongoing excavation operation."
In conclusion, the court held that the Pond was a water of the
United States regulated by the CWA. Therefore, Healdsburg violated
the CWA by discharging wastewater into the Pond.
James Shine

United States v. Moses, 496 F.3d 984 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that
the evidence sufficiently supported the determination that Teton
Creek constituted a water of the United States, that Moses caused the
unauthorized discharge of pollutants into the Creek, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied consecutive motions for a new trial).
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Charles Lynn Moses ("Moses") conducted work to re-route and reshape a channel of Teton Creek in Teton County, Idaho, adjacent to
one of his development projects in order to control the Creek's seasonal flow of waters. Due to an upstream manmade diversion structure, water only flows in this particular segment of Teton Creek during
the spring run-off months. Moses' stream alteration work spanned a
period of twenty years, during which he ignored multiple governmental warnings, including a warning from the Army Corps of Engineers
("Corps") requiring a Clean Water Act ("CWA") permit for his work, a
subsequent cease and desist order from the Corps, and an administrative compliance order from the Environmental Protection Agency.
In light of this conduct, the government prosecuted Moses for violations of the CWA. The United States District Court for the District
of Idaho upheld a jury verdict convicting Moses of violations of the
CWA for knowingly discharging and causing to be discharged poll utan ts from a point source into the waters of the United States without a
proper permit. The district court denied both of Moses' consecutive
motions for a new trial. Moses appealed.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit identified
and resolved the three issues presented on appeal: whether for the
purposes of the CWA: (1) Teton Creek constituted a water of the United States, (2) Moses' stream alteration work caused discharge of a pollutant into waters of the United States, and (3) Moses' work required a
permit.
The court approached the issue of whether Teton Creek constituted a water of the United States from two separate angles. First, the
court considered the historical condition of the Creek. In United States
v. Appalachian Eke. Power Co., the United States Supreme Court introduced the notion that the courts cannot take away a water's navigability
status once established. Since Teton Creek fell within the Corps' regulations defining waters of the United States prior to the man-made diversion, the court insisted that this classification remain unchanged in
its aftermath. Second, the court considered the Creek's present condition apart from its historical roots. The court relied on its previous
holding in Headwaters, Inc. v. Taknt Irrigation Dist. that tributaries that
flow intermittently constitute waters of the United States. The Headwaters analysis met support in the recent Supreme Court case of Rapanos
v. United States, where a divided bench expressed unanimity with respect to the issue of intermittent streams as waters of the United States.
Therefore, finding no reason to distinguish the instant case from
precedent, the court held that the channel of Teton Creek altered by
Moses constituted a water of the United States.
The court then evaluated whether Moses' work caused an unauthorized discharge of a pollutant in a water of the United States when he
conducted the work only during the dry months. The court answered
affirmatively on the basis that the simple dredging and redepositing of
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material can violate the fmA. Moses asserted as a defense that his
conduct fell within the incidental fallback exception as set forth in the
Corps' regulations. However, the court quickly disposed of this argument by highlighting the stark contrast between the actual definition
of incidental fallback and the evidence presented. The record clearly
showed that Moses moved mass quantities of material in the course of
rerouting Teton Creek.
Finally, the court rejected Moses' arguments that he never needed
a fmA permit in the first place. Noting that a court must construe
exceptions from the fmA narrowly, the court found no basis for Moses' conduct to fall within the fmA exception for discharges due to the
maintenance of serviceable structures. The court also rebutted Moses'
theory that the permit issued pursuant to the Rivers and Harbors Act
covered his stream alteration work because such permits do not apply
to activities within the scope of the CWA.
Since the evidence clearly supported the finding of discharge of
pollutants into a water of the United States without a permit, the court
concluded that the district court acted within its discretion when it
denied Moses' motions for a new trial and affirmed the judgment of
the district court.
Risa Borowick

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS
McConnell v. PacifiCorp, Inc., No. C 07-02382 WHA, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 63948 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2007) (holding that: (1) the
Federal Power Act preempts injunctive relief, and (2) the Federal Power act provides a remedy when a hydroelectric plant's construction,
operation, or maintenance causes damages).
The Klamath Watershed is home to the Yurok and Karuk Native
Americans and other members of the community (collectively
"McConnell"), who use the area for fishing. PacifiCorp operates the
Klamath Hydroelectric Project ("KHP"), which uses river and creek
water to produce electric power under the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission ("FERC''). McConnell alleged that PacifiCorp's operation
of the dams polluted the Klamath River by increasing water temperatures above natural levels. The increase in temperature reduced the
levels of dissolved oxygen to levels lethal to fish. Additionally, the
heightened temperatures promoted the growth of brown-green algae
and the associated toxin, microsystin. McConnell sued PacifiCorp alleging that PacifiCorp's operation of the dams was a nuisance.
The Federal Power Act ("FPA") governs the operation of the KHP.
The FPA charges FERC with balancing the competing interests in
projects like KHP. PacifiCorp contended that the FPA preempts the
McConnell's claim for injunctive relief. FERC stated that the FPA
preempts all state and local laws concerning hydroelectric licensing,
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apart from those adjudicating proprietary water rights. Moreover, the
Supreme Court in California v. FERC upheld the supremacy of the FPA
over state law. Consequently, PacifiCorp argued that state law has no
role in the regulation of hydropower except in proprietary water
rights.
McConnell sought a permanent injunction directing PacifiCorp to
cease operation of the dams and reservoirs in a manner that caused the
aforementioned environmental hazards. The court held that the injunctive relief impermissibly intruded on the comprehensive regulatory scheme for a hydropower project. Three key decisions influenced
the court in its determination. First, the Supreme Court in First Iowa
Hydro-Elec. Coop. v. Fed. Power Comm'n established federal preemption in
regards to hydropower. Second, California reaffirmed First Iowa's holding that the FPA established a comprehensive federal regime, subject
to a limited reservation of state authority. Finally, the Ninth Circuit
applied California in Sales Hydro Assoc. v. Maughan and held that the
FPA preempted the field of hydropower regulation. The court held
that the KHP is subject to the FPA, which gave FERC broad powers and
exclusive licensing authority of the development and operation of nonfederal hydroelectric projects on navigable waters.
Although the FPA prevents injunctive relief, Congress preserved
state-law damage remedies under 16 U.S.C. § 803. The FPA provides a
right to recover from a licensee for damages caused by the construction, maintenance, or operation of the projects. McConnell's nuisance
claim fell under state-law; therefore, the FPA did not bar their claim.
The court found that PacifiCorp's license did not have the specificity
required by the California Civil Code Section 3482 to gain exemption
from the nuisance claim. Furthermore, the California Supreme Court
explained in Greater Westchester Homeowners Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles,
that "although an activity authorized by statute cannot be a nuisance,
the manner in which the activity is performed may constitute a nuisance." McConnell alleged that the manner that PacifiCorp operated
the dams was a nuisance. As a result, the court did not bar the nuisance claim.
The court held that the FPA preempted McConnell's claim for injunctive relief. Consequently, the court granted PacifiCorp's motion
for judgment on McConnell's request for injunctive relief. However,
the court denied the motion to dismiss or for judgment on the pleadings because the FPA allows for recovery based on damages caused by
the construction, operation, or maintenance of the hydroelectric plant.
Tamara Qureshi

Fitzgerald v. Harris, No. 07-16-B-W, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61806
(D. Me. August 20, 2007) (holding that the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act
did not preempt state control of state owned lands along a river protected as "wild river area" and, as such, the state could permit motor
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vehicle access points and permanent bridges on the waterway even if
the state actionjeopardized the river's protected status).
The U.S. Secretary of the Interior designated the Allagash Wilderness Waterway as a "wild river area" of the National Wild and Scenic
Rivers System under the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act ("WSRA"). Pursuant to the WSRA, a "wild river area" is generally only accessible by
trail, the shorelines and watersheds are essentially primitive, and the
water is unpolluted. Further, the WSRA provided that the designated
rivers "shall be preserved in free-flowing condition" and not subject to
new federal water resources projects.
Two avid wilderness canoeists, Charles Fitzgerald and Kenneth
Cline ("the canoeists"), filed an action in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Maine, against the Director of the Maine Bureau of Parks
and Lands ("MBPL Director"). The canoeists sought a declaration that
the WSRA preempted certain provisions of Maine state law ("AWW")
pertaining to motor vehicle access and permanency of bridges. The
canoeists further requested that the court enjoin the MBPL Director
from implementing the disputed provisions.
Under the theory of conflict preemption, the canoeists argued that
the disputed provisions of the AWW were invalid because there was an
irreconcilable conflict between the WRSA and those provisions. Specifically, the canoeists argued that the state law did not comply with the
intent of the WSRA to preserve the primitive qualities of the river and
it conflicted with the WSRA's standard for a "wild river area" of "inaccessible except by trail" because the disputed provisions provided for
six permanent bridges over the Allagash River and eleven motor vehicle access points.
The court looked to both the WRSA and the agency guidelines and
publications relating to the Act to determine whether conflict preemption existed. The court found that the WRSA did not compel the state
or local government to implement a particular plan with regard to the
designated river nor were there any binding provisions on the state
and local governments to protect the river. Instead, the WRSA merely
encouraged the state and local governments to employ land use planning to protect "river values."
While the administrative guidelines did not warrant full Chevron deference per the court, the court held they "do carry weight." According to the court, state and local governments retained full regulatory
power over non-federal areas of a WSRA protected river and limited
the federal role to cooperation and assistance per the agency guidelines. The court further found the WSRA's aim of permanently preserving the designated rivers did not override the regulatory power that
remained with the state.
The court held that this did not preclude the state from permitting
the eleven motor vehicle access points and six permanent watercourse
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crossings for a WSRA protected river because the federal statute did
not preempt the state's control of state owned land along the Allagash
River. As such, the court recommended that the district court grant
the MBPL Director's motion to dismiss.
Julie Anderson

United States v. Nevada, No. 2:00-CV-0268-RLH-LRL, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 69177 (D. Nev. Aug. 31, 2007) (holding that a sudden, selfimposed need for water could not overcome the Nevada State Engineer's denial of the DO E's water permit application and cease and desist order).
The Department of Energy ("DOE") attempted to obtain Nevada
water permits in association with a proposal to create a nuclear waste
depository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. The Nevada State Engineer
authorized temporary permits to the DOE, which expired April 9,
2002. The State Engineer denied the DOE's request to extend the
permits. The State Engineer also denied the DOE's 1997 application
for permanent appropriation of 430 acre-feet of groundwater in connection with the planned construction of the repository.
Meanwhile, the State Engineer and the DOE worked out an arrangement for DOE's interim use of water. Originally, the agreement
allowed for the use of potable water and water for emergency and fire
use. In 2003, the parties came to a "tentative agreement," which allowed an increase in DOE's water use to 1.36 million gallons per year.
The DOE had mentioned the need for an additional 300,000 gallons of
water for bore hole drilling for seismic investigation. However, the
State Engineer did not stipulate to that use. In 2004, the DOE announced that it would drill 35 bore holes, requiring an additional 2
million gallons of water. The State Engineer never approved the use of
the water. In 2007, the DOE announced that it would need 4 million
gallons of water and was planning on boring 48 holes. The State Engineer never agreed to the use of water for any of the proposed 48 holes.
The DOE began to use the water for the holes. The State Engineer
issued a cease and desist order to the DOE over the use of water for the
bore hole drilling. The DOE complained that the order was causing
delay and unnecessary expense, that the bore holes were necessary and
authorized by Congress, and that the Congressional mandate
preempted state water law. The State Engineer lifted the order on the
condition that the parties could reach an agreement. Eventually, the
State Engineer agreed to water use with certain conditions, namely that
the DOE could not use water for the purpose of additional phases or
expanded phases of the bore hole drilling. DOE did not accept the
limitation and the State Engineer reinstated the cease and desist order.
On July 20, 2007, the DOE filed an emergency injunction and resumed drilling operations. The DOE also refused entry on the site to
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the State Engineer, which prevented the State Engineer from enforcing the order. The DOE based its motion on a claim that preemption
precluded compliance with state water law.
The court found that the DOE's preemption claim was without merit; that the DOE's need for the water was not federally mandated; that
due to the arbitrariness of DOE's increasing requests, any immediate
need for the water was self-imposed by the DOE; and that the DOE
could obtain the water it claimed it needed from a nearby well it already had water rights to. The court further found that Congress had
not enacted legislation that preempted Nevada's state water rights.
The court held that the State Engineer's denial of DOE's water permits
was not in violation of the state's water laws and that Nevada was only
responsible for complying with the "reasonable needs" of the DOE "as
described in the Stipulation."
The court found that the DOE's requests exceeded the amounts
originally stipulated by the parties. The court held that the DOE's unexplained and increased demand for water was not a reasonable need
and therefore the State Engineer was not in violation of Nevada water
law by denying the requests. The court held that the State Engineer
acted reasonably in denying the request, that the DOE's demand to use
water was in excess of the agreement, that there was no clear federal
mandate that preempted state water law, and that the DOE's rejection
of the State Engineer's restrictions was unreasonable. The court determined that the DOE did not present evidence or arguments demonstrating that it would prevail in the underlying case, that the DOE
failed to demonstrate the possibility of irreparable injury if the relief
was not granted, that the balance of hardships did not favor the DOE,
and that public interest issues did not weigh in favor of the DOE. The
court held that the DOE did not present evidence that its need for water was necessary given the circumstances. The court determined that
the DOE failed to meet the criteria necessary to justify a preliminary
injunction and denied the DOE's emergency preliminary injunction
motion.
Jacki Lopez
UNITED STATES CLAIMS COURT

Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 100 (2007)
(holding that operating criteria that benefit fish habitat and reduce
the quantity of water a district can divert does not constitute a physical
or per se taking, but rather a regulatory restriction on an owner's use
of property).
Casitas Municipal Water District ("Casitas") is responsible for the
operation of the Ventura River Project ("Project") in Ventura County,
California, on behalf of the United States Bureau of Reclamation
("BOR"). The Project provides water to the county for agricultural,
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municipal, industrial, and domestic uses. Casitas is subject to the rules
and regulations of the BOR for the operation of the Project, and the
California State Water Resources Control Board grants Casitas its right
to the beneficial use of Project water by way of a license subject to specific quantity limitations. In August 1997, the National Marine Fisheries Seivice ("NMFS") declared the West Coast steelhead trout, which
exists in the Ventura River, an endangered species. After several years
of consultation between the BOR and the NMFS on how to protect and
develop the fish habitat in the river, the NMFS issued a Biological Opinion that revised the Project's operating criteria. These new criteria
imposed increased flow volumes in the river, which in turn meant a
decrease in the amount of water Casitas could divert. Casitas adhered
to the new BOR criteria, but argued that the loss of its right to divert
an additional 3,200 acre-feet annually from the river constituted a Fifth
Amendment physical or per se taking for which they deserved just
compensation.
Casitas filed suit against the United States ("U.S.") in the United
States Court of Federal Claims and sought contract damages and, in
the alternative, argued that the change in operating criteria was a taking. Following an earlier decision that rejected the contract claim, the
U.S. moved for partial summary judgment, and argued that the restrictions at issue did not constitute a physical or per se taking. Rather, the
U.S. argued that the court should analyze the issue as a regulatory constraint on property use and use the test stated in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City to determine if a taking occurred. The U.S.
argued that a physical or per se taking occurs only when the government has physically invaded property or appropriated it for its own or
another's use. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Tahoe-Sierra
Preseroation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regi,onal Planning Agenl)', the U.S. argued that restrictions on the use of property that do not deprive an
owner of all economically beneficial use are not categorical takings,
but rather should be analyzed as regulatory takings using the Penn Central factors.
In response, Casitas argued that the U.S. regulatory restriction on
the use of water caused a physical or per se taking, because the use of
water determines its value and any interference with that use results in
a total loss of value. Casitas sought to show that what one may consider
a regulatory restriction on land can have a more profound effect on
the use of water, because the water right owner is dispossessed, the
owner loses the right to exclude others, and the government applies
the property to a different use. It was that distinction, Casitas argued,
that led the Supreme Court to find physical or per se takings in the
regulatory restrictions of water.
Relying on Tahoe-Sierra, the court held that the distinction between
a government's physical takeover of property and a government's mere
restriction on the use of property was paramount in determining
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whether a physical or per se taking occurred. As a result, the court
held that the government action did not constitute a physical or per se
taking, and granted the motion for partial summary judgment.
Ryan Malarky

STATE COURTS
CALIFORNIA

Concerned McCloud Citizens v. McCloud Cmty. Servs. Dist., 54
Cal. Rptr. 3d 1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that a contingent sales
agreement for spring water, which stipulated that there must be an
environmental review, did not constitute approval of a project).
On October 1, 2003, the McCloud Community Services District
(the "District") approved a proposed agreement with Nestle Waters
North America, Inc. ("Nestle") to purchase and sell up to 1,600 acre
feet of spring water per year for bottling. The agreement set up a
process by which both parties were responsible for designing specific
details of the proposed project. For example, Nestle was required to
pick a site for its bottling plant and the District was responsible for designing a collection system. The agreement would not bind either party until the District completed compliance with the California Environmental Quality Act ("CEQA"), and there existed no possibility of a
challenge under the CEQA.
Concerned McCloud Citizens, an unincorporated citizens group
formed to protect natural and cultural resources in the area, filed a
petition for a writ of mandate. They argued that the agreement should
be vacated because the District failed to conduct an environmental
review pursuant to requirements under CEQA.
The Superior Court, Siskiyou County, granted the request for the
writ of mandate and ordered that part of the agreement be set aside.
The District and Nestle appealed arguing that Concerned McCloud
Citizens lacked standing to challenge the agreement and that compliance with CEQA was not required before the District approved the
agreement.
The Court of Appeal for the Third District of California found that
Concerned McCloud Citizens had standing to bring suit. A state statute barred any person from maintaining an action unless they objected to the project orally or in writing prior to the close of a public
comment period. However, the court held that the statute was not
applicable because the District did not hold a public hearing or allow
for a comment period.
The court, however, held that the agreement between the District
and Nestle did not constitute approval of a project pursuant to CEQA;
therefore, the agreement was not subject to environmental review.
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The court concluded that the agreement did not give Nestle any vested
rights and did not legally commit the District to any definite course of
action because the agreement was dependant on many contingencies,
including full compliance with CEQA. Further, the court noted that
because of the lack of specificity in the details of the proposed project,
preparation of an environmental review would have been premature.
The court set aside the trial court's judgment granting Concerned
McCloud Citizen's petition for writ of mandate and remanded the case
to the lower court with instructions to enter a new judgment denying
the petition.
Jacob Schlesinger

County of Imperial v. Superior Court, 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 145 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2007) (holding that the California Environmental Quality Act
requires water districts to be named as parties in county's actions, and
unnamed water districts were indispensable parties).
Imperial Irrigation District ("Imperial") and San Diego County Water Authority ("San Diego") entered into an agreement to transfer
200,000 acre feet of water per year ("afy") and agreed to conserve
100,000 afy for possible future acquisition by The Metropolitan Water
District of Southern California ("Metropolitan") and Coachella Valley
Water District ("Coachella"). The State Water Resources Control
Board ("Board") approved this transfer. The County of Imperial
("County") filed two petitions challenging aspects of the Board's approval under the California Environmental Quality Act ("CEQA").
Neither petition named Metropolitan or Coachella as a party. Imperial
demurred and argued that the County failed to name Metropolitan or
Coachella, who were indispensable parties in both proceedings. The
trial court sustained the demurrers without leave to amend, finding
Metropolitan and Coachella were indispensable parties and that the
statute of limitations had run. County filed a petition for a writ of
mandate and argued the trial court abused its discretion. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the ruling.
On appeal, County challenged the Board's approval of Imperial
and San Diego's transfer and challenged the transfer under CEQA.
However, the main issue of dispute was whether Metropolitan and
Coachella were indispensable parties. Therefore, the court only addressed this limited procedural issue.
Imperial, Metropolitan and Coachella all possess water rights on
the Colorado River as part of the Seven Party Agreement. Imperial is
the largest single holder of water rights on the Colorado River in California, and it provides enough water to irrigate 500,000 acres and delivers waters for other services. All three entities have their water rights
linked in a priority system, with Imperial having the highest priority
rights and thus the ability to divert its full right to water before Metro-
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politan being able to divert any. San Diego does not possess any water
rights to the Colorado River. Therefore, the diversion of water from
Imperial to San Diego and the priority system created the conflict
among these water entities.
In 1998, Imperial and San Diego proposed an initial agreement
where Imperial would exchange 300,000 afy of Colorado River water in
return for money for up to 75 years. This long-term transfer required
approval by the Board, which has authority to approve a requested
transfer as long as the transfer does not substantially injure any legal
user of water or unreasonably affect the environment. Metropolitan
and Coachella protested this transfer and contended that the transfer
violated their priority rights under the Seven Party Agreement.
While the transfer petition was pending, multiple states and agencies negotiated the quantification settlement agreement ("QSA") in an
effort to control water use from the Colorado River. Under the QSA,
the transfer of water from agricultural to urban uses formed a key element. The Imperial to San Diego transfer was the largest such transfer.
In order to resolve Coachella and Metropolitan's objections to the
proposed transfer of water from Imperial to San Diego, Coachella and
Metropolitan entered into the Protest Dismissal Agreement ("PDA'').
The PDA amended the transfer petition so that only 200,000 afy would
be transferred per year from Imperial to San Diego and the remaining
100,000 afy would be available for acquisition by Metropolitan and
Coachella. The Board sent out a public notice stating the approval of
the acquisition would be approval of a transfer. In December 2002, the
Board approved Imperial and San Diego's transfer petition.
In January 2003 and November 2003, the County filed two cases,
No. 82 and No. 876, challenging the transfer. The Court later coordinated these two cases. The County failed to name Metropolitan and
Coachella as parties. Imperial filed demurrers in both cases, arguing
the County failed to name Metropolitan and Coachella, as they are
indispensable parties. The trial court sustained the demurrers on indispensable party grounds and granted leave to amend. The County
then amended its petitions, including Metropolitan and Coachella as
parties. Metropolitan, Coachella, and San Diego then filed joint demurrers, arguing Metropolitan and Coachella could not be added after
the statute of limitations had run. The trial court found Metropolitan
and Coachella indispensable parties in the cases and sustained the demurrers without leave to amend. The trial court found that the County did not timely name Metropolitan and Coachella in its petitions and
that they qualified as indispensable parties because they had interests
divergent from those of the named parties that might be impaired by
the litigation. The County challenged the trial court's order.
The court reviewed the ruling under California Code of Civil Procedure section 389 for abuse of discretion. Section 389 states in pertinent part that a party is necessary if "he claims an interest relating to
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the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the
action in his absences may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede
his ability to protect that interest." Section 389 goes on to state that if a
party is necessary and cannot be made a party the court should determine whether the action should proceed with the parties named, or
should be dismissed with prejudice. One factor the court should consider is to what extent a judgment entered in the parties' absence
would be prejudicial. The court should consider these factors with
fairness and equity in mind. The court also considered CEQA, which
requires that the courts should avoid thwarting the purpose if CEQA
through harsh application of the indispensable parties rule. The underlying policy of CEQA is to inform the public and decision makers of
any environmental consequence of a proposed project.
In its decision, the court also examined section 21167.6.5 of the
Public Resources Code, which requires naming approval recipients in
CEQA litigation and includes any recipient of approval. The court
found Metropolitan and Coachella within the class of transferees the
Legislature sought to protect as "recipients of approval" under section
21167.6.5. The court found that the named parties were covered under section 21167.6.5 and had different interests than the other parties
named in the action because of their different functions with respect
to the water. In determining that Metropolitan and Coachella were
recipients of approval, the court looked to the status of the proposed
transfer. The court found that because the Board's order unambiguously approved the future transfer of 100,000 afy of water to Metropolitan and Coachella, those parties were recipients of approval under
section 21167.6.5.
The court then reviewed the ruling for abuse of discretion. The
court concluded there was no abuse of discretion in finding that the
unnamed districts were indispensable parties and that potential prejudice exists, namely the loss of 100,000 afy under the transfer agreement
and the potential affect on the DSA. The court noted that the County
did not fashion any relief to avoid prejudice. Furthermore, the court
noted that Metropolitan and Coachella had differing interests in the
proceeding than Imperial, San Diego, and the County, and that the
County had other forums in which to challenge the adequacy of the
original petition. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's ruling
and denied the County's petition.
Claire Soto
COLORADO
Fort Lyon Canal Co. v. High Plains A & M, LLC, 167 P.3d 726 (Colo. 2007) (holding that a mutual ditch company's bylaws do not require stockholders to pay legal and engineering expenses when challenging the determination for a water change in a water court).
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The Fort Lyon Canal Company ("Company"), a mutual ditch company, filed for declaratory relief in the Water Court for Division 2 of
Colorado ("water court") naming High Plains and others ("stockholders") as defendants. The Company sought an order declaring the
stockholders liable for the legal costs incurred in defending the Company's determination for a change of a water right. The water court
granted summary judgment in favor of the stockholders. The Company appealed directly to the Supreme Court of Colorado.
When stockholders in the Company desire to change the use of
their water, they must make a written request to the Company's Board
of Directors. If the Board of Directors determines that a change is
permissible, they can place conditions on the grant necessary to prevent iajury to the canal. The Company bylaws require stockholders to
pay the legal and engineering expenses incurred in making the original determination. If the stockholders disagree with the Board's determination, or the conditions placed upon the grant, they can challenge the determination in water court.
The Company argued that the bylaws held stockholders liable not
only for the legal expenses incurred in making a determination for a
water change, but the legal expenses the Company incurred in defending a stockholder challenge in water court as well. The court noted
that its enforcement of company bylaws requiring stockholders to pay
legal fees was consistent with express statutory provisions that allow for
the awarding of reasonable attorney's fees, as long as the bylaw that
affects a water right is consistent with the jurisdiction of the water
court. Reading the relevant provision in the bylaws, the court held that
stockholders were only responsible for legal expenses incurred when
requesting a water change. Stockholders were not liable for the legal
fees if the board of directors decided to participate in subsequent water court proceedings.
The Company further argued that the circumstances surrounding
the adoption of the provision demonstrated the intent to hold stockholders responsible for all expenses associated with a request for a water change. The court noted that extrinsic evidence may be helpful in
determining the intent of parties when the adopted bylaw was ambiguous. The court held, however, that the bylaw was unambiguous, and
the intent of parties when adopting the provision can not contradict
the unambiguous language of the bylaw.
Accordingly, the court affirmed the water court's ruling.
Christopher Hudson
In re Tonko, 154 P.3d 397 (Colo. 2007) (holding that the district
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to determine certain water
rights because applications for a change of decreed water rights are
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the water courts, and that issue
preclusion did not bar action in the water court because the non-
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moving party did not have an opportunity to fully and fairly litigate
their claimed water rights in previous litigation).
The Tonkos' immediate predecessors-in-interest ("Tonkos") filed a
condemnation hearing in the Fremont County District Court to obtain
a ditch right-of-way. The district court ruled that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and that the District Court for Water Division No. 2
("water court") had exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether the
Tonkos had or could obtain an adjudicated water right. The water
court, in granting summary judgment against the Tonkos, held that
"the issue of the historic use of the subject water rights" had been litigated adversely to the Tonkos in the district court and could not be relitigated in the water court. The Colorado Supreme Court ("Court")
reviewed the issues of whether the district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction and whether the water court erred in granting summary
judgment against the Tonkos based on issue preclusion.
Noting that, per statute, water courts retain exclusive jurisdiction
over all water matters, the Court stated that determining what constitutes a water matter "turns on the distinction between the legal right to
use of water ... and the ownership of a water right." The Court found
that applications for a change of decreed water rights fall within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the water courts. The Court added that the
water court may examine documents and evidence in order to determine the decree's setting, intent, meaning, and effect when adjudicating the applicant's water use right.
The Court defined issue preclusion as the doctrine that "the final
decision of a court on an issue actually litigated and determined is
conclusive of that issue in any subsequent suit." The water court cited
issue preclusion as the reason to bar re-litigation because the district
court had already determined the issue of historic use of the subject
water rights. However, in review, the Court determined that the parties had not fairly and fully litigated the issues presented in the district
court. Therefore, the Court held that it was err for the water court to
grant summary judgment against the Tonkos.
In its discussion on issue preclusion, the Court examined four elements required to bar re-litigation: identity, privity, final judgment on
the merits, and full and fair opportunity to litigate. The Court found
the first element, identity, unsatisfied because the district court did not
determine the issue of the Tonkos' water use rights raised by the Tonkos' application, which asserted that their water rights derived from
their immediate predecessor-in-interest. The second element, privity,
was satisfied because the T onkos were a party in the previous proceeding. The court found the third element, a final judgment on the merits, unsatisfied because the district court entered no final judgment
regarding the Tonkos' immediate predecessor-in-interest's water use
rights. Finally, the court found the fourth element, a full and fair op-
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portunity to litigate, unsatisfied because the issue was not identical to
any issue the district court determined. Therefore, the Tonkos were
not allowed a full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue because it
was never completely presented in previous litigation
The Supreme Court of Colorado reversed the water court's dismissal of the Tonkos' claim and remanded the case to the water court to
determine the issues within its exclusive jurisdiction.
Christopher Frenz

Upper Eagle Reg'l Water Auth. v. Simpson, 167 P.3d 729 (Colo.
2007) (holding that evidence in the record supported the district
court's finding that the proposed decree would not cause injury, and
that claim preclusion does not bar an objector from challenging the
authority's reliance on a depletion table in its augmentation plan).
The Upper Eagle Regional Water Authority ("Authority") encompasses the Town of Avon and the Metropolitan Districts of Eagle-Vail,
Edwards, Arrowhead, Berry Creek, and Beaver Creek. Prior to this
action, the Town of Avon annexed the Village at Avon and the metropolitan district responsible for that development dedicated water rights
adequate to serve it to the Authority, plus an additional twenty percent
for a total of 10.8 acre-feet. In order to ensure that it could use this
water for demands of its entire service area, the Authority filed an application for augmentation and exchange. The proposed plan would
allow the Authority 10.8 acre-feet of out-of-priority depletions from the
Eagle River, so long as the Authority augmented the flow with releases
from the Wolford and/or Ruedi Reservoirs. In order to calculate this
augmentation, the Authority used a depletion rate table that it developed in 1992 and 1993 using its members' adjudicated augmentation
plans ("Original Decrees") from before the Authority's formation.
The Original Decrees projected future water demands using predicted
irrigation and in-building depletion rates assuming 100% build-out.
The Authority relied on the depletion table in two prior cases concerning augmentation plan applications in which the Colorado Water Conservation Board ("CWCB") was a party.
At trial, the District Court, Water Division, approved the proposed
decree, finding that the Authority met its burden of showing that the
plan would not injure any vested water rights. In addition, the district
court found that the CWCB did not produce sufficient evidence to invalidate the Authority's determination based on the depletion table.
The CWCB appealed to the Supreme Court of Colorado.
First, the court reviewed the holding to determine whether there
was sufficient evidence in the record to support the district court's
finding that calculations based on the depletion table proved the absence of injury. In doing so, the court stated that the proponent of the
augmentation plan has the initial burden of establishing that the out-

Issue 1

COURT REPORTS

221

of-priority diversion will not cause injury. If the proponent establishes
the absence of injury, the burden shifts to the objector to show injury
to an existing water right; the court does not require a specific water
right, rather proof of injury to senior appropriators is sufficient. If the
objector adequately presents contrary evidence based on evidential
facts, not potentialities, the burden shifts back to the proponent to
show absence of injurious effect.
The court found that adequate evidence in the record supported
the district court's finding of injury. The court noted that a provision
within the proposed decree, which reserved for the CWCB the right to
halt the Authority's operation of the plan if that operation affected the
CWCB's instream flow rights, adequately protected the CWCB from
injury. Furthermore, the court found that water engineers' testimony
as to the reasonableness and adequacy of the depletion table supported the district court's finding that the Authority presented a prima
facie case that the out-of-priority diversions would not result in injury.
The court also noted that the CWCB did not provide any convincing
evidence to contradict the Authority's assertion of no injury.
Second, the court responded to the CWCB's argument that the district court approached the case incorrectly, in that it should have determined the amount and timing of the applicant's depletions and
available replacement water before determining injurious effect. The
court held that the district court followed the appropriate method of
analysis by considering the proposed depletions and augmentation
water both in quantity and in time as part of a comprehensive inquiry
into whether an injury would result, rather than as an independent
inquiry in and of itself.
Additionally, the court responded to the Authority's alternative argument that claim preclusion barred the CWCB from challenging the
Authority's use of the depletion table because the CWCB had the opportunity to raise such a challenge in those cases to which it was a party. The court held that due to the unique circumstances of individual
augmentation plans, claim preclusion would not have barred the district court from considering the individual circumstances of the proposed plan.
The court affirmed the district court's approval of the proposed
decree and held that claim preclusion cannot bar consideration of individual circumstances of augmentation plans.
Ryan Malarky

Vance v. Simpson, No. 2005CW063 (Colo. Water Ct. Div. 7, July 2,
2007) (holding that the diversion of ground water during coal-bed methane extraction requires a water well permit).
William S. Vance, Jr., Elizabeth S. Vance, James G. Fitzgerald, and
Mary Theresa Fitzgerald (collectively "the Ranchers") filed suit in the
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Water Division 7 District Court, challenging the Colorado Engineer's
decision not to require coal-bed methane ("CBM") mining companies
to obtain water right permits for water withdrawals occurring from
CBM gas production. The Ranchers asked the district court to determine the statutory obligation of the State Engineer to require well
permits and augmentation plans when the mining companies divert
ground water, hydraulically connected or tributary to surface streams
in which the Ranchers hold water rights, during CBM production.
To remove CBM, mining companies extract water from the coal
seams to reduce reservoir pressure. Ground water diverted in CBM
production is then transported to reirtjection wells where the water is
reinjected deeper into the ground. CBM production often consumes
all of the water, making it unavailable for shallow groundwater users.
The Oil and Gas Conservation Act ("the Oil and Gas Act") grants
the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission ("COGCC") authority to regulate and oversee oil and gas wells and the exploration
and production waste from such wells. The state board of examiners
of water well construction and pump installation contractors has no
authority over the construction, pump installation, or abandonment of
wells subject to the jurisdiction of the COGCC.
The COGCC has specific statutory authority to regulate the disposal of produced water. However, the COGCC has no expressed statutory
authority regarding diversion of water that is in or tributary to natural
surface streams. The Oil and Gas Act, furthermore, does not explicitly
exclude diversion and consumption of ground water associated with
CBM drilling operations from application of the water acts governing
the appropriation and administration of water.
COGCC Rule 209 applies to diversion of water and states that in oil
and gas operations each owner shall exercise due care in the protection of coal seams and water-bearing formations as required by the
applicable Colorado statutes. The district court found that applicable
Colorado statutes included the Ground Water Management Act
("Ground Water Act") and the Water Act.
The Water Act provides the right to divert the unappropriated
stream and tributary ground waters of the state to beneficial uses.
Ground water is subject to state water law and administration under
the Ground Water Act.
The legislature carefully exempted certain circumstances from application of the water acts, but did not explicitly exempt oil and gas
wells from the Ground Water Act's permitting requirements. The absence of an exemption for oil and gas wells demonstrates a legislative
intent to require water well permits under factual scenarios that contrast with statutory exemptions.
Based upon the theory that the inclusion of one thing implies the
exclusion if another, the district court concluded that non-exempted
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mineral-related activities, such as oil and gas activities, are subject to
the scrutiny of state water law.
The district court then examined whether the diversion of water in
connection with CBM production is an appropriation of water. Appropriation is the application of a specified portion of the waters of the
state to a beneficial use pursuant to the procedures prescribed by Colorado law. The definition of beneficial use depends on specific circumstances of the case and the court should broadly interpret its
meaning.
The General Assembly intended to integrate the appropriation,
use, and administration of underground water tributary to a stream
with the use of surface water in a way to maximize the beneficial use of
all of the waters of Colorado through the Water Act.
The district court concluded that the removal of water during CBM
production, regardless of the fact that the division of water is inadvertent, occurred as a result of the active and intentional pumping of water to accomplish the intended purpose. Therefore, the district court
found that the pumping of water in the course of CBM production is
an appropriation for a beneficial use.
The next issue considered by the district court dealt with whether
the CBM drilling operation that removed water from the ground constituted a well within the meaning of the Ground Water Act. The
Ground Water Act defines a well as any structure or device used for the
purpose or with the effect of obtaining ground water for beneficial use
from an aquifer. Using this definition, the district court concluded
that a CBM drilling operation that removes ground water constitutes a
"well." The district court contended that, while the objective is not the
water produced from the drilling operation, the effect of the drilling
operation is to obtain ground water from the aquifer. The district
court further held that an oil and gas well is not subject to the technical criteria applicable to construction of a water well, but an oil and gas
well that affects water rights is subject to the permitting requirements
of the Ground Water Act.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
Ranchers along with the requested relief.
Niceta Bradburn
GEORGIA
Coastal Marshlands Prot. Comm. v. Ctr. for a Sustainable Coast,
649 S.E.2d 619 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that the Coastal Marshlands Protection Act does not allow the Coastal Marshlands Protection
Committee to consider the adverse impacts of integrated upland developments' storm water runoff when the upland development does
not service or augment the marshland project).
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The Coastal Marshlands Protection Committee ("the Committee")
granted Point Peter LLLP ("Point Peter") a permit to build up to 1,200
residential homes as part of the Cumberland Marina development
project in Georgia's coastal marshland. Subsequently, the Committee
granted Point Peter a permit to build two public marinas, three day
docks, and adjoining upland offices and parking lots. Since the residential development and the marina are interconnected, the Administrative Law Judge ("AL]") remanded the decision back to the Committee to consider the effect of the residential development project on
storm water runoff into the marshland. Point Peter appealed the decision.
After granting a construction permit in the coastal marshlands, the
Coastal Marshlands Protection Act ("CMPA") required the Committee
to consider whether the project is in the public's interest and whether
feasible alternative sites exist. Public interest concerns required weighing, among other things, the effects of storm water runoff and erosion
into the marshlands "in the context of not only the marshland component of the project, but also ... [the upland] component intended to
serve or augment the marshland component of the project."
The Georgia Court of Appeals found the ALJ erred by interpreting
the CMPA to require the Committee to consider the effects of the adjacent upland residential development on storm water runoff into the
marshland. According to the ALJ, the upland residential project may
"otherwise alter" the storm water runoff into the marshlands, and thus
required consideration. The court disagreed and found such an interpretation would expand coverage of the CMPA "far beyond the legislature's intended scope" to require considering any runoff that passes
though coastal marshlands. The court noted that other statutes already regulate runoff falling outside the CMPA's reach. The court
used a canon of statutory construction to determine that the CMPA
only regulated projects with "direct physical alteration" of marshlands.
Thus, the court held that the CMPA authorized the Committee to consider the effects of storm water runoff created by a project's upland
component only when the upland component "services or augments"
the proposed marshland project.
In this case, the Cumberland Harbor development involved two interconnected projects: the marina and dock project, and the residential development project. The CMPA did not authorize the Committee
to consider the residential development project's effects on the marshland because the residential development project was not an upland
component that "services or augments" the marshland project. The
Committee needed to only consider the effects that the office and
parking lots have on storm water runoff because they "service or augment" the marshland project.
Ultimately, the court reversed the ALJ's decision which required
the Committee to consider the residential development's effects on
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storm water runoff and affirmed the ALJ's findings that the marina did
not unreasonably increase erosion or interfere with endangered species.
William Garehime
IDAHO

American Falls Reservoir Dist. No. 2 v. Idaho Dep't of Water Res.,
154 P.3d 433 (Idaho 2007) (holding that: (1) parties must exhaust administrative remedies before the court analyzes the constitutionality of
the Idaho Department of Water Resources' Rules for Conjunctive
Management of Surface and Ground Water Resources ("CM Rules");
(2) because the CM rules reference existing Idaho law, the CM Rules'
perceived failure to define specific procedural components was not
unconstitutional; and (3) the CM Rules were constitutional in addressing partial decrees and treatment of carryover water).
Anticipating shortages, a group of water entities including the
American Falls Reservoir District No. 2, A & B Irrigation District, Burley Irrigation District, Minidoka Irrigation District and Twin Falls Canal
Company (collectively "American Falls") issued a Delivery Call to the
Director of the Idaho Department of Water Resources ("Director") in
January 2005, requesting the Director to curtail junior ground-water
use during the 2005 irrigation season. Rangen, Inc., Clear Springs
Foods, Inc., Thousand Springs Water Users Association, and Idaho
Power Company joined the group and collectively represented surface
water rights in the Snake River canyon and storage contracts for the
Upper Snake River reservoirs.
The Director responded that he would make a determination of injury after receiving inflow forecasts for the Upper Snake River Basin,
and also requested additional data for 15 prior irrigation seasons regarding diversions of natural flow, storage water, and ground water;
number of water rights holders and corresponding average monthly
head gate deliveries; total reservoir storage; amount of water leased or
made available to other users; number of acres irrigated by flood or
sprinkler; and type of crop planted. American Falls responded with
the requested information and also objected to the scope of the request.
The Director issued a Relief Order within two weeks of receiving
the inflow forecast and confirmed that shortages were likely for 2005
and would materially iajure American Falls. He ordered junior
ground-water rights holders to supply replacement water to offset the
American Falls supply or risk curtailment. Both American Falls and
subsequent intervener Idaho Ground Water Appropriators, Inc.
("IGWA") requested an administrative hearing of the decision.
Prior to the hearing, American Falls filed a declaratory judgment
action in district court, claiming that the CM Rules were unconstitu-
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tional as applied to the facts of the case, and that the CM Rules were
void on their face. American Falls later requested stays and a continuance in its administrative hearing schedule. The district court
granted summary judgment in finding the CM Rules facially unconstitutional but for a different reason: lack of constitutionally mandated
procedural components. The district court also found that the CM
Rule 42 provision allowing for a reasonable amount of carry-over storage of unused water was unconstitutional and held that it injured senior storage water rights protected by the Idaho Constitution and water statutes.
In its analysis, the Supreme Court of Idaho identified seven issues
on appeal, four of which relate to water law.
First, the court considered if the district court correctly exercised
jurisdiction, given that the separate administrative process had not run
its course. The court determined it would review the case only in the
context of the CM Rules' constitutionality on their face, not as applied
to the facts of the case. In doing so, the court found the district court
erred in exercising jurisdiction before the parties exhausted all administrative remedies, citing precedent that a statute may be analyzed as
constitutional either "on its face" or "as applied" to the facts of the
case; that such challenges are generally mutually exclusive; and that a
court should not rule a statute unconstitutional as applied to the facts
of a case until all administrative proceedings are complete and a
record of facts available.
Second, the court found the district court erred in holding the CM
Rules facially unconstitutional due to lack of required procedural
components, given that CM Rule 20.02 incorporates by cross-reference
existing Idaho statutory and case law. American Falls argued that the
CM Rules conflict with existing state law by placing the burden on senior water users to prove material injury, while juniors continue to divert. American Falls also claimed the CM Rules do not specify the
standard applied by the Director in considering a call. The district
court found the CM Rules failed to provide the necessary tenets and
procedures related to a delivery call, including a procedural framework
to allocate burdens of proof, definition of evidentiary standards the
Director would apply to such a call, legal effect to a partial decree, objective criteria to evaluate such factors, and a framework to process a
call for water in a timely manner.
In its facial analysis, the court considered each procedure deemed
lacking by the district court. The court found the requested burdens
of proof and evidentiary standards available via CM Rule 20.02, which
incorporates Idaho law by reference, and so includes such procedures
as addressed in existing Idaho statutory and case law. Regarding the
issue of timely response to the delivery call, the court determined that,
at its face, the CM Rules provide for a timely response; and, further, if
the court were performing an "as applied" analysis, the record showed
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the Director in this case responded within two weeks of receiving the
inflow forecast. The district court also found that the CM Rules do not
provide objective standards by which the Director could evaluate criteria in evaluating a delivery call. The court stated, however, that allowing the Director to exercise some discretion and a lack of any standard
beyond the direction provided in Rule 42 of general "reasonableness"
did not warrant voiding the CM Rules.
Also, contrary to the district court finding that the CM Rules essentially allowed the Director to re-adjudicate a decreed water right upon
the delivery call, the court determined the CM Rules in all applications
do not, on their face, fail to consider a partial decree. The court acknowledged that an examination of constitutionality "as applied" to the
facts of the case would allow for greater factual analysis, which is not
available with a facial analysis.
Third, in examining if the "reasonable carryover" provision of the
CM Rules is facially unconstitutional, the court stated that to permit
excessive carryover of stored water unrelated to need would be unconstitutional. However, allowing the Director some discretion to determine the reasonable necessity of carryover for future need is not facially unconstitutional.
Fourth, because the issue arose generally in the argument regarding the constitutionality of the CM Rules, the court addressed whether
exempting domestic and stock water rights from the CM Rules' administration was unconstitutional and constituted a taking of vested water
rights, as concluded by the district court. The court found that the CM
Rules prioritize domestic and stock watering ground waters rights and
exempt them from delivery calls, but - unlike the state constitution do not specifically address compensating the senior water right holder
if there is any taking. The district court interpreted the CM Rules as
allowing domestic users to take senior water rights without compensating the senior user. The court concluded the CM Rules need not include every possible remedy, and that the inclusion of Idaho law by
reference allowed for a separate takings claim.
The court separately declined to address the effect of a severability
clause presented in CM Rule 4 and also reviewed the district court's
revocation of its order allowing the City of Pocatello to intervene. The
court found the city did not meet its burden to show the district court
erred in its revocation.
The court reversed the district court's decision granting partial
summary judgment to American Falls and affirmed its revocation of
the City of Pocatello's motion to intervene.
Nico/,e Bonham Colhy
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United States v. Pioneer Irrigation Dist., 157 P.3d 600 (Idaho 2007)
(holding that consumers held title to water and decree did not need to
include identity of each beneficial title holder or quantity of amount
owned).
The United States Bureau of Reclamation ("BOR"), under the authorization of the Reclamation Act of 1902 ("the Act"), developed and
filed water right claims for storage and irrigation from storage for
three dams and their accompanying reservoirs: Arrowrock, Lucky Peak
and Anderson Ranch (collectively the "Boise Project"). Several irrigation districts (collectively the "irrigation entities") filed separate claims
to the same water rights consistent with their respective uses. The Idaho Department of Water Resources ("IDWR") sided with the BOR, recommending that the court place the water rights in its name and deny
the claims of the irrigation entities.
While the case was before the Special Master, the irrigation entities
moved to consolidate the issue of ownership between the BOR and the
entities. The Snake River Basin Adjudication court ("SRBA") granted
the request. All of the parties classified the ownership issue as one of
law or mixed fact and law. Five of the irrigation districts, as well as the
BOR and the Department of the Interior, filed motions of summary
judgment asserting no genuine issue of material fact on the issue of
ownership.
The SRBA court held that the United States has nominal legal title
to the Boise Project water and the irrigation entities hold equitable
title in trust for their landowners. The SRBA court further held that
pursuant to state law it would include a remark stating that the irrigation entities held equitable title to the Boise Project water rights. After
the SRBA court issued the Remark, the irrigation entities requested the
SRBA court change the language of the Remark. The SRBA court did
issue a new Remark stating in part that the "ownership of this water
right is divided."
The United States appealed, claiming the court should agree with
the IDWR's recommendation that the BOR have title to the water
right. The irrigation entities cross-appealed, claiming the SRBA court
erred by not including the identity of each irrigation entity and quantity of the water beneficially owned by each irrigation entity in the Remark.
The United States made two claims to the ownership of Boise
Project water rights. First, it said Idaho case law states irrigation districts do not have ownership of BOR reclamation project waters.
Second, the United States claimed that if the BOR held the water
rights, it would not cause a reduction in the irrigation entities' use of
water.
The court addressed these claims by recounting three United
States Supreme Court holdings. The court said Ickes v. Fox stands for
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the proposition that irrigators who have made their required payments
and met the other obligations under the Act have "acquired a vested
right to the use of waters as appurtenant to their lands." Again in Nebraska v. Wyoming, the Supreme Court held that a property water right
was "acquired by perfecting an appropriation" followed by application
of the water for a beneficial use. Finally, in Nevada v. U.S. the court
held that any ownership of water rights by the government was temporary and superseded by the owners of the land and became appurtenant to the land once the owners beneficially used the water. The
court found that the common theme of these cases was a connection
between beneficial use and ownership rights.
The court then looked to the Idaho code for guidance on the issue
of beneficial use in the state. It found several instances in the code
and the state Constitution where the beneficial use of water creates in
the water a property right appurtenant to the land where the owners
put it to use. Likewise, the same statutory sources provide that "beneficial users have an interest stronger than mere contractual expectancy."
The court found further evidence in the Idaho code that the government holds water rights in trust for the landowners, and that irrigation
districts manage the rights for those owners.
The United States countered that Washington County Irr. Dist. v.
Ta/,boy and other Idaho case law meant irrigation districts did not hold
ownership in the Boise Project because only Idaho law, not the Reclamation Act, determines ownership of water rights. The court held that
while this is true, Idaho law defines water ownership, none of the cases
cited by the United States dealt with the BOR or the Reclamation Act.
The court interpreted Ickes and its progeny as a strong argument for
the proposition that the Reclamation Act's purpose was in developing
dams and storage facilities, not "depriving the irrigation entities of an
equitable interest in project water rights."
In denying both the United States' arguments, the court held that
"it is clear that the entity that applies water to a beneficial use has a
right that is more than a contractual right." Here, the irrigation entities acted on behalf of landowners who put the Boise Project's waters
to a beneficial use. Thus, according to Idaho state law, the Reclamation Act, and U.S. Supreme Court cases, the irrigation districts hold an
interest in the water based upon their representation of the water users' interests. The court remanded the case to the district court with
orders to include the following language in the original Remark of the
SRBA court: "However, as a matter of Idaho constitutional and statutory law title to the use of the water is held by the consumers or users of
the water."
The cross-appellant irrigation entities requested that the court require the SRBA court to identify each irrigation entity holding title to
the water and the amounts of the right owned. The United States argued that the identities and quantities involved do not need identifica-
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tion because contracts between the entities and the U.S. already do
that. The court held that the SRBA court did not err in denying this
request because the SRBA court specifically stated, "ownership of this
water right is derived from law and is not based exclusively on the contracts between the Bureau of Reclamation and the irrigation organizations."
Thus, the court remanded the decision of the district court in part,
with an order to substitute the court's remark, and affirmed the decision in part.
Matthew Willwn
MAINE

FPL Energy Maine Hydro LLC v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 2007 ME 97,
926 A.2d 1197 (affirming the State Board of Environmental Protection's denial of water quality certification for a water storage project
where the Board's interpretation of the statutory requirements of certification was reasonable, and therefore, entitled to deference).
FPL Energy Maine Hydro LLC ("FPL"), which owns and operates
the Flagstaff Storage Project on the Dead River in Somerset and Franklin Counties, appealed a Superior Court judgment that affirmed the
Board of Environmental Protection's ("Board") denial of water quality
certification. The Board is the reviewing body within the Department
of Environmental Protection ("Department"), the agency in Maine
responsible for water quality. Although the Department initially approved certification on FPL's application for the Flagstaff Project, the
Board ultimately vacated the Department's decision and denied the
water quality certification. FPL appealed to the Supreme Judicial
Court of Maine after the Superior Court affirmed the Board's decision,
and held the Board's interpretation of the standards for water quality
review were entitled to deference.
FPL based its appeal on three arguments: (1) when the Board
failed to act on the application within a one-year statutory deadline,
the Department waived the certification requirement; (2) the Board
analyzed water quality with an incorrect standard; and (3) the Board
erred in concluding the Flagstaff Storage Project did not meet the correct Class C water quality standard. FPL premised each argument on
the Board's misinterpretation of the applicable Maine statute, and in
each case, the court held that where the agency's interpretations were
reasonable, supported by the plain language of the statute, or otherwise consistent with legislative intent, the Board's decision was entitled
to deference.
After reviewing the statute's legislative history, the court held that
the Board acted consistent with the legislative intent and was not a
waiver of the certification requirement. Although the statute did not
define "act on," the legislative history revealed that the purpose of the
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statute was to prevent denial by way of delay rather than by substantive
decision. Here, there was no indication that the Board attempted to
deny certification by way of procedural delay. Further, the court held
that the statute was silent in defining "act on"; therefore, the Board's
interpretation was reasonable.
The court held that the Board exercised proper discretion in its interpretation of the relevant statute. On review of the Department's
initial approval of FPL's water quality certification, the Board found
the Department had employed a new standard for assessing water quality, bypassing the relevant Maine statutory requirements for approval of
the new standard. Specifically, the Department analyzed the Flagstaff
Storage Project application with an impoundment-to-impoundment
standard, comparing a storage reservoir to another storage reservoir,
rather than to a natural lake standard. The Board reversed the Department's certification because the Department was required to receive EPA approval before changing the natural lake standard to the
lesser impoundment-to-impoundment standard, which it failed to do.
The court reviewed the legislative intent, which indicated a desire to
change the standard, but found that it did not exempt the Department
from obtaining EPA approval. The court held that the Board's interpretation of the statute's plain language was reasonable to utilize the
natural lake standard as a baseline for all water quality certifications.
Finally, the court held that the Board's expertise in environmental
concerns and experience in administering those provisions enabled
the Board to interpret the relevant statutes reasonably. FPL argued
that regardless of the certification standard used, the Flagstaff Storage
Project achieved the required water quality standards as a matter of law
because as a hydropower project, it did not discharge any pollutant.
The Board found this position inconsistent with a long line of state and
federal holdings that waters from hydropower projects do constitute
discharges subject to environmental regulation. The court affirmed
the Board's decision after determining that the Board's interpretation
of the statutes was reasonable.
Jeff McGaughran
NEVADA

Walker v. United States, 2007-NMSC038, 142 N.M. 45, 162 P.3d
882 (holding that the right to graze livestock on federal land is not
implicit in a vested water right or a right-of-way used to convey the water associated with a vested water right).
Cattle Ranchers ("Walkers") brought a takings claim against the
United States after the Forest Service terminated a grazing permit for
overgrazing-related deterioration of the allotment.
The Walkers
brought suit in the United States Court of Claims ("Claims Court")
after the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico
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denied their surface ownership claim and ordered them to remove
their cattle from the allotment. The Claims Court certified two questions to the New Mexico Supreme Court ("The Court"), which answered both questions in the negative.
The first certified question asked whether a limited forage right is
implicit in a vested water right. The Walkers claimed that historical
use of a water right for watering cattle, the customary practices of the
area, and New Mexico law all implied a right to use the land surrounding their water right for livestock forage. In determining whether New
Mexico law implied such a right, the Court first looked to federal case
law applying New Mexico law. The Court focused on Diamond Bar Catt/,e Co. v. United States which rejected a claim similar to the Walkers';
namely, that New Mexico law grants a possessory property right for
cattle grazing on federal land to those with a vested water right because
grazing is required to exercise the water right. The Court cited New
Mexico case law in agreement with the Diamond Bar Court's finding
that because no state law can grant a property interest in federal lands
enforceable against the federal government, New Mexico law only allowed those with vested water rights to use public lands for grazing to
the exclusion of those without vested water rights.
New Mexico water law follows the doctrine of prior appropriation,
whereby beneficial use establishes and exercises a water right which is
separate and distinct from adjacent land. Since water rights are independent of a particular location, the Court rejected the Walkers' argument that by terminating their grazing license, the federal government prevented the beneficial use of their water right and thus the
water right would be lost because the Walkers could always use the water right for other purposes or sell it. The Court also rejected the argument that a land right utilized to gain a water right is incident to a
water right, because under New Mexico law, the only water right appurtenant to land is an irrigation right. Finally, the Court rejected the
Walkers' argument that customary practice in New Mexico Territory
extended a vested water right to a right to forage on adjacent lands.
The Court found that although the practical result was that the owner
of a water right usually grazed stock nearby, none of the laws or customs of Spain, Mexico, or New Mexico Territory maintained that a
stock watering right includes an appurtenant grazing right. The Court
also stated that even if there was evidence of customary practice, such
evidence was irrelevant as it was inconsistent with New Mexico law.
The second certified question asked whether New Mexico recognizes a limited forage right implicit in a right-of-way for the maintenance and enjoyment of a vested water right. The Walkers argued that
the right to forage is within the scope of a right-of-way under the Mining Act of 1866 and New Mexico law. Specifically, they argued that
because New Mexico law requires adequate water for grazing cattle, it
implied a right to bring the cattle to the water, and thus allowed graz-
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ing on the federal land en route to the water source. The Court rejected this argument and found that New Mexico does not convey or
imply any grazing rights and the Mining Act of 1866 only recognized a
property right in public lands for the construction of ditches and canals to carry water, not a property right for cattle grazing. The Court
concluded that the scope of an easement in New Mexico is narrow and
measured by the easement's nature and purpose. After determining
that the purpose of the Walker's easement was for water conveyance
not cattle grazing, the Court concluded that while the Walkers have a
right to bring water to their cattle, it is outside the scope of any statutory right-of-way to authorize cattle grazing on federal land.
The Court answered both certified questions, whether grazing
rights are implicit in water rights and whether grazing rights are implicit in rights-of-way, in the negative; leaving the determination of
whether a taking occurred to the Claims Court.
Steven Earl

NORTH CAROLINA
Ellison v. Gambill Oil Co., Inc., No. COA06-1016, 2007 WL
2827477 (N.C. Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2007) (holding that the trial court
erred in not providing instructions to the jury regarding the third-party
exception to strict liability provisions for water pollution and that questions included on the verdict sheet regarding third-party negligence
did not render this error harmless).
Kate H. Ellison ("Ellison") sued several parties in Watauga County
Superior Court ("trial court"), including Gambill Oil, Jim Gambill
("Gambill"), B&B Mini Mart, Inc. ("Mini Mart"), and Gunvantpuri B.
Gosai ("Gosai"), president of Mini Mart, under the strict liability provisions of the North Carolina Oil Pollution and Hazardous Substances
Control Act ("OPHSCA"). Following a jury trial, the trial court
awarded Ellison $500,000 for compensatory and punitive damages.
Gambill Oil appealed the award and argued for a new trial. Gambill
Oil claimed that the trial court erred when it refused to instruct the
jury on the third-party exception to strict liability provisions of
OPHSCA. The Court of Appeals of North Carolina reversed and remanded.
In May 2001, Gambill Oil hired Jeff Barrett ("Barrett") to install a
new monitoring system, sumps, and lines at the Mini Mart. In January
2005, Ellison discovered that her well had been contaminated with
gasoline, which leaked from underground storage tanks located at the
nearby Mini Mart. After discovering the problem, Gambill Oil hired
Barrett to repair the leak. Testimony and evidence during the jury trial
indicated that Barrett improperly installed a sump, causing the gasoline leak.
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The court recognized that OPHSCA imposes strict liability on any
party "using, transferring, storing, or transporting oil or other hazardous substances immediately prior to a discharge of such ... into the
waters of the State." However, the court also reasoned that the thirdparty exception to OPHSCA liability precluded strict liability for discharges of oil or other hazardous substances if the potentially liable
party proved that an act or omission of a third party caused the discharge. This defense applies regardless of whether or not the act or
omission was negligent.
Following precedent, the court first determined whether the trial
court erred in refusing to give certain jury instructions. The court considered whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the third-party liability exception defense. Next, the court reasoned that if the evidence supported the jury instructions, the trial
court's failure to provide the instructions was reversible error. The
court remanded the case for a new trial because evidence supported
giving third-party liability instructions to the jury.
In conclusion, the court declared that neither it nor the dissent offered any binding precedent showing a duty to affirmatively plead the
third-party exception to strict liability. The court further explained
that even if it were to require that defendants affirmatively plead such a
claim, Gosai and Mini Mart met that burden. Because the trial court
found sufficient evidence that Barrett caused the gasoline leak, the
court held that the trail court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the
third-party exception to strict liability under OPHSCA. Therefore, the
court reversed and remanded the case for a new trail.
Eric Stevens

UTAH
Tuttle v. Olds, 155 P.3d 893 (Utah Ct. App. 2007) (holding that no
takings occurred when Olds informed Tuttle that no water rights existed on property and that Tuttle did state a claim of negligence upon
which relief may be granted).
Landowners William Tuttle, Charlene Tuttle, J. Kenton Tuttle, and
Lori Tuttle (collectively the "Tuttles") appealed the Third District
Court of Utah's dismissal of negligence and takings claims against Utah
State Engineer Jerry Olds and the Department of Natural Resources
(the "State") stemming from a $1.4 millionjudgment entered against
the Tuttles in a related case involving water rights.
In 1994, the State created a groundwater management plan for the
Pahvant Valley following a federal study that showed an overdraft of
water in that area. The Tuttles owned a 1700-acre farm in the valley.
As part of the management plan, the State conducted a survey comparing actual irrigated acreage with the theoretical acreage that all valley
landowners' water rights could irrigate. This survey revealed substan-
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tial illegal watering, and the State mailed warning letters to landowners
engaged in this practice. After some neighbors received these letters,
the Tuttles became concerned and visited the Utah Division of Water
Rights. An employee referred the Tuttles to a map delineating areas of
illegal watering in red; the Tuttles' farm was not included in the red
area. In 1996, the State mailed letters to all valley landowners that explained that all irrigated lands had valid water rights and that the State
had notified all illegal water users.
In 1998, the Tuttles decided to sell the farm to the Ellsworths. During the negotiations, the State notified the Tuttles that the survey overlooked a diesel-powered well on their property, and no valid water
rights existed for the well. Nonetheless, the Tuttles provided the
Ellsworths with a copy of the 1996 letter confirming sufficient and valid
water rights for the farm and completed the sale in 1999. After learning that the farm did not have valid water rights for the well, the
Ellsworths brought a successful $1 .4 million suit against the Tuttles.
The Tuttles subsequently filed negligence and takings claims against
the State; however, the trial court dismissed the claims.
On appeal, the Tuttles argued that the trial court improperly considered matters outside of the pleadings in dismissing the claims. The
Court of Appeals of Utah agreed, and held that the trial court erred by
considering the Ellsworths' judgment against the Tuttles.
Examining the pleadings under the correct standard, the court
held that the Tuttles satisfactorily stated a claim for negligence by alleging that the State was not required to perform the water usage survey, the State did not conduct the survey with reasonable care, and the
negligent survey resulted in a $1.4 million verdict against the Tuttles.
Accordingly, the court held that negligent surveying could result in a
successful suit by the Tuttles.
However, the takings claim did not survive the motion to dismiss.
While water rights are a protectable property interest in Utah, the
court held that the Tuttles did not allege facts showing that the State
deprived the Tuttles of any legal water rights. The State did not decrease or change the Tuttles' water rights; rather, the 1998 letter only
deprived them of the illegal use of water for the diesel-powered well.
Accordingly, the court held that the trial court properly dismissed the
takings claim.
Matt Larson

WYOMING
Bentley v. Dir. of State Lands & Invs., 2007 WY 94, 160 P.3d 1109
(Wyo. 2007) (holding that water rights were validly severed from real
property and conveyed by the owners of the lands to the Wyoming
Game and Fish Commission with an easement).
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In 1992, the State Board of Land Commissioners ("Board") considered a sale of lands in Carbon County that contained the Dome Rock
Reseivoir ("reseivoir"), also known as Indian Creek Reseivoir. The
reseivoir, a trophy fishery, is located entirely within the boundaries of
Section 16. In response to concern that public use of the reseivoir
would cease with the sale of the land, the Board approved an easement
in favor of the Wyoming Game and Fish Commission ("Game & Fish").
The easement allowed public use of the access road, parking area, area
around the reseivoir, and fishing in the reseivoir. The easement did
not convey any water rights to Game & Fish on its face, but it incorporated by reference Board Matter El-A, which grants "any water rights
that the Board may own in the reseivoir." John Anselmi purchased the
property subject to any easements at a public auction and later assigned the Sales Contract to James and Pamela Bentley.
The reseivoir is an on-channel facility along Indian Creek, completely located within Section 16. The section's primary permit allowed for the creation of the reseivoir and provided for the storage of
65.15 acre-feet of water within the reseivoir. Three secondary permits
granted the authority to appropriate the stored waters of the reseivoir
to beneficial use. These three secondary permits allocated the entire
capacity of the reseivoir to lands within Sections 16 and 21. The Bentleys owned all lands in Sections 16 and 21 that benefit from the water
rights preseived in the permits.
In 2004, the Bentleys sued, seeking a declaration that the easement
was void, injunctive relief, and damages. With respect to the water
rights, the Bentleys argued that, as owners of the lands benefiting from
the use permits, they were the owners of the water in the reseivoir.
The district court of Carbon County upheld the validity of the easement and determined that the transfer of the water rights of Section 16
to Game & Fish was valid. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Wyoming, the Bentleys contended that the district court erred, asserted that
the easement was invalid, and claimed ownership of the water rights
associated with the property.
The Bentleys contended the easement could not have severed the
water rights because the legal owner of the lands also owns the water
rights. Generally, a water right beneficially used upon land becomes
appurtenant to the land and passes with the land upon conveyance.
However, owners can identify and separately convey water rights. After
conveyance of the easement, the Board still held legal title to Section
16 and owned the water rights attached to it. In Matter E-lA, the
Board declared its intent to sever its ownership and transfer "any water
rights that the Board may own in the reseivoir" to Game & Fish. The
Board clearly indicated its "intention to convey specific property" when
it excluded the reseivoir water rights in the patent for Section 16. The
Supreme Court agreed with the district court that the easement con-
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veyed the water rights to Game & Fish and severed them from Section
16.
The Bentleys also contended that the conveyance was invalid and
did not sever the water rights because the Board failed to petition the
State Engineer's Office for change in use, change in point of diversion,
enlargement of use, or change in place of use of the water. According
to the court, the Bentleys overlooked the distinction between stored
water and natural unstored streamflow. The Wyoming legislature determined that the severance of water rights that are for the direct use
of the natural unstored streamflow from the lands, place, or purpose
from which they are acquired is not permissible. However, the legislature also determined that acquisition of the use of stored reservoir water by agreement is permissible. In this case, Game & Fish validly acquired the water rights by agreement.
Lastly, the Bentleys claimed that the indications of an easement
would not have alerted them to the transfer of water rights in the reservoir. The court found the claims that the Bentleys lacked notice
unconvincing because they accepted an assignment of an equitable
interest, which is subject to every imperfection and competing claim.
The court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that
the easement was valid, and found that the easement severed and conveyed the water rights associated with Section 16 to Game & Fish.
Kathleen Brady

